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Abstract 
 
 This thesis describes five interconnected studies that systematically examined 
argumentative skills in children with ages ranging from 5 to 12 years old.  This research 
is the first to explore how children, at a younger age than previously studied, produce 
and evaluate arguments in different tasks and contexts.  
 The first set of studies focused on children’s ability to generate arguments and 
counterarguments, while they engaged in an interview with the researcher (Study One), 
and while discussing a topic with their peers (Study Two). Results indicated that at 8 
years, but not at 5 years, children were able to grasp counterargument as a form of 
justification as displayed in individual interviews. However findings from group 
discussions suggested that counterarguments were not deployed in group settings until 
11 years. Results are discussed in terms of the development of the ability to take into 
account others’ perspectives.  
 The next two studies examined how children evaluate arguments and 
counterarguments considering their own and others’ perspectives. In Study Three, a 
computer-based task assessed children’s evaluation of argument strength. Results 
revealed that children, at 8- years and 11- years, relied on the strength of their beliefs to 
evaluate different types of arguments. Moreover, 8- year olds perceived fewer 
differences between weak and strong arguments, compared to 11- year olds. Study Four 
explored argument effectiveness using a similar computer-based task. Some 
developmental differences were found, for instance, 11- year olds regarded arguments 
with more reasons as more persuasive while 8- year olds did not. 
 The final study explored children’s ability to perceive goal-directed arguments 
and strategies deployed in video-recorded dialogues. This is the first study of its kind to 
look at argumentation processes in real social contexts, and its importance is discussed 
in terms of generalising the findings to children’s interactions in everyday situations.   
 These five studies have important implications in learning and education, and 
directions for intervention and future research are outlined. This needs to focus on 
devising specific educational programs for children at different ages. 
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Chapter One - Introduction  
1.1. Argumentation and its role in life and society 
 Argumentation is present in almost all human communication and it is familiar 
to everyone. People have to justify their opinions, choices and ideas on a daily basis. 
For example, the lawyer arguing in a trial, the politician defending a policy, the child 
pleading for a toy, the student presenting the pros and cons of a theory, or the consumer 
complaining about the quality of a product are all engaging in some form of 
argumentation. Engaging in written argumentation is also a common everyday life 
activity, for example producing an essay or a response to something read in a 
newspaper.  
 Argumentation is, thus, a verbal activity that can be performed orally as well as 
in writing. Moreover, argumentation has a social dimension: in advancing arguments to 
support a position, one directs oneself to other people (van Eemeran, Grootendorst, & 
Henkemans, 2002). It is also typically construed as a rational activity that is aimed at 
defending a position and advancing arguments with the intent to persuade (van 
Eemeran, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 2002). Indeed, many researchers have claimed 
that the main function of reasoning is argumentative (Billig, 1996; Goldstein, Crowell, 
& Kuhn, 2009; Haidt, 2001; Kuhn, 1992; Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Oaksford & Chater, 
2007). As Goldstein, Crowell, and Kuhn (2009) explain: asserting, supporting, and 
refuting claims and arguments to convey ideas and convince others is the purpose to 
which people apply reasoning skills. Mercier and Sperber (2011) go further and 
hypothesise that reasoning so conceived is adaptive, that is, it  has evolved  and 
persisted mainly because it makes human communication more effective and beneficial.  
According to Mercier and Sperber (2011), this hypothesis fits well with research 
that has focused on the role that social interaction plays on cognitive development (e.g., 
Dunbar, 1996; Dunbar & Shultz, 2003; Tomasello, Carperter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 
2005). These studies all stress the importance of communication for human cooperation, 
for example in setting common goals, and assigning duties and rights. In particular, 
argumentation can be used as a tool for resolving disagreements that are likely to occur 
in families, groups, and societies. It is, thus, a powerful and valuable cultural practice.  
As Hitchcock (2002) acknowledges, argumentation has the unique potential to 
change ignorance into knowledge and prejudice into reasoned judgement. Societal 
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debates include discussion of controversial topics, such as socio-moral questions and 
policy issues. By allowing opinion change about those issues, the practice of 
argumentation can have a massive impact in human lives. According to Hitchcock 
(2002), this impact is beneficial: Human well-being (and the well-being of animals, 
species, the biosphere, and our planet) is better served and protected by positions and 
policies that are open to reasonable debate.  
1.2. Issues underlying the study of argumentation 
Argumentation theory has always been of central interest to philosophers, 
linguists, psychologists and intellectuals of various fields. Despite the enduring interest 
in the topic, many issues related to how people represent, reason about, and resolve a 
critical discussion remain open to debate. For example, what constitutes a good 
argument has not been described in any systematic way. The relationship between 
commitment to a position and the ability to resolve a disagreement also remains poorly 
understood. Moreover, even though descriptions of a formal model of argument has 
been advanced (e.g., Toulmin, 1958), insufficient evidence has been offered to 
determine whether similar defining rules and evaluative criteria, as those used to 
analyse the logic of individual arguments, can also be applied to study informal 
arguments constructed in social contexts.  
Educational researchers also have a long history of studying the practice of 
argumentation, not only because it is an important competence to be learned, but also 
because argumentation can be used to foster learning in various domains, such as 
philosophy, history, sciences, and mathematics. However, as Mirza and Perret-Clermont 
(2009) note, learning the skills entailed in argumentation and acquiring knowledge by 
arguing, at school, still raises theoretical and methodological questions. For example: 
How do learning processes develop in argumentation? How does one design effective 
argumentative activities? How can one reduce belief biases that prevent effective 
gathering and evaluation of available information? How can the argumentative efforts 
of students be sustained? What are the psychological issues involved when arguing with 
others?  
Although it has been widely accepted among teachers and psychologists that 
schools should focus more on teaching their students critical thinking skills than on 
memorising facts, school curricula still do not offer sufficient methodological guidance 
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on how to improve students’ reasoning and problem solving skills (Mercer, 2009). In 
fact, there is still controversy over whether or not critical thinking should be taught as 
an independent subject or within established subjects. For instance, in the U.K. school 
system, Critical Thinking as a subject is only offered as an independent A-Level course 
to 17-18 year olds (National Curriculum, 2010). Yet, the question of whether critical 
thinking concepts and principles should be taught in school at an earlier stage, either as 
an independent subject or adapted to fit the content of each subject, is important.  
Mercer and his colleagues (e.g., Mercer, 2000; Mercer, Dawe, Wegerif, & Sams, 
2004; Mercer & Sams, 2006) made one of the earliest attempts to address this issue and, 
since the early 90s, they have been working with teachers to develop a practical 
programme of instruction and activity for schools in the U.K., called Thinking Together.  
The present research contributes to further understanding of the argumentative 
skills that children exhibit at an early age and how they develop. To this date, little hard 
evidence exists on the development of argument skills in younger populations. For 
instance, are there systematic differences between the arguments produced by 5-years 
olds and those produced by 8-year olds? Can children learn to argue better through 
practice? Can children at different ages learn to argue the same way? Are children 
influenced by their beliefs while evaluating and generating arguments? The conceptual 
and empirical work described in this thesis concerns argumentation skills in school-age 
children (5-12 years) and aims to identify the salient features of the development of 
these skills in different tasks and involving a variety of topics (e.g., moral, social, 
scientific). Furthermore, it explores how context and topic affect understanding and 
generalisation of arguments. This research has, therefore, very important educational 
implications and highlights the role of school in fostering children’s argumentative 
skills.  
1.3. Definition of argumentation  
Although the practice of argumentation occurs in various contexts, such as legal 
settings or among friends in informal contexts, the defining rules and evaluative criteria 
of each one are similar enough to suggest a single definition for argumentation. This 
section provides various accounts for defining argumentation and discusses its shared 
features. 
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Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, two influential scholars in 
argumentation theory, define argumentation as: 
 
A verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of 
the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of 
propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint 
(van Eemeran & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 1).  
 
 This general definition accounts for many theoretically important aspects of the 
notion of argumentation. According to van Eemeran and Grootendorst (2004) 
argumentation is: (a) a verbal activity, expressed by the use of language, (b) a social 
activity, because it is directed at other people, (c) a rational activity, which is concerned 
primarily with reaching conclusions through logical reasoning, (d) an activity whose 
goal is to convince the listener or the reader of the acceptability of the standpoint, (e) an 
activity that consists in advancing propositions to justify a standpoint (in the case of a 
positive standpoint) or to refute a standpoint (in the case of a negative standpoint), and 
(f) a complex speech act aimed at convincing a reasonable critic. Accordingly, the 
primary goal of argumentation is the justification and rebuttal of differences of opinion 
or controversial positions in a logical and rational way (van Eemeran & Grootendorst, 
2004). From a similar perspective, Johnson (2000) defines argumentation as “a 
sociocultural activity of constructing, presenting, interpreting, criticising, and revising 
arguments for the purpose of reaching a shared rationally supported position on some 
issue” (p. 12). These two definitions emphasise argumentation as a social interaction 
aimed at conflict resolution.  
 In contrast, Zarefsky (1995) stated that a central concept for argumentation is 
“the practice of justifying decisions under conditions of uncertainty” (p. 43). As noted 
by Voss and van Dyke (2001), this definition accounts for two important aspects of the 
concept of argumentation. First, while describing argumentation as a social activity, 
Zarefsky (1995) uses the term justifying as a contrast to proving which cannot be done 
with argumentation. Second, he notes that decision making is based on the 
consideration of choices and taking a position and, thus, occurs under conditions of 
uncertainty (Voss & van Dyke, 2001). This perspective contrasts with the former 
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definitions (e.g., van Eemeran & Grootendorst, 2004) which have described 
argumentation in the context of rationality and even possibly certainty.   
Other definitions focus on different goals of the practice of argumentation. For 
example, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyeca (1969) argue that “the aim of argumentation is 
not to deduce consequences from given premises; it is rather to elicit or increase the 
adherence of the members of an audience to theses that are presented for their consent” 
(p. 9). Walton (1989, 1995, 2006) also regarded persuasion as the ultimate goal of 
argumentative discourse.   
Thus, there are multiple definitions which differ on the emphasis placed on the 
goals of the practice of argumentation. In some definitions, argumentation is aimed at 
justifying and rebutting a controversial position through logical reasoning (e.g., 
Johnson, 2000; van Eemeran & Grootendorst, 2004). In other definitions, the function 
of argumentation is mainly one of social interaction aimed at sharing different positions, 
reaching a resolution and building consensus (e.g., Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyeca, 1969).  
1.3.1. The common features of definitions of argumentation 
 All definitions stated above converge in some fundamental issues. First, the 
study of argumentation should focus, not only on argument as a set of isolated premises 
and conclusions, but also on the construction of arguments in a social context. Thus, the 
term argumentation refers to the use of argument as both a product and a process 
(Henkemans, 2003; Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Ricco, 2008; Rips, 1998; van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). Nonetheless, implicit in argument as a product is the 
advancement of a claim followed by justifications and critiques, which is the main 
feature of argumentative discourse processes, and so the two kinds of argument are 
interrelated (Billig, 1996; Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Therefore, the study of 
arguments should address social interactions between people in dyads or groups. 
Second, these definitions suggest that argumentation arises from attempts to resolve 
conflicts of opinion. In a recent work, van Eemeran and Grootendorst (2004) changed 
the concept of conflict of opinion into the concept of difference of opinion. 
Nevertheless, all approaches share a main goal: the practice of argumentation is the 
resolution of these conflicts or differences of opinion. Third, the assumption that 
argumentative discourse exchanges rely on different set of commitments (Walton, 1989, 
1995) is widely accepted. Walton (1989) defined a commitment as a presumptive or 
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inconclusive premise given by a partner. The goal of a critical dialogue is to draw 
conclusions from the partner’s commitments and also try to convince the partner to 
accept certain premises. Fourth, as noted by Jovičić (2006), these approaches assume 
that participants are rational, but also irrational agents since they tend to make fallacies 
(e.g., van Eemeren, 2002; Walton, 2006). Fifth, in terms of the criteria for evaluating 
argumentation, all approaches stated above agree that it is not enough to focus only on 
the criterion of logical validity. Instead, they recommend using multiple methods and 
analytical models to evaluate different kinds of arguments.  
1.4. A brief history of theories of argumentation  
The study of argumentation goes back to classical antiquity, where Aristotle’s 
logical theory is first found. Although argumentation plays an important role in society, 
until the 1950s there was no relevant empirical research in the area (van Eemeran & 
Grootendorst, 2004). In the 1950s, debating and argumentation became an important 
academic topic in universities and colleges in the United States. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
Perelman and Toulmin became the most influential authors in argumentation research. 
Contemporary theories developed by various authors have contributed extensively to 
the revision of some aspects of previous argumentation theories (e.g., van Eemeran & 
Grootendorst, 2004). 
The next sections review some historical and theoretical considerations of 
ancient theories, medieval and enlightenment theories, modern theories, and 
contemporary theories. The final section provides a critic reflection of all approaches 
and highlights the importance of integrating elements of different theories.  
1.4.1. Ancient theories 
Studies in argumentation theories have a long tradition and their roots go back to 
classical antiquity. The first known reference to oratory skills occurs in Iliad (Homer, 
ninth century B.C.), in which heroes like Achilles, Hektor, and Odysseus were honoured 
for their ability to advise and persuade their peers and followers (the Laos or army) in 
wise and appropriate action. Oratory became important in Ancient Greece as a medium 
through which political and legal decisions were made, and through which 
philosophical ideas were developed and disseminated. Teaching in oratory was 
popularised in the fifth century B.C. by itinerant teachers known as Sophists. Later, 
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classical authors such as Aristotle (third century B.C.) and Cicero (first century B.C.) 
made great contributions to argumentation theory and many of their writings are still 
fundamental in modern theories of argumentation (van Eemeran & Grootendorst, 2004).  
Aristotle developed the categorical syllogism, which is one type of logical 
argument in which one proposition (the conclusion) is inferred from two others (the 
premises), such as the following:  
 
  Major premise: All men are mortal. 
  Minor premise: Socrates is a man. 
  Conclusion: Socrates is mortal. 
 
The syllogism is at the core of deductive reasoning, in which facts are 
determined by evaluating existing statements, in contrast to inductive reasoning in 
which facts are determined by repeated observations. Aristotle’s categorical syllogism 
provided certainty in the performance of logic-based tasks, and over the last three 
quarters of the twentieth century, the psychological study of reasoning employed mainly 
this type of tasks (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983). Logic-basic tasks are experimentally 
simpler to conduct than tasks having uncertainty, and performance is easier to evaluate 
because it is based on whether an individual applied or not the rules of logic.   
 Aristotle also wrote extensively about dialect in Topica (1928) and De 
sophisticis elenchis (1928), and also about rhetoric in the Rhetorica (1928). Dialectics 
refers to conducting a debate that is dialectical because a systematic interaction in which 
arguments and counterarguments are exchanged (van Eemeran, 2004). The aim of the 
dialectical method is to try to resolve the disagreement through rational discussion, and 
ultimately, the search for truth (Blair, 2003; Pinto, 2001). For Aristotle, rhetoric is 
concerned with finding the most suitable means to persuade an audience (van Eemeran, 
2004). Greek rhetoric contributed largely to the development of the Roman rhetoric, for 
example Cicero’s theories on rhetoric described in De inventione (1949).  
1.4.2. Medieval and Renaissance to Enlightenment theories 
 After the decline of the Western Roman Empire, the discipline of rhetoric 
continued to be important for the study of the verbal arts, such as oratory. Even though 
the study of verbal arts went into decline for several centuries, it reappeared in formal 
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education when the medieval universities first formed. During this period, the study of 
rhetoric became highly scholastic: students were trained to create discourses on 
historical subjects and study legal questions. Rhetorical was also used, in this period, in 
the arts of sermon writing by scholars associated with the medieval Christian church. 
For instance, after his conversion to Christianity, St. Augustine (354-430) used rhetoric 
for spreading his religion. Other medieval rhetorical writings include, for example, 
those of St. Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274) and Geoffrey of Vinsauf (1200-1216), 
(Henrick, 2004).  
 In the Renaissance period, rhetoric regained its classical roots. The sixteenth 
century scholars disfavoured medieval scholastic logic and dialectic and favoured the 
study of classical Latin style, grammar, philology, and rhetoric. Erasmus (1466-1536), 
was one of the most influential figures in this period, and he became known for writing 
several textbooks in rhetoric. In the later sixteenth century, his work was widely studied 
in Elizabethan grammar schools in the U.K. The mid-sixteenth century saw the rise of 
the vernacular rhetorics - those written in English rather than in the classical languages. 
However, it was in the seventeenth century that the vernacular style models developed 
(i.e., models that looked to English, rather than to Greek, Latin, or French). In this 
period, the most influential writings on rhetoric were those of Francis Bacon (1561-
1626) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Both authors were concerned with finding a 
suitable style for the discussion of scientific topics, which required mainly a clear 
exposition of facts and arguments, rather the ornate style favoured at the time (Henrick, 
2004).  
 The study of rhetoric continued through the eighteenth century in the 
Enlightenment period. In this period, the most influential rhetorical theorists were 
Campbell and Whately. In his main work The Philosophy of Rethoric, published in 
1776, Campbell drew a distinction between “scientific evidence” and “moral evidence”. 
According to the author, these two types of evidence differ in structure; while scientific 
evidence consists of a set of interdependent premises which form one argument, moral 
evidence consists of a number of independent arguments. Whately contributed to 
advances in rhetoric writings by discussing two different ways in which reasons may be 
combined in order to produce a stronger argument. A first type of case consists of 
reasons of the same type, which separately have little or no strength, but can lend 
sufficient support to a conclusion when taken together. A second type consists of 
combining a number of different types of reasons to produce a strong argument. The 
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analysis of argument structure, led by these two authors, contributed to the development 
of the logic textbooks that appeared in the second half of the twentieth century 
(Henkemans, 2001).  
1.4.3. Modern theories  
 After the 1950s, argumentation theory gained a new impulse thanks to the 
publications of Toulmin’s (1958), The uses of argument, and Perelman and Olbrechts-
Tyteca’s (1969), The new rhetoric. Both works argued in favour of a jurisprudence 
model of argumentation rather than the most commonly used mathematical model. 
Toulmin’s book, The uses of argument (1958), remains today one of the most 
influential works on the theory of argumentation. Toulmin regarded the previous model 
of formal logic to be inadequate to explain everyday arguments, so he proposed a new 
model of practical reasoning. Toulmin’s model consists of four basic elements: a claim 
or assertion; data or evidence which consists of facts or observable events that an 
arguers offers in support of a claim; a warrant (belief or principle) that links the 
evidence to the claim; and backing that further supports and justifies the warrant. The 
warrant performs a connection function between the data and the claim. It is usually 
implicit or unstated and it requires the listener to recognise the underlying reasoning 
behind the claim and the data. For example, in the statement: “that dog is probably 
friendly. It is a Golden Retriever”, the warrant is the generalization that most or all 
Golden Retrievers are friendly (Toulmin, 1958). Warrants are based on ethos (source 
credibility, authority), logos (reason-giving, induction, deduction), pathos (emotional or 
motivational appeals), and shared values (free speech, right to know, fairness, etc.).  
Backing provides additional justification for the warrant (Toulmin, 1958). 
According to Toulmin, an argument is considered sound or valid by the degree  to 
which the warrant is made acceptable by a backing (van Eemeran & Grootendorst, 
2004). The kind of backing that is required depends on the topic that is the subject of 
the argument, and therefore the criteria for evaluating argumentation are, in Toulmin’s 
perspective, “field-dependent”. 
Moreover, a good argument includes two additional elements: qualifiers that 
limit the conditions under which the claim is valid; and rebuttals that directly oppose 
the claim. Thus, for Toulmin, reasoning and argument involve not only support for 
points of view, but also attack against opposing points of view.  
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Toulmin’s model has been used extensively for research in many fields, but it 
has also been criticised for several reasons. A first criticism is that it pertains only to a 
single argument and, therefore, it is not effective in the analysis of discourse of large 
bodies of argumentative text (Voss & van Dyke, 2001). For instance, Stein and Albro 
(2001) demonstrated that it is difficult to identify the components of the Toulmin 
categories in argumentative texts, particularly to distinguish components such as 
backing from datum or qualifier. A second criticism, as pointed out by Perelman (1984), 
is that Toulmin neglected the role of the audience; his model favours structure over 
pragmatics.  
Along with Stephen Toulmin, Chaïm Perelman is among one of the most 
influential argumentation theorists of the twentieth century. His main work is the Traité 
de l'argumentation - la nouvelle rhétorique (1958), with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, which 
was translated into English as The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, in 1969. 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca began research on the logic of informal arguments in 
1948. Inspired by the Greek and Roman rhetorical tradition, they hypothesised that the 
rationale governing informal argument could be derived from the principles of 
rhetorical theory and in particular from considerations of audience and values. The New 
Rhetoric is based on the idea that, “since argumentation aims at securing the adherence 
of those to whom it is addressed, it is, in its entirety, relative to the audience to be 
influenced” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p.19). Thus, the criteria for 
evaluating argumentation are determined by the degree to which it is sucessful in 
influencing the audience for a particular purpose (van Eemeran & Grootendorst, 2004). 
The relation between the persuasion goal and the justification goal is that the argument 
to persuade may be adequately justified, but the goal of persuasion may also entail 
poorer justification.  
As Voss and van Dyke (2001) point out, advertisers and politicians often try to 
make weak reasons appear strong as a persuasive strategy. According to Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), all argumentation must proceed from a point of agreement, 
that is, the speaker or writer must have the same premises as the audience in order to 
convince the audience of a proposition. They defined two categories of premises: the 
first deals with facts, truths, and assumptions; the second with values and value 
hierarchies (Voss & van Dyke, 2001). Both facts and truths are usually established prior 
to argument; these are aspects of reality that would be immediately accepted without 
dispute. As Perelman (2001) explains, “if we presuppose the coherence of reality and of 
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our truths taken as a whole, there cannot be any conflict between facts and truths on 
which we could be called to make a decision” (p. 1394). Presumptions, like facts and 
truths, need not be defended; if the argument requires opposing presumptions, the 
arguer can induce opinion change by presenting arguments for the opposite side. Value-
related premises may also constitute starting points to argument, but they should not be 
treated as universal. However, Perelman (2001) notes that “establishing and reinforcing 
common values is necessary, because they influence action and determine acceptable 
behaviour” (p. 1394). Because informal arguments are concerned with the adherence of 
an audience, rather than the mere demonstration of propositions proper to formal logic, 
the arguer has to ensure that the audience accepts each one of the successive elements of 
an argument.  
Perelman (2001) outlines two ways the arguer may achieve this acceptance: the 
first involves associations according to quasi-logical arguments, appeals to reality, and 
arguments that establish the real; the second approach responds to incompatible 
opinions through the dissociation of concepts.  
Quasi-logical arguments are “similar to the formal structures of logic and 
mathematics” (Perelman, 2001, p. 1396). For example, definition is a common quasi-
logical approach that is used, not only for establishing the meaning of a term, but also 
for emphasising certain features of an object for persuasive purposes. Other quasi-
logical arguments include relations of division, arguments of reciprocity and arguments 
of probability. Appeals to reality are divided in two categories: arguments that convey 
succession (e.g., consequences of a particular action, goals and outcomes of an event or 
process), and arguments dealing with coexistence, which include associations of a 
person to a specific act (e.g., arguments from authority). The remaining associate 
technique involves arguments that establish the structure of reality and includes two 
types: arguments from example or model, and arguments by analogy. The former rely 
on generalisations derived from a single situation, in the case of example, or on the 
conformation of a single situation to an accepted practice or ethos, in the case of 
models. According to Perelman (2001), appeals to the real that rely on analogy are very 
common. These appeals establish the relation between two terms by noting their 
similarity to another (e.g., “What a note is to a singer, a word is to a writer”). Metaphor, 
another common aspect of argumentation, is also a form of analogy. 
Moreover, when arguers seek to reconcile incompatible opinions, they may gain 
adherence by a dissociation of concepts. The final technique discussed by Perelman and 
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Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) is a common approach in metaphysics that opposes 
appearances to reality. As Perelman (2001) explains, the recognition that some 
appearances are incompatible, for example “an oar in water looks broken but feels 
straight to the touch” (p. 1400) leads to a conception of reality by which appearances 
may be judged. Thus, the aspects conforming to reality are considered valuable, while 
other aspects not consistent with reality are dismissed as illusive. As Perelman (2001) 
exemplifies, an arguer may try to argue in favour of “real democracy” through 
dissociation of ideas by opposing the term “real democracy” to “apparent democracy”, 
or “quasi-democracy”. As a result, in the process of opposition, the arguer seeks the 
audience acceptance of “real democracy”, not on the basis of its merit as an idea, but 
rather through the devaluation of opposing terms. 
The New rhetoric theory has been subject to two major criticisms; the first 
focuses on the concept of a universal audience (Ray, 1978), and the other on the 
apparent separation of audience considerations and argument techniques (van Eemeren 
& Grootendorst, 2004). Nevertheless, as Frank (2003) argues, the positive influence and 
application of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s theory far outweighs its criticisms. 
The New rhetoric and its later developments have been foundational for argumentation 
theory and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s work has influenced many studies 
in politics and social psychology. 
1.4.4. Contemporary theories  
 According to Gilbert (1997), a common feature present in contemporary 
research in argumentation theory, such as pragma-dialectis (e.g., van Eemeran, 2002), 
informal logic (e.g., Walton, 1989) and communication theory  (e.g., Jacobs & Jackson, 
1982) is the evaluation of argument in the context of natural conversation.  
 The pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation developed by Frans van 
Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1992, 2004) is used to evaluate argumentation in actual 
practice. Unlike logical approaches (which focus on the study of argument as a product) 
or communication theories (which focus on argument as a process), pragma-dialectics 
emphasises the study of argumentation as a discourse activity, and therefore the study of 
argument as both product and process. The notion of critical discussion plays a central 
role in this theory, in that argumentation should ideally be part of a critical discussion. 
In a critical discussion, argumentative discourse is treated as a discussion in which 
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argumentation is directed at the resolution of a difference of opinion (van Eemeran & 
Grootendorst, 2004). The authors proposed four stages that the arguers have to go 
through to resolve their difference of opinion: confrontation stage, opening stage, 
argumentation stage and concluding stage (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). In the 
confrontation stage, the arguers establish that they have a difference of opinion. In the 
opening stage, they decide to resolve this difference of opinion. The arguers determine 
their points of departure: they agree upon the rules of the discussion and establish which 
claims and arguments they can use to support their position. In the argumentation stage, 
an arguer defends his or her standpoint by putting forward arguments to counter the 
opponent’s criticisms. In the concluding stage, the interlocutors evaluate to what extent 
their initial difference of opinion has been resolved and in whose favour. This model 
also defines the nature and distribution of the speech acts that play a constructive part in 
the various stages of the resolution process. 
As the theory’s designation reveals, this approach to argumentation is not only 
dialectical, but also pragmatic. According to the authors,  
 
The pragmatic dimension manifests itself primarily with the fact that the moves, 
that can be made in a discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion are 
conceived as verbal activities (“speech acts”), carried out within a framework of 
a specific form of oral and written language use (“speech event”), in a context of 
interaction that takes place against a specific cultural-historical background (van 
Eemeran & Grootendorst, 2004, p. 52).  
 
Recently, this theory has incorporated insights from rhetoric into the analysis of 
argumentative discussion (van Eemeran & Houtlosser, 2006). Arguers involved in a 
difference of opinion “manoueuvre strategically” the discourse in the attempt to 
persuade an audience. Moreover, they use both  rhetorical and dialectical means to 
achieve the persuasive goal, including making an opportune selection of a topic at the 
stage concerned, approaching the audience effectively, and carefully exploiting 
presentational means (van Eemeran & Houtlosser, 2006).   
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 Pragma-dialectical theory has been applied extensively in the evaluation of 
various types of argumentative discourse, including legal argumentation, mediation, 
negotiation, parliamentary debate, interpersonal argumentation, political argumentation, 
and health communication  (van Eemeren, 2002). Evaluation is carried out by applying 
the following analytical operations: (1) determining the points at issue; (2) recognising 
the positions the parties adopt; (3) identifying the explicit and implicit arguments; and 
(4) analysing the argumentation structure.  
The informal logic approach (Walton, 1995) aims at assessing, analysing, and 
also improving "everyday" reasoning. Thus, the aims of informal logic have been 
related to some educational goals, particularly to those of the Critical Thinking 
Movement (Johnson, 2000), whose goals are to inform and improve public reasoning, 
discussion and debate by promoting models of education which emphasise critical 
inquiry. Three distinct approaches to argument characterise informal logic. The first is 
founded on fallacy theory, the second is rhetorical, and the third is dialogical. One of the 
most influential authors in this approach is Douglas Walton, who has discussed a great 
variety of fallacies in his work (Walton, 1989, 1995, 2006). For Walton (1995), fallacies 
are a subgroup of argumentation schemes. According to Walton (1995), an 
argumentation scheme is only a fallacy when used inappropriately; for instance, an 
appeal to authority may be valid when used in an appropriate context, as in the case of a 
testimony of an expert witness presented in the court. Walton (1989, 1995) also refers to 
other argumentative schemes or fallacies: ad hominem, appeal to pity, and argument of 
consequences.  
 The work of communication scholars, such as Daniel O'Keefe, Scott 
Jacobs, Sally Jackson, and David Zarefsky has also extensively influenced theories and 
research in argumentation. Sally Jackson and Scott Jacobs’s seminal contribution to the 
field of argumentation appears in the paper Structure of Conversational Argument: 
Pragmatic Bases for the Enthymeme, published in 1992. They described argumentation 
as a form of managing conversational disagreement within communication contexts and 
systems that naturally prefer agreement. As Jackson and Jacobs (1992) argue, this 
perspective elaborates contemporary argumentation theories in two ways. First, 
arguments are conceived as collaborative products, that is, they are jointly produced by 
speakers in a conversation. Second, it opposes to previous models that have associated 
argument structure with reasoning processes (e.g., Toulmin, 1958).  
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Jackson and Jacobs (1992) argued that arguments produced in a conversation are 
often incomplete, for example, they do not always link two premises with a conclusion. 
Aristotle used the term enthymeme to describe this simple form of arguments. However, 
rather than regarding the enthymeme as a syllogism with a missing premise, Jackson 
and Jacobs (1992) define enthymemes as arguments constructed socially in a 
conversation with the aim to address the questions and objections of a speaker. 
Moreover, they follow the rules of turn-taking in conversation and work towards 
agreement. As the authors explain, arguers often do not search for possible gaps in their 
partner’s utterances; they agree with turns unless they have good reasons to disagree. 
Similarly, they accept counterarguments in response to challenges unless they are quite 
unable to understand the relation between the initial claim and the new evidence.  
Furthermore, Jackson and Jacobs (1992) claim that giving too much information 
for a claim is not only unnecessary, but also disadvantageous. Giving more support than 
is required increases the possibility of disagreements to occur - and does so without 
improving prospects for agreement. Others authors prefer to emphasise the pragmatic 
function when reviewing the conceptual interpretation of the enthymeme (e.g., 
Gerritsen, 1999; Hitchcock, 1995).  
1.4.5. Recent developments in research and theories in argumentation 
Psychological research in argumentation has led to revisions in some theoretical 
approaches described above. For instance, several studies have shown that arguers 
rarely generate all components of an argument. Stein and Miller (1990, 1993a, 1993b) 
showed that children generate evidence in favour of their own position, rather than 
against it. Stratman (1990) has also shown the same to be true in legal settings. In 
particular, a lawyer rarely introduces negative evidence against his or her own case. In a 
trial or in virtually all contexts, it is the opponent who generates counterarguments, 
rather than the supporter of a position. Arguers also tend to omit warrants that support 
their own position, often assuming that their listeners or readers inferred the appropriate 
warrant (Stein, Bernas, & Calicchia, 1997). These findings have led many researchers to 
make adaptations of Toulmin’s formal model of argument in their studies (e.g., Kuhn, 
1991; Means & Voss, 1996).  
Most recently, cognitive and developmental psychologists studying 
argumentation have been interested in the normative models of argument which include, 
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for example, pragma-dialectics (van Eemeran & Grootendorst, 2004; van Eemeran & 
Houtlosser, 2006) informal logic (Walton, 1995),  and communication theory (Jackson 
& Jacobs, 1992; O’Keefe, 2002). In contrast to mathematical models of formal logic, 
normative models of argument acknowledge the role of social interaction in the 
construction of arguments. These compelling models have led psychologists to examine 
how individuals construct arguments in social contexts (e.g., Felton, 2004; Felton & 
Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Stein & Albro, 2001).  
The research presented in this thesis incorporates theoretical and empirical 
insights of these normative models. Since these models emphasise the importance of the 
discourse context in which individuals construct arguments (Felton & Kuhn, 2001), 
these were regarded as the best way to examine the development of children’s 
argumentative competence.  
1.5. The theoretical framework of the present research 
 The present thesis concerns the development of children’s argument skills. The 
focus is on children at the age when they are first able to understand and construct basic 
forms of arguments. Several researchers have argued that preschoolers can produce 
basic arguments, consisting of simple reasons to justify their desires and actions, for 
example, arguing over the possession of a toy (Pontecorvo, 1993; Stein & Albro, 2001).  
By the age of five, children become fully capable of constructing arguments on 
both sides of an issue regarding familiar topics (Stein & Trabasso, 1982; Stein & Miller, 
1993a, 1993b). Because the methodology deployed in the present research involved 
giving children narrative and discourse comprehension tasks, the youngest age group 
selected for these samples were first graders (5-6 year old children). When children 
enter school they have the opportunity to interact with adults and peers. Indeed, one of 
the foremost challenges of childhood is to learn how to engage in interactions and 
resolve disagreements with peers and adults (Albro, 1996). Nonetheless, the 
developmental literature on children’s argument skills is very limited. For the most part, 
it has focused on how children resolve arguments - disputes or quarrels (e.g., Dawe, 
1934; Stein & Miller, 1990, 1993a, 1993b). In the present thesis, however, the term 
argument is used to mean the product, rather than the process of engaging in a 
discussion.  
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1.6. Research aims and structure of the thesis 
The present thesis describes a series of five interconnected studies that 
systematically examined age differences in children’s argument skills. The purpose of 
these studies is to assess children’s skill in argument generation and what is expected to 
be a parallel skill – the evaluation or appreciation of stronger arguments and superior 
moves in dyadic argumentation. The first set of studies explored systematic age 
differences in children’s ability to produce arguments. A third aspect of skilled 
argument, in addition to skill in argumentative discourse and in production of individual 
expository arguments, is skill in argument evaluation. The next three studies described 
in this thesis investigated this third component.  
To date, this is the first research to explore children’s argument skills at such a 
young age, in different argumentative settings and using various tasks. Such 
investigation is warranted, given the significance of argument and argumentation in 
education and in children’s everyday thinking. Having a better understanding of the 
skills involved in argumentation and how they develop can contribute to its 
improvement.  
This thesis consists of eight chapters, and an overview of each chapter is 
provided below.  
 
Chapter Two provides a review of the existing literature on argumentation, 
with particular emphasis on studies involving children’s argument skills. 
 
Chapter Three outlines and discusses the research methodology used in the 
present studies and highlights important ethical issues related to conducting research 
with children in schools. 
 
Chapter Four describes the first study, which explored age differences in 
children’s ability to produce arguments while engaging in a structured interview with 
the researcher about socio-moral topics. Children were 5-, 8-, and 11- years of age and 
were recruited from schools in southern England. This study also examined the effects 
of argumentative discussions between peers on children’s knowledge and arguments.  
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Chapter Five describes the second study of the present thesis. This study 
identified the argumentative strategies children deploy in the earlier peer group 
discussions, using the transactive coding scheme (Felton & Kuhn, 2001) as a 
framework. Results provided further understanding of the findings obtained in the first 
study.  
 
Chapter Six describes two studies focused on how children evaluate arguments 
and counterarguments considering their own and others’ perspectives. The third study 
employed a computer-based task to assess children’s evaluation of argument strength. 
The fourth study explored argument effectiveness using a similar computer-based task.  
 
Chapter Seven describes the fifth study and is the last empirical chapter. This 
study focused on age differences in children’s ability to recognise argument strategy in 
video-recorded dialogues produced by other children. This is the first study of its kind 
to look at argumentation processes in a real social context.  
 
Chapter Eight provides a discussion of the research findings, outlines 
implications of the present studies, and identifies areas for future research. 
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Chapter Two - Background and Previous Research in Argumentation 
2.1. Introduction 
 The definition of argumentation and the historical review of the most relevant 
theories of argumentation, outlined in Chapter One, highlighted the importance of 
conducting further research related to argumentation processes. Argumentation has been 
studied in various fields of psychology, including educational, developmental, 
cognitive, and social psychology. This has included both qualitative and quantitative 
research focused on different aspects of argument skills, including emergency and early 
development (e.g., Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b), use of argument strategy in discourse 
(e.g., Felton & Kuhn, 2001), goals of argumentative discourse (e.g., Felton, 2004; Stein 
& Albro, 2001), counter-argumentation (e.g., Leitão, 2003; Means & Voss, 1996), and 
persuasion ability (e.g., Clark & Delia, 1976).   
This chapter provides a review of the existing literature, highlights recent 
findings concerning the development of children’s argument skills, and outlines the 
context and further justification for the present research.  
2.2. Defining a good argument 
 An argument can be defined as a conclusion sustained by at least one reason 
(Angell, 1964). The skills in generating and evaluating arguments are closely linked – 
an individual has to consider evidence related to an issue in order to arrive at a 
conclusion or make a decision and to provide reasons for maintaining a particular claim. 
Arguing about different positions assumes importance when a problem is complex, 
controversial or ill-structured with no definitive solution (Kuhn, 1991; Means & Voss, 
1996; Voss, Perkins, & Segal, 1991; Walton, 1989). In those cases, the search for 
reasons related to both sides of an issue has been recognised as crucial for defining good 
arguments. Arguments can be elaborated in different ways and at different levels, and 
can differ both in content and structure. Unlike categorical syllogisms, the content of 
informal arguments is important for their evaluation (Voss & van Dyke, 2001).  
Arguments can be evaluated in terms of their soundness or strength, which refers 
to two criteria: the acceptability of the supporting evidence per se and the relevance in 
terms of the extent to which it supports the claim (Means & Voss, 1996; Voss & van 
Dyke, 2001). An example of a short argument is as follows: 
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Marijuana should not be legalised. That’s because sustained use of marijuana 
worsens a person’s memory, and nothing that adversely affects one’s mental 
abilities should be legalised (Govier, 2005, p. 1). 
 
 In the argument stated above, a claim is made that marijuana should not be 
legalised, and reasons are given to support this claim. The argument invites the 
evaluator to consider whether marijuana does have a negative effect on memory and 
whether no substance that adversely affects mental abilities should be legalised.  
Evaluation on the basis of acceptability of the supporting reasons requires the 
evaluator to consider the justifications advanced against the legalisation of marijuana. If 
the person does not agree with the claim, it is unlikely that the person thinks the 
argument provides good support of the claim. If the evaluator agrees with the claim, 
then he or she needs to judge the relevance of the supporting reasons (i.e., the extent to 
which the reasons offered back up the claim). If the evaluator accepts the reasons as 
relevant, the conclusion that marijuana should not be legalised follows from them.  
The strength of an argument also depends on whether counterarguments are 
taken into account (Angell, 1964; Kuhn, 1991; Leitão, 2003; Voss & van Dyke, 2001). 
The assumption is that the strength of an argument is not independent of 
counterarguments, that is, an argument, although regarded as strong when standing 
alone, may be evaluated as less strong when a counterargument is offered (e.g., “But 
marijuana generally is not more harmful than alcohol or tobacco if used in 
moderation”).   
These criteria refer to the evaluation of the quality of an argument, but there is 
also another important criterion, which is the effectiveness of an argument (Voss & van 
Dyke, 2001). An argument is effective when it succeeds at the goal of persuasion. When 
people present arguments in speaking or writing, they usually try to persuade others by 
giving reasons or citing evidence to support their claims. People may also construct and 
consider arguments as a means of reflecting on how they could justify a claim that they 
already believe (Govier, 2005).  
The word argument may be used to mean a dispute or a quarrel, as in the 
sentence, “He had an argument with his wife”. In ordinary speech, this use is rather 
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common. In some developmental research, the word argument is also used to refer to a 
dispute or conflict between children or adults and children (e.g., Stein & Miller, 1990, 
1993a, 1993b). In the present thesis, however, the term argument is used to mean the 
product of a debate or a reasonable discussion. The distinction between argument as a 
product and a process is further explored in the next section.  
2.3. Argumentation and psychological research 
The psychological research in the field of argumentation has considered the 
study of argument as both a product and a process. Research that focuses on the product 
perspective considers the structure of individual arguments (Means & Voss, 1996; 
Ricco, 2003). These studies examine the role that individual claims and reasons plays in 
informal arguments (Kuhn, 1991; Shaw, 1996; Toulmin, 1958), and also the types of 
inference that lead from reasons to claims (Blair, 1992; Evans & Thompson, 2004).  
Research from within the process perspective, on the other hand, considers how 
arguments are constructed when people engage in a dialogue or a conversation. Such 
research has included studies of the speech acts (Muntigl & Turnbull, 1998; Searle, 
1969), attempts to analyse shifts in arguments during a discussion (Bailenson, 2001; 
Kuhn, 1995; Rips, 1998; Siegler, 2000; Siegler & Crowley, 1991; Walton & Krabbe, 
1995), and also accounts of developmental differences in goals and strategies of arguers 
(Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Udell, 2003;  Leitão, 2000).  
These two kinds of argument are not unrelated, however. Arguments as products 
contain implicit two-sided process arguments that weight support for and against a 
claim, compared to support for and against alternatives to the claim (Kuhn, 1991).  
2.3.1. Generating arguments 
Arguments can be defined as cognitive constructions used by individuals to 
explain and justify an idea or a point of view (Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Research in 
argument skill is usually carried out with an individual being asked to discuss a topic 
and to take a position regarding the issue (e.g., Kuhn, 1991; Means & Voss, 1996). The 
person is then asked to justify the position by providing reasons to support it. In some 
interviews, the person is asked to provide opposing reasons as well. 
In 1991, Kuhn conducted a major study to examine argumentative reasoning 
across the life span. In the years since Deanna Kuhn published the book on argument 
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skills (Kuhn, 1991), the field has moved through a series of changes. Until then, the 
majority of studies of reasoning had explored its processes in a social vacuum, focusing 
on an individual’s ability to solve logical problems (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1983). Kuhn’s 
innovative work breaks away from this tradition, by examining individuals’ thinking as 
interiorised dialogic argument. Her studies focused on problems involving informal 
reasoning, that is, reasoning applied outside the formal contexts of symbolic logic and 
mathematics and dealing with topics that are familiar to everyone, such as the causes of 
unemployment and school failure. The details of Kuhn’s framework and methodology 
deployed in her research are further described in the next chapter (see Chapter Three).  
The purpose of Kuhn’s study (1991) was to answer the following research 
questions: to what extent does argumentative thinking underlie the beliefs people hold 
and the decisions they make? And, most importantly, to what extent are people aware 
of, and have control over their beliefs?  
Subjects, ranging in age from adolescence to late adulthood (14 to 69 years) and 
educational level (college and non-college), were asked to describe their views on 
everyday problems that were familiar to them, such as crime and unemployment. The 
central focus of the investigation was the thinking of average people, but in addition to 
the main sample, a group of experts from three different fields (parole officers, teachers, 
and philosophers) participated in the study. These expert subjects were included to 
examine how expertise influences reasoning; comparing experts’ reasoning regarding 
the topic about which they have expertise with their reasoning regarding topics about 
which they have no particular expertise.  
Interviews considered various questions. Firstly, participants were asked to offer 
their theories regarding the causes of returning to crime, school failure and 
unemployment. Then, they were asked to justify the theory by providing supporting 
evidence. In the next segment of the interview, participants were asked to generate 
opposing positions that a hypothetical other might offer. This question sometimes 
elicited a counterargument with respect to the subject’s theory or an alternative theory. 
In either case, the subject was asked for a rebuttal. In the remaining part of the interview 
for each topic, subjects were asked for a remedy for the problem implicated in the 
question, as a way of assessing the consistency of the subject’s causal theory. Finally, 
the interviewer gathered information regarding the subject’s epistemological theories on 
their own thinking, and also the subject’s skills in evaluating evidence.  
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Kuhn identified three major differences regarding both content and structure of 
subject’s causal theories. Participants tended to provide theories with a single cause, or 
with multiple causes presented in parallel, or with interactive multiple causes. More 
individuals stated multiple parallel causes than single causes, with multiple interactive 
causes stated least.  
With respect to evidence, results showed that the majority of participants were 
unable to produce genuine evidence to support their causal theories. Kuhn (1991) 
defined genuine evidence as presenting information that was different from the theory 
itself. Instead they tended to offer pseudo-evidence or non-evidence. In other words, the 
participants did not seem to know the difference between theory and evidence, despite 
the high level of confidence expressed by the participants that their theories were 
correct.  
The results also showed that subjects were often unsuccessful in generating 
counterarguments. Asking subjects to generate opposing arguments that they do not find 
convincing in the first place, might seem an unreasonable thing to ask. However, Kuhn 
(1991) maintains that subjects’ counterarguments are important indicators of the way 
they regard their own theories. Results also showed that even those counterarguments 
assessed as successful often weakly opposed a theory. Most revealing was the 
unwillingness to generate a counterargument, which indicated that subjects regarded the 
initial theory or supporting evidence as incontestable.  
In addition, subjects had problems with offering a rebuttal to the opposing 
position and integrating the original theory with the opposing position. Kuhn (1991) 
reported that the ability to generate rebuttals was the most cognitively complex 
argument skill assessed in the interview. However, some subjects were able to achieve 
integrative rebuttals.  
An interesting finding in evaluating these successful rebuttals is the asymmetry 
that emerges in the ability to examine critically one’s own theory versus an alternative 
one. This asymmetry appears in two different aspects. First, subjects were more likely 
to be successful in rebutting an alternative theory than their own theories. Second, when 
subjects compare their own theories to an alternative theory, a substantial number 
display the subtype in which an argument is made against the causal necessity of the 
alternative theory. This shows that subjects tend to neglect to apply this test to their own 
theories and, thus, even some of the rebuttals classified as successful integrative 
rebuttals, constitute weak arguments.  
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Another striking finding of this study was the significantly superior performance 
of the college-educated participants compared to the non college-educated participants. 
These results confirm the findings of previous research which revealed that, from the 
sixth grade (11-12 years) to the ninth grade (14-15 years), there is a fast development of 
argument skills. After that, educational level makes the difference, with college-
educated people performing better than ninth-graders, but with people without a college 
education performing at a level between sixth and ninth graders (Kuhn, 1989).  
Means and Voss (1996) studied argument generation in students aged 10-, 12-, 
14-, and 16-years. Students were grouped in gifted, average, and low-ability groups, as 
defined by the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC) evaluation results. 
They were then asked to solve individually a series of problem assessment tasks, such 
as open-ended questions (e.g. “If students misbehave at school, what should be done?”). 
In the second part of the study, students aged 13-, 15-, and 17- years, were grouped 
according to the general mental ability assessed by Wechsler questions. They were 
asked to analyse and comment on controversial propositions regarding drug and alcohol 
use (e.g., “The use of marijuana should be legalised”; “Alcohol should be legalised”). 
Additionally, participants were given a knowledge test about those topics. Evaluation of 
argument skills included number of reasons, qualifiers, counterarguments, and type of 
argument structure generated.  
Means and Voss (1996) found that grade level and ability levels seem to play a 
role in argumentation. The influence of these two factors can be partly explained in 
terms of knowledge about the topic under consideration. Results showed that older 
students and also gifted students have the greatest knowledge. Moreover, knowledge of 
the topic was found to be related to the number of arguments generated and types of 
reasons supporting them. Results also indicated that argumentation skills did not 
increase with school grade, suggesting that education does not significantly affect the 
development of argument skills at this age. This finding is in broad agreement with 
results from other research studies (e.g., Kuhn, 1991; Perkins, 1985).  
Kuhn (1991) and Means and Voss (1996) provided useful descriptions of 
individuals’ informal reasoning, although their studies involved adolescents and adults 
rather than the age group of current interest. 
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2.3.2. Generating arguments in dyads and groups 
As noted earlier, studies in argumentation also focus on the contexts in which 
arguments arise (e.g., Felton & Kuhn, 2001). According to this approach, an argument 
is not defined as a product constructed by a single individual, but as a discussion 
activity in which a person engages with others. When people take part in a discussion, a 
different set of argument skills come into play. They should be skilled in advancing and 
constructing new arguments, and also in listening, questioning, challenging and 
criticising their partners’ arguments.  
Various theories offer useful frameworks for conceptualising and evaluating 
skills in argumentative discourse. Discourse-based models (e.g., Walton, 1989) are 
important because they recognise the role of discourse on the construction of argument 
in a social interaction. Most often, arguments arise from disagreements people have 
with each other. During these discussions, it is likely that arguments are incomplete or 
claims remain implicit. Thus, as Felton and Kuhn (2001) argue, the best way to study 
the development of argumentative competencies is to examine the process by which 
individuals construct arguments in conversational contexts (Felton & Kuhn, 2001).  
Kuhn’s research has been developed on the basis of Walton’s model of 
argumentative discourse (1989). According to Walton (1989), when people engage in a 
critical dialogue, each speaker has two goals. The first is to construct one’s own 
conclusion from a partner’s commitments. By commitments Walton (1989) refers to 
inconclusive premises that the partner is willing to concede. The second goal is to 
challenge or undermine the partner’s position by identifying inconclusive premises.  
Felton and Kuhn (2001) argue that the strategies entailed in argumentative 
discourse are deployed in discussions to address these two goals. Kuhn, Felton, and 
their colleagues conducted a series of studies on how argumentative discourse skills 
develop in adolescence and adulthood. In order to examine this development, they 
proposed a coding scheme to analyse dialogues between adolescents and adults on the 
topic of capital punishment. The coding scheme includes three categories: transactive 
questions, transactive statements and non-transactive statements.  
According to Felton and Kuhn (2001), “an utterance is defined as transactive if 
it attempts to engage the partner in discourse either by referring to the partner’s 
preceding utterance or by prompting a response from the partner” (p. 139). This analytic 
scheme also includes the coding of strategic sequences. Felton and Kuhn (2001) defined 
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strategic sequences as “patterns of utterances that might represent an attempt to advance 
or pre-empt an extended argumentative strategy” (p. 145). Strategic sequences include, 
for example, rebuttals, which are defined as sequences of counterarguments. This 
coding scheme is described in more detail in the methodology chapter (see Chapter 
Three).  
Felton and Kuhn (2001) analysed multiple dialogues (in agreeing and 
disagreeing dyads) between peers on the topic of capital punishment. When comparing 
the dialogues of adolescents and the dialogues of young adults, results showed that 
adolescents were less able to adapt strategies or discourse to the goals of argumentative 
discourse. In particular, adolescents were preoccupied with the task of producing 
argumentative discourse, that is, with generating the form of dialogue they understand 
to be required in argumentative discourse. Examples of typical elements of dialogues 
include: speakers taking turns, addressing the topic, and expressing their views. 
However, as Felton and Kuhn (2001) noted, the major difference between less skilled 
arguers and arguers with greater skill lies at a more subtle level, having to do with their 
understanding of the goals of argumentative discourse. For less skilled arguers, the only 
goal was to have one's own position prevail. Argumentative discourse of adolescents, 
thus, focused on elaborating one's own position, with only superficial attention to the 
opponent's position. When trying to undermine the opponent's position, adolescents 
simply advanced their own position. Skilled arguers, in contrast, understood the goal of 
undermining the opponent's argument, a goal distinguishable from that of undermining 
the opponent's position. Thus, adults showed a better understanding of the lines of 
argument that underlie the opponent's position, and were able to construct effective 
counterarguments, and anticipate and address rebuttals.  
Another way in which high skilled arguers differed from low skilled arguers was 
in the flexibility of their argumentation. Unlike adolescents, adults were able to adapt 
their use of argumentative strategies to different discourse contexts. In particular, 
adolescents showed minimal modification of discourse behaviour when moving from 
disagreeing to agreeing partners. Most notably, counterargument remained at about the 
same level of frequency when a difference in position did not exist as when it did. In 
contrast, adults in discourse with the partner who shared the same view diminished the 
use of strategies directed toward weakening the partner’s arguments (e.g., 
counterargument) and increased the use of strategies that enhanced their own position 
(e.g., add and advance statements). 
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Felton and Kuhn (2001) interpreted these results in light of Activity Theory, 
developed by Leont’ev (1981). According to this framework, an activity is composed of 
goal-directed behaviours or actions. The development of an activity develops in two 
fronts. First, activity develops as the individual produces goal-discourse strategies. 
Second, activity develops as the individual refines the goals being pursued.  
Accordingly, Felton and Kuhn (2001) conceptualised argumentative discourse as 
an activity in the process of development. Development of argument skill proceeds 
simultaneously along two fronts. One is enhancing skill in directing the course of 
dialogue so as to meet the activity's goals; the other is deepening understanding of these 
goals. These two forms of development reinforce one another. Advancement in 
discourse skill is propelled in part by a better understanding of the goals of discourse.  
At the same time, exercise of these skills in discourse activity promotes more 
refined understanding of goals (Felton & Kuhn, 2001). Some intervention studies in 
argumentation have been successful at promoting argument skills through exercise. For 
example, Wiley and Voss (1999) showed that engagement in constructing arguments 
enhance knowledge in college students.  
Moreover, Kuhn and Udell (2003) conducted a study to verify if the same 
patterns identified in the previous research (Felton & Kuhn, 2001) were observed in a 
condition where change was induced experimentally. Participants (academically at-risk 
13- to 14-year olds) engaged in an intervention aimed at developing their argumentative 
discourse skills. One condition included peer dialogues, while another did not. Results 
showed that both groups improved, but the former was the most effective. Participants 
showed increased frequency of usage of argumentative discourse strategies, such as 
counterargument.  
2.3.3. Arguing with peers and learning 
This sub-section concerns how engaging in argumentation with peers might 
enhance individuals’ argument skills and promote knowledge acquisition. There are a 
number of studies demonstrating that engagement in peer group discussions enhances 
conceptual understanding (e.g., Doise & Mugny, 1984; Howe, Tolmie, & MacKenzie, 
1995; Mason, 1996, 2001; Phelps & Damon, 1989; Zohar & Nemet, 2002) and 
reasoning (Chinn & Anderson, 1998) in school-age children. These studies have also 
found that collaboration is more successful when peers have different ideas about the 
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topics they are considering (Doise & Mugny, 1984; Howe, Tolmie, & Mackenzie, 
1995). In addition, the topics should require genuine discovery or conceptual grasp 
(Howe, Tolmie, Duchak-Tanner, & Rattray, 2000; Phelps & Damon, 1989). Based on 
these findings, hypotheses have been proposed about the forms of interaction that 
promote knowledge and learning. For instance, the combination of different 
perspectives and discovery or conceptual understanding suggests a need for the 
discussion of opposing ideas. This has been supported by several research studies. For 
example, Howe and her colleagues documented the value of direct opposition in 
promoting scientific knowledge (e.g., Howe & Tolmie, 1998; Howe, Tolmie, Greer, & 
Mackenzie, 1995). What remain unclear are the mechanisms by which collaborative 
interaction leads to advances in knowledge and reasoning. Leman (2002) identified two 
“schools of thought” to account for how these advances are achieved. One is the 
transmission account, which emphasises the ways in which knowledge is transmitted 
from one individual to another. The other one is the construction account, which 
conceptualises the process of interaction as a forum for the construction of new 
knowledge.   
 According to the transmission account, cognitive development is a consequence 
of a process of knowledge induction, from a more to a less advanced peer (e.g., Roazzi 
& Bryant, 1998; Russell, Mills, & Reiff-Musgrove, 1990). It has been argued that this 
account has its roots in Vygotskian theory, since the emphasis is upon an asymmetry in 
knowledge between children, or between children and adults (Leman & Duveen, 2003).  
Other researchers have provided evidence that challenges the need for 
asymmetry in knowledge, a central feature of the transmission account. Ames and 
Murray (1982) found that interaction between two non-conservers who had both given 
different answers was enough to induce development in conservation ability. Based on 
this finding and their own work, Doise and Mugny (1984) proposed a construction 
account, which proposes that cognitive development results from the integration of 
diverse perspectives, rather than the transmission of knowledge. According to Doise, 
Mugny, and Pérez (1998), interaction facilitates the process of integration of different 
perspectives, leading to more adequate, decentred and sophisticated forms of reasoning. 
Perret-Clermont, Brun, Saada, and Schubauer-Leoni (1984) also argue that a further 
difficulty for transmission accounts is that, whilst processes of transmission of 
knowledge can result in advances in reasoning and skill, the transmission account does 
not explain why an expert’s argument is accepted by a novice. In an expert-novice 
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paradigm, Leman (2002) found that more advanced arguments were more compelling to 
children at an intermediate stage of development, whereas less advanced arguments 
were accepted only when a novice had argued persistently and persuasively for his or 
her position. As Leman and Duveen (2003) point out, the issue of acceptance of 
arguments is particularly relevant for understanding transmission and construction 
accounts. They argue that the question of how and why arguments are accepted can be 
further investigated by focusing on issues of legitimacy and legitimisation, that is, how 
children and adults conceive of their beliefs as valid, and why they may accept or not 
alternative perspectives. Leman and Duveen (1996) suggested that epistemic and social 
status constitute two sources of influence in interaction, by presenting alternative ways 
of legitimising beliefs. In particular, their study focused on epistemic authority, that is, 
the power or authority that arguments possess (as opposed to individuals or social 
groups) in influencing judgements. According to the authors, the two forms of influence 
are distinct. With epistemic influence, arguments possess persuasive power, whereas 
with social status, persuasive power is a consequence of an individual’s position within 
a social organisational structure of hierarchy.  
Leman and Duveen (1996) examined age differences in children’s interactions 
during a perceptual judgement task. Children in two age-groups (6-7 and 11-12 years) 
were asked to judge whether two lines in an optical illusion were the same or different 
lengths. In some conditions, children were given expertise in the task; for example, in 
the form of sticks, in other conditions they were not. They found that younger children’s 
conversations were more conflictual than those of the older children. Moreover, gender 
differences in conversations were found; particularly, the younger children had 
difficulty accepting the arguments of a girl expert compared with a boy expert. These 
results led Leman and Duveen (1996) to conclude that younger children (6-7 years) tend 
to regard interaction as a contest between two competing views rather than a forum for 
discussion and debate in which children could evaluate arguments. Thus, younger 
children’s responses were more likely to be affected by social status influence, which 
was associated with a child’s gender identity. Older children (11-12 years), on the other 
hand, were more likely to be persuaded by epistemic influence, that is, they were more 
predisposed to evaluate the validity of arguments.  
Leman and Duveen (2003) further explored the relationship between gender, 
processes of argumentation and cognitive change in children’s interactions. In their 
study, children aged 9-10 years were asked to discuss a moral dilemma with a same age 
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peer. The possible effects of social status were examined by balancing the gender mix 
of the pair (i.e. either same-sex or boy-girl pair). Additionally, all pairs were 
asymmetric in terms of their previous independent responses to the task. Children’s 
dialogues were analysed and coded to establish the number and sophistication of 
supports (arguments in favour) and rebuttals (arguments against) used by children to 
justify a particular position. The authors had anticipated that children who had adopted 
a particular position pre-interaction would seek to support that position in a subsequent 
discussion. However, contrary to what was expected, children demonstrated a good 
strategic grasp of arguments in conversations. They were able to support their own 
position and also address another’s positions, suggesting that 9-year old children start 
exhibiting awareness, though perhaps in an unsophisticated way, of interaction as a 
forum for the exchange of perspectives and for epistemic construction.  
Results also showed that a child’s gender identity constrained the process of 
exchange of perspectives in conversations. Specifically, in boy-girl pairs, children spent 
a considerable amount of time presenting their own position and less time talking about 
a partner’s position. On the other hand, in same-sex pairs, children appeared more 
willing to address another’s position. This finding had already been found in previous 
work (e.g., Leman, 1998; Leman & Duveen, 1996, 1999). Moreover, in terms of the 
outcomes of interactions, the majority of argument elements appeared to work well in 
terms of producing an influence, contrary to basic rebuttals. As Leman and Duveen 
(2003) note, basic rebuttals are simple refutations of another’s position. They are the 
equivalent of telling another person that they are wrong without giving a reason why 
that person is wrong, nor stating one’s own position, thus, they do not function on the 
level of perspectives. Children’s engagement with (or discussion of) each other’s 
perspectives, in contrast, was linked with effective influence. Leman and Duveen (2003) 
suggested that it is not the case that any sort of conflict, for example social asymmetries 
in relations associated with a child’s identity, is related to advances in cognitive 
development. Co-operative peer interaction can clearly yield more benefits than 
interaction that is conflictual. More importantly, the socio-cognitive conflict (i.e., the 
exchange of different perspectives) was found to be crucial for promoting 
developmental advance and knowledge acquisition.  
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2.4. Children’s argumentation 
 Researchers have focused on several different aspects of children’s arguments, 
including the nature (e.g., Eisenberg & Garvey, 1981; O'Keefe & Benoit, 1982), 
structure (e.g., Chambliss & Murphy, 2002), emergence (e.g., Stein & Albro, 2001), 
generation of justifications (e.g., Anderson, Chinn, Chang, Waggoner, & Yi, 1997; 
Orsolini, 1993; Stein & Miller, 1993b), power and dominance (e.g., Meyer, 1992), and 
resolution of argumentative discussions (e.g., Benoit, 1981). The next two sub-sections 
concern the social factors associated with the emergence and the development of 
argument skills in infancy.  
2.4.1. Emergence and early development of argument skills  
A fundamental question addressed in argumentation research is at what age 
children demonstrate an ability to construct arguments and engage in an argumentative 
discussion (Voss & van Dyke, 2001). The ability to understand and produce arguments 
is claimed to emerge early in development (Anderson et al, 1997; Clark & Delia, 1976; 
Orsolini, 1993; Orsolini & Pontecorvo, 1992; Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b). This claim 
seems to contradict the work of Kuhn outlined earlier in this chapter, which has 
documented adolescents and adults’ poor performance in argumentative tasks (e.g., 
Kuhn, 1991). 
These apparently contradictory results may be explained by the types of tasks 
used in these two lines of research. For instance, Kuhn (1991) studied argumentation 
about the causes of social phenomena by asking participants to offer causal theories and 
evidence for social topics (e.g., school failure or unemployment). Kuhn also used 
interviews and questionnaires to measure the success of educational programmes to 
check the acquisition and transference of new skills. For example, Zohar and Nemet 
(2002) used similar tools to study argumentation skills applied to scientific issues (e.g., 
genetics and ethics). They found that when the teacher scaffolded argumentative skills 
through explicit prompts, the learned skills could be applied in near transfer and far 
transfer tasks. On the other hand, Stein’s work (e.g., Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b) has 
focused on children’s arguments that arise in natural occurring contexts (e.g., family 
interactions). Anderson and colleagues (1997) have also observed children’s arguments 
resulting from interactions with peers. Unlike Kuhn, these researchers studied children’s 
argumentative skills using less complex tasks in familiar contexts. It is then clear from a 
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theoretical point of view that the implementation of argumentation skills is highly 
sensitive to context (Schwarz, 2009).  
According to Stein and Albro (2001), by the age of two children are already 
familiar with conflict interactions and, by the age of four, children become able to 
understand and participate in family disagreements. With the development of language, 
cognitive skills, and social knowledge about rules and rights (Benoit, 1981; Tesla & 
Dunn, 1992), children’s ability to argue and negotiate improves. They may even win 
some disputes with parents or older siblings (Eisenberg, 1992; Perlman & Ross, 1997). 
Later, when children enter school, they have more opportunities to engage in conflicts 
or argumentative discussions and learn how to resolve them with their peers. Through a 
series of studies, Stein and her colleagues (e.g., Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b; Stein & 
Albro, 2001) have shown that the emergence and development of argumentation skills 
have a social origin, and that children learn to master these skills through the conflicts 
they experience with their parents, siblings, and peers. 
Family interactions  
 Children first learn to argue with others in the context of family, through 
interactions with their parents (Dunn & Munn, 1987; Hay & Ross, 1982; Shantz & 
Hobart, 1989), and siblings (Ross, Ross, Stein, & Trabasso, 2006). In mother-child 
conflicts over the “right” to perform certain actions, 3-years-olds have justified their 
own position by arguing about the consequences of the actions (Dunn & Munn, 1987). 
By the age of 4, young children learn how to raise opposition with their parents and 
become active participants in family conflicts. Stein and Albro (2001) argue that the 
way in which children and parents resolve these disagreements influences children’s 
thinking and skills in participating in other social conflicts. Sibling conflicts also offer 
opportunities for persuasive negotiation in which children clarify their differing 
perspectives (Herrera & Dunn, 1997; Rinaldi & Howe, 1998; Slomkowski & Dunn, 
1992).  
Erikson (1963), Piaget (1932), and Sullivan (1953) all agreed that children’s 
early conflict experiences influence the development of knowledge about social rules, 
relationships, family processes, and the self. For example, Johnson and McGillicuddy-
Delisi (1983) credited socialisation factors within the family environment as seminal in 
promoting children’s knowledge of rules and conventions. They found that preschool 
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children’s awareness and rationale for rules and conventions were related to social class 
variables (e.g., socioeconomic status of the family), but parental behaviours were 
predictive of children’s level knowledge above and beyond demographic characteristics.  
Peer interactions in preschool years 
 Quarrels and conflict talk are very common and frequent among preschool 
children. Dawe (1934) attempted to classify quarrels of preschoolers and divided them 
into four categories: possessions, physical violence, interference with activity, and 
social adjustment. Observations of children aged 2 to 5 years, interacting spontaneously 
with others in the playground, showed that the majority of quarrels started by a struggle 
for possessions (e.g., a child’s desire for another’s doll, or a child’s refusal to give up a 
swing). Most quarrels analysed in this study were short, with an average duration of 23 
seconds. Furthermore, children were able to settle quarrels themselves almost in all 
occasions, most frequently by one child’s forcing another to yield. Dawe (1934) also 
found that boys were involved in more conflicts, and were more aggressive during these 
conflicts than girls. Boys’ typical behavioural responses included pushing, striking, and 
pulling. Although verbal activities, such as crying, forbidding, and commanding, were 
also common, silence was a more frequent reaction than any other activity. Talking, and 
in particular engaging in dialogues, was rare among the youngest preschoolers.  
However, there was some indication that reciprocal comments and discussions 
of the argumentative type, during peer conflict, increase with age. Although quarrels 
among young preschoolers (2-3 years) are short and characterised by the presence of 
intense motor activity, the increase in talking among older preschoolers (4-5 years) 
appears to be paralleled by increasing duration of quarrels (Dawe, 1934; Dunn & Munn, 
1987; Herrera & Dunn, 1997).  
Meyer (1992) also analysed the naturally occurring conflict episodes between 
preschoolers, aged three years, and found a broad range of linguistic and non-linguistic 
strategies displayed by children to win a dispute. Verbal tactics used by preschoolers 
included: shifting liability to a third party, verbal exchanges, postponing direct 
confrontations, increasing volume, topic changing, offering empty compromises, and 
threatening the opponent. Nonverbally, preschoolers tried to win peer conflicts by 
violating interactive space, having the physical advantage of standing while the 
opponent is sitting, producing loud noises (such as hand clapping), and exerting 
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superior strength while pulling or struggling. According to Meyer (1992), these early 
attempts to construct simple arguments and strategies to win disputes contribute to 
children’s development of communication and argument skills they exhibited later in 
life. 
Orsolini (1993) investigated older preschoolers’ production of justifications in 
three main contexts: classroom conversations, symbolic play, and classroom activities. 
An analysis of the discussions showed that the social context constrains the arguments 
used by 4-year-olds to justify actions and claims. For instance, reference to causes, 
norms, and rules was a frequent type of justification only in disputes occurring in 
conversations led by the teacher. References to motives, on the other hand, tended to 
occur in non-teacher-led activities. Results also showed that the most frequent format 
for justifications during children’s conversations was focused on backgrounding. 
Orsolini (1993) defined backgrounding as a descriptive communicative act used by a 
speaker to show his or her knowledge on the topic, and to provide more information to 
enable the recipient to understand better the speaker’s position.  
Furthermore, in both disputes and classroom conversations, a considerable 
number of justifications are produced when there is a break of some normative 
expectation. Disputes start with disagreeing with a claim or action. In classroom 
conversations children’s because utterances usually follow negative assertions and 
negative events.  
Results from this study also corroborated the hypothesis that the interactive and 
sequential organisation of conversation is a basic learning mechanism for children’s 
justifications. According to this hypothesis, children are expected to provide 
justifications within some sequences of communicative acts. When justifications are not 
produced, the recipient is very likely to request an explanation. This request advances 
the production of justifications. In fact, results showed that the conversational 
antecedents of a teacher’s why-questions were correlated with the antecedents of 
spontaneous children’s utterances using because. The major conversational antecedents 
for children’s justifications were: (a) description of a negative event, (b) production of a 
negative assertion, and (c) reference to general events, with a high commitment to the 
truth of what is said. As Orsolini (1993) explained, these results suggest that the 
interactive and sequential organisation of conversation may lead children to understand 
two pragmatic meanings of reasons. First, justifications compensate for the breaking of 
some norm. Second, justifications enable the recipient to “better understand” something 
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that is unexpected or questionable. For instance, a teacher’s request for elaboration on 
what has been said are probably what lead children, even in their spontaneous 
justifications, to use a descriptive talk such as backgrounding.  
In a previous study focused on teacher-child discussions, Orsolini and 
Pontecorvo (1992) also suggested that teacher-led discussions facilitate preschoolers’ 
(5-year-olds) learning of justifications. In these interactions, children are required to 
justify opposition and points of view, and provide an answer to teacher’s requests for 
explanation or evaluation. Thus, in this particular context and sequential environment 
preschoolers’ early attempts to talk about conditions of actions, causes, and 
consequences emerge.  
Previous research has offered important contributions regarding preschoolers’ 
use of arguments, and the possible conversational mechanisms underlying young 
children’s justifications (e.g., Orsolini, 1993; Orsolini & Pontecorvo, 1992). However, 
remaining to be learned are the specific arguments that can work as good justifications 
for particular topics. One of the aims of the research in this thesis is to tackle this issue, 
that is, to document age differences in children’s use and evaluation of good arguments. 
Specifically, Study One (Chapter Four) provides a description of the number and type 
of reasons that children generate in an interview about socio-moral topics. The set of 
studies described in Chapter Six examined the types of justification children at different 
ages consider to be strong (Study Three) and effective (Study Four).  
Peer interactions in primary school years 
 When children enter school, normally at the age of five in the U.K., they 
continue to experience peer conflict on a daily basis. Within peer groups, children learn 
the importance of cooperating and sharing, and to deal with incompatible goals. Some 
researchers have claimed that young children are unable to negotiate effectively because 
of their inability to appreciate the goals of the opponent or take the perspective of the 
other (e.g., Selman, 1980). In contrast, other research (e.g., Anderson et al., 1997; 
Levine, Stein, & Liwag, 1999; Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b; Stein & Trabasso, 1982) 
has demonstrated that young children (around 7 years of age) are quite capable of 
understanding and using the goals of an opponent during a discussion.  
For instance, Anderson and his colleagues (1997) explored the properties of 
children’s naturally occurring arguments in the classroom. The arguments were 
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identified from transcripts of 20 discussions by children in the fourth grade (8-9 years), 
which took place in a format of collaborative reasoning. Children gathered in a small 
group and discussed a dilemma faced by story characters. The teacher initiated the 
discussions and encouraged children to listen and evaluate each other’s arguments, and 
also to share their positions and offer reasons to support their ideas. Results indicated 
that, although children’s arguments were replete of missing information (e.g., clear 
reasons, explicit conclusions, and warrants to authorise conclusions), children showed a 
basic understanding for others’ points of view and responded accordingly. 
2.4.2. Development of argument skills in infancy 
 An important question in understanding the development of argument skills 
concerns whether primary school children have the same logical ability to understand 
and reason about arguments as secondary school children and college students. Two 
different perspectives have been advanced about the development of argument skills. 
One perspective relies mainly upon Piagetian theory and stipulates that young children 
cannot argue in a logical manner until the onset of formal operational reasoning. 
According to this point of view, children under the age of ten or eleven cannot engage 
in sophisticated argumentative reasoning, because they lack the ability to reason and 
understand many of the rules of formal logic. Studies in moral reasoning (e.g., 
Berkowitz, Oser, & Althoff, 1987) have provided evidence to support this perspective.  
Berkowitz, Oser, and Althoff (1987) asked subjects from six to twenty years of 
age to participate in dyadic interactions. Subject dyads were matched for gender, grade 
level, and differed in the position they favoured in regard to a moral dilemma. An 
analysis of the discourse produced by these subjects led Berkowitz and colleagues to 
conclude that justification for moral claims does not appear spontaneously or in a 
complex form in children between the ages of six to eight years. Arguments produced 
by these children were reported to be simple repetitions of position, and justifications 
were offered only when requested by an opponent and then they were regarded as 
“personal, idiosyncratic, and illogical”. Children from six to eight years of age were 
reported to resolve their disputes by either physical or verbal power manipulations, but 
without recourse to argumentative discourse. Berkowitz and colleagues do claim that 
children from nine to eleven years recognise the need for advancing justifications to 
convince the opponent, but they cannot generate effective evidence due to inadequate 
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consideration of the opponent’s view. According to Berkowitz and his colleagues, it is 
only after the age of eleven that children engage in reasoned dyadic interaction and 
demonstrate adequate argument skills.  
 A contrasting perspective to the Berkowitz and Piaget view emerged with a 
series of studies conducted by Stein and colleagues (Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b; Stein 
& Trabasso, 1982). According to Stein and her colleagues, children at age five or even 
younger demonstrate some of the argumentative competence of older children and even 
adults in domains that are familiar to them. For instance, Stein and Trabasso (1982) 
argued that 5-year old children were able to construct complex moral justifications 
when asked to resolve a moral dilemma that was familiar and made interesting to them. 
In Stein and Trabasso’s study, all groups of subjects, including preschool children, third 
graders, and secondary students provided logically consistent reasons to support their 
positions. When the evidence was evaluated, holding constant the choice made by 
children, reasons did not differ across age groups. Children who supported the same 
position generated justifications that were similar in kind and content, across all age 
groups. These results led Stein and Trabasso (1982) to reflect on the importance of 
using materials that are comprehensible across the age groups. A lack of understanding 
of the basic concepts of the dilemmas could easily result in a failure to provide 
“logically” consistent reasons, particularly for the youngest children. The issue of 
familiarity and knowledge of the topics was addressed in all studies in this thesis, and is 
further discussed in the methodology chapter (see Chapter Three).  
Further research studies carried out by Stein and her colleagues have taken into 
account, not only the amount of knowledge children and adults have about a topic, but 
also the role that commitment and prior value judgements play in determining the 
choice for a position, and the ability to retain an accurate representation of a conflict. In 
these studies (Albro & Stein, 2000; Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein, Bernas, & Calicchia, 
1997; Stein, Bernas, Calicchia, & Wright, 1996; Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b), children 
and adults are asked to remember past conflicts using different strategies, and to 
remember the nature and content of face-to-face interaction that occurred during a 
negotiation. These studies focus on young children and their understanding of conflicts 
experienced with their parents and peers. Stein and her colleagues have found that 
young children have complex knowledge of argument in social situations that are 
personally significant. These studies are reviewed in the next section.  
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2.5. Theories and empirical findings on the development of argument skills 
 The ability to argue and counter-argue effectively seems difficult to master, 
particularly at a young age (Golder & Coirier, 1994; Leitão & Almeida, 2000). Several 
hypotheses have been proposed relating to why this skill seems difficult to improve with 
age. For instance, studies following the Piagetian tradition consider that the 
development of argument skills depend on socio-cognitive decentring. In contrast, the 
work of Stein and her colleagues (e.g., Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein & Miller, 1993a, 
1993b) has shown that the mastery of argument skills occurs at an earlier age than 
previously predicted, and that the structure and content of arguments are regulated by 
the goals and relationships of arguers. Moreover, the role that epistemological 
understanding plays on the development of argument skills has been studied 
systematically by Kuhn and colleagues (e.g., Kuhn, 1991, 1999a, 2001, 2003; Kuhn & 
Udell, 2007). 
2.5.1. Decentring and perspective-taking ability  
As stated earlier in this chapter, studies following the Piagetian tradition 
consider that the emergence and improvement of argument skills are primarily age-
linked and are dependent on socio-cognitive decentring (e.g., Golder & Coirier, 1994, 
1996). According to this perspective, young children fail to consider the perspectives of 
others, because they are centred in their own views. Although education and language 
development play a fundamental role on the development of argumentation skills, 
further improvement in argumentative discourse is the result of the mastery of formal 
operations, which occurs only in early adolescence.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, only Clark and Delia (1976) have 
attempted to relate skill in constructing persuasive arguments directly to perspective-
taking ability. In their study, children aged 7- to 15 years (in grades two through nine) 
were presented with three hypothetical persuasive communication situations: asking a 
parent to buy a gift, asking a parent to attend an overnight party, and asking a person to 
keep a lost puppy. Children’s task was to say everything they could think of to gain 
agreement. Children’s responses were coded in two sets of categories, and ordered 
according to the level of perspective-taking skill required. The first set coded the 
strategic form in which the request itself was phrased in a persuasive attempt (e.g., an 
unelaborated statement of desire was coded as low level, whereas an elaborated 
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proposal to demonstrate that little is required of other, saying for example “the gift 
wouldn’t cost much”, was high level). The second set coded the functional strategies 
used to support the request (e.g., a request that demonstrates a matter of right, for 
example, “all the other kids have a three-speed” was coded as low level, whereas a 
request that included counterarguments was high level). Overall, the youngest children 
demonstrated very little perspective-taking, and the older children used strategies 
reflecting progressively greater ability to understand and adapt to the perspective of 
others. The most significant developmental advances occurred between the second and 
third graders, third and fourth graders, and eighth and ninth graders. Clark and Delia 
(1976) interpreted these results as being consistent with a Piagetian constructivist 
perspective and seminal findings on social role-taking (e.g., Flavell, Botkin, Fry, 
Wright, & Jarvis, 1968).  
However, results from studies carried out with different theoretical and 
methodological approaches have raised reasonable doubts about the validity of this 
hypothesis. For example, research conducted by Stein and her colleagues (e.g., Stein & 
Miller, 1990, 1993a, 1993b) has shown that at the age of eight, or even earlier, children 
are able to deal with opposition and to engage in successful negotiation in conflicts 
experienced with their parents and peers.   
2.5.2. Goals and relationships of arguers 
  According to the Goal-based Model of Argument, proposed by Stein and her 
colleagues, the structure and content of arguments are regulated by the goals and 
relationships of the arguers. Their studies (e.g., Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein & Miller, 
1993a, 1993b) have focused on the analysis of children’s arguments experienced in 
everyday conflicts with their family and peers. As Stein and Albro (2001) note, a 
dispute starts when two (or more people) try to accomplish incompatible goals. When 
both parties recognise that they have a goal conflict and both of their goals cannot be 
attained at the same time, they start defending and advancing justifications to support 
their positions. Arguers usually enter a negotiation with the goal of persuading their 
opponent of the value of their claim.  
Stein and colleagues’ theory assumes that the evaluation and regulation of social 
relationships is always present in interpersonal conflicts. An arguer may believe that 
maintaining a relationship with an opponent is more important than defending his or her 
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position. If so, the arguer may choose not to continue a dispute. When the reverse is 
true, and the relationship is less important than the claim, the arguer may disregard the 
logic and validity of the arguments given by the opponent (e.g., Stein & Miller, 1990; 
Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b). In many situations, children and adolescents enter into a 
dispute not to see who will win, but to determine who will be the most dominant person 
(e.g., Laursen & Collins, 1994; Meyer, 1992).  
Stein and colleagues have shown that the complexity of an argument depends on 
who wins and who loses. Stein and Liwag (1999) found that winning was associated 
with complexity of argumentation in both children and parents.  
When the outcome of a conflict was one in which the parent won, it was the 
parent who provided the most complex form of arguing. Similarly, when the child won 
a dispute, it was the child who evidenced the most complex form of argumentation. 
Stein, Bernas, and Calicchia (1997) replicated this finding on disputes between 
adolescents. In their study, the winner provided a more complex form of argument than 
the loser. Stein and colleagues (1997) also showed that winners had more knowledge 
about their own position than their opponent did before the dispute began. Additionally, 
they found that winners had less knowledge about the reasons for their opponents’ 
position than the opponents had about the winners’ position. This asymmetry in mutual 
understanding favoured the winners. Arguers who were able to reach a compromise had 
more prior knowledge about both positions than did either winners or losers.  
Stein and colleagues (1997) also assessed memory for the negotiation between 
adolescents. The two types assessed were source memory, which refers to the accuracy 
of recalling who uttered a particular statement, and content memory, which refers to 
what was said. Results indicated that losers evidenced the best memory for who said 
something.  Losers tied those who compromised for remembering accurately what was 
said. These results led the researchers to conclude that, during a negotiation, losers 
acquire knowledge about the problems with their own position and the strengths of their 
opponent’s position. Winners had less accurate memory than did the losers for what was 
said in the argumentative discussions, but remembered accurately the source.  
Winners offered the most counterarguments to their opponents and this helped 
their subsequent recall of who said what. However, they made significantly more errors 
in remembering accurately what their opponent said, either against their own position or 
in favour of their opponent’s position, consistent with their prior knowledge of the 
positions. Additionally, winners almost always misrepresented a loser’s initial reasons 
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to support a particular position. Although winners recalled well the loser’s claims for 
choosing his or her own side, the winners were poor at remembering the reasons losers 
gave for justifying their positions.  
Those who compromised were the best at remembering the content of what each 
person said in support of a position, and at understanding both sides of an argument in 
resolving the conflict. Stein et al. (1997) proposed that arguers who compromised 
focused their negotiation on the construction of new goals to resolve the problem. 
However, they had difficulty in identifying accurately who gave suggestions for the new 
solution. Stein and Liwag (1999) found similar results in parent-child argumentation.  
Stein and colleagues have also focused on the role that emotion plays in the 
understanding and resolution of conflicts that children experience with their parents and 
peers. Stein and Albro (1997) assessed young children’s arguments under different 
feeling states and social contexts. Their data are part of a larger study that involved 180 
families (Liwag & Stein, 1995; Stein & Liwag, 1997, 1999). In their study, parents were 
asked to choose and talk about a series of events that made preschool children 
experience different types of emotions (happiness, sadness, anger, and fear). Thirty 
parents were asked to talk further about two recent conflicts that they had with their 
children, one in which they had observed their child express anger, and one in which 
they had observed their child express sadness. Children were also asked to remember 
and recount the same conflicts. Stein and Albro (1997) chose to study events evoking 
anger and sadness, because prior work showed that events involving anger were 
understood differently than events involving sadness. For instance, Levine et al. (1999) 
noted that although parents reported their children feeling angry during conflict, the 
majority of children (60%) disagreed with their parents and said that they felt sad during 
the conflict.  
The aim of the Stein and Albro’s study (1997) was to analyse whether these two 
different emotional responses to a conflict influence strategies and types of outcomes in 
negotiations. Results indicated that the conflicts that aroused anger in children most 
frequently were those in which parents took children’s possessions away from them, 
and those in which parents’ and children’s goals for pursuing a future course of action 
were in conflict. The conflicts that resulted in sadness in children most frequently were 
those in which the child was denied affection or interaction, or when the child was 
punished. Both children and parents reported conflicts in which children expressed 
anger as more memorable. Results also showed that outcomes of parent-child conflict 
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were predicted by the jointly reported emotions of parents and children. Over the 48 
conflicts reported, in which children and parents agreed on the outcome, 58% ended 
with parents winning, 19% ended with children winning, 12% ended in a standoff, and 
9% ended in compromise. When parents and children both reported reacting with anger, 
they were unable to negotiate and come to a resolution, because they focused on their 
own goals; in such case, neither party was willing to change or attempt to understand 
the other’s perspective. The most frequent outcome was a standoff. When both children 
and parents expressed sadness, parental wins and parent-child compromises occurred. 
This result led Stein and Albro (1997) to conclude that the experience of sadness 
provoked a joint consideration of what they could do to maintain a positive relationship.  
Albro (1996) also showed that the degree of liking and caring that two people 
express toward each other predicts the nature of the conflict resolution. In her study, 4-
year-old children were asked to remember and spontaneously report both good times 
and conflicts with their best friend and their lost disliked peer. Results showed that the 
degree of liking did not influence recalling the conflict (67% of children recalled 
conflicts with their best friends and 64% recalled conflicts with the peer they disliked). 
However, the degree of liking did influence the recall of good times (88% of children 
recalled good times with their liked peers, and only 24% recalled good times with peers 
they disliked). The role of liking in a relationship also influenced outcomes of conflicts. 
Disputes with liked peers frequently ended in win-loss scenarios, whereas conflicts with 
disliked peers ended in standoffs. Furthermore, compromises were infrequent in liked 
peer conflicts and never occurred in conflicts with disliked peers.  
These series of studies have shown that preschool children are able to 
understand and generate the principle components of an argument. They also provide 
evidence that the ability to construct detailed, complex and logically cohesive 
justifications in defence of a favoured position improves with age. However, this 
development does not guarantee a deeper understanding of opposing views. A conflict 
may exist between displaying good argument skills and reaching a beneficial resolution 
for both parties in an argumentative discussion. For instance, a theory compromising a 
goal-based model of argument does not explain why older children choose not to 
incorporate counterarguments in argumentative discussions or essays, even when they 
have sufficient knowledge to argue on both sides of an issue (Leitão, 2003; Stein & 
Bernas, 1999). Leitão (2003) addressed this question, by looking at how children 
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evaluate and select retrieved ideas from texts according to the communicative goal of 
writing-related tasks. 
2.5.3. Epistemological understanding 
 According to Kuhn and her colleagues (e.g., Kuhn, 1991, 2001, 2003; Kuhn & 
Udell, 2007), epistemological understanding underlies and shapes reasoning and 
argumentation. These researchers argue that to fully understand processes of knowing 
and arguing, it is important to examine people’s understanding of their own knowledge. 
In providing justification for a claim, young children have difficulty differentiating 
explanation and evidence in an argument (Kuhn, 2001). Although epistemological 
understanding progresses developmentally, there is substantial variation among adults, 
with few adults achieving understanding of the complementary strengths and 
weaknesses of explanation and evidence in argument (e.g., Kuhn, 1991).  
 Kuhn and Pearsall (2000) investigated how young children justify simple 
knowledge claims. The researchers predicted that below a certain age, children would 
fail to distinguish between theoretical explanation and evidence as a basis for their 
knowledge claims. For example, 4- to 6-years-olds were shown a sequence of pictures 
in which two runners competed in a race. Certain cues suggested a theoretical 
explanation as to why one would win; for example, one had fancy running shoes and the 
other did not. The final picture in the sequence provided evidence for the outcome; for 
example, one of the runners held a trophy.  When the children were asked to indicate the 
outcome (“Who won the race?”) and to justify this knowledge (“How do you know [he 
won]?”), 4-year olds did not show a clear distinction between evidence for the claim 
and the explanation for it. In the race example, when asked “How do you know?” 
children tended to respond in an explanation-based manner, referring to the running 
shoes cue (“Because he has fast sneakers”), rather than the trophy cue (“He’s holding a 
trophy”).  
Similarly, in another set of pictures in which a boy was shown first climbing a 
tree and then down on the ground holding his knee, the “How do you know [that he 
fell]?” question was often answered “Because he wasn’t holding on carefully.” Children 
who gave these kinds of responses to the “How do you know?” question were asked a 
follow-up question, “How can you be sure this is what happened?”  This prompt elicited 
a shift from a theory-based to an evidence-based response for some children on some 
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items. Still, even with this prompt, 4-year olds gave evidence-based responses on 
average to less than a third of the items. Six-year-old children, on the other hand, 
distinguished the difference between explanation and evidence more readily than 4-
year-olds. These results led Kuhn and Pearsall (2000) to conclude that children who 
have not yet achieved the epistemological understanding in question do not clearly 
distinguish explanation from evidence when multiple clues that offer different types of 
justifications are present. The findings also suggest that epistemological understanding 
progresses developmentally and, by the age of six, children start appreciating the 
distinction between theory and evidence.  
Another study (Kuhn & Felton, 2000) showed that epistemological 
understanding does continue to develop. In their study, eight graders, college students, 
and beginning graduate students were asked to choose the stronger of two arguments to 
support a claim (e.g., “Why do teenagers start smoking?”). One argument provided a 
theoretical explanation that made the claim plausible (e.g., “Smith says it’s because they 
see adverts that make smoking look attractive. A good-looking guy in neat clothes with 
a cigarette in his mouth is someone you would like to be like”). The other argument 
provided empirical evidence that the claim was true (e.g., “Jones says it’s because they 
see ads that make smoking look attractive. When cigarette ads were banned from TV, 
smoking went down”). Participants were asked to give reasons to justify their choices, 
including the strengths of the chosen argument and weaknesses of the other argument.  
Additionally, they were also asked if the chosen argument had some weaknesses 
and the non-chosen argument any strengths. Results showed that the older age group 
(graduate students) achieved the highest levels of epistemological understanding. Yet, 
few participants exhibited an understanding of the epistemic strengths and weaknesses 
of each argument type. According to Kuhn and Felton (2000), epistemic characteristics 
apply to the form of the argument; non-epistemic characteristics relate to the content of 
an argument. Non-epistemic responses most often addressed the correctness of an 
argument (e.g., “This is a good argument because it’s true”), rather than the quality of 
the argument supporting a claim. The percentages of students citing the epistemic 
strength of explanation (e.g., “It gives a reason”) ranged from 30% among the young 
adolescents to 60% among the graduate students. Fewer students cited the epistemic 
weaknesses of explanation (e.g., “It’s only a theory” or “It could be wrong”), ranging 
from 0% to 26%. Moreover, the percentages of students citing the epistemic weaknesses 
of evidence (e.g., “It doesn’t say why”) were the lowest, ranging from 2% to 10%.  
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 These findings are in broad agreement with other empirical investigation of 
epistemological beliefs that have identified three major levels of epistemological 
understanding (see Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, for review). Table 2.1., shown below, 
illustrates the levels for the development of epistemological understanding proposed by 
Kuhn and colleagues (e.g., Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). In addition to the three 
levels that Hofer and Printich identify, Kuhn’s model includes a pre-absolutist level 
characteristic of early childhood. Kuhn and colleagues (2000) refer to the other three 
broad levels as absolutist, multiplist, and evaluativist.   
At the absolutist level, individuals believe that knowledge is objective, certain, 
non-problematic, right and wrong, and does not have to be justified since observations 
of reality or authorities are its sources. This absolutist conception is most likely to 
change dramatically during adolescence, and then be replaced by a multiplist or 
relativist conception. At the multiplist level, individuals believe that knowledge is 
ambiguous and consists of personal opinions that people possess that usually cannot be 
challenged or discussed. Only at the most advanced, the evaluativist level, is knowledge 
seen to consist of claims which require support by alternative theories, evidence, and 
arguments (Kuhn, 1999a; Kuhn et al., 2000). At this level, individuals believe that 
knowledge is uncertain and that there are shared norms of inquiry and knowing, and 
consequently that some positions are reasonably more justified and grounded than 
others.  
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Table 2.1. Levels of epistemological understanding (Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000, 
p. 311) 
Level Assertions Knowledge Critical thinking 
Realist Assertions are 
copies of an 
external reality. 
Knowledge comes 
from an external 
source and is 
certain. 
Critical thinking is 
unnecessary. 
Absolutist Assertions are facts 
that are correct or 
incorrect in their 
representation of 
reality. 
Knowledge comes 
from an external 
source and is 
certain but not 
directly accessible, 
producing false 
beliefs. 
Critical thinking is 
a vehicle for 
comparing 
assertions to 
reality and 
determining their 
truth or falsehood. 
Multiplist Assertions are 
opinions freely 
chosen by and 
accountable only to 
their owners. 
Knowledge is 
generated by human 
minds and therefore 
uncertain. 
Critical thinking is 
irrelevant. 
Evaluativist Assertions are 
judgments that can 
be evaluated and 
compared according 
to criteria of 
argument and 
evidence. 
Knowledge is 
generated by human 
minds and is 
uncertain but 
susceptible to 
evaluation. 
Critical thinking is 
valued as a vehicle 
that promotes 
sound assertions 
and enhances 
understanding.  
 
Further research on epistemological beliefs, led by Kuhn and her research team, 
explored the dimensions that define these developmental levels and how they connect 
with each other. They proposed that the cognitive task that underlies the achievement of 
mature epistemological understanding is the coordination of objective and subjective 
components of knowing (e.g., Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000; Kuhn & Weinstock, 
2002). The objective dimension dominates, initially sacrificing subjectivity; 
subsequently, the subjective dimension assumes a dominant position, and finally, the 
two are coordinated. A key event in this evolution is the replacement of the source of 
knowledge from the known object to the knowing subject.  
At this stage, a multiplist’s recognition of the existence of conflicting assertions 
(e.g., “even experts disagree”) is likely to emerge, leading to awareness of an uncertain 
and subjective nature of knowing. The evaluativist reintegrates the objective dimension 
of knowing, by acknowledging the uncertainty without neglecting evaluation. Thus, two 
people can have different opinions and both “be right”, but one position can have more 
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merit (“be more right”) than the other, because it is better supported by argument and 
evidence. It is only at this stage that people evidence a disposition to engage in the 
intellectual effort that reasoned argument entails, such as justifying claims (Kuhn, 
Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000). 
According to the authors, the origins of the coordination process are identifiable 
in the early childhood achievements highlighted by research findings on children’s 
theory of mind. Children, aged three, show some epistemological awareness in making 
reference to their own knowledge states, using desire and belief terms such as want, 
think and know (Bartsch & Wellman, 1995). However, the flood of empirical research 
over the last 30 years on early understanding of mental states has generated consensus 
that children below the age of four regard people’s claims as independent to reality. The 
conceptual acquisition most studied by these researchers has been the achievement of an 
understanding of belief in the classic false-belief task. Three-year olds believe that a 
newcomer will share their own accurate knowledge that the chocolate is no longer in the 
blue cupboard, and can now be found in the green cupboard (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). 
They do not recognise that the other person can be misled by his or her false beliefs. By 
four or five years of age, most children can attribute beliefs, even false beliefs, to both 
self and others (e.g., Astington & Gopnick, 1991; Wellman, 1990; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983). Kuhn (1999b) argues that the ability to recognise assertions as the expression of 
someone’s belief constitutes a milestone in young children’s cognitive development. 
This contributes to further achievement in epistemological understanding. 
Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000) further postulated that this progression 
tends to occur in a systematic order across different judgment domains (personal taste, 
aesthetic, value, and truth), with the orders the reverse of one another in the two major 
transitions of this progression. In their study, Kuhn and colleagues (2000) analysed a 
sample of seven groups of children, adolescents, and adults, varying in age, education 
and life experience. As the researchers predicted, the subjectivity is most readily 
acknowledged in personal taste and aesthetic judgements and least readily in truth 
judgments. Once subjectivity is accepted and becomes dominant, objectivity is 
reintegrated in a reverse order, that is, most readily with respect to truth judgments. 
Results also showed that, for a number of individuals, both transitions proved most 
difficult in the values domain.  
 A number of studies has shown that beliefs about knowledge are associated with 
performances in conceptual change (Mason, 2002, 2003; Southerland & Sinatra, 2003), 
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argument generation skills (Mason & Scirica, 2006), argumentative writing skills 
(Mason & Boscolo, 2004), and juror-reasoning skills (Weinstock & Cronin, 2003).  
A crucial consideration regarding this research topic is that epistemological 
understanding is considered as dispositional rather than as a competence factor or 
general intelligence (Kuhn, 2001; Weinstock & Cronin, 2003). As noted by Stanovich 
(1999), individual differences in performance on argumentation tasks must be explained 
by reference to epistemological dispositions, for example, a disposition to think flexibly 
and to change one’s beliefs in the face of contradictory evidence. Other factors, such as 
knowledge and cognitive ability are also necessary to account for individual differences 
in cognitive performance. 
2.6. Argument, inquiry and critical thinking 
 For some time, argumentation has been linked to critical thinking (e.g., Ennis, 
1962; Nickerson, Perkins, & Smith, 1985). However, although argument skills are 
related to and part of critical thinking, they are not the same thing. In a seminal study on 
critical thinking and education, Glaser (1941) proposed that the ability to think critically 
involves three elements: (1) a disposition to consider in a thoughtful way the problems 
and subjects that come within the range of one's experiences; (2) knowledge of the 
methods of logical inquiry and reasoning; and (3) some skill in applying those methods. 
Contemporary educational and developmental psychologists have addressed, in one way 
or another, these central elements. Broadly speaking, the skills involved in effective 
critical thinking include: argument generation, inquiry and meta-cognition (Kuhn, 
1999a). 
 In argument generation, as pointed out by Govier (2005), the statement of an 
argument is most frequently the product of reasoning and critical thinking. To generate 
arguments, individuals are required to examine a statement and take a position 
regarding an issue, and to provide reasons to support it. Additionally, they may have to 
consider the alternative side of an issue and provide opposing reasons as well (Voss & 
van Dyke, 2001).  
 Inquiry skills are recognised as being very important to critical thinking. The 
primary reason is that an individual, when asked to reason about an argumentative topic, 
in a text or speech, should be able to recognise the argument (i.e., the claim and reasons 
to support it) and coordinate his or her knowledge with the new evidence.  
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 Metacognition is also crucial to develop strong critical thinking skills (Felton & 
Kuhn, 2007; Kuhn, 1999b; Olson & Astington, 1993). In fact, Kuhn (1999b) argued that 
the most relevant skills in critical thinking are metacognitive rather than cognitive. In 
contrast to first-order cognitive skills that enable one to know about the world, second-
order meta-knowing skills involve knowing about one’s own and others’ knowing. 
Kuhn’s developmental model of critical thinking (1999a) identifies three broad 
categories of second-order cognitive skills: metastrategic, metacognitive, and 
epistemological. The distinction between metastrategic and metacognitive knowing 
derives from a widely established dichotomy in philosophy and cognitive psychology 
between procedural knowledge (knowing how) and declarative knowledge (knowing 
that). Procedural or metastrategic competencies entail the application of strategies to 
achieve goals. On the other hand, metacognitive competencies operate on one’s base of 
declarative knowledge and are needed to reflect on one’s own theories and the bases for 
believing them.  
Finally, epistemological competencies are required to understand one’s own and 
others’ knowledge. Evidence that meta-knowing skills are the intellectual skills most 
closely associated with critical thinking comes from microgenetic studies of the 
strategies children or adults employ in coordinating theory and evidence (Kuhn, 1989; 
Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, & Andersen, 1995; Kuhn, Schauble, & Garcia-Mila, 1992). 
These studies have shown that it is through coordination processes of existing 
understanding with new evidence that knowledge is acquired. Kuhn (1989) proposed 
that a critical change that occurs with the development is the attainment of increasing 
control over this process. This attainment is meta-cognitive, because it involves an 
awareness, understanding and management of one’s cognition. Kuhn’s work supports 
the claim that this control increases both with age, in cross-sectional studies (e.g., Kuhn 
& Udell, 2007), and over time, in microgenetic studies (e.g., Kuhn, Garcia-Mila, Zohar, 
& Andersen, 1995).  
 Having provided a description of the component skills of critical thinking, the 
next section addresses the significance of critical thinking in learning. 
2.6.1. Implications for education 
 John Dewey was one of the first educational philosophers to recognise that a 
curriculum aimed at building thinking skills would benefit not only the individual 
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learner, but the community and the entire society (Govier, 2005). Critical thinking is 
considered important in education because it enables students to analyse, evaluate, 
explain, and restructure their thinking. In most school and college subjects, students 
need to critically analyse the material they are studying. For example, if they are 
studying social sciences, students will need to think and discuss themes such the causes 
of crime or the importance of family. In History, students have to deal, for example, 
with arguments related to the causes of war, or the role of religion in social change. If 
students are studying Biology, they will have to evaluate arguments on the nature of 
evolutionary change, or the effects of global warming. Later in life, individuals will also 
need to be proficient in defending their positions and understanding others’ points of 
view in order to participate successfully in debates on societal questions and to critically 
evaluate different information sources, such as the Internet. 
Educational and developmental studies have shown that many students have 
difficulties in recognising arguments and commenting analytically on argumentative 
texts (e.g., Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993) or understanding the value of 
counterarguments (e.g., Kuhn, 1991; Stein & Bernas, 1999). As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter, Brem, Russell, and Weems (2001) suggested that students’ poor 
evaluations of scientific information found on a website was a result of students’ failure 
to analyse sufficiently.  
In recent years, Kuhn and colleagues conducted several studies focused on 
understanding and promoting thinking skills in adolescents and adult learners. They 
studied the process of knowledge acquisition through the method of inquiry learning 
(e.g., Kuhn, 2007a; Kuhn, Black, Keselman, & Kaplan, 2000). For instance, Kuhn et al. 
(2000) asked middle-school students, aged between eleven and thirteen years, to engage 
in computer-based inquiry learning and work together in pairs on an earthquake 
problem.  
The objective of this task was to analyse a database to determine which of a set 
of varying factors did and did not make a difference to earthquake risk. Students’ 
progress was followed via the microgenetic method. This yielded insight into students’ 
strategies of investigation, analysis, and inference and the ways in which these 
strategies change as they become more proficient inquiry learners. Results indicated that 
students seem to lack the cognitive skills needed to make their inquiry learning 
productive. Some of these skills are crucial in the initial inquiry phase of the process, 
including recognising that there is a question to be asked, and that there is information 
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to be examined to sustain their beliefs and claims. As Kuhn et al. (2000) argue, in the 
absence of this recognition, students are rarely effective in the later phases of inquiry 
learning, involving analysis, inference and argument. The implication of this evidence 
for educators is that answers cannot be provided to questions that the student does not 
have.  
2.7. Persuasion: The pragmatic function of argumentation 
This section addresses a different but related aspect of argumentation. Earlier in 
this chapter, the focus was placed on the argumentative process. In this section, the 
focus is redirected to the effectiveness of argumentation or persuasion. In particular, this 
section closely inspects existing persuasion research to see what light might be shed on 
whether (and the degree to which) children choose to persuade when they are engaged 
in argumentation. In other words, do children understand persuasion as a goal or a 
desirable outcome of argumentation? Moreover, do children pursue this goal? 
The ultimate goal of argumentation, whether in face-to-face interactions or in 
written argumentative texts, is changing the audience’s view (Leitão, 2003; Voss & van 
Dyke, 2001). Persuading people to change their points of view or attitudes is difficult to 
achieve. Arguers are required, not only to present reasons to support the claim they want 
others to come to accept (e.g., “I am not in favour of capital punishment because it is 
not effective in deterring people from crime”), but also to consider the strength and 
relevance of the others’ current views (e.g., “O.K. Perhaps I would think in a different 
way if a crime was committed against someone I love”). As Watkins (2001) points out, 
“persuasion is, in fact, a negotiation that results in concrete impacts on the behaviour of 
other people” (p. 115). In some cases, the persuader’s intent is to gain others’ 
agreement; or in other situations it is necessary to gain others’ active support and, thus, 
to change their attitudes. In both situations, the persuader must be able to influence 
others’ points of view through communication (Leitão, 2003; O’Keefe, 2002; Watkins, 
2001).   
 Empirical evidence has suggested that persuasion skills develop considerably 
throughout childhood. For example, Clark and Delia (1976) presented children in grades 
two through nine (from 7- to 14- years) with three hypothetical persuasive 
communication situations (e.g., asking a neighbour to keep a lost puppy) and asked 
them to say everything they could think of to gain agreement. Children’s responses 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND AND PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN ARGUMENTATION 
 
65 
 
were coded in two sets of categories, and ordered according to the level of perspective-
taking skill required. The first set coded the strategic form in which the request itself 
was phrased in a persuasive attempt (e.g., an unelaborated statement of desire was 
coded as low level, whereas an elaborated proposal to indicate that the persuader needs 
help from the other, saying for example “I’m asking you to keep this dog because my 
mom doesn’t let me have it”, was high level). The second set coded the functional 
strategies used to support the request (e.g., a request that included counterarguments, 
saying for example, “It does cost much to feed a dog, but I will bring you food to feed 
the dog if you’ll keep it” was high level). Overall, the youngest children demonstrated 
very little perspective-taking, and the older children used strategies reflecting 
progressively greater ability to understand and adapt to the perspective of other.  
 The authors interpreted these results as being consistent with a Piagetian 
constructivist perspective and seminal findings on social role-taking (e.g., Flavell, 
Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968). These findings suggest that children may not use 
mental state information in persuasion, although they might be able to perform well in 
false-belief tasks. More recently, Bartsch and London (2000) conducted a study 
addressing directly this hypothesis of whether children use information about others’ 
mental states to invent and select persuasive strategies. Participants were preschoolers, 
third graders, and sixth graders and were told about story characters persuading parents 
to buy pets or toys. Children were either given or not given information about story 
parents’ beliefs and asked to invent or select appropriate arguments. Results showed 
that older children (third and sixth graders), but not preschoolers, used belief 
information to select appropriate persuasive arguments. Bartsch and London (2000) 
concluded that these results were consistent with the notion that use of belief 
information in persuasion tasks develops progressively through childhood and early 
adolescence, as advanced in the study by Clark and Delia (1976).   
Other studies, particularly in educational research, have also pointed out 
children’s relatively slow growth in the area of persuasive and argumentative writing 
(e.g., Coirier, 1996; Coirier, Andriessen, & Chanquoy, 1999; Knudson, 1992). Students’ 
difficulty in writing good quality essays is also a major concern of teachers and 
educators. Recently, educational psychologists have examined how task instructions 
mediate the effects of quality of argumentative writing.  
For example, Felton, Garcia-Mila, and Gilabert (2009) compared the effects of 
two distinct kinds of activity in argumentative discourse, dispute and deliberation, on 
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the content learning in science instruction and argument quality of first-year secondary 
school students. Dispute and deliberation can be distinguished by their different goals 
(Makau & Marty, 2001). In dispute the goal is to defend a view and challenge 
alternatives, whereas in deliberation the goal is to choose a point of view by evaluating 
the alternatives (Felton, Garcia-Mila, & Gilabert, 2009). Results from this study showed 
that disputative goals may diminish the value of argumentation by prompting students 
to defend their views and minimise alternative views. In contrast, deliberative goals led 
to greater gains in content learning and argument quality by encouraging students to 
collaboratively construct and contrast different views.   
Similar results were obtained by Ferretti and colleagues who compared the 
effects of a general goal to persuade and an elaborated goal (that contained specific sub-
goals on the argumentative writing) of 9- year old and 12-year old students with and 
without learning disabilities (Ferretti, Lewis, Andrews-Weckerly, 2009; Ferretti, 
MacArthur, Dowdy, 2000). Both studies showed that the elaborated goal induced 
students to include more alternative views and arguments, and therefore to produce 
more persuasive essays than the general goal of persuasion. These studies are important 
for designing interventions that use argumentation to foster students’ persuasive and 
argumentative skills.  
 Empirical evidence in educational research shows that persuasion ability, which 
is related to more general argumentative skills, is important to children’s academic 
experience. The ability to persuade others is also important to children’s social 
experience (Bartsch & London, 2000). In preschool years, children already use verbal 
and non-verbal tactics to get parents and siblings to share toys and food, to receive gifts, 
abandon bedtime rules, and so forth (Bartsch, Wright, & Estes, 2010). Later, when 
children enter school, they are inundated daily with a variety of persuasive appeals 
asking them to adopt certain behaviours, such as not smoking, to share a game or to 
write convincing essays.  
Persuasion is an ubiquitous form of human interaction and deserves great 
attention in argumentation studies. Nevertheless, with the exception of old studies on 
children’s persuasion skills (e.g., Clark & Delia, 1976; Delia, Kline, & Burleson, 1979) 
and the work conducted by Bartsch and colleagues on children’s attention to beliefs in 
persuasion (Bartsch & London, 2000; Bartsch, London, & Campbell, 2007; Bartsch et 
al., 2010), no recent developmental studies have been conducted on how persuasion 
ability develops with age.  
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 The research described in this thesis seeks to address this gap in literature by 
focusing on argumentation as a goal-oriented process. For instance, Study Four (see 
Chapter Six) explored what types of argument children at different ages select in a 
persuasion task. 
2.8. Areas for investigation 
To summarise, a review of the literature has revealed a need to develop 
empirical research focused on children’s argument skills. Previous research has focused 
on how young children use arguments during family or peer conflicts (e.g., Stein & 
Miller, 1993a, 1993b) and in naturally occurring school contexts (e.g., Anderson et al., 
1997), but less is known about their ability to produce more complex arguments related 
to socio-moral topics (e.g., the value of friendship) or policy issues (e.g., whether 
students should wear school uniforms). Moreover, educational studies in argumentation 
have focused on how students generate arguments related to academic topics, and few 
studies have examined how children select arguments in evaluation tasks. The study of 
evaluation skills is highly practical for education and in children’s everyday life. For 
instance, in family interactions, children need to understand and carefully examine the 
views and arguments exchanged, in order to argue and counter-argue effectively. In 
school, students are also required to critically evaluate the relevance of claims and 
arguments provided in textbooks and other sources, such as the Internet (Glassner, 
Weinstock, & Neuman, 2005).  
This chapter highlighted a number of implications of argumentation studies, 
particularly in education. Piagetian and Vygotskian views concerning the importance of 
social interaction to learning has contributed largely to an interest in studies focusing on 
discussions, particularly in classrooms. A series of studies conducted by Doise and 
Mugny (e.g., Doise & Mugny, 1984) has shown that conflicts generated through the 
advancement of a myriad of different perspectives stimulate discussion between 
children, hence contributing to social and cognitive development. Several studies have 
also shown the benefits of interaction on the construction of specific knowledge, such as 
conservation tasks (e.g., Ames & Murray, 1982; Leman & Duveen, 1996); scientific 
concepts (e.g., Howe, Tolmie, Greer, & Mackenzie, 1995), historical topics (Pontecorvo 
& Girardet, 1993), and socio-moral topics (e.g., Felton, 2004).  
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Whilst a number of studies have explored the use of social interactions as a 
means of cognitive engagement, less is known about what sort of elements in a 
discussion promote children’s argument skills. The ability to engage in conversation 
and to communicate effectively is critical to successful functioning in life. 
Understanding how engagement in a discussion enhances children’s critical thinking 
and learning has important implications for education.  
Past studies have identified links between argumentation competence and 
persuasion ability. Justification of an argument implicitly carries with it the idea that the 
argument is persuasive. Also, conflict situations involve attempts to persuade, which 
becomes part of negotiation and conflict resolution. However, no previous research has 
developed measures and discourse coding schemes to examine in particular these 
abilities in younger age groups.  
2.9. Conclusion  
 To conclude, this review of the literature identified a number of areas requiring 
further investigation. These include: examination of age differences in children’s 
generation of informal arguments, to enable a clearer picture of the skills 5-, 8-, and 11-
year olds possess and deploy both individually and with their peers, and exploration of 
whether engagement in argumentation influences their argument skills; investigation of 
how 8-year olds and 11-year olds differ in terms of preference and evaluation of what 
constitute strong and persuasive arguments; and a further examination of the links 
between argument strategy and persuasiveness. The present research aims to address 
these areas through a series of qualitative and quantitative studies. Having provided the 
context and further justification for the present research, the next chapter describes and 
evaluates the chosen research methodology.  
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Chapter Three - Methodology  
3.1. Introduction 
 Both the introductory chapter (Chapter One) and the literature review (Chapter 
Two) highlighted a number of challenges regarding the assessment of children’s 
argumentation skills. For instance, there is little consensus among researchers on the 
criteria for defining the quality of arguments. Moreover, the relative lack of research 
tasks and analytical coding schemes for assessing skills in argumentation of young 
children constitutes a real challenge in this sort of research.  
 This chapter initially provides a description of the samples collected for the 
studies in this thesis. Participants were age-school children recruited from schools in the 
U.K; therefore a particular emphasis is given to the characteristics of the educational 
context in this country. The methods employed in the research studies outlined are then 
discussed alongside some problems that arise in the study of argumentation and 
reasoning with children. A more detailed description of these methods, including their 
strengths and limitations, is then provided in each of the four empirical chapters. A 
concluding section discusses common ethical issues which were considered across 
studies.  
 Before discussing these methodological issues, the next section provides some 
general background on the assessment procedures applied in the present research. A 
variety of techniques was employed, including surveys and interviews, correlational and 
experimental studies.  
3.2. The selection of an appropriate method 
 Most of the studies described in the literature review (Chapter Two) used either 
qualitative or quantitative methods to describe and examine individuals’ argument 
skills. Qualitative research usually functions to develop a theory from the data collected 
(an inductive process) and, thus, focuses on describing a phenomenon, and collecting 
and analysing detailed observations, narrative histories, conversation scripts or video 
transcriptions. On the other hand, quantitative research is typically designed to test 
predetermined hypotheses that are formed based on existing theory (a deductive 
process). Hence, quantitative research methods focus on quantification of a 
phenomenon, relying on numbers, counts, and frequency-type data (Weathington, 
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Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010). Methods of data collection in quantitative research 
include, for example, surveys (questionnaires), structured interviews, content analysis 
according to a coding scheme, and group experiments (studies that involve control and 
experimental groups).  
 Despite the prevalence of qualitative methods in some psychology areas (e.g., 
social, educational, clinical), there has not been widespread acceptance of qualitatively 
influenced research within other areas of psychology. The reasons for this are varied 
and not fully understood or agreed upon. According to Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003) 
the main reason for resistance to use qualitative methods has been the lack of education 
regarding these methods. It has also been suggested that qualitative researchers differ 
greatly from quantitative researchers in terms of their perspectives on methods and 
goals for research studies (Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010). Although 
this may be correct, many researchers have argued that there are more advantages in 
combining these two general approaches to research, than in continuing to separate 
them out (e.g., Shaw, 2003). For instance, in the case of educational interventions for 
children, which are implemented in complex environments (e.g., schools, nurseries), 
answering the question of why some interventions work while others fail is not easily 
done within a quantitative framework. Such a question can be more comprehensively 
addressed with the use of a qualitative and quantitative (i.e., mixed-methods) strategy.  
As Schwarz (2009) discusses, in a recent review chapter on methodological 
issues, productive argumentative activity may be encouraged by elicitation procedures, 
argumentative scripts, confronting subjects with hypothesis testing, and pairing peers 
that have different opinions. Kuhn’s work on argumentation and education has 
employed many of these data collection methods. These included semi-structured and 
structured interviews (e.g., Kuhn, 1991) and pair interactions (Felton & Kuhn, 2001; 
Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Many of Kuhn’s studies, in which 
the present research is grounded, have employed content analysis according to a coding 
scheme, which is a common mixed-methods analysis technique.  
Recent research conducted by Creswell (2002) and Nussbaum, Hartley, Sinatra, 
Reynolds, and Bendixen (2002) also worked toward a synthesis of theoretical 
perspectives using a mixed-quantitative-qualitative approach. Based on this previous 
research, the use of a variety of qualitative and quantitative methods was deemed 
necessary and more appropriate for the studies presented in this thesis.  
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3.3. Quantitative and qualitative methods combined 
As described in the previous section, a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods was used in the present research. Mixed-methods research can be 
seen as a; 
 
Type of research in which a researcher or team of researchers combines 
elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g., use of 
qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference 
techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007, p.123).  
 
A mixed-methods approach was chosen because the research questions involved 
in the studies in this thesis concerned, not only exploring the skills involved in 
argumentation, but also identifying age differences in children’s ability to evaluate and 
produce arguments. Furthermore, other researchers who have studied the topic of skills 
in argumentation have also relied on a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methods, such as interviews (e.g., Kuhn, 1991; Means & Voss, 1996), and content 
analysis using analytical schemes (e.g., Kuhn & Felton, 2001; Udell, 2007).  
In sum, several reasons were considered before designing the research studies 
that favoured the use of a mixed-methods research. The set of considerations is listed 
below: 
 
1. Research questions included exploring children’s argument skills, and 
examining age differences in argument skills; 
2. The main goal was investigating in detail children’s argument skills in a natural 
context (i.e., in schools); 
3. Other researchers who have studied the topic of argumentation have relied on a 
mixed-methods approach;  
4. Research employing either quantitative methods or qualitative methods 
exclusively to study the topic of argumentation present several limitations;  
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5. The researcher had time and interest in engaging in qualitative inquiry. This was 
also feasible, because the timetable developed at the start of the PhD specified 
that the researcher had three years to complete data collection and analysis of a 
series of studies, thus there was enough time to use a variety of techniques; 
6. The researcher was comfortable in using both qualitative and quantitative 
research techniques. 
 
The different techniques for data collection and analysis used in the present 
research are described in the next sections. 
3.3.1. Mixed-methods data collection 
Data collection techniques included the development of new questionnaires 
constructed in various formats (e.g., computer programs), and face-to-face interviews 
and group discussions. When planning for the construction of these measurements, 
qualitative techniques were also used to ensure that the tasks were appropriate for 
children in the age groups selected. For example, in the pilot stage of Studies Three and 
Four, focus groups were used to gather information on the sorts of topics and arguments 
children understand and talk about. These topics and arguments were then used to 
construct questionnaires. More specifically, the five studies included in this thesis 
consisted of:  
1. Interviews with children at different ages to explore the use of argument 
elements (Chapter Four); 
2. Group discussions with children at different ages to identify the use of 
argumentative discourse strategies  (Chapter Five); 
3. Computer-based tasks in questionnaire format to measure children’s evaluation 
and preference for different types of argument (Chapter Six); 
4. A video-based task and a questionnaire to assess children’s understanding of the 
function of persuasive strategies in an argumentative dialogue (Chapter Seven). 
The first study (Chapter Four) charted age differences in children’s (5-, 8-, and 
11-years) ability to generate arguments in response to socio-moral questions. Further, it 
investigated whether engagement in peer group discussions on similar topics led to 
subsequent improvement in children’s individual use of sophisticated argument 
elements (e.g., two-sided arguments) compared to a control group who did not engage 
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in group discussion. This study used individual interviews to examine the specific 
elements that children generate at different ages. The interview format method has been 
used in other relevant research, for example, to study children’s disagreements for moral 
and non-moral issues (Wainryb, Shaw, Laupa, & Smith, 2001), or to explore age 
differences in adults’ argument skills (Kuhn, 1991). Moreover, Weathington, 
Cunningham, and Pittenger (2010) argue that the interview method is best suited to 
describe complex phenomena, and to determine future research questions. Thus, as little 
was known about the topic under study, conducting interviews was deemed necessary 
before attempting to design quantitative measures.  
Indeed, the results obtained in this first study revealed new features of children’s 
competencies that were further examined. The objective of the second study was to 
identify the argumentative strategies used by children in group discussions. Although 
there is a rich literature on peer collaboration that is relevant for this topic (e.g., Doise & 
Mugny, 1984; Forman & Larreamendy-Joerns, 1995; Howe, Tolmie, Anderson, & 
Mackenzie, 1992; Leman, 2002; Leman & Oldham, 2005; Williams & Tolmie, 2000), 
none of these studies have looked particularly at children’s argument strategy, that is, 
children’s ability to direct discourse and use specific elements of argumentation (e.g., 
rebuttal strategy) to convey their points of views effectively and win discussions. 
Accordingly, Kuhn and colleagues’ recent research on argumentative strategies, and 
their development of the transactive coding scheme, was the best suited theoretical and 
methodological approach to use in this second study. Since the objectives, rationale and 
data analysis of this study were different from those used in Study One (Chapter Four), 
the methods and findings are reported in a new chapter (see Chapter Five). These two 
interconnected studies were important to gain an understanding of the complex 
processes involved in the study of argumentation and were then used to inform the 
development of quantitative measures for the next studies.  
In particular, having identified in the previous set of studies developmental 
differences in children’s ability to take into account others’ perspectives, two new 
studies (Chapter Six) were designed to examine how children evaluate arguments and 
counterarguments considering their own and others’ perspectives. In Study Three, a 
computer-based task assessed how 8-year olds and 11 year-olds differ in terms of their 
understanding and evaluation of argument strength. Study Four explored evaluative 
skills in argument effectiveness using a similar computer-based task. Prior to these 
studies, focus groups (a qualitative research technique) with the youngest age group (8-
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year olds) were conducted. The objective of the pilot study was to identify children’s 
knowledge regarding several topics and determine which topics and arguments were 
best suited to be deployed in the main studies. These studies are detailed in Chapter Six. 
The final study further explored the developmental differences in children’s 
argument evaluation skills that were identified in the previous studies. Specifically, 
Study Five (Chapter Seven) explored children’s ability to understand and evaluate goal-
directed arguments and strategies deployed in video-recorded dialogues. An experiment 
was designed using scenarios which featured a blend of technology and human 
interaction. This is the first study of its kind to look at children’s argumentation 
processes in a real social/ dialogical context. In addition, qualitative research techniques 
were also used, including surveys (questionnaires).  
3.3.2. Mixed-methods analysis 
The data analysis technique chosen to be deployed in the first set of studies in 
this thesis was content analysis; one of the most commonly used mixed-methods 
analytical approaches. Content analysis involves the coding of data into categories. The 
qualitative aspect of this analytical approach comes into play during the formation of 
content categories (Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010).  Content categories 
were defined beforehand, based on the existing theory and relevant literature on 
argumentation (e.g., Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn, 1991; Means & Voss, 1996). For 
instance, the reasons offered by children in the interviews to justify their points of view 
(Study One) were coded according to the criteria defined by Means and Voss (1996).  
Also, children’s conversations in peer group discussions were analysed in Study 
Two (see Chapter Five) according to the transactive coding scheme developed by 
Felton and Kuhn (2001). This coding scheme is described in more detail further in this 
chapter. In addition, once children’s responses were categorised and data were sorted in 
the first set of studies, further discussion about the initial categorisation findings led to 
the development of subsequent research designs.  
For the reasons outlined above, the present research argues that a mixed-
methods approach is more informative when attempting to explore and describe age 
differences in children’s argument skills. To summarise, Table 3.1., shown below, 
highlights the methods deployed in the present research, illustrating how they were used 
for primarily quantitative and qualitative research means.  
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Table 3.1. Application of similar methods for quantitative and qualitative research in 
the present studies (portions adapted from Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 
2010, p. 533) 
 Quantitative methods Qualitative methods 
Formal 
interview 
Rating children’s responses to 
specific questions for assessing 
quality of arguments 
Recording and transcribing the 
entire interview, including 
researcher’s questions, children’s 
responses, gaps in conversations, 
etc., viewing all as meaningful 
information to help develop the 
larger program of research 
Peer group 
discussion 
a) Using an analytical coding 
scheme to rate children’s 
argument strategies in peer 
discussions  
b) Using peer discussions as an 
experimental condition and later 
quantifying differences between 
experimental and control groups  
Recording and transcribing the 
entire discussion, children’s 
utterances, speakers’ turns, gaps 
in conversations, etc., viewing all 
as meaningful information 
Questionnaire Gathering self-ratings of 
agreement with descriptive items 
and scales 
Eliciting writing responses to 
open-ended questions or 
comment-request boxes 
3.3.3. Benefits and challenges of mixed-methods research 
Using a mixed-methods approach presents several benefits. Firstly, it can 
provide more comprehensive answers to research questions, going beyond the 
limitations of a single approach. Moreover, it can also provide a basis for triangulation, 
which refers to the process of operationalising and measuring constructs or variables in 
multiple ways to converge upon a more accurate assessment (Webb, Campbell, 
Schwartz, & Sechrest, 2000). In the present research, in particular, combining 
qualitative methods (e.g., conducting focus groups at a preliminary stage) and 
quantitative methods (e.g., random sampling, quantifying differences between groups) 
offered the possibility of engaging in both theory testing and theory building within the 
same research study. As a result, the researcher gained more knowledge about the 
phenomena.  
There are also more practical reasons for using a combined, mixed-methods 
approach. A first reason is that research in psychology is challenged with the goal of 
understanding phenomena that exist within and between people. In particular, any 
efforts to operationalise and quantify social and psychological constructs are always 
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limited by the possibility of error (Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010). Some 
challenges posed by this research were mainly due to idiosyncrasies of study 
participants (i.e., young children) and the context in which the research was conducted 
(i.e., schools).  
In order to overcome these challenges, the present research used many strategies 
for minimising error, for example, through careful design and planning of experiments, 
and collecting data with a variety of methods. Another reason is that using a mixed-
methods approach has positive implications for the generalisability of results, in that a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data provides a clearer picture of the 
phenomena. Moreover, the use of mixed methods provides sufficiently rich data to draw 
accurate and rational inferences (Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010). 
In sum, using a research strategy that integrates different methods can produce 
better results in terms of quality and scope. However, there are also many challenges 
associated with this effort to integrate the two types of research methods. As Bryman 
(2007) is careful to note, researchers have a tendency to report only the quantitative or 
the qualitative data, but not both; or to report findings from one method, followed by 
findings from the other method, without any attempt to integrate them. Moreover, the 
researcher had a personal preference for quantitative methods, so inevitably more 
quantitative techniques were used. In order to overcome these issues, at the end of each 
study chapter and in the final discussion of this thesis (Chapter Eight), the findings from 
the five studies with different methods are compared and convergence is sought.  
3.4. Participants 
 This thesis focuses on argument skills of school-aged children. The participants 
were recruited from primary and secondary schools. The first two studies presented in 
this thesis focused on three developmental stages. Children were 5-, 8-, and 11- years of 
age and were in the first, fourth and seventh level of school education, respectively. The 
next three studies examined age differences in argument evaluation skills. The complex 
nature of the tasks in these studies required recruiting older participants, namely with 
ages ranging from 8 to 12 years.  
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3.4.1. Recruitment 
  Between March 2008 and July 2010, twelve schools situated in the areas of 
Berkshire, Middlesex, Windsor and Maidenhead, Slough, and Surrey, in South East 
England, were approached for recruitment into five studies on age differences in 
children’s argument skills. A total of five hundred and eighty children, aged 5-, 8-, and 
11- years, participated in five experimental studies. Both genders were equally 
represented. Students were of heterogeneous ethnic (mostly European) and 
socioeconomic (mostly middle class) backgrounds. 
3.4.2. Sample characteristics and scope in this project 
 As stated in Chapter Two, the main purpose of the current project was to study 
age differences in children’s argument skills. This research extends the previous 
investigation by involving participants younger than those who participated in the 
studies mentioned in the literature review chapter (e.g, Kuhn, 1991; Means & Voss, 
1996), and takes into account personal variables such as knowledge of, and interest in 
the topic to be argued. These two variables should be controlled, given the findings of 
previous research. For instance, Means and Voss (1996) found that knowledge about the 
topic was related to the number of arguments and types of justifications generated by 
secondary students. Previous research on learning from a text in college students has 
documented that knowledge and interest are both significant predictors of 
comprehension of a text’s meaning (Alexander & Murphy, 1999; Alexander, 
Kulikowich, & Schulze, 1994; Boscolo & Mason, 2003; Schiefele, 1996). Moreover, 
Stein and colleagues have found that preschool children have complex knowledge of 
argument in social situations that are familiar or personally significant, such as past 
conflicts between mother and child (e.g., Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein & Miller, 1993a, 
1993b). Given these findings, it was expected that the two motivating variables - 
knowledge and interest - would influence children’s willingness to persist in the tasks 
and their ability to construct arguments about the topics. Although the effects of topic 
knowledge and interest on argumentation were not directly examined, the tasks 
designed for the present studies were carefully piloted to ensure that children were 
familiar with and engaged in the topics. This is a challenging but an important research 
goal, because the study of arguments related with topics that children understand and 
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are interested in may reveal knowledge and strategies not found when children are 
asked to respond to arguments that carry little personal meaning. 
The first set of studies focused on how children generate arguments, when 
engaging in an interview with the researcher (Study One), and when discussing an 
argumentative topic with their peers (Study Two). In these two studies, tasks involved 
socio-moral topics drawn from children’s story books, written for children aged 5 to 12 
years (e.g., helping others, trusting others, stealing and lying). Because preschool 
children would not be able to engage in the tasks designed for this set of studies, it was 
decided to carry out the project with school-age children only. The starting point was to 
select children in the first level of primary education, when they were 5-6 years old. A 
two-year gap was added to the youngest group for selecting the next two groups. The 
first two studies were, therefore, based on samples of children at three different age 
groups: 5-6 years, 8-9 years, and 11-12 years.  
The next two studies (Studies Three and Four) involved more demanding tasks 
in terms of children’s knowledge of current social issues (e.g., wearing school uniforms 
and receiving pocket money). They also required that children had acquired reading and 
writing skills and had learnt how to use a computer. Hence, the youngest group included 
in these studies were 8-9 year old children. At this age, children are in the fourth level 
of primary education, and they are supposed to have acquired literacy skills, and also 
basic computer skills through Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
lessons. Moreover, at 8 years of age, children are in an important transitional stage in 
terms of starting to take into account other’s perspectives (as concluded from the results 
of the previous studies). The interest here was to compare how 8-year olds and 11-year 
olds evaluate arguments and counterarguments considering their own and others’ 
perspectives. 
The fifth and last study focused on age differences in children’s ability to 
recognise argument strategy in argumentative dialogues. The task required children to 
be good readers in order to comprehend and to fill out a questionnaire, therefore, the 
youngest group included in this study was again 8-9 year old children.  
 In order to better understand the contextual characteristics of the sample 
collected for the present research, a description of the patterns of schooling in England 
is provided in the next section.  
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3.4.3. Contextual characteristics: schools in England 
Children normally start primary school around the age of five, but many schools 
have a reception year for four-year-olds. Primary or elementary education forms the 
first years of formal, structured education that occurs during childhood. Children 
normally move on to secondary school at the age of 11. The division between primary 
and secondary education is somewhat arbitrary, but it generally occurs at about 11-12 
years of age (adolescence). Some educational systems have separate middle schools for 
that period (UK Government website for citizens, 2010).  
There are two main categories of schools in England: state and independent 
schools. All children between the ages of five and 16 are entitled to a free place at a 
state school, so the majority of children attend state schools (UK Government website 
for citizens, 2010). Most state schools admit both boys and girls, though some are 
single-sex. There are four main types of state school: community school, foundation and 
trust school, voluntary-aided school, and voluntary-controlled school. Within the state 
schools system, there are some schools with particular characteristics, which include for 
example: specialist schools, faith schools, and grammar schools. They all receive 
funding from local authorities and follow the National Curriculum (UK Government 
website for citizens, 2010). They are also regularly inspected by the Office for 
Standards in Education, Children's Services and Skills (Ofsted). 
The main functions of Ofsted are to inspect and regulate schools to assess the 
quality and standards of education and identify whether students are achieving as much 
as they can. After the inspection, schools receive an overall grade from 1 to 4: grade 1 
(outstanding), grade 2 (good), grade 3 (satisfactory), and grade 4 (inadequate). The 
inspectors’ findings are published in a report for the school, parents and the wider 
community. The inspection report provides information about how effective the 
school’s work is and contains recommendations about what the school should do to 
improve further (Ofsted website, 2010)   
Independent schools differ from state schools because they are funded by fees 
paid by parents and income from investments. Independent schools set their own 
curriculum and admissions policies, but their standards are also regularly monitored by 
either Ofsted or an inspectorate approved by the Secretary of State (UK Government 
website for citizens, 2010).  
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The National Curriculum includes a set of programmes of study defined for each 
subject and each key stage. The programmes of study (as defined by the Education Act 
1996, section 353b) set out what students should be taught, and attainment targets set 
out the expected standards of students' performance. It is for schools to choose how they 
organise their school curriculum to include the programmes of study. When planning, 
schools should consider the four general teaching requirements: use of language, use of 
information and communication technologies (ICT), health and safety, and inclusion 
(National Curriculum, 2010c).   
The primary curriculum is organised on the basis of two key stages. At key 
stages 1 and 2 the statutory subjects that all students must study are art and design, 
design and technology, English, geography, history, information and communication 
technologies (ICT), mathematics, music, physical education and science. Religious 
education must also be provided at key stages 1 and 2. At the end of key stages 1 and 2, 
children are assessed by National Curriculum Tests (National Curriculum, 2010a; TDA, 
2010). 
The National Curriculum for England at key stages 3 and 4 was first published 
by Qualifications and Curriculum Authority (QCA) in 2007, and implementation started 
in September 2008 (QCDA, 2010; National Curriculum, 2010b). As in the primary 
curriculum, the same four general statutory requirements apply across the secondary 
curriculum. These include the following areas: inclusion of all learners, use of language, 
use of ICT, and health and safety. At the end of key stages 3 and 4, students are 
assessed by national exams. 
The National Curriculum is an important element of the school curriculum.  The 
school curriculum comprises all learning and other experiences that each school plans 
for its students. The two main goals are: (1) to provide opportunities for all students to 
learn and to achieve, and (2) to promote students' spiritual, moral, social and cultural 
development and prepare all pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and 
experiences of life (National Curriculum, 2011).  
As emphasised in the introductory chapter (Chapter One), most teachers 
recognise that intellectual engagement, and critical thinking plays a significant part in 
students’ ability to learn and to achieve. In order to learn content, students need to do 
their own thinking, their own construction of knowledge. However, both National 
Curriculum and school curriculum offer no guidance on how to put critical thinking 
concepts and principles into practice.  
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The topic of this thesis is, thus, extremely relevant for educational practices. 
Indeed, most of the teachers whose students participated in this thesis were interested in 
the activities and experiments conducted in their schools and requested more 
information about the studies, including its results and implications, after they had been 
concluded.  
3.4.4. Data collection 
 The data presented in the five studies of this thesis were collected at schools. In 
total the researcher visited 12 schools, including eight primary schools and four 
secondary schools. Most of these were state schools, and only two were independent 
schools. 
Practical issues such as the availability of research participants, researchers, 
equipment, and space determined the selection of the school. As a result, it was not 
possible to match the sample characteristics for each study in all criteria (such as type of 
school and school performance as reported by Ofsted). Nevertheless, whenever 
possible, children in different age group targets (e.g., 5-year-olds and 8-year-olds) were 
recruited from the same school. In addition, for each of the five studies, samples were 
drawn from schools located in the same broad geographical area. 
In the first two studies, samples were collected from one independent school and 
three different types of state school (voluntary-controlled, voluntary-aided, and 
community schools). Although these schools differed in type, their overall effectiveness 
and student’s achievement results, reported by Ofsted, were similar. Specifically, all 
schools received a report with good results (grade 2). Schools were located in the local 
counties of Windsor and Maidenhead, Surrey and Middlessex, in South East England. 
In the pilot study conducted prior to the next two studies (Studies Three and 
Four), participants were recruited from an independent school with outstanding school 
performance results (grade 1) in Surrey. The sample collected for Study Three was from 
two community schools with similar school performance results (grade 3 or 
satisfactory) from Middlessex and Windsor and Maidenhead. In Study Four children 
were also recruited from community schools, but the secondary school situated in the 
county of Berkshire had better performance results (grade 1 or outstanding) than the 
primary school (grade 3 or satisfactory), located in Slough.  
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For the last study, primary school children were recruited from two community 
schools with satisfactory school performance results (grade 3) located in Windsor and 
Maindenhead, and in Middlessex; whereas secondary school children were drawn from 
a grammar school with outstanding school performance results (grade 1) in Slough. 
Grammar schools select all or most students based on their academic ability.  
 The way in which the different sample characteristics may have affected 
comparisons between groups and the results of the present studies is unclear. To date, 
there has been no systematic research on the effects of culture, educational context, and 
academic performance in children’s argument skills. Nevertheless, this issue receives 
more attention and is further discussed in the concluding chapter (Chapter Eight). 
3.5. Instruments and procedures 
 At the start of the preparation of the present research studies, a survey of 
existing instruments was conducted to determine whether new instruments were needed 
to measure argumentation skills in children at different ages. Both Chapter One and a 
review of the literature (Chapter Two) highlighted the important contribution of Kuhn’s 
approach to the study of argumentation skills. Therefore, a significant part of the present 
research applied and adapted the methods developed by Kuhn and colleagues, including 
individual interviews and analytic schemes to assess argument skills in social/ dialogical 
contexts. The following section describes and evaluates this chosen methodology and 
highlights important practical issues. Methodological challenges and constraints led to 
the need to develop new instruments more appropriate for children.  
3.5.1. Transactive coding scheme 
 Deanna Kuhn, Mark Felton, and colleagues have conducted several research 
studies on how argumentative discourse skills develop with age, starting from 
adolescence. These skills refer to the ability to conduct effective discussions, by 
proposing and defending their own ideas and challenging the opponent’s arguments. In 
order to examine this development, the authors devised a coding scheme for analysing 
dialogues of adolescents and adults on the topic of capital punishment (Felton & Kuhn, 
2001). This coding scheme was also applied on subsequent research studies (e.g., 
Felton, 2004; Kuhn & Udell, 2003, 2007; Udell, 2007). The completed scheme was 
obtained in manual form from Mark Felton, of the San Jose State University, California.  
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Purpose of the coding scheme 
 The coding scheme was designed to describe the interactions between partners 
engaged in a dialogue. The primary purpose of the coding is to classify the interactive 
function of a statement rather than the content of the statement (Felton, 2000). The 
coder must ask, “How is the speaker engaging or interacting with the partner?” Looking 
at the last utterances of both speaker and the partner gives to the coder a window into 
the conversational purpose of an utterance. For example, the coder can determine 
whether the speaker has ignored the partner or not, or how the content of the speaker’s 
utterance relates to the immediate conversation. Because the focus is on how the 
partners’ are interacting, the coder should not relate an utterance to something said long 
ago in the conversation. Instead, the coder focused on the last utterance of the speaker 
and of the partner.  
Terminology of the coding scheme 
 As a convention, each conversational turn participants take through the course of 
a dialogue is referred to as an utterance.  Participants in a dialogue consist of a speaker 
and a partner. The speaker is the person who has produced the utterance under 
consideration; it applies to whichever person is speaking at the moment.  The partner is 
the person to whom the utterance is addressed.  Every utterance exchanged between the 
speaker and the partner is assigned a code from the transactive coding system (some 
utterances will warrant more than one code). According to this scheme, any utterance 
addressed to someone other than the partner (most often the investigator) is assigned a 
Null (see list of codes, below).  
 An important note here is that, in Study Two, this coding scheme was applied to 
group discussions, rather than dialogues. In this case, the coding scheme was adapted to 
fit the characteristics of the discussions. Specifically, groups were formed by five 
children, and all participants took turns during discussions. Participants were referred to 
as speakers. Usually, through the course of a discussion, it was expected that 
participants address the utterance of the last speaker. However, from time to time, the 
investigator asked a child to clarify his/ her position in relation to the last speaker’s 
utterance (e.g., “So, do you disagree with what [child’s name] said?”). In those 
situations, and every time participants responded to the investigator’s prompt questions, 
participants’ utterances were assigned a Null code.  
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Format of the coding scheme 
 The codes in the analytic scheme are divided into two categories: transactive 
questions, and transactive statements. “An utterance is defined as transactive if it 
attempts to engage the partner in discourse either by referring to the partner’s preceding 
utterance or by prompting a response from the partner” (Felton & Kuhn, 2001, p. 139). 
 Transactive questions are those utterances which request a response from the 
partner, for example “What do you mean?” or “Why do you prefer capital punishment 
over life in jail?” (p. 140). They are often stated in the form of a question, but they can 
also take the form of a command or a request to clarify something (e.g., “Now tell me 
why you say that”). Conversely, transactive statements are those utterances which do 
not request a response from the partner. Transactive statements refer to the speaker’s 
thoughts or reactions to the conversation utterances expressed in response to the partner. 
They can also be interpretations of the partner’s thoughts. A list of codes and a brief 
definition of each code are provided in Table 3.2.   
Table 3.2. Analytic scheme for argumentative discourse (from manual by Felton, 2000, 
p. 46-47) 
Transactive questions  
Agree-? A question that asks whether the partner will accept or agree 
with a claim made by the speaker 
Clarify? A request for the partner to clarify his or her proximal 
utterance 
Justify? A request for the partner to support his or her proximal 
position or argument 
Meta-Question? A question which relates to the dialogue itself, rather than the 
content of the dialogue 
Position? A request for the partner to state his or her position on an 
issue 
Probe? A case or a scenario (hypothetical or real) followed by a 
request for the partner to take a position 
Question? A simple informational query which does not refer back to 
the partner’s proximal utterance 
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Transactive questions  
Respond? A request for the partner to react to the speaker’s 
immediately preceding utterance 
Transactive statements 
Agree A statement of agreement with the partner’s preceding 
assertion 
Clarify A clarification of speaker’s own position or argument in 
response to the partner’s immediately preceding utterance 
Continue A continuation or elaboration of the speaker’s own last 
utterance, adding something new 
Counter-A A disagreement with the partner’s immediately preceding 
utterance, accompanied by an alternate argument 
Counter-C A disagreement with the partner’s immediately preceding 
utterance, critiquing it 
Coopt Acknowledgment, implicit or explicit, that the partner’s 
immediately preceding utterance supports or plays into the 
speaker’s position 
Disagree A simple disagreement without further argument 
Dismiss An assertion that the partner’s immediately preceding 
utterance is irrelevant to the speaker’s position 
Extend-O An extension or elaboration of the partner’s immediately 
preceding utterance, adding something new 
Interpret A rewording of the partner’s immediately preceding 
utterance without simply repeating the utterance verbatim or 
adding something new 
Meta- statement [see meta sub codes] An utterance which relates to the 
dialogue itself, rather than the content of the dialogue 
Null An unintelligible or irrelevant utterance 
Refuse An explicit claim by the speaker to be unable or unwilling to 
respond to the partner’s transactive question 
Respond The answer to a Question? which does not advance or clarify 
the speaker’s position 
Restart A statement following a string of utterances coded null that 
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Transactive questions  
attempts to re-engage the partner in conversation about the 
topic 
Unconnected A statement with no obvious connection to the immediately 
preceding utterances of either the partner or the speaker 
 
The coding scheme also includes Meta Sub Codes. These include: (1) Meta-
directive: asking the other side to do something; (2) Meta-comprehension; (3) Meta-
position; (4) Meta-argument: regarding the argument; (5) Meta-argumentation: 
regarding the process of argumentation; (6) Meta-t: reference to a technical issue or 
time; (7) Meta-clarify task; (8) Meta-scenario; (9) Meta-clarify; and (10) Victory claim. 
However, because the focus of the present research was not on the study of the 
meta-cognitive abilities, these codes were not applied to the discourse of children who 
participated in the studies of this thesis. As referred in the literature review chapter 
(Chapter Two), there is now a substantial body of literature on issues regarding 
argument skills and epistemological understanding (e.g., Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kuhn, 
in press; Kuhn & Felton, 2001; Kuhn & Pearsall, 2000;  Kuhn & Udell, 2003; Kuhn & 
Weinstock, 2002; Kuhn, Cheney, & Weinstock, 2000; Stanovich, 1999; Weinstock & 
Cronin, 2003). It is not within the scope of this thesis to address these issues, but rather 
to explore the salient features of children’s argumentative discourse. 
Theoretical framework for the coding scheme 
 The codes of this analytic scheme are related to some of the elements of Searle’s 
(1979) taxonomy, developed in his theory of speech acts. Transactive questions and 
statements (Felton & Kuhn, 2001) include both assertives and commissives from 
Searle’s taxonomy (1979).  
 Speech Act Theory appears as extremely relevant in the study of argumentation 
theory, particularly argumentative discourse. The two classic books on speech act 
theory are How to do things with words by Austin (1962), and Searle’s (1969) 
Discussion of speech acts, which constitutes an important update of the theory. In 1962, 
Austin stated for the first time that stating or describing is only one function of language 
and, thus, some utterances are not statements or questions about some relevant 
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information, but are actions. Searle (1979) classified speech acts into five basic 
categories, based on the classification of Austin (1962):  
 1. Assertives: according to Searle, the purpose of the components of the assertive 
class is to “commit the speaker to something being in the case, to the truth of the 
expressed proposition.” Searle explain that all these components “are assessable on the 
dimension of assessment which includes true and false” (p. 12) 
 2. Directives: these consist of “attempts by the speaker (in varying degrees) to 
get the hearer to do something, i.e., to perform a speech act” (p. 13). Searle gives some 
examples of verbs of this class: ask, order, command, request, beg, plead, pray, entreat, 
and also, invite, permit, and advise.  
 3. Commissives: consist of speech acts whose point is “to commit the speaker 
(again in varying degrees) to some future course of action” (p. 14). The difference 
between directives and comissives is that the latter consist of requests to try to get the 
hearer to do something, not necessarily to commit or obligate him to do it.  
 4. Expressives: the purpose of this class is “to express the psychological state 
specified in the sincerity condition about a state of affairs specified in the propositional 
content” (p. 15). Expressive verbs include: thank, congratulate, apologize, condole, 
deplore, and welcome.  
 5. Declarations: these include making a statement in which the propositional 
content corresponds to the reality. Searle exemplifies: “If I successfully perform the act 
of nominating you as a candidate, then you are a candidate” (p. 17).  
 In some cases, the speaker utters a sentence that does not mean exactly and 
literally what he says. For example, in hints, insinuation, irony and metaphor, the 
speaker’s utterance meaning might not correspond to the sentence meaning. These are 
indirect speech acts (Searle, 1979). As noted above, the analytic scheme proposed by 
Felton and Kuhn (2001) relates to only two of the five categories of speech acts 
classified in Searle’s taxonomy (1979), which are assertives and commissives. 
 The development of this methodology also drew on the framework originating 
with Walton (1989), who conceived two goals of argumentation. The first is to obtain 
commitments from the opponent that can be used to support one’s own claims. The 
second is to challenge and weaken the opponent’s position, by critiquing his or her 
claims. Both of these goals mandate that arguers pay attention to the ideas of the 
opposing side (Felton & Kuhn, 2001). Thus, the analytic scheme is transactional in 
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nature because the strength of an argument, or the extent to which an argument is 
effective, is determined by whether and how an arguer addresses the ideas advanced by 
the opposing side (Goldstein, Crowell, & Kuhn, 2009).  
 The strategies that can be found in argumentative discourse of adolescents and 
adults (Felton & Kuhn, 2001) function to direct discourse to address these two goals. 
The definition and coding of these strategies are detailed in the next section. 
Development of the analytic scheme and definition of strategic sequences 
 The coding scheme was first used to identify the strategies that appeared in 
simple argumentative discourse, that is, the argumentative discourse of individuals not 
explicitly trained in these aspects. The scheme was then employed to compare the 
argumentative discourse strategies exhibited by a group of adolescents to those 
exhibited by a group of adults (Felton & Kuhn, 2001). Provisional codes were applied 
to the pilot data, and a total of four researchers came together to ascertain reliability and 
identify new codes for any utterances that were not classifiable in the provisional 
system. This process involved some revisions and additions to the initial scheme drafted 
in 2000 (obtained in manual form from Mark Felton). These changes included:  
1. Inclusion of a third category in the analytic scheme - nontransactive statements. 
“Nontransactive statements are utterances that do not connect to the partner’s 
preceding utterance, that is, they neither address the partner’s preceding 
utterance, nor prompt the partner to respond” (Felton & Kuhn, 2001, p. 140) 
These include utterances coded as Continue and Unconnected. Continue should 
be coded when the speaker ignores the partner’s preceding utterance and 
continues his or her own idea. Unconnected should be coded when the partner 
breaks from the preceding conversation and introduces a new argument or idea.  
2. Rename the code Probe?, defined as a case or a scenario (hypothetical or real) 
followed by a request for the partner to take a position. This code was later 
called Case? 
3. Replacement of the code Extend-O, defined as an extension or elaboration of the 
partner’s immediately preceding utterance, adding something new, by two more 
specific transactive statements: Add, and Advance. The code Add is defined as 
an extension or elaboration of the partner’s preceding utterance, and the code 
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Advance is defined as an extension or elaboration of the partner’s preceding 
argument.  
4. Inclusion of the code Aside, defined as a comment that does not extend or 
elaborate the partner’s preceding utterance; and the code Substantiate, defined as 
an utterance offered in support of the partner’s preceding utterance. 
5. Exclusion of the code Restart.  
 This revised and summarised version of the analytic scheme, published in 2001 
by Felton and Kuhn, was used in the studies presented in this thesis. However, Felton’s 
manual (2000) was also consulted for more detailed information on the definition and 
description of each code. 
 This analytic scheme also includes the coding of strategic sequences. Felton and 
Kuhn (2001) defined strategic sequences as, “patterns of utterances that might represent 
an attempt to advance or pre-empt an extended argumentative strategy” (p. 145). Based 
on this analytic system, four sequences of codes were identified: (1) Corner sequence, 
identified when the speaker asks the partner to clarify his position (Clarify-?), or when 
the speaker tries to interpret the other’s response (Interpret), and then, challenges his 
view advancing a Counter-C; (2) Case-? sequence, which is a variant of the corner 
sequence defined by Clarify-?, followed by a Counter-C. Instead of Clarify-?, the 
opening statement is Case-?; (3) Rebuttal is defined as presenting a counterargument 
that follows another counterargument (Counter-A or Counter- C) produced by the 
partner; (4) Blocking occurs when the speaker presents a Counter-C, to reject or 
counter-argue the premise of a leading question (e.g., Case-?) posed by the preceding 
speaker.  
 In Study Two (Chapter Five), these strategic sequences were identified in peer 
discussions produced by children in three different age groups. Furthermore, in Study 
Five (Chapter Seven), these strategies were used in argumentative dialogues as stimuli 
to test whether children recognise the pragmatic function that these strategies play in 
discussions between arguers.  
Multiple coding  
 Following studies by Kuhn and colleagues, in which the coding scheme was 
applied (e.g., Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Udell, 2003), all discussions were 
transcribed and coded by two trained coders blind to treatment, time, and identity of the 
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participants. The coders were the researcher, and the researcher’s supervisor. 
Discussions were examined for inter-coder reliability, and disagreement between coders 
was resolved by discussion. The researcher coded all discussions, while the researcher’s 
supervisor randomly sampled 20% of the coded discussions and recoded them to 
establish reliability. Reliability is reported in each study chapter. 
Advantages of the coding scheme 
 This coding scheme can be applied to a broad range of topics. It was originally 
applied to the topic of capital punishment (Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). 
Later, Kuhn’s colleagues applied the coding scheme to the topics of abortion (Felton, 
2004) and teen pregnancy (Udell, 2007) in a population of adolescents.  
 For instance, Kuhn and Udell (2003) and Udell (2007) conducted intervention 
studies with adolescents in which this coding scheme was applied. In particular, the 
study conducted by Kuhn and Udell (2003) tested the effectiveness of an intervention 
designed to foster adolescent’s argument skills on the topic of capital punishment. 
Later, Udell (2007) conducted a study to replicate the previous findings, so she tested 
the effectiveness of an intervention in developing adolescent’s argument skills on a 
personally relevant topic (teen pregnancy) or one of general social relevance (capital 
punishment). Additionally, Udell (2007) explored the differential effects of the two 
topics in promoting the transferability of skills to the new topic. In both studies, 
participants were assigned to pro and con teams formed with peers with contrasting 
views. All participants then engaged in sessions with a collaborative, goal-based activity 
providing practice for argumentative thinking. Key-features of these activities included: 
(1) generating reasons, (2) elaborating reasons, (3) supporting reasons with evidence, 
(4) evaluating reasons, (5) developing reasons into an argument, (6) examining and 
evaluating the opposing side’s reasons, (7) generating counterarguments to others’ 
reasons, (8) generating rebuttals to others’ counterarguments, (9) contemplating mixed 
evidence, (10) conducting and evaluating two-sided arguments. Participants were then 
assigned to two conditions; one condition included peer dialogues, and another did not.  
 Interventions in both studies were successful in developing adolescents’ 
argument skills. Specifically, participants who engaged in the full intervention activity 
showed an increase in the use of high quality counterarguments (Counter-C) in the 
posttest assessment. Unlike the previous study, the intervention in the second study was 
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not effective in improving adolescents’ use of the rebuttal strategy (Udell, 2007). The 
study conducted by Udell (2007) also showed that only the intervention focusing on the 
personally relevant topic (teen pregnancy) resulted in the transfer to the less personal 
topic (capital punishment). Transfer to the opposite direction did not occur.  
These studies showed that argument skills develop and that engagement in an 
argumentative discourse activity can promote that development. However, the findings 
also indicated that skills in argumentation are not transferable to all topics, and the 
mechanisms governing transfer remain unclear (Udell, 2007). These intervention studies 
confirm the relevance of studying cognitive development and the reasoning that 
underlies people’s claims, although they involve adolescents and young adults rather 
than the age group of current interest. Nonetheless, because the coding scheme was 
successfully applied in studies with adults using several socio-moral topics, it was worth 
testing whether it could also be applied to studies with young children. The topics 
chosen to be deployed in Study Two (Chapter Five) was also of a socio-moral nature 
(e.g., helping friends, trusting others, and stealing). 
 This method offers other advantages. First, the coding scheme is based on a 
theoretical framework, as noted in a previous section in this chapter. Moreover, it 
allows a direct look at communication via transcripts, and thus gets at the central aspect 
of social interaction. At the same time, it constitutes an unobtrusive means of analysing 
those interactions. It also has the advantage of allowing both quantitative and qualitative 
operations (Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010). Table 3.3, presented below, 
summarises the advantages and challenges of using this coding scheme in the present 
research.  
Potential limitations of the coding scheme 
 This coding scheme was originally created to be applied to dyadic discussions, 
so the major limitation of using this scheme in the present research was that the coding 
system had to be adapted to fit the discourse of more than two speakers. Specifically, 
groups were formed of five children, and all participants took turns during discussions. 
As mentioned earlier, when necessary, in order to verify whether a speaker had 
addressed the utterance of the last speaker, the investigator had to ask a child to clarify 
his or her position in relation to the last speaker’s utterance (e.g., “So, do you disagree 
with what [child’s name] said?”). In those situations, and every time participants 
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responded following the investigator’s prompt, participants’ utterances were assigned a 
Null code. However, this happened rather infrequently, as children tended to address or 
reply to the last speaker in a discussion. 
Another disadvantage of applying this coding scheme is that it is extremely 
time-consuming.  Moreover, it can be subject to error, especially when the coder tries to 
make inferences or interpret the data. Thus, particular attention was given to intercoder 
reliability to ensure validity of the coding. However, as shown in Table 3.3., the 
potential advantages of applying this coding scheme far outweigh its disadvantages.  
Table 3.3. Advantages and challenges of applying the transactive coding scheme in the 
present research 
Advantages  Potential limitations and how they were 
overcome in the present research 
• Can be applied on a broad range 
of topics (e.g., capital 
punishment, abortion, teen 
pregnancy) 
• It was originally developed to be 
applied to dyadic discussions, but it 
was adapted to fit the discourse of 
group.  
• Its validity was tested in several 
studies (e.g., Felton, 2004; 
Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & 
Udell, 2003; Udell, 2007) 
• It is time-consuming 
• It was developed on a 
theoretical framework, 
including the Goal-based 
Theory (Walton, 1989), and the 
Theory of Speech Acts (Searle, 
1979). 
• Subject to human error. For this 
reason, multiple coding was 
applied in the analysis. All 
discussions were transcribed and 
coded by the researcher. A second 
coder (the researcher’s supervisor) 
randomly sampled 20% of the 
coded discussions and recoded 
them to establish reliability. Both 
coders were blind to treatment, 
time, and identity of the 
participants. 
• It permits looking directly at 
communication via transcripts, 
and thus gets at the central 
aspect of social interaction 
 
• It is an unobtrusive means of 
analysing discourse in social 
interactions 
 
• It allows both quantitative and 
qualitative operations in further 
analyses 
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3.5.2. Surveys: interviews and questionnaires 
 Stangor (2007) defines a survey as “a series of self-report measures administered 
either through an interview or a written questionnaire” (p. 103). Surveys are used to 
collect descriptive data from a sample of individuals. The goal is to produce a 
“snapshot” of the points of view, attitudes or behaviours of a group of people at a given 
time. Both interview and questionnaire approaches were used in the studies outlined in 
this thesis.  
 The research interview is used to assess individuals’ thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviours (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). The researcher in one-to-one interviews 
collects personal information from participants using a series of oral questions. One 
advantage of in-person interviews is that they may allow the researcher to develop a 
closer rapport and sense of trust with the participant (Stangor, 2007). This is of 
particular relevance when interviewing a young population, because children may often 
feel shy or fearful around strangers (Breakwell, 1995). When children start feeling 
comfortable around the researcher, they are more motivated to continue the interview 
and to give more honest and open responses.  However, one disadvantage of face-to-
face interviews is that they are extremely time-consuming both in terms of conducting 
and transcribing them.  
 Interviews can give both qualitative and quantitative data, depending on the 
standardisation and/ or free ranging nature of questions asked (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009). In order to obtain more objective data, a structured interview, which uses 
quantitative fixed-format items, was chosen for the methodology of Study One (see 
Chapter Four). The questions were prepared ahead of time, and the researcher read the 
questions to the participant. A detailed interview structure is outlined in the next 
subsection.  
The structured interview has the advantage over an unstructured interview in 
allowing better comparisons of the responses across participants, because the research 
topic is investigated in a consistent way, that is, the questions, time frame and response 
format are the same for each participant. It is then possible to generalise the findings to 
the population from which the interview sample was drawn (Stangor, 2007). Stein and 
Miller (1993a) also recognised the need to conduct more developmental studies on the 
ability to understand and generate discourse under more structures circumstances, rather 
than rely on the results obtained on the basis of children’s spontaneous generation of 
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arguments. Spontaneous argumentative discourse is constrained by quality and type of 
evidence offered by the arguers. Sophisticated reasoning may be used only if necessary 
or demanded in response to a question or a counterargument. Thus, using a structured 
interview allows a better examination of children’s complex argument skills.  
There are also disadvantages associated with the structured interview format. 
For instance, this format can make it difficult to examine complex skills, such as the 
skills involved in producing and defending points of views and arguments. Moreover, 
restrictive questioning may lead to restrictive answers. There is also the consideration of 
whether the questions are valid, that is, whether they measure the skill that they were 
supposed to be measuring.  
Interview to assess argument generation (adapted from Kuhn, 1991) 
 In the book The Skills of Argument (1991), Kuhn described a carefully designed 
and executed set of interviews about the understanding and use of arguments in the 
broad sense. The study involved subjects across the life span, ranging in age from 
adolescence to late adulthood. Kuhn (1991) asked questions that most people have 
occasion to think and talk about in everyday life, such as "What causes prisoners to 
return to crime after they are released?"; "What causes unemployment?"; "What causes 
children to fail in school?" Participants were asked to offer their own explanations 
regarding the cause of the phenomenon and then asked to provide supporting evidence 
for their assertions. The fact that people were asked about real, meaningful issues that 
were familiar to them in their own experience is an important feature of this study and 
one that sets it apart from traditional research on reasoning. Another defining feature of 
Kuhn’s methodology (1991) is that it allowed an examination of individuals’ ability to 
produce arguments and counterarguments (in a similar way that would occur in a 
dialogic, social context), but in a one-to-one interview. More specifically, after 
participants produced justifications to support their points of view, they were challenged 
with opposing assertions and asked to evaluate the new evidence. For example, to elicit 
opposing positions and counterarguments, the interviewer asked: “Suppose now that 
someone disagreed with your view that this is the cause. What might they say to show 
that you were wrong?” Then, the participant was asked for a rebuttal: “What could you 
say to show that this person was wrong?” (Kuhn, 1991, p. 17).  
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 This approach made it possible to examine individuals’ mastery of 
argumentative reasoning skills while avoiding many of the complicating factors, of a 
social nature, that are involved in dialogic contexts (Kuhn, 1991). This idea of 
connecting social and mental processes had already been noticed by some researchers. 
The most influential were Vygotsky (1978) and Piaget (1950) who incorporated it in 
their theories. However, Kuhn’s research (1991) offered an important update to these 
early theories and contributed to a better understanding of how people reason about 
everyday phenomena. Since its publication, Kuhn’s study (1991) has had a great 
influence on investigators concerned with the development of reasoning competences, 
such as Leitão (2003), Means and Voss (1996), and Voss and van Dyke (2001).  
In this research, Kuhn’s work also served as a theoretical and methodological 
basis to establish the criteria of quality of arguments. In the present research, however, 
the focus was on early development: childhood and early adolescence. For instance, 
Study One (Chapter Four) evaluated whether children, aged 5-, 8-, and 11- years, were 
able to generate various elements of argumentation, such as counterarguments. Table 
3.4. provides an illustration of the interview used in the pretest assessment of children’s 
argument skills. The interview structure was adapted from Kuhn (1991), who assessed 
similar skills in adolescents and adults. Follow-up questions and probes were used in 
interviews to reinforce instructions, in order to clarify meaning and to give 
encouragement to research participants. These included both verbal (e.g., “Uh huh”; 
“Mmm”; “Can you tell me more about that?”; “Can you think of other reasons to justify 
your point of view?), and non-verbal probes (e.g., nod of the head; silent pause). 
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Table 3.4. Interview for assessment of argument skill illustrated for the sharing topic 
(adapted from Kuhn, 1991, p. 299-300) 
Generating arguments and reasons 
1) Do you think that ___? (e.g., people should share their things with others or keep 
what they like for themselves?)  
2) Why? Try to give reasons to explain your position. 
a) (Probe, if necessary) Can you give some reasons why you think “people 
should ___?” 
b) If you were trying to convince someone (or a child with the same age) that 
your view is right, what reasons could you mention to convince that person 
that “people should ___?” 
c)  (Probe, when child completes initial response) Can you think of anything 
else? 
Generating opposing positions and counterarguments 
1) Imagine now that someone disagreed with your opinion that “people should ___ 
because ___” What opposing reasons could this person say to show that you were 
wrong?  
a)  (If child does not understand) Suppose a person has a view very different from 
yours - what might they say to convince you that you were wrong?  
b)  (Probe, if necessary) Can you think of anything else? 
c) (If both sides of the question mentioned and counterarguments already 
indicated) You mentioned some reasons why “people should ___” Just to be 
sure I understand, can you explain a little bit more about these reasons, or think 
about other reasons to justify this alternative position?  
Generating rebuttals 
1) And what could you say to convince this person that he or she is wrong?  
a) (Include if no counterargument generated) Suppose that someone disagreed 
with you and said that people should ___ because ___. What could you say to 
show that the person was wrong? 
b)  (If not already indicated) What could you say to show that your own opinion 
is the correct one and what reasons would you give to defend it? 
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A questionnaire is a set of fixed-format, self-report items that is completed by 
participants (Stangor, 2007). Self-administered questionnaires include instructions to 
the respondent, for example answering procedures (“Tick-one”; “Put a circle on the 
item you prefer”), and participants can answer at their own pace, often without 
supervision. In computer-assisted questionnaires (used in Studies Three and Four), 
instructions, definitions and routing directives appeared on the screen in the particular 
coding used by the system. In comparison to interviews, questionnaires may produce 
more honest responses, because participants are more likely to perceive them as being 
anonymous, and thus may be more likely to respond truthfully. Moreover, 
questionnaires are more likely to be less influenced by the characteristics of the 
researcher, because the researcher is not directly asking the questions like in interviews 
(Stangor, 2007).  
Since the target population in the present research involved young children, the 
researcher was always present when the questionnaire was being completed and ready 
to clarify any questions. Also, for the youngest group of children (8-9 years), the 
researcher “worked through” the questionnaire, by reading the questions aloud and 
providing further clarifications whenever necessary. Thus, like in the previous method 
(interviews), it is likely that the researcher’s characteristics (for example, gender, age, 
accent, etc.) influenced children’s willingness to participate and to answer accurately. 
Although such researcher effects could not be eliminated, steps were taken to control 
them. For instance, the female researcher conducted all studies involving questionnaires 
and interviews. This allowed holding constant the stimulus provided by the researcher. 
Moreover, the researcher followed guidelines to clarify children’s questions consistently 
and debrief participants in a systematic manner.  
 The design of questionnaires was carefully planned to appear brief and 
interesting. Additionally, the researcher tried to increase children’s response rate and 
motivation, by ensuring the confidentiality of all data, by emphasising the importance of 
their participation in the research and by providing praise and stickers (e.g., “Well 
done!”; “Keep up the good work!”) for completing the questionnaire.  
Question response formats 
 There are two main types of questions: open-ended questions that ask 
participants to generate their own responses to the questions, and closed-ended 
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questions that require participants to select a response choice from a set of options 
(Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010). For the purpose of the present 
research, and accordingly for the research questions and hypotheses formulated, 
questionnaires were constructed with only closed-ended questions. Furthermore, closed-
ended questions were preferred over open-ended questions for two reasons. First, many 
children, especially the youngest group (8-9 years), would have had difficulty in writing 
out their own responses or would had provided minimal or vague answers to open-
ended questions. Second, the closed-ended response format is easier to evaluate 
objectively.  
 The formats for closed-response question used in the present studies were 
numerical response format, and forced choice alternatives. In some studies, these two 
formats were combined. The numerical response format, often referred to as the Likert 
format (Likert, 1932), is one of the most common options for the closed-response 
format questionnaire for two main reasons (Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 
2010). First, it offers a clear and unambiguous ordinal scale of measurement. Second, 
the same format can be used for several different questions, so that responses to 
multiple questions can be combined to obtain an average score.  
 The scales designed for Study Three (detailed in Chapter Six) used a Likert 
response format. A five-point response set was employed in these scales. The 
middlemost response option in these scales was a neutral choice (e.g., neither or 
neutral). The advantage of offering a middle alternative position is that participants will 
not feel forced or constrained to choose one of the polar positions (e.g., agree or 
disagree), which could produce an unreliable measure (Clark-Carter, 2009). Figure 3.1. 
presents examples of a Likert-type response format used in Study Three.  As shown in 
Figure 3.1., visual cues (figures of thumbs up and down) were added to facilitate 
children’s understanding of the scale.  
 
Children should wear school uniforms 
    
 
    
 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Agree 
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Children should wear school uniforms, because… 
uniforms are easy to wear. 
    
 
    
 
Very Weak Weak Neutral Strong Very Strong 
Figure 3.1. Examples of the Likert format drawn from methodology of Study Three 
Study Four (Chapter Six) and Study Five (Chapter Seven) used both the Likert 
format and forced choice format. In the forced choice format, participants were asked to 
select a response that best represented their answer to the question. In Study Four, 
children were asked to click (using the mouse of the computer) on the statement that 
best answered the question (see Figure 3.2). In Study Five (see Chapter Seven), children 
were given a paper-and-pencil format questionnaire and asked to choose one of the 
several alternative items. Figure 3.3 represents examples of forced choice alternative 
items used in Study Five. 
 
 
 
I am Thomas. I think children SHOULD wear school uniforms. 
Which one of these arguments is most likely to persuade Thomas that children should 
NOT wear uniforms? 
uniforms stop children being creative 
uniforms are dull, and uniforms can be expensive 
Figure 3.2. Example of forced choice alternatives used in Study Four 
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Please check or circle the appropriate number: 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the 
list would you pick as the most important 
thing to explain your previous answer? 
(1) The inventor had the best arguments 
(2) The opponent had the best arguments 
(3) Both inventor and opponent had 
strong arguments 
(4) I do not know 
  
Who do you think should be the winner 
for the category “Technology” in this 
competition? 
      Inventor of the translation telephone       
      Inventor of the flying car         
Figure 3.3. Example of forced choice alternatives used in Study Five 
3.5.3. Challenges of conducting surveys with children in schools  
 Conducting surveys (interviews and questionnaires) with children in schools 
presents several challenges. For example, there are the logistics of lessons and breaks to 
cope with, which result in limited time to interview children on an individual basis 
(Oppenheim, 1992). There are the additional problems of overcoming the children’s 
possible fear of strangers and obtaining honest and valid responses. Children are often 
unwilling to assert themselves or to contradict an adult and, therefore, they tend to 
answer questions in the way they think the researcher expects them to do (Breakwell, 
1995). In order to overcome this difficulty, children were told by the researcher that she 
was only interested in their ideas and that there were no right or wrong answers.  
Children were also reassured that their participation was voluntary and that they 
were allowed to withdraw from the study at any point if they did not wish to continue.  
In addition, particular attention was given to the wording of the instructions and the 
questions, to avoid acquiescence bias.  There is a strong acquiescence response bias in 
children: they tend to say “yes”, irrespective of the question or what they think about it, 
particularly when they are eager to please (Breakwell, 1995). Therefore, when children 
gave yes/no answers, prompt questions were used to elicit more ideas. Children also 
exhibit a preference for “don’t know” responses. They say “don’t know” for various 
reasons: they are not interested in answering, they do not understand the question, they 
are too shy to say more, they do not know how to explain what they know, and they 
really do not know. Thus, conclusions based on “don’t know” responses were treated 
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with caution in the discussion of the studies. Each of the four empirical chapters 
presented in this thesis addressed this question in more detail.  
Another difficulty in conducting surveys with children is that they are relatively 
easily distracted. Young children tend to pay attention to unpredictable aspects of the 
interview or the questions. In order to improve children’s concentration, the researcher 
chose, whenever possible, a quiet location in school, for example an empty classroom or 
the library. Interviews and questionnaires were also kept short, for example, in Study 
One, individuals interviews took less than 10 minutes to complete. Moreover, the 
researcher tried to retain children’s attention by covering different topics in the 
interviews, changing the pace, and asking questions accompanied with visual materials. 
For instance, in Studies Three and Four computer-based questionnaires included figures 
and visual clues (e.g., thumb-up or thumbs-down, see Figure 3.1).  
In many situations, either during interviews or completion of questionnaires, 
children tended to ask the researcher a lot of personal questions. They were curious 
about the researcher, for example whether she was new, and why she was there. The 
strategy adopted here was to respond to the questions briefly, without showing any 
exasperation. Occasionally, a child got into the infinite series of “Why?” questions. In 
these cases, the researcher tried to distract the child with a new topic.  
Some children, who were shy or had vocabulary deficits, showed hesitation in 
answering questions. In these occasions, the researcher avoided offering suitable words. 
Instead, children were told that they could take as much time as they needed to think 
about and answer the question. An alternative strategy was to rephrase the question or 
move on to the next topic.  
Moreover, because children were tested at schools, they had to leave the 
classroom, complete the survey and return to the class. Once back, they were liable to 
talk about the interview or the questionnaire with other classmates who would 
subsequently participate in the study. This introduced the possibility of a feedback loop 
with early participants acting as informants for later participants. As a result, the later 
participants could develop a distorted expectation of what the research task entailed. In 
order to overcome this problem, later participants were asked what they heard and what 
they expected and then any misconceptions were clarified. This was better controlled in 
Studies Three and Four, in which computer-based tasks were used, because all children 
in the class completed the test at the same time. Another advantage of using computer-
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based tasks was that the questions and topics were randomised, making it more difficult 
for early participants to inform later participants.   
Recording interviews and children’s interactions can be especially difficult when 
the researcher is taking notes. For instance, children may give contradictory responses, 
or they may lose interest while the researcher is taking notes. For these reasons, the 
interviews (Study One) and group discussions (Study Two) were recorded using audio 
or video recording.  
Another difficulty in conducting surveys with children at different ages is to 
design interviews and questionnaires adequate to their level of literacy and knowledge. 
In order to overcome this problem, the procedures were reviewed carefully in the pilot 
stage. Furthermore, prior to the design, the researcher spent some time observing and 
assisting in classroom activities, to become more familiar with the activities that 
students normally undertake in school.  For instance, the idea of designing a task about 
scientific inventions (Study Five) came up after observing that science competitions 
were a popular activity among fourth graders in various schools.  
 In sum, there are a number of challenges in interviewing children in schools that 
were carefully evaluated before designing and conducting the research studies presented 
in this thesis. These include: duration of lessons and breaks in schools; fear of strangers; 
the tendency to say “yes”; the tendency to say “don’t know”; susceptibility to 
distraction; the urge to prompt; feedback loops; recording difficulties; and creating 
appropriate surveys for children. 
3.5.4. Sampling and generalisation 
 Random sampling requires the specification of a population of subjects and then 
the assurance that each subject has an equally likely chance of being selected for the 
study (Keppel & Wickens, 2004). In order to meet these conditions, students were 
selected randomly from a class in a specific year group, and then each student was 
invited to participate in the study in a random order.  
 Besides selecting randomly the sample of students in schools, each subject was 
then assigned randomly to different conditions in the experiments. For instance, in 
Study One (see Chapter Four), children were assigned randomly to one of the treatment 
conditions - the control group and the experimental group. Both random sampling and 
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random assignment are important requirements for the generalisability of the results of 
the studies to the population (Keppel & Wickens, 2004).   
3.5.5. Piloting 
 Conducting studies with school children requires additional care in the pilot 
stage (Oppenheim, 1992). Small-scale studies were designed to test logistics and gather 
information prior to the larger studies in order to improve the latter’s quality and 
efficiency. In this preliminary stage, different methods were used, including focus 
groups and survey questionnaires. These procedures are further explained in the sections 
that follow. 
Focus group 
 Focus group is a method of inquiry designed to collect qualitative data. Byers 
and Wilcox (1991) describe focus groups as discussion groups that address a particular 
topic or topics. One of the characteristics that distinguishes focus groups from other 
qualitative methods is the group discussion. Krueger and Casey (2009) define focus 
group interviews as “a planned series of discussions designed to obtain perceptions on a 
defined area of interest in a permissive, non-threatening environment” (p. 2). The major 
assumption of the focus groups is that with a permissive atmosphere that fosters a range 
of opinions, a better understanding of the topics will be obtained. There are a variety of 
definitions of focus groups. These definitions usually contain the following core 
elements (Vaughn, Schumm, & Sinagub, 1996, p. 5): (i) the group is an informal 
assembly of target persons whose points of view are requested to address a selected 
topic; (ii) the group is small, 6 to 12 members, and is relatively homogenous; (iii) a 
moderator with prepared questions and probes sets the stage and induces participants’ 
responses; (iv) the goal is to elicit perceptions, feelings, attitudes, and ideas of 
participants about a selected topic; and (v) focus groups do not generate quantitative 
information that can be projected to a larger population.  
Focus groups differ from other small-group interview procedures for two 
reasons (Vaughn, Schumm, & Sinagub, 1996). First, in contrast to informal small 
groups conducted to collect people’s points of view, focus groups are more organised, 
more formal, and the findings result from analysis of the transcriptions from the 
interviews. A second distinction between focus groups and small groups is that small 
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groups are usually carried out with the goal of consensus building or problem solving. 
In contrast, reaching a consensus is not an explicit goal of focus groups. Rather, the 
main goal is to find out people’s points of view on a topic.  
 This method was chosen for the pilot study of Studies Three and Four, discussed 
in Chapter Six. The main goal of using focus groups for this pilot study was to gather 
children’s points of view and knowledge on different topics. Two focus groups (of 6 
children each) were formed, rather than just one in order to obtain a better sense of 
which topics were most important. Having more than one group enables an 
identification of which issues are specific to a single group and which ones come up 
repeatedly (Morgan, 1998). A less structured approach of focus group was chosen, 
because the purpose of using the focus group technique was exploratory. The specific 
objectives were to discover children’s perspective on the proposed research topics, and 
to generate new ideas and insights related to those topics. Because the emphasis was on 
discovery and exploration, the researcher gave children the freedom to determine the 
content of their discussions and used a flexible approach to create a productive group 
dynamic.  
The researcher exercised direct control over the discussion only in rare 
occasions, for example, when one child was dominating the entire discussion and not 
letting other children participate. Open-ended questions were used to explore the topics 
and generate ideas. The resulting responses from the group discussions were then used 
as a basis for developing a meaningful set of closed alternatives for these studies.  
 Focus groups are best used to obtain participants’ opinions but not to determine 
the exact strength of their opinions (Vaughn, Schumm, & Sinagub, 1996). Although the 
researcher can probe to determine how strongly participants feel, quantitative methods 
are more appropriate for that information. For this reason, the pilot studies conducted 
also included the use of survey measures, which are described in the next section. 
Survey questionnaire 
 Survey questionnaires are extremely useful for obtaining a large quantity of data 
quickly and with minimal expense (Weathington, Cunningham, & Pittenger, 2010). For 
these reasons, a questionnaire was developed prior to conducting Study Five (see 
Chapter Seven) to gather information on the sorts of arguments individuals consider 
strong. The data obtained in this pilot stage were then used to devise materials for the 
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main study. For this particular pilot study, a convenience sample was used, that is, 
undergraduate students were chosen to take part in the study because they were easy to 
find. 
3.5.6. Using computers to collect data 
 Collecting data from research participants with computers has several important 
advantages. First, computers can help standardise conditions, by ensuring that each 
participant receives the same stimuli, in the same order, and for the same amount of 
time. Computers are also helpful in presenting and collecting information in ways that 
would be difficult or impossible to do without them. In terms of presenting information, 
computers can randomly select stimuli from lists, allowing counterbalancing across 
research participants. Moreover, computers can also keep track of which stimuli have 
been presented, and which order (Stangor, 2007). In terms of collecting information, 
computers can collect virtually any data, for example, responses in a specific format and 
reaction times. Computers can also be programmed so that participants must answer 
each item before they continue, thereby reducing the amount of missing data. 
Furthermore, using computers to collect data allows the researcher to leave the lab room 
after research participants start the procedure, thus reducing the possibility of distraction 
and also researcher bias. 
Computer program to assess how children evaluate arguments 
 In Studies Three and Four (both detailed in Chapter Six), children’s ability to 
evaluate strong and persuasive arguments was assessed using a computer. The task 
consisted of a self-completion computer test, with instructions and questions appearing 
on the screen. The software package used was Active Server Pages (ASP), developed by 
Microsoft. This package allows the researcher to create web pages that are connected to 
a database. The database had three functions: (1) hold lists of stimuli, including text and 
pictures; (2) present stimuli chosen randomly from lists and place them in specific 
locations on the screen, and (3) collect demographic information, responses and reaction 
times from participants. This allowed the researcher to present different stimuli in 
different conditions, thus counterbalancing arguments and topics.  
Despite these many advantages, using computers also has some disadvantages. 
First, because each child had to have his or her own computer, the number of 
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participants that could be tested at the same time was limited. More specifically, the 
number of computers available in schools varied from 10 to 30. Furthermore, it is 
possible that some children may not have paid full attention to or did not follow the 
instructions given by the computer, and the researcher would not have been able to 
check up on whether they had. Computers may also malfunction in some cases. Another 
disadvantage is that the software used in these studies did not allow importing the data 
file directly into the statistical software packages used, including Excel and SPSS. 
Therefore, the data were entered manually.  
3.6. Analyses and statistical procedures 
Specific details of how data were analysed, and the rationale for using particular 
statistical tests are provided in each of the four empirical chapters. However, some 
general issues are discussed in this section. Firstly, data were analysed using SPSS 
version 14.0.1 for Windows. In accordance with the recommendations of Howitt and 
Cramer (2008), the data were screened for accuracy of data entry, missing values, 
outliers, and normality, prior to any analyses. This included using frequency 
distributions, graphs and descriptive statistics to screen the data.  
 There are several options for handling missing data, including deletion of cases 
or variables and replacement of missing data (i.e., imputation). Howitt and Cramer, 
(2008) advise that the former can be used if only a few cases have missing data and they 
are randomly distributed through the data. Thus, for every missing value in the datasets, 
subjects with the missing values were deleted. For example, in Study One (see Chapter 
Four), six out of 190 participants missed at least one day of the one-week testing 
program; therefore, these cases were deleted from the dataset. The disadvantage to this 
approach is that it reduces the sample size of the data. However, because this study had 
a large dataset, there were enough subjects even after deleting the cases with missing 
values. Similarly, for the datasets of studies that employed web designed questionnaires 
(Studies Three and Four) and paper-and-pencil questionnaires (Study Five), cases with 
missing values were deleted, once the examination had revealed the missing data to be 
randomly distributed. 
 In order to check the distribution of the data, histograms were plotted and the 
values of skewness and kurtosis were examined. Skewness involves the symmetry of 
the distribution. Skewness that is normal involves a perfectly symmetric distribution. A 
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positively skewed distribution has scores clustered to the left, with the tail extending to 
the right. A negatively skewed distribution has scores clustered to the right, with the tail 
extending to the left. Kurtosis involves the peakedness of the distribution. Kurtosis that 
is normal involves a distribution that is bell-shaped and not too peaked or flat. Positive 
kurtosis is indicated by a peak. Negative kurtosis is indicated by a flat distribution 
(Howitt & Cramer, 2008). Thus, the further the value is from zero, the more likely it is 
that the data are normally distributed (Brace, Kemp, & Snelgar, 2006). In addition to 
this, Shapiro-Wilk was used as an objective test of normality. This gives an indication 
of whether a distribution follows the normal curve. If the test is non-significant (p ˃ 
.05), this indicates that the distribution of the sample is not significantly different from a 
normal distribution. However, if the test is significant (p ˂ .05) then the data are 
normally distributed (Brace et al., 2006).  
 Following screening of the data, descriptive statistics were used to describe the 
data. In all studies presented in this thesis, descriptive statistics are reported, including 
measures of central tendency (e.g., mean, median), and measures of dispersion (e.g., 
range, standard deviation, variance) (Brace et al., 2006). Inferential statistics were then 
used to examine the research hypotheses, of which there are two main types: parametric 
and non-parametric.  
Parametric statistical tests make assumptions about the population parameters 
and the nature of the distribution of scores in the population. The common assumptions 
are that the scores are normally distributed in the population (or have the classic “bell-
shape” curve), or that the distribution of (hypothetical) sample means is normally 
distributed. Also they assume that the random sample has been drawn from this 
population of scores. Some parametric tests also assume that the variances of population 
scores are the same in the treatment groups (Fife-Schaw, 1995). Whenever appropriate 
for the data of these studies, parametric tests were chosen in preference to their non-
parametric equivalents, because they are more powerful and are better able to detect 
treatment effects. However, the data in most studies in this thesis did not satisfy the 
assumptions of parametric tests. Hence, the non-parametric alternatives to the 
parametric tests were used, including in first study, and also in Studies Three, Four and 
Five. Selecting non-parametric statistical tests for analysing the data in these studies 
was the appropriate choice, because the measures were ordinal and categorical. As Fife- 
Schaw (1995) is careful to note, to truly establish the normality of a distribution, it is 
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required to estimate its mean and variance. However, it is difficult to establish this 
assumption with ordinal and categorical data.  
 Hypothesis testing with non-parametric tests proceeds by creating sampling 
distributions which apply to the specificities of each study, including the data, design 
and null hypothesis, and calculating all possible values of the relevant test statistics. 
Then non-parametric tests examine whether the observed value obtained in the test 
statistic is relatively extreme and therefore unlikely to have occurred by chance, 
considering the null hypothesis to be true (Fife-Schaw, 1995). While not identical to the 
procedures used with parametric tests, the basic logic of hypothesis testing remains the 
same for both types of tests. By convention, if the probability of observing a mean as 
different from that predicted by the null hypothesis (under the hypothesis that the H0 is 
true) is less than p = .05, then the null hypothesis is rejected. However, if the probability 
is not less than .05 then the null hypothesis is not rejected (Fife-Schaw, 1995).  
 When hypothesis testing, it is important to decide whether to make a one-tailed 
or two-tailed test of the null hypothesis (Brace et al., 2006). In an one-tailed test, the 
null hypothesis is rejected if the difference between the observed mean and that 
predicted under the H0 is relatively small but is in a previously specified direction. On 
the other hand, a two-tailed test requires a somewhat larger difference but is 
independent of the direction of difference (Brace et al., 2006). In the first set of studies 
presented in this thesis, the focus was in finding strong relationships regardless of 
whether they were positive or negative, and so two-tailed tests were used. In the 
following studies, stronger hypotheses were formulated that specified the direction of 
the expected effect. In these cases, the less conservative one-tailed test was used.  
As all studies employed cross-sectional designs, the data were analysed in terms 
of group comparisons and in terms of associations and correlations (Brace et al., 2006). 
For example, the independent t-test and the Mann-Whitney Test (the non-parametric 
equivalent of the t-test), were used as tests of difference for two sample designs, and the 
Spearman’s rs was used as a test of correlation. Details of these analyses are provided in 
the relevant study chapters.  
3.7. Common ethical issues across studies 
 The way in which participants are treated and how they can benefit, even 
indirectly, from participating in research is one of the most important issues in research 
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(Salkind, 2003). Several basic principles were addressed to ensure ethical research 
across the studies presented in this thesis: applying and obtaining ethical approval, 
protection from harm, anonymity and confidentiality, informed consent and debriefing, 
and considerations about using college students in research. 
3.7.1. Ethical approval 
 All research studies presented in this thesis obtained ethical approval from the 
Department Ethics Committee (DEC). The series of five studies conducted involved 
different research designs and methods; therefore, separate approval was requested to 
cover the different projects. The researcher requested ethical approval from the Royal 
Holloway, University of London Research Ethics Committee for the first set of studies 
in January 2008. This involved completing the Psychology Departmental Ethics 
Approval Form, which required the specification of the following criteria: title of 
project, purpose of project and its academic rationale, description of methods and 
measurements, participants, consent and participant information agreements, debriefing, 
statement of ethical considerations, estimation start date and duration of project. Ethical 
approval for Studies One and Two was obtained within one month after submission of 
the request form. New ethical approval was requested in December 2008 to cover the 
next set of studies (Studies Three and Four), through the same application process. Once 
more, new ethical approval was requested in September 2009 for the fifth and last study 
in this thesis. All research projects were approved without raising any significant ethical 
questions. As these research studies were conducted with children, across a number of 
schools, the researcher was also required to have a Criminal Record Bureau (CRB) 
check. A valid CRB check was obtained on the 4th of March 2008, and data collection 
for the first study started in late March 2008.  
3.7.2. Protection from harm 
 All studies were innocuous and the tasks and methods involved did not differ 
substantively from the sorts of activities that children would engage in on an everyday 
basis at school, during classes or Personal, Social, and Health Education (PSHE) 
lessons. In fact, most tasks were planned and designed in accordance with children’s 
educational level and school curriculum. Moreover, the researcher benefited from the 
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input of professionals who had first hand experience of children’s abilities on a daily 
basis. 
 The objectives of the studies developed in this research included not only 
preventing physical or psychological harm by designing appropriate tasks for children, 
but also considering the potential benefits to children by participating in these studies. 
For instance, all children received incentives for participation. Moreover, according to 
teachers, children also benefited from discussing some research topics, for example the 
socio-moral issues addressed in the first two studies (e.g., sharing with others, helping 
others, etc.). In fact, some teachers used these topics for further debate and discussion in 
their classes after research had been conducted.  
3.7.3. Anonymity and confidentiality 
 Anonymity was maintained across studies through the use of a single master 
sheet which contained both the names of the participant and their participant number. 
Only the number was placed on scoring sheets and databases. The list of corresponding 
names and numbers was kept in a secure and locked place at the university.  
 Data and audio or video recorded material and information on each child were 
held in the strictest confidence and seen only by the researcher and her supervisor. 
Children were asked for informed consent prior to the use of recording.  
3.7.4. Informed consent and debriefing 
 Consent letters for parents or legal guardians were written according to British 
Psychological Society (BPS) and American Psychological Association (APA) 
guidelines, specifically the format outlined in the fifth edition of the Publication 
Manual of the American Psychological Association (2001). Active parental consent was 
requested for children participating in recording material (audio or video). An example 
of a template letter asking for active parental consent is attached in Appendix 2. For 
studies that only required children to fill out a questionnaire, passive parental consent 
was requested. An example of a template letter asking for passive parental consent is 
attached in Appendix 14. Information letters were first read and approved by Head 
teachers and class teachers, and then sent to parents (consent forms included opt-out 
return sheets). An example template letter for the Head teacher is attached in Appendix 
1. A full agreement of schools to allow pupils to engage in the study was ensured.  
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Additionally, children’s assent to participation was requested before data 
collection. Children were also told that they were allowed to withdraw from a session at 
any time if they did not wish to continue. For the youngest age group, 5-6 year-old 
children, there was the additional concern of whether they were old enough to make a 
decision about withdrawing. In that case, the researcher relied on her good judgment 
and personal ethics.  
 Children were debriefed immediately following the session about the general 
intent of the study and all questions were answered in a way that children could 
understand. School staff were informed of the outcomes of the work through a 
newsletter. Some teachers also requested the presentation of results during class 
assembly, for debriefing all students and teachers who were involved in the research. 
However, the researcher did not share the individual results with participants. Instead, 
the researcher and her supervisor gave a brief presentation at schools, regarding the 
details of the research and potential implications of the main findings for learning and 
education.  
3.7.5. Using college students in pilot research 
 The Psychology department in which the researcher works requires students to 
participate in research and offers extra credit for their participation. The rationale for 
this requirement is that participation in research is educational. Because it was easy to 
collect data from college students, they were used in the piloting stage of Study Five 
(see Chapter Seven). The same basic ethical principles, described in the previous 
sections, were applied to the research with college students. Specifically, each 
participant was offered a detailed explanation of the pilot study and its importance.  
College students were also reassured that their participation was voluntary and 
had no effect on the credit they would receive for the course in which they were 
enrolled and from which they were recruited. More specifically, all students received an 
extra credit for participating in the study and they were not offered more or less credit 
based on their performance in the study. Similarly, participants who decided to 
withdraw from the study were not penalised.  
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3.8. Conclusion 
 The aim of this chapter was to describe and discuss relevant methodological 
considerations. General issues relating to each of the five empirical studies conducted 
for this thesis were outlined, with particular focus on integrating qualitative and 
quantitative methods to explore and identify age differences in children’s argument 
skills. In addition, common ethical issues across studies were also addressed. The next 
chapter describes the first study of this thesis: age differences in children’s generation of 
individual arguments.  
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Chapter Four - Study One: Age differences in children’s generation of 
individual arguments 
4.1. Introduction 
Research in the field of argumentation has received growing attention in recent 
years, particularly in education. Many studies of argumentation in children have 
addressed argumentation in a social context, focusing on the importance of peer 
interaction and collaboration (e.g., Anderson, Nguyen-Jahiel, MacNurlen, Archodidou, 
Kim, Reznitskaya et al., 2001; Marttunen, Laurinen, Litosseliti, & Lund, 2005). This 
focus stems from the observation that argumentative discussions create a forum for 
children to listen to one another and evaluate different points of view and the arguments 
for and against each others’ positions. Engaging in argumentation requires the ability to 
present sound arguments for one’s opinions, advance counterarguments, and refute 
critiques by others (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Henkemans, 2002). This is an 
important skill because engaging in argument and discussion with another child is a key 
means of promoting acquisition of scientific knowledge (e.g., Howe, Tolmie, Greer, & 
Mackenzie, 1995), problem-solving (e.g., Fawcett & Garton, 2005), sound decision-
making (e.g., Udell, 2007) and socio-moral judgement (e.g., Leman & Bjornberg, 2010; 
Leman & Duveen, 1999).  
Previous research has shown that the ability to understand and produce 
arguments emerges early in development (e.g., Anderson, Chinn, Chang, Wannover, & 
Yi, 1997; Clark & Delia, 1976; Orsolini, 1993; Orsolini & Pontecorvo, 1992). Yet, 
debate endures as to how argumentative skills develop during childhood. Stein and 
Albro (2001) suggested that argumentative skills develop in parent-child or peer-child 
conflicts.  The way in which children and parents or peers learn to resolve conflict 
influences their thinking and their skills at participating in constructive social 
interchanges with other people (Stein & Albro, 2001). Nevertheless, the role of peer 
interaction on children’s ability to articulate their positions and reasons (i.e., to argue 
effectively) remains unclear.  
The present study was designed to identify age differences in the types of 
arguments children generate when asked about socio-moral issues. The specific aims of 
this study were to explore developmental differences in children’s skill in generating 
arguments, and also to examine the contribution of peer group discussions to 
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improvement of individual arguments. Children aged from 5 to 12 years engaged in 
interviewer dialogue and in peer group discussions. The group task involved discussing 
three different topics of a socio-moral theme in response to a stimulus story. Using 
folktales and fables to challenge students to think about honesty, friendship, right and 
wrong, and other questions of ethics is a common activity in classrooms. Moreover, it 
permitted assessing children’s reasoning regarding simple, everyday topics, rather than 
complex problem solving or scientific tasks.  
4.1.1. Evaluating children’s arguments 
Arguments are cognitive constructions used by individuals to explain and justify 
an idea or a point of view (Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Evaluating arguments is not a simple 
task and much debate has been devoted to what elements constitute a good argument. 
Criteria for defining arguments are often based on models of formal argumentation 
(e.g., Toulmin, 1958). According to Toulmin (1958), a good argument should include 
six categories: claim, data, warrant, backing, rebuttal, and qualifier. The first three 
elements (claim, data, and warrant) are considered as the essential components of 
practical arguments, while the second triad (qualifier, backing, and rebuttal) may not be 
needed in some arguments. An argument is considered sound or valid by the degree to 
which the justification (data) supports the claim (Toulmin, 1958). Argument structures 
may also include one or more opposing statements (rebuttals) that support the 
contradiction of the claim. Although Toulmin’s (1958) notion of qualifier is not a main 
criterion of argument soundness, the use of qualifiers usually incorporates an 
acknowledgement and examination of both sides of an argument. Thus, if an argument 
structure incorporates more elements (such as multiple arguments) it is regarded as 
stronger (Means & Voss, 1996). Toulmin’s model has received various criticisms, but 
its most important principles are still in use today for evaluating the structure of 
different types of argument. However, a comprehensive evaluation of informal or 
everyday arguments should focus not only on the structure of arguments but also on its 
content. The content of informal arguments may vary with a person’s beliefs about the 
topic (Kuhn, 1991; Means & Voss, 1996).  
In the present study, arguments were evaluated according to the criteria stated 
above. Indeed, similar criteria have been used by Anderson et al. (1997), Kuhn (1991), 
Means and Voss (1996), and Orsolini (1993). Kuhn (1991) noted the importance of 
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considering the generation of counterarguments (i.e., arguments that contradict one’s 
original position) as an indicator of the way individuals regard their own positions. In a 
study regarding argumentative reasoning in adolescents and young adults, Kuhn, Shaw, 
and Felton (1997) classified two-sided arguments (arguments based within a framework 
of alternatives) as a higher quality type of argument. Means and Voss (1996) also 
classified the quality of reasons stated to support a claim, distinguishing different types: 
abstract, consequential, rule-based, appeal to authority, personal, and vague reasons.  
In developmental research, although studies have shown that young children are 
able to produce arguments in natural conversations (e.g., Anderson et al., 1997; 
Orsolini, 1993), little attention has been directed specifically toward exploring what 
types of argument children generate, particularly regarding students at the elementary 
school level. In the first part of this study, the individual arguments that children at three 
age groups, 5-, 8-, and 11-years, produce in an interviewer dialogue about moral issues 
were assessed. Kuhn’s approach (1991) of examining informal reasoning as interiorised 
dialogic argument was adopted to analyse how children generate arguments considering 
both their own perspective, and also the perspective of a hypothetical other. 
The previously stated criteria were applied in this study to evaluate children’s 
arguments. More specifically, high quality argumentation was classified based on the 
presence of the following elements: (a) full arguments (as opposed to unjustified 
claims); (b) two-sided arguments, that is, arguments that address more than one side of 
the question (as opposed to one-sided arguments); (c) number and type of reasons; (d) 
counterarguments (as opposed to unjustified counterclaims); (e) rebuttals (i.e., 
arguments that refute a counterargument).   
4.1.2. Exploring the role of argumentation in cognitive change 
A further objective for this study was to analyse the effect of peer group 
discussion in the quality of children’s individual arguments.  There is now substantial 
research giving evidence of the benefits of argumentation in the promotion of 
knowledge construction in classrooms (e.g., Nussbaum & Sinatra, 2003; Schwarz, 
Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000). For example, studies in science education have shown that 
collective argumentation often results in conceptual growth of scientific concepts 
(Howe, Tolmie, & Mackenzie 1995). Recently, Asterhan and Schwarz (2007) tested the 
role of argumentation within peer collaboration settings that are designed within a 
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socio-conflict paradigm. In that study, undergraduates were assigned to dyads and 
collaboratively tried to explain a concept of evolutionary theory. Half of the dyads were 
instructed to engage in argumentative dialogue; the other half was simply instructed to 
collaborate. The results of this study showed that, whereas peer collaboration by itself 
leads to immediate gains in conceptual understanding, only those students who engaged 
in argumentative discussions preserved these gains in a delayed posttest. Schwarz and 
Linchevski (2007) analysed the role of task design and argumentation in cognitive 
development during mathematical thinking in the context of peer interaction. Similarly, 
the results showed that beyond the importance of given characteristics of tasks, the 
process of argumentation that takes place between the peers explains the subsequent 
gains of the individuals. In addition, these studies and also the extensive work 
conducted by Howe and colleagues (e.g., Howe, McWilliam, & Cross, 2005; Howe, 
Rodgers, & Tolmie, 1990) have shown that peer collaboration often results in 
conceptual growth that is detectable several weeks after interaction. Moreover, these 
benefits were not found to result from the ideas shared during the collaborative group 
work.  In following studies, Howe and colleagues explored the incubation effect to 
explain these results. These studies were conducted with primary school, and addressed 
the understanding of physics concepts (e.g., floating and sinking; heating and cooling).  
The results suggest that delayed conceptual growth can result from the 
productive use of events experienced after the interaction; and that usage is stimulated 
by unresolved conflicts that occurred during the group work (Howe, Rodgers, & 
Tolmie, 1990; Howe, Tolmie, Greer, & Mackenzie, 1995). Other research studies have 
explored the effects of interaction on argumentative reasoning. The cognitive skills 
involved in argument have been shown to develop with engagement in dyadic 
interactions (Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997), and in response to intervention (Anderson et 
al., 2001; Felton, 2004; Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn & Udell, 2003). Kuhn and 
colleagues (1997) conducted a study to test whether the engagement in thinking about a 
specific topic (capital punishment) would enhance the quality of reasoning about that 
topic. Results indicated that both adolescents and young adults who engaged in a single 
dyadic discussion showed improvements in the quality of reasoning.  
Types of qualitative improvement included, for example, a shift from one-sided 
to two-sided arguments. This latter form of arguments is based in various possible 
alternatives and meta-cognitive awareness of existence of multiple views. Felton (2004) 
examined the development of discourse strategies in adolescent argumentation and also 
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the effect of practice in promoting cognitive change. Participants engaged in pretest and 
posttest measures of strategy use on two topics (capital punishment and abortion) and 
then engaged in five weekly dialogues on the main topic only (capital punishment). 
Control group participants engaged in dialogue only, while experimental group 
participants engaged in a combination of dialogue and paired reflection in dialogues. 
Results showed that the combination of practice and reflection was more effective in 
promoting advances in argumentative discourse than practice alone. Based on these 
findings, Kuhn and Udell (2003) developed a successful intervention designed to foster 
development of argument skills in academically at-risk adolescents.  
Although it is reasonable to conclude that children’s argument skills develop 
with age and experience (engagement in argumentation), little is known about the 
interaction between these different processes. Such interaction is, however, important. 
At different ages children may pick up different skills from conversations with their 
peers. Engaging in argumentation might foster specific skills depending on the age of 
the children involved, and this would have implications for those professionals in 
education who seek to devise and manage children’s classroom discussions.  
4.1.3. The present study 
Drawing on previous studies (e.g., Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn & Udell, 2003), argument 
skills were defined as cognitive abilities that enable individuals to justify a claim and to 
evaluate, respond and criticise the claims of others. Cognitive skills entailed in 
argument include the ability to generate arguments, and also to take into consideration 
opposing arguments. There were several specific predictions. In terms of age 
differences in argument skills, the first hypothesis was that argument skills would vary 
with age. Specifically it was predicted that older children (11-12 years-old) would be 
more skilled in generating high quality arguments (i.e., full arguments, more and more 
varied arguments, two-sided arguments, counterarguments and rebuttals) than younger 
children (5- and 8- year olds). Secondly, it was hypothesised that engaging in 
argumentative discussions about socio-moral topics would promote the quality of 
arguments on a similar topic. In other words, it was predicted that children at all ages 
who had engaged in sessions of peer discussion would produce more high-quality 
arguments after these sessions compared with a control group of children who did not 
engage in peer discussion. The third research question focus was on any possible 
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interactions between age and the benefits (or otherwise) on argument skills of peer 
argumentation. Given the absence of previous research in this area there were no 
specific predictions here.  
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Participants 
 One hundred and ninety children (78 boys, 122 girls) participated in this study. 
Children came from three different age groups, 5-6 years (M age = 5,7 years, SD = .47), 
8-9 years (M age = 8,5 years, SD = .50), and 11-12 years (M age = 11,8 years, SD = 
.40). Children were in their first, fourth, and seventh year of school education, 
respectively. All children in a class participated (i.e., there were no exclusion criteria 
based on gender, race, or any other characteristic). The sample was collected at public 
and private elementary and secondary schools in the local area of Surrey, South East 
England. Students were of heterogeneous ethnic (mostly European) and socioeconomic 
(mostly middle-class) backgrounds. Six children missed at least one day of the one-
week program; therefore, the statistical analysis is based on a sample of 184 
participants.  
 In the first instance, a letter explaining the study in more detail was sent to the 
Head Teacher of each school. A template letter to schools is attached in Appendix 1. 
This was followed up by a telephone call. After receiving permission from the schools, 
a consent letter was sent to children’s parents. A template consent letter is attached (see 
Appendix 2). Children were also asked for their consent to participate before the study 
began. They were told that the researcher was interested in how children understand and 
think about stories and socio-moral issues, and reminded that participation was 
voluntary and that they could withdraw from the study at any time. Debriefing for the 
participating children took the form of a brief presentation to the class discussing how 
children at different ages might think and feel about different issues, for example 
whether people should share with others or the reasons why lying is wrong. A more 
comprehensive debriefing was also given to teachers after the data collection had been 
completed. 
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4.2.2. Design 
 Participants were randomly assigned to control and experimental groups. 
Children in both groups engaged in pretest and posttest measures of argument 
generation on two topics (sharing and lying). Children in the experimental group 
engaged in three group discussions on different topics (friendship, stealing, and 
trusting). Children in the control group were not involved in group discussions. The 
study employed a mixed ANOVA design. There were two independent, between-groups 
variables: age group (5-6, 8-9, and 11-12 years), and condition (experimental and 
control groups). The independent within-subjects variable was test of argument skill 
(pretest and posttest). Dependent measures included measures of argument skill, which 
are detailed in the method section.  
4.2.3. Procedure 
Participants engaged in an one-week program that included a variety of tasks 
related to argument generation. The study included: (1) a pretest of assessment of 
argument skills, (2) group discussions of assessment of argumentative strategies, and (3) 
a posttest of assessment of argument skills. The procedure involved all children in a 
program which began on the first day of the school week (Monday) and finished on the 
final day of that week (Friday). These three phases of the procedure are detailed below.  
Pretest of assessment of argument skill 
On the first day, all children engaged in a pretest assessment of argument skill. 
The pretest consisted of an individual interview based on a discussion topic about 
sharing. Each participant was asked by the researcher to formulate arguments, 
counterarguments and rebuttals providing justifications for the key question: “Do you 
think that people should share their things with others or keep what they like for 
themselves?” The interviewer then asked the child to give reasons in support of their 
opinions: “Why? Try to say all reasons that explain your position”. This question was 
followed by several probes, for example, “If you were trying to convince someone (or a 
child with the same age) that your view is right, what reasons could you say to convince 
the person that people should ___ (e.g., share their things with others)?”  
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In the next segment of the interview, each child was asked to generate an 
opposing position: “Imagine now that someone else disagreed with your opinion that 
people should ___ (e.g., not share or keep their things for themselves)” What opposing 
reasons could this person say to you to show that his or her view is the right one?” This 
question sometimes elicited a counterargument with respect to the child’s initial 
argument, and sometimes an alternative argument related to the other side of the 
question. If the child produced an initial two-sided argument in response to the question, 
including pro and con reasons, the interviewer asked the child to talk further about the 
opposing reasons or generate new ones: “You mentioned some reasons why people 
should ___ (e.g., not share things with others). Just to be sure I understand, can you 
explain a little bit more about these reasons, or think about other reasons to justify this 
alternative position?”  
In the remaining part of the interview, the child was asked to generate a rebuttal, 
prompted by the question: “What could you say to convince this person that he or she is 
wrong?” If the child was unable to generate a counterargument, in response to the 
previous question, the interviewer proposed one and asked the child to rebut it. (The 
complete interview protocol is presented in Appendix 3). 
The interview took approximately 3 to 4 minutes. All of the verbal dialogue data 
were recorded on audiotape and later transcribed for coding and analysis. The coding 
was based on a scheme that was developed by Means and Voss (1996) that assessed 
similar skills in adolescents and also on coding schemes developed by Kuhn (1991), and 
Kuhn and Udell (2003) that assessed argument skill in adults (the full scheme is detailed 
later in the method section).  
Group discussions 
  Participants in the experimental condition (N = 115) participated in group 
discussions about three different stories. Children were in different groups each time. 
Group discussions took place over three consecutive days and no group had more than 
one discussion in the same day. Participants were assigned to small groups of five 
children of the same age and grade level. Groups consisted of roughly equal numbers of 
boys and girls. At the beginning of each session, the group was given instructions to 
engage in and listen to a recorded story: “Let’s listen to a story about a man and a bear. 
Please try to pay attention, because after you listen to the story, we are going to talk 
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about it”. The stimuli stories are fully detailed in Appendix 4. The storytelling was 
immediately followed by a discussion of the story as a whole. Conversations were 
elicited by a key question related to the story. For example, for the first story (“The bear 
that spoke”), students were asked the following question: “Do you think there is any 
difference between helping a friend or a stranger?” Then the researcher gave the 
following instructions to the group: “Your task is to talk about friendship and helping 
others. You will need to discuss the reasons each of you have for your views and find 
out where you agree or disagree. If you disagree, try to determine why and try to reach 
an agreement if you can.” If participants had difficulty maintaining the discussion 
during the prescribed time, or generating arguments, the researcher asked some 
questions to prompt further dialogue and also to generate counterarguments and 
rebuttals. The full protocol interview for group discussions is detailed in Appendix 5.   
Discussions lasted an average of 8 minutes among 5-6 year old children, 13 
minutes among 8-9 year old children, and 11 minutes among 11-12 year old children. 
All of the verbal dialogue data were recorded on videotape and later transcribed for 
coding and analysis (Analysis and coding of discussions are detailed on Study Two, 
Chapter Five).  
The three stories selected for these tasks came from different countries and 
cultures including folktales from Europe, India, and North America. All three stories 
contained a theme for thought and discussion (e.g., stealing, friendship and helping 
others, and trust). Participants in the control condition (N = 75) also listened to the 
storytelling, but instead of discussing the topic with their peers, they were asked to 
engage individually in a written activity. The researcher asked the same questions 
presented in the experimental condition. Each participant received a blank sheet to write 
their answers. For example, related to the story “The black tulip”, participants were 
asked the following questions: (1) “In the story, the thief said that thieves never prosper. 
Do you think that stealing is always wrong? Try to refer to all reasons that support your 
position”; (2) “Imagine that someone disagrees with your opinion. What would you 
reply to him or her to explain that your position is right?”; (3) “What could you say to 
show that your own view is the correct one?” These questions prompted the generation 
of arguments, counterarguments and rebuttals, respectively (see again Appendix 6). 
Five-year-old children, instead of writing arguments, were asked to think about the 
story and imagine, or think for themselves, what they would say if they had to answer 
the questions (see Appendix 6). The activity took no more than 10 minutes to complete. 
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Posttest assessment of argument skill 
 On the fifth and final day, children in both experimental and control conditions 
took part in a posttest assessment of argument generation skill. The posttest was 
identical to the pretest, except that children were asked to give their opinion about a 
different topic (lying). Each participant was asked to formulate arguments, 
counterarguments and rebuttals providing justifications for the key question: “Most 
people would say that lying is always wrong, except when there’s a good reason for it. 
What do you think about this statement: is lying always wrong?” (see again Appendix 3 
for more detail). The individual interview took no more than 3 to 4 minutes. All of the 
verbal dialogue data were recorded on audiotape and later transcribed for coding and 
analysis. 
4.2.4. Coding of responses and justification categories 
The coding of individual argument skills was based on a scheme that was 
developed by Means and Voss (1996) that assessed similar skills in adolescents and also 
on coding schemes developed by Kuhn (1991), and Kuhn and Udell (2003) that 
assessed argument skill in adolescents and adults (the full scheme is detailed later). 
Thus, responses to the key questions provided the basis for assessing children’s 
argument skills and exploring the quality of arguments generated. Coding was based on 
the following criteria:  
Generating arguments 
According to Means and Voss (1996) it is important to distinguish if an 
individual states an argument or a simple assertion or a claim. By definition, an 
argument is an assertion followed by reasons that support it. Consider the following 
example: Student A is asked the question, “Do you think that lying is always wrong?” 
and the student says, “I think that lying is always wrong, and people shouldn’t do it”. In 
this case, the student gives an opinion, but does not produce a valid reason to justify that 
opinion. Alternatively, a student B when asked the same question replies, “I think that 
lying is wrong, because you can get into trouble if you do it”. In this case, student B 
generates a full argument, that is, an opinion, “I think that lying is wrong” supported by 
a consequential reason “Because you can get into trouble”. 
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In a given answer, a child could address one side of the question or consider 
both sides of the issue. Two-sided arguments were defined as a stronger type of 
argument, because frequently it provided the occasion to generate multiple arguments 
and also opposing arguments. Each measure, claim, one-sided argument, two-sided 
argument, were coded as {0, 1, 2} respectively.   
Number and types of reasons 
An argument was considered stronger depending on the number of acceptable 
reasons that an individual stated in order to support an opinion and the quality of those 
reasons. Classification of reasons was based on a coding scheme developed by Means 
and Voss (1996) that assessed similar skills in adolescents.  
The number of different types of reasons that a child stated in order to support 
an opinion was counted. Most research based on the Toulmin’s framework has 
considered an argument supported by several different reasons to be stronger than an 
argument supported by just one reason. A distinction was made between reasons 
included in the child’s initial argument, and opposing reasons which were included in 
counterarguments. Table 4.1 presents some examples of these reasons.  
Table 4.1. Examples of reasons given by children to justify their views 
Reasons in favour of sharing 
“Because when you share your feelings and fears, you feel better and less lonely”; 
“Because if people share things, like books, then they don’t have to waste money 
buying new things all the time” 
Reasons against sharing 
“Because you have to protect your things”; “Because important and secret things are not 
meant to be shared”  
Reasons in favour of lying 
“Because you can lie when you think the truth will make someone sad”; “Because 
sometimes you want to keep a secret, and not telling a secret is not a bad lie” 
Reasons against lying 
“Because if people find out, they will never trust you again, even if you tell the truth”; 
“Because you might lose your friends” 
 
  In a study concerned with the quality of content of arguments produced by 
adolescents (Means & Voss, 1996), reasons presented were divided into six categories. 
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According to this classification, quality of reasons decreases over the following 
categories: abstract reasons, consequential reasons, rule-based reasons, authority 
appeal reasons, personal reasons, and vague reasons. Rule-based, authority appeal, and 
personal reasons are supposed to differ little in quality (Means & Voss, 1996). These 
coding categories were adapted and used to classify the content of children’s arguments. 
Table 4.2 presents these categories and some examples of reasons given by children.  
Table 4.2. Justification categories for children’s responses 
Category Description Examples 
Abstract An elaborate 
statement or a full 
argument. 
“Because some people have lots of money and 
they don’t need it all, or they don’t actually 
spend it, so they could give it to people who 
might really need it. If everyone had the same, 
then the world would be fair” (posttest, girl, 11 
years). 
Consequential A statement in which 
a direct consequence 
(positive or negative) 
is stated as an 
outcome of a 
particular reason 
“Because if you lie really badly, like adopting 
a false identity, you can go to prison and really 
bad things come out of it” (posttest, girl, 11 
years). 
Rule-based An accepted belief or 
a statement based on 
moral issues. 
“Because sharing with people is kind” (pretest, 
girl, 5 years). 
Authority 
appeal 
A statement that 
involves appeal to an 
authority. 
“Lying is wrong because the teacher might 
find out and be upset” (posttest, girl, 5 years). 
Personal A statement based on 
personal experience. 
“Because I don’t like when people lie to me” 
(posttest, girl, 5 years) 
Vague An imprecise 
statement. 
“Because that would be the best thing to do” 
(pretest, boy, 5 years) 
Generating an opposing claim versus a counterargument 
Another criterion of argument structure evaluation is taking into account the 
generation of counterarguments. As Kuhn (1991) noted, “the ability to generate 
opposing arguments is an important indicator of the way subjects regard their own 
opinions” (p. 143). As with argument generation, it was distinguished whether a 
participant stated a simple opposing claim (e.g., “Other people might think that lying is 
good”) or a full counterargument, that is, an opposing opinion supported by reasons. 
Table 4.3 provides examples of each of these outcomes. Counterarguments were coded 
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as absent or present based on children’s ability to offer reasons to support the opposite 
side of the question, by considering a hypothetical other’s point of view.   
Table 4.3. Illustration of possible outcomes of participant’s attempts to generate 
counterarguments 
Counterclaim “Other people could say that you shouldn’t share” (pretest, girl, 
5 years).  
Counterargument “Some people could say that they don’t want to share some 
things, like precious things, because other people may not 
return them” (pretest, boy, 8 years) 
Rebuttals 
A final criterion assessed was the ability to generate rebuttals, that is, to rebut 
the previous counterargument, either by criticising it, arguing that it was not as strong as 
the initial argument or advancing an alternative argument against it. A successful 
rebuttal was also coded when a participant advanced spontaneously a critique 
immediately after generating a counterargument. Table 4.4 provides an example of a 
rebuttal generated immediately after a counterargument. Children who did not generate 
a counterargument in the previous segment of the interview were also given the 
opportunity to generate a rebuttal. As with counterargument generation, rebuttals were 
coded as absent or present.  
Table 4.4. Illustration of a counterargument followed by a rebuttal 
Posttest, girl, 
11 years 
 
 
“People would probably say that lying is always wrong, because not 
telling the truth might be harmful to others/ but sometimes a small 
white lie can go for the benefit of others./ When people say that lying 
is wrong, they’re not thinking through it completely, because they’re 
only thinking about people making things up/ and hurting people./ 
However, a small lie, like keeping a secret or a promise,/ might be the 
right thing to do in order to help other people”   
4.2.5. Reliability of argument skill measures 
Coding children’s responses in pretest and posttest assessments involved 
interpreting utterances in order to identify kinds of arguments and opposing arguments 
generated, and to classify different types of justifications. This coding scheme involved 
giving more than one code per turn.  
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To establish reliability of the coding, a second judge coded 40 interviews (about 
20% of the total number of responses). The second judge was given a description and 
brief introduction to the scoring of categories but was blind to the scores of the first 
judge. The consistency between the ratings of judges was very good. The pretest 
Cohen’s kappa result was .93; while the posttest Cohen’s kappa result was .90.  
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Design and analysis 
A mixed design was employed in this study. The first factor was the within-
subjects factor comparing pretest and posttest measures of argument skill and argument 
content. The second factor was the between-subjects factor of age group, with three 
levels (5-, 8- and 11- years), and the factor of condition, with two levels (experimental 
and control). There were three dichotomous variables and measures of argument skill: 
type of argument (one-sided and two-sided), counterargument (absent or present), and 
rebuttal (absent or present). There were also measures of quality of argument content: 
reasons and opposing reasons (number and type). Analysis examined children’s mean 
use of these different types of reasons. Several parametric and non-parametric tests were 
used as appropriate.   
The following analyses detail: (1) the effect of baseline age differences on 
argument skill; (2) the effect of the group discussion activity on the individual 
arguments given in pretest and posttest; and then (3) the results of the interaction 
between age and group (group discussion versus no discussion) on improvements of 
argument skills and argument quality. 
Baseline age differences in argument type  
The first hypothesis tested was that argument generation skill would improve 
with age. Specifically, it was predicted that 11-12 year-old children would be more 
skilled in constructing arguments compared with 8-9 year-olds who, in turn, would be 
more skilled than 5-6 year-old children. First, age differences in the ability to generate 
arguments at the initial assessment (topic about sharing) were explored. Results showed 
that all participants were able to provide full arguments. Figure 4.1 illustrates the 
percentages of children at different ages producing two types of argument. 
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There was a relationship between children’s age and the type of arguments 
generated, χ2 (2, N = 189) = 61.64, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .571. As shown in Figure 
4.1, 5-year-old children offered only one-sided arguments. Both 8- and 11-year-old 
children generated two-sided arguments, but 11-year-old children were more skilled in 
constructing two-sided arguments than 8 year olds.  
 
 
Figure 4.1. Percentage of children at different ages generating one-sided or two-sided 
arguments 
Baseline age differences in counterarguments and rebuttals 
Then children’s ability in generating counterarguments and rebuttals was 
examined. The prediction here was that older children would be more skilled in 
generating successful counterarguments and rebuttals, when compared to younger 
children. The analysis confirmed this prediction; there was a relationship between 
children’s age and the generation of successful counterarguments, χ2 (2, N = 189) = 
29.42, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .395. Table 4.5 shows the percentages of children at 
different ages producing counterarguments. 
Regarding generation of rebuttals, results also showed a relationship between 
children’s age and the ability to rebut previous lines of argument, χ2 (2, N = 189) = 
23.84, p < .001, Cramer’s V = .355. As in the case of generation of counterarguments, 
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the older two groups were more skilled in generating rebuttals, when compared with the 
youngest group (5-year old children) (see again Table 4.5 below). 
Table 4.5. Percentages of children generating counterarguments and rebuttals by age 
group 
 5 years, N=61 8 years, N=73 11 years, N=55 
Counterarguments 52.5 % 83.6 % 92.7 % 
Rebuttals 44.3 % 72.6 % 85.5 % 
Baseline age differences in number and type of reasons  
Lastly, the quality of argument content, that is, the reasons children produced to 
justify their opinions was explored. Using a one-way between-subjects ANOVA, with 
age as a condition, age differences in the number and type of reasons (and opposing 
reasons) given by children were examined. Results indicated age differences in terms of 
number of reasons found in children’s initial arguments, F (2,178) = 3.04, p < .01, 
partial η2 = .05, with number of reasons increasing progressively with age. As shown in 
Table 4.6, Bonferroni post hoc tests revealed differences between 5-year olds and 11-
year olds. It was expected that there would be differences in the kinds of reasons 
offered, with older children likely to give more high quality reasons (e.g., abstract and 
consequential), and fewer low quality reasons (e.g., personal and vague). Data and post 
hoc analyses (p < .001) reported in Table 4.6 show that older children (11 years) offer 
more abstract reasons than younger children (5 and 8 years),  F (2,188) = 21.90, p < 
.001, partial η2 = .19. There were also age differences in terms of authority-based 
reasons, F (2,188) = 4.19, p < .01, partial η2 = .43. As Table 4.6 shows, authority-based 
reasons were only found on the arguments of 8- year olds. No age effects were found 
for other categories of reasons, including consequential, rule-based or moral, personal 
and vague reasons. 
Age differences in terms of opposing reasons given by children in 
counterarguments were also explored. Similarly, it was predicted that older children 
would use an increased number of opposing reasons when compared to younger 
children. There was a significant effect of age for the number of opposing reasons, F 
(2,188) = 24.16 p < .001, partial η2 = .27, with significant post hoc differences between 
5-year-olds and 8-year-olds and between 5-year-olds and 11-year-olds, and between 11- 
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and 8-year-old children (see again Table 4.6). There was also a significant effect of age 
for consequential opposing reasons, F (2,188) = 7.78 p < .001, partial η2 = .07. As can 
be seen in Table 4.6, tests revealed a significant difference between 5- year and older 
age groups (i.e., 8- years and 11- years). There was also a significant effect of age for 
rule-based or moral opposing reasons, F (2,188) = 20.86 p < .001, partial η2 = .18. Post 
hoc tests indicate significant differences between 5-year-olds and 8-year-olds and 
between 5-year-olds and 11-year-olds, and between 11- and 8-year-old children (see 
again Table 4.6). 
Table 4.6. Mean (and standard deviation) use of number and type of reasons and 
opposing reasons, relating to significant results for each age group   
 5 years, N=60 8 years, N=71 11 years, N=53 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Number of reasons 1.36a .52 1.58a .71 1.73b .65 
Abstract reasons .03a .18 .27b .48 .60c .63 
Authority based reasons .00a .00 .07b .25 .00a .00 
Number of opposing reasons .56a .56 .95b .55 1.29c .59 
Consequential opposing reasons .11a .32 .38b .52 .44b .57 
Rule-based opposing reasons .00a .00 .19b .43 .47c .54 
Note. Separate subscripts on each line indicate groups differing significantly (p<.05) 
using Bonferroni post hoc tests.  
Pre- to posttest differences between control and experimental groups 
 The main focus of this analysis was the evaluation of changes in the quality of 
argument skills from pretest to posttest in the experimental and control groups. In 
particular, this analysis looked at how peer discussion affected individual arguments 
offered by children. The principal hypothesis was that arguments of children in the 
experimental group (i.e., those who engaged in group discussion) would improve 
between pre- and posttest compared with individuals in the control group (i.e., no group 
discussion). More specifically, concerning argument generation, it was predicted that 
the experimental group would use more sophisticated argument elements (such as two-
sided arguments) after group discussion than the control group.  
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As predicted, there were positive changes in argument skill at posttest in the 
experimental group, in terms of generation of two-sided arguments. The McNemar-
Bowker test showed a significant difference between the proportion of children 
generating two-sided arguments at pretest, and the proportion of children generating 
two-sided arguments at posttest (N = 112, exact p < .001) in the experimental group. 
As seen in Figure 4.2, the proportion of children generating one-sided 
arguments, at pretest, is higher than the proportion of children generating two-sided 
arguments in both groups. At posttest, the proportion of children using two-sided 
arguments increased significantly only in the experimental group. Table 4.7 provides an 
illustration of change from one-sided to two-sided argument by an 8-year old child. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Pre- and posttest distributions of children in experimental and control 
groups by type of argument generated 
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Table 4.7. Illustration of change from a one-sided to a two-sided argument (girl, 8 years 
old) 
Pretest “I think people should share, because if they don’t share they will not have 
any friends. And it’s nice to share because someone may not have something 
and he asks you to borrow it and you could help him, so it’s nice to share.” 
Posttest “I think it is not always wrong to lie, because someone could tell you 
something that could hurt your friends and if you don’t want to tell them, 
then you might lie and say something different to protect them from getting 
hurt. So, I don’t think it is always wrong; but if someone says to you that they 
have something that they don’t actually have, then they shouldn’t lie - that’s 
bad! And I think lying is wrong when you can tell the truth and you lie on 
purpose, but sometimes you have to lie. So, lying is wrong but sometimes it 
can be good.” 
 
There was also a significant difference in the proportion of children generating 
rebuttals at pretest compared with the proportion of children generating rebuttals at 
posttest in the experimental condition, using the McNemar test for binominal data (N = 
112, exact p < .001) As Figure 4.3 shows, 66.2% of experimental participants and 
67.8% control participants generated rebuttals at pretest. At posttest, the percentage of 
experimental participants who were successful at generating rebuttals increased to 
85.7%, showing a positive change.   
There was no significant effect of condition (experimental or control) on the 
within-subjects variable (pre- to posttest use) on measures of quality of argument 
content, including number and range of reasons offered, and the different types of 
reason used (abstract, consequential, rule-based, authority, personal and vague).  
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Figure 4.3. Pre- and posttest percentages of children in experimental and control 
groups generating rebuttals  
Pre- to posttest age differences between control and experimental groups 
The next analysis focused on how peer discussions, compared with no 
discussion, affected children’s argument skills at different ages. Using the McNemar-
Bowker test, with pre- and posttest repeated measures of argument skill, the relations 
among age group, condition (control versus experimental groups) and the proportion of 
children using different measures of argument skill were explored. There was a 
statistically significant difference in the use of two-sided arguments by 11-year old 
children comparing the two conditions (control versus experimental) (N = 30, exact p = 
.001) (see Table 4.8). 
There was also a significant difference from pre- to posttest in terms of 
proportion of 8-year olds generating rebuttals, comparing the two conditions (control vs. 
experimental) (N = 54, exact p = .004). Eight-year-old children in the experimental 
group were more successfully in producing rebuttals at posttest than children in the 
control group. There were no statistically significant results using this test for the oldest 
age group, because all 11-year-old children used counterarguments and rebuttals.  
There were no significant interactions between age and group in the number of 
reasons given by children and no significant interactions between age and group in the 
types of reasons generated.  
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Table 4.8. Pre- and posttest frequencies and percentages of children in experimental 
and control groups by type of argument generated 
 Experimental group Control group 
 
5 years 8 years 11 years 5 years 8 years 11 years 
Pretest       
One-sided  29 (100%) 55 (100%) 13 (42%) 32(100%) 8 (44%) 10 (42%) 
Two-sided  0 0 18 (58%) 0 10 (56%) 8 (33%) 
Posttest       
One-sided 16 (57%) 28 (52%) 2 (7%) 27 (84%) 10 (56%) 14 (58%) 
Two-sided 12 (43%) 26 (48%) 28 (93%) 5 (16%) 8 (44%) 16 (67%) 
4.4. Discussion 
 The present study examined developmental differences in children’s ability to 
generate arguments related to social-moral questions. The main goal was to explore the 
types of arguments children use from 5 years old onwards. This study also explored the 
contribution of peer group discussions over a period of three days to improvement of 
individual arguments generated by children. Kuhn’s approach (1991) of examining 
adults’ reasoning on everyday issues as interiorised dialogic argument was adopted to 
analyse children’s argumentative skills.  
 The findings reported in this chapter provide an insight into children’s 
understanding and ability to construct arguments considering both their own 
perspective, and also the perspective of a hypothetical other. In this respect, the  results 
are consistent with earlier findings that suggest that the ability to understand and 
produce basic arguments emerges relatively early in development (e.g., Anderson et al, 
1997; Clark & Delia, 1976; Orsolini, 1993; Orsolini & Pontecorvo, 1992; Stein & 
Miller, 1993a, 1993b). This study shows that, by the age 5 years, children are able to 
produce the principal components of an argument, that is, they state an opinion 
supported by at least one reason.  
 Analysis of age differences in argument generation skills revealed that 
argumentative skills develop with age. Across the three age groups, there were 
significant changes in argument quality, demonstrated by the progression with age from 
one-sided to two-sided arguments. Most notably, compared with one-sided arguments, 
two-sided arguments are a more complete type of argument, and thus contribute to 
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attainment of competence in argumentative reasoning (Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn, Shaw, & 
Felton, 1997). Results showed that 11-12 year old children were more skilled in 
constructing two-sided arguments than 8-9 year old children, who in turn performed 
better than 5-6 year old children.  
As noted in cognitive and developmental literature, analysing counterarguments 
is also relevant. Counterargument is another type of argument that addresses an 
opposing position, and it is an important criterion of skilled argumentation (Kuhn, 1991; 
Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997). Even 5-year-olds were able to produce some 
counterarguments, although the average number was significantly lower compared with 
the average number of counterarguments produced by older children. However, there 
were no significant differences between the counterarguments used by children aged 8-9 
and 11-12 years, suggesting that these become cemented as a feature of children’s 
arguments from 8 years onwards. There was also a significant effect of age group in use 
of rebuttals, with significant differences again between the youngest and the older two 
age groups. As Kuhn (1991) explains, generating rebuttals requires that the participant 
integrates previous lines of argument. Thus, counterargument and rebuttal are markers 
of an awareness of others’ perspectives in argumentative and, as such, have been 
characterised as more advanced argument skills (e.g. Kuhn, 1991). 
For the younger children, comparative difficulty in generating counterarguments 
and rebuttals might be a result of a problem in coordinating own and other perspectives 
in an argumentative setting. Kuhn and Udell (2007) found that young adolescents are 
less able than adults to coordinate attention to favoured and opposing positions in an 
argument. Although adolescents prefer an argument strengthening the favoured 
position, they are able to attend to the other’s point of view, and even generate an 
argument against it, when explicitly asked to do so. As Kuhn and Udell (2007) explain, 
young adolescents are able to execute the skill (of addressing the opposing position), 
but it seems that they do not recognise the need to do so. Based on these findings that 
report developmental differences between adolescents and adults, one might 
hypothesise that, similarly, younger children (5 and 6 years) did not consider the 
hypothetical other’s position as relevant as compared with older children (8 to 12 
years), therefore they did not find the need to challenge it by generating 
counterarguments. 
The second hypothesis predicted that engaging in group discussions (compared 
with not engaging in such discussions) would have a beneficial effect on the individual 
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children’s argument skills in a subsequent posttest. This prediction was based upon 
previous research which has found that argument skills improve after a period of 
engaging in discussion with other children (e.g. Kuhn et al., 1997). However, broadly 
speaking, this second hypothesis was not confirmed in the present study. Generally, all 
children (i.e., both those who engaged in group discussion and those who did not) 
showed improvements in argument skills in the subsequent posttest. The broad finding 
here appears to be at odds with previous research and there are at least two possible 
explanations for the discrepancy. It may be that the present study simply did not involve 
sufficient opportunity for sustained interaction to make gains in argument skills visible 
in the posttest. A longer period of more and longer sessions of interaction might have 
led to differences between control and experimental groups.  
Other studies (albeit with older participants) that have involved longer and more 
frequent opportunities for discussion have indicated that, although individual reflection 
has been found to be an important ingredient in the development of argument skills, it is 
particularly effective when combined with real group discussion (see again, Kuhn & 
Udell, 2003). Moreover, peer interaction appears to have benefits over and above 
individual reflection on other developmental tasks (Howe, McWilliam, & Cross, 2005).  
Thus, the finding of no differences comparing group discussion with individual 
reflection, in terms of improvements in argument skills between pretest and posttest, 
should be treated with some caution in terms of its generalisability across age groups, 
conversation topics, and forms (type and frequency) of discussion. Moreover, while the 
present results are consistent with other studies that have documented the potential of 
argumentation and collaborative debate in promoting the development of argumentative 
skills (e.g., Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Nussbaum & Sinatra, 2003), they also suggest that 
many of these benefits may be attributable to the role of discussion as a stimulus for 
individual reflection. 
However, not all findings of improvement in argument skills can be attributed to 
reflection alone. This analysis revealed an important, significant interaction between 
condition (group discussion vs. individual reflection) and age group in argument 
generation at pre- and posttest. Significant differences were found in the use of two-
sided arguments between experimental and control conditions for children aged 5-6 and 
11-12 years, but not for 8-9 year-olds. Specifically, in the youngest and oldest age 
groups use of two-sided arguments increased in both discussion and reflection 
(experimental and control) groups. However, in the 8- year old age group, while the 
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discussion group used more two-sided arguments at posttest, the control group showed 
no similar advances. For each age group the posttest increases were from a high 
baseline, that is, although the youngest children used more two-sided arguments at 
posttest they generally used fewer two-sided arguments; 8 year olds used slightly more 
two-sided arguments overall; and 11-12 year olds used most both at pretest and at 
posttest. 
This latter finding is important because it suggests that development in the use of 
two-sided arguments appears to be linked specifically to engaging in peer group 
discussion at 8 years. An obvious question is why this might be the case at this age 
group and not in the younger and older age groups. Part of the answer may lie in the 
analysis of age differences in other measures of argument skill. These, generally, show a 
smooth progression from less to more advanced or sophisticated forms of argument 
with age. In particular, while the use of two-sided arguments shows a progressive 
increase with age for each year group, the use of one-sided arguments only diminishes 
significantly in the oldest age group. It may be that 8-year-olds are in a transitional 
stage in terms of their orientation to argument and knowledge: Leman and Duveen 
(1996) have argued that while younger children (6-7 years) see argument and discussion 
as winning and losing, older children (11-12 years) view argument and discussion as a 
means of establishing the right or correct answer to a question. Correspondingly, 
younger children may view knowledge as being linked to the expression of a personal 
opinion or perspective, whereas older children view knowledge as more discursive or 
evidence-based.  
 If the 8-year-olds in the present study are between these two contrasting 
conceptual orientations to knowledge and argument, it may explain why they begin to 
use more two-sided arguments but not fewer one-sided arguments than the 5-year-olds. 
At this transitional stage, group discussion may act as a prompt or cue to consider 
others’ perspectives. However, individual reflection on the task is not sufficient to shake 
children out of a focus on their own perspective. Older children are aware of the need to 
incorporate others’ perspectives in making arguments, and so in the present study 
showed posttest increases in use of two-sided arguments in both reflection and 
discussion conditions. The posttest increases in two-sided arguments amongst younger 
(5 year old) children are more difficult to explain. A possible explanation is that these 
younger children treat each side of the argument as an interesting example, a sort of list 
of alternatives, rather than seeking to strategically deploy one set of arguments to 
CHAPTER 4: AGE DIFFERENCES IN CHILDREN’S GENERATION OF ARGUMENTS 
 
137 
 
support a position. Thus, in posttests, the increased use of two-sided arguments 
corresponds to an increase in ability to generate alternative arguments amongst the 5 
year olds. Amongst the 11 year olds, however, it corresponds to an increased strategic 
deployment of these more sophisticated elements. The 8 year olds stand between these 
two differing phases. 
Thus, there seems to be an important shift in how children address differences in 
perspectives, at around 8 years of age. Before around 7 years children appear to resolve 
differences in perspective or views exclusively as a matter of winning or losing. 
However, from approximately 9 years onwards, children see interaction as an 
opportunity to address and understand others’ views and recognise that discussion offers 
a means of resolving these differences (Leman & Duveen, 1996; Leman & Oldham, 
2005). The present results may, therefore, reflect children’s changing orientations to 
interaction at an important transitional age. At 8 years children may not fully grasp the 
importance of considering that an argument may have two sides. However, discussion 
and conversation prompts children to consider this possibility. 
4.4.1. Limitations  
An obstacle in analysing the empirical evidence in this study was the lack of 
adequate coding schemes to assess and evaluate the quality of children’s arguments and 
the cognitive skills entailed in children’s argumentative reasoning. More reliable and 
sensitive evaluation systems are needed to determine whether children generate 
progressively better arguments with age.  In particular, counterarguments were elicited 
by asking children to “Imagine that someone disagreed with his or her opinion”, and to 
“Give opposing reasons that the hypothetical other could say to convince you that he or 
she is right”. Given their limited skills in second-order perspective taking (Kuhn, 
1999b), it is possible that children, particularly 5-year olds, struggled to consider the 
hypothetical situation in the interviews. Therefore, the younger children’s performance 
may have been constrained by their understanding of the task itself.  
A further methodological limitation was the fact that the topics discussed in the 
pre- and posttest sessions were not counterbalanced (the sharing topic was always in the 
pretest, and the lying topic always in the posttest). This limitation affected the 
interpretation of the results regarding the differences in performance across the two 
sessions. A possible reason why children generated more two-sided arguments in the 
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posttest was that they found it easier to provide arguments about the lying topic. 
However, only the experimental group improved in this way, so the results were not 
exclusively attributable to this limitation of the design in the present study.  
Another possible contributing factor to these findings is that argument skill is 
confounded with children’s knowledge about the topics. It is possible that the older a 
child is, the more he or she would be able to think up counterarguments and rebuttals 
with respect to sharing and lying topics. If this was the case, then obtained age 
differences were not necessarily due to children’s growing understanding and use of 
arguments, but perhaps due to their ability to come up with other views and arguments 
with respect to these topics.  
These two methodological issues (i.e., randomisation processes and children’s 
prior knowledge) were taken into account in the design of the subsequent studies. For 
instance, the third and fourth studies (both detailed in Chapter Six) employed various 
topics that were selected in a carefully planned pilot study to assess whether the 
youngest children were familiar with those topics. Moreover, presentation of topics and 
arguments was randomised.  
Another potential criticism of this study was the fact that the sessions of 
interaction were short, and the posttest was conducted only three days after the initial 
assessment. As discussed earlier, the result that at 8 years of age group discussions were 
particularly beneficial in developing an appreciation of the relevance of others’ 
perspectives was based on a single indicator (two-sided arguments) of the many used in 
this study. Given that no differences were found in the other indicators, for example in 
children’s ability to generate counterarguments and in the quality of the justifications 
provided, it is difficult to draw conclusions about a possible interaction between age and 
benefits of engaging in argumentative discussions.  
Furthermore, there were two potential limitations regarding the tasks assigned to 
control and experimental groups of children at different ages. First, the task of 5-year 
old children differed from the task required of children in other age groups. Instead of 
writing arguments, 5-year olds were asked to think about the story and imagine, or think 
for themselves, what they would say if they had to answer the questions. However, it is 
impossible to know whether children engaged indeed in thinking, making problematic 
the comparison between the 5-year olds in the control group and the corresponding 
experimental group. Second, in the intervention of the experimental group, the 
researcher asked occasionally some questions to prompt further dialogue and also to 
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generate counterarguments. The support provided by the researcher in the experimental 
group could have been an extraneous variable, which makes it difficult to interpret 
differences between groups. Compared to the experimental group, the researcher did not 
have an equally active role in the control group and she did not provide assistance when 
participants had difficulty in writing counterarguments.  
4.4.2. Implications 
 The purpose of this study was to gain a better understanding of how children at 
different ages generate arguments, and also evaluate the individual arguments produced 
by children before and after engaging in an argumentative discourse activity. This study 
is important, because it extends the limited literature on children’s argument skills by 
examining the specific argumentative elements children generate at different ages. 
Results indicate that there are important developmental differences at a young age in 
argument skill; however, more research should be carried out to better understand the 
course of this development.  
 The question of whether peer-interaction promotes children’s argument skills is 
an important one and has relevance for pedagogical classroom situations. Results 
suggest that at 8-years group discussions may be particularly beneficial in developing 
awareness of two-sided arguments and an appreciation of the relevance of others’ 
perspectives in argument. Further research is required to establish how children’s 
knowledge and use of arguments changes around 8 years, and how opportunities for 
discussion and individual reflection can be optimised to promote the development of 
argument skills. One of the educational implications of these findings is that 
encouraging children to think critically about everyday topics, and enabling them to 
share their opinions and arguments in the classroom, may help students to develop 
argument skills that will serve them well across a range of different situations. The 
study presented in the next chapter (Chapter Five) focuses on the mechanisms behind 
these effects. Specifically, some of the characteristics in children’s discussions 
(discourse and strategic elements) that might promote the development of argumentative 
reasoning were explored.  
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Chapter Five - Study Two: Children’s strategic arguments and social 
interaction 
5.1. Introduction 
While the first study focused on children’s ability to articulate positions and 
reasons in an individual basis, this study focuses specifically on the nature of children’s 
conversations and their ability to direct argumentative discourse with others. The central 
objective was to identify what argument skills children from three age groups (5-6, 8-9, 
and 11-12 years-old) possess and how they use them in group discussions with peers. 
There are two distinctive features in the present study. Analysis of children’s discourse 
included identifying and counting the total number of utterance types they use while 
discussing a topic with the peer group. The second feature was to explore whether 
children exhibit goal-directed strategies while engaging in discussions. This latter 
question could reveal whether, even if children can use certain elements of 
argumentation, they choose to deploy these elements in discussion where social 
dynamics and consideration of different perspectives may be more active.  
5.1.1. Integrating theoretical approaches to study argumentation 
 The main theoretical point of reference in understanding the role of social 
interaction in individuals’ ability to argue is offered by normative theories of argument. 
These include Formal Dialectics (Krabbe, 1986, 1992, 2002), Communication Theory 
(Jacobs & Jackson, 1982); Informal Logic (Walton, 1989), Pragma-Dialectics (van 
Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). These theories are based on different assumptions, 
including the set of rules and definition of argumentation (see the literature review in 
Chapter Two). But there are also many similarities in the general assumptions of 
normative theories. These theories assume that argumentation can be broadly defined as 
a social activity in which people discuss claims. Thus, analyses of argumentation should 
focus on communication and interaction between two or more people. Also, these 
theories explain that argumentation arises from attempts to resolve conflicts or 
differences of opinion, and that people involved in a discussion may have different sets 
of commitments. Moreover, it is suggested that there is not a single principle to evaluate 
argumentation. On the contrary, evaluative criteria should be applied according to 
different kinds of argument. Normative theories offer a useful framework for analysing 
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empirically how individuals construct argument in the interaction with others, and were 
the theoretical basis of this study.  
Additionally, Activity Theory (Leont’ev, 1981) is of particular interest for this 
study, since it offers a theoretical framework for understanding the development of 
argumentative strategies in discussions. According to Leont’ev (1981), when people 
engage in a discussion, they develop actions, or behaviours to pursue goals, and these 
goal-directed behaviours become increasingly sophisticated during a discussion. 
Moreover, a discussion develops as individuals improve their strategies and achieve 
goals. Felton and Kuhn (2001) have argued that these two forms of development 
reinforce one another.  
5.1.2. Age differences in arguing and winning arguments 
 Previous studies have laid the groundwork for investigating how children 
interact with their peers in collaborative discussions. The skills involved in 
argumentative discussions are complex. Children are required, not only to share their 
points of view, but also to understand and listen to another’s arguments and form 
strong, coherent and persuasive arguments. Clark and Delia (1976) showed that taking 
the perspective of other is a fundamental social-cognitive ability to effective social 
communication amongst children and adolescents. That is, the ability to understand and 
to adapt to the perspective of other, which develops with age (e.g., Selman & Byrne, 
1974), leads to a more effective communication of persuasive messages.  
Results of the study conducted by Clark and Delia (1976) showed that ninth 
graders constructed more than three times the number of arguments second graders 
offered. The major differences in the use of arguments and persuasive strategies were 
found between second and third graders, between third and fourth graders, and between 
eighth and ninth graders. Leman and Duveen (1996) explored the dynamics of 
conversations of same-aged peers in a discussion of a simple perceptual task. Children 
from two age groups (6-7 and 11-12 years) were asked to judge whether two lines in an 
optical illusion were the same length. Some children (experimental condition) received 
training in a measurement algorithm using sticks placed over the lines. Children in the 
control condition did not receive training. Discussion pairs consisted of one child who 
had answered independently that the lines were the same length and one who responded 
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that they were different. The children were asked to discuss it and arrive at an 
agreement.  
The results from this study showed striking differences between the age groups, 
particularly the ways in which the “expertise knowledge” was used strategically in the 
discussions. Older children (11-12 years) showed a good grasp of the strategy of an 
argument, employed their expert knowledge appropriately, and tended to arrive at a 
conclusion by weighting the reasons of both sides. By contrast, younger children (6-7 
years) were less centred in the arguments provided, and tended to rely on external 
features of the situation in justifying their beliefs. Their conversations were very 
conflictual, and this conflict was based on personalities or the strength of belief of each 
child, and also on gender differences.  Leman and Duveen (1996) concluded that while 
older children understand better the interpersonal and communicative processes 
involved in knowledge acquisition, younger children have more difficulty in separating 
concepts of knowledge from concepts related to an individual’s social status. In another 
study, Leman and Oldham (2005) used a collaborative recall task to explore the nature 
and outcomes of children’s interaction with another child at the same age (two 7-years-
olds or two 9-years-olds) or different age (7- and 9- year-old). Children were instructed 
to memorise word lists for recall. In the first condition, children recalled collaboratively: 
in a pair with the other child. In the second condition, recalled words independently.  
Analyses included recall scores, contribution of each child of a dyad to the 
number of items collectively recalled, and measures of social dominance. The main 
results indicated that older children dominate social aspects of interaction and recall 
when paired with younger child. But with the same-age peer, younger children did not 
benefit from the collaboration. Leman and Oldham (2005) argued that younger children 
may lack full awareness of the potential of interaction to facilitate their performance in 
the task.  
 Anderson’s et al. (2001) study with fourth graders (9-10 year olds) showed that 
children also attempt to coordinate conversation with the goals of argumentation. Their 
results suggest that, when engaging in a discussion, children share and appropriate each 
other’s strategies. As a result, strategy use gradually “snowballs” within conversational 
partners. These strategies include attempts to make explicit claims, to articulate one’s 
position taking into account what other partners said, and to challenge opposing 
arguments with hypothetical scenarios and critiques.  
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 Felton and Kuhn (2001) assessed more sophisticated strategies in dialogues of 
adolescents and adults. Their study reports the development of an analytical system for 
analysing multiple dialogues between peers on the topic of capital punishment.  
Argumentative strategies include corner sequence, in which a speaker questions 
his partner for the purpose of finding a weakness in the partner’s position, which the 
speaker is then able to criticise. Two strategies that represent defensive moves were 
rebuttal, defined as a sequence of counterarguments, and block that occurs when a 
partner counterargues the premise of a leading question posed by the partner, avoiding 
in this way being forced to undermine his or her position. A fourth strategy identified 
was case sequence, which represents an offensive move, in which a speaker questions 
the partner about a hypothetical scenario or case, with the goal of directing the partner’s 
argument. Results showed that the use of these strategies, particularly corner sequence, 
rebuttal and block occurred more frequently in adult dialogues than in adolescent 
dialogues. Felton and Kuhn (2001) also compared the use of strategies in argumentation 
in agreeing and disagreeing dialogues. At the beginning of the study, participants 
identified their positions on capital punishment using an opinion scale adopted from 
Kuhn and Lao (1996). Participants were, then, assigned to agreeing, disagreeing, and 
neutral dyads. If the dyad members agreed with each other, they were asked to find all 
the reasons why they agreed. If they disagreed, they were asked to reach a consensus. 
Results show that agreeing discourse is as strategic as disagreeing discourse, although 
its goals differ. Felton and Kuhn (2001) also found that adolescents did not exhibit the 
strategic skill that adults did of adapting discourse to the requirements of particular 
contexts (agreeing vs. disagreeing dialogues).  
5.1.3. Work on peer collaboration 
 An important function of a discussion about a topic is the exchange of different 
points of view (Howe, 2010). There is now a substantial body of work dedicated to the 
study of peer interaction on several subjects of the school curriculum. Results have 
confirmed the significance of contrasting views on literacy and the arts (e.g., Miell & 
Littleton, 2004), mathematics (e.g., Schwarz, Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000), and science 
(Howe, Rodgers, & Tolmie, 1990; Howe & Tolmie, 2003; Howe, Tolmie, Greer, & 
Mackenzie, 1995; Howe, Tolmie, & Rodgers, 1992; Tolmie, Howe, Mackenzie, & 
Greer, 1993). For the past 20 years, research focused on science conducted by Howe 
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and her colleagues have provided enough evidence of the power of exchanges of 
opinion. In all of the studies, the children who worked in groups where initial ideas 
differed and/ or were observed to express differences during group work performed 
significantly better when individually given posttests a few weeks later than during the 
initial assessment. Their progress was also significantly more salient than the progress 
detected with children who worked in similar groups and/ or failed to express 
contrasting ideas. The most striking finding was that contrasting opinions triggered 
change despite the fact that their scientific quality was weak. In a recent study, Tolmie, 
Christie, Howe, Thurston, Topping, Donaldson et al. (2007) found that knowledge gains 
obtained after the implementation of a 3-weeks science program, involving group tasks 
for 10- to 12-year olds, were sustained after an 18-month interval.  
5.1.4. The present study 
Whilst there are documented age differences on adult performance in strategic 
skills in argumentative contexts (Felton, 2004; Felton & Kuhn, 2001), there is little 
evidence regarding children’s and young adolescents’ ability to develop strategies to 
direct an argumentative discourse with their peers. Thus, the focus of children’s 
discussions in the current study constitutes a novel approach to study the development 
of argumentation skills. The coding scheme used was adopted from the study by Felton 
and Kuhn (2001) who assessed discourse and strategic argumentative skills in adults. 
The first question in the current study is whether children understand and use 
sophisticated arguments (e.g., counterarguments) and argumentative strategies (e.g., 
blocks, rebuttals) to argue with their peers. This study also focuses directly upon the 
question of whether the use of argumentative strategies reflecting higher levels of 
argument skill increases with children’s age. More specifically, it was expected that 
older children (11-years old) would use a greater number of argumentative strategies 
than younger children (8- years), who in turn would behave more strategically than 5- 
year olds. 
5.2. Method 
 The empirical data reported in the present chapter are based on transcriptions of 
a series of group discussions on three different socio-moral topics. The sample included 
children from three age groups (5-, 8-, and 11- years-of-age). Prior and subsequent to 
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the series of discussions, participants were asked to indicate and justify their own 
individual opinion regarding two topics (sharing and lying). These pretest and posttest 
assessments and group discussions were conducted as part of the previous study (see 
Chapter Four). The series of discussions provided the data for the work presented in this 
chapter. 
5.2.1. Participants 
 A total of one hundred and fifteen participants engaged in a series of group 
discussions. The sample included children in three different age groups; 5 years (M age 
= 5, 7 years, SD = .48), 8 years (M age = 8, 4 years, SD = .48), and 11 years (M age = 
11, 9 years, SD = .34). Children were in their first, fourth, and seventh year of school 
education. Students were of heterogeneous ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds, and 
they were drawn from public and private elementary and secondary schools in the local 
area of Surrey, South East England. In the first instance, a letter explaining the study in 
more detail was sent to the Head Teacher of each school. A template letter to schools is 
attached in Appendix 1. After receiving permission from the schools, a consent letter 
was sent to children’s parents or guardians, who were required to give written consent 
for their child’s participation in this study. A template consent letter is attached (see 
Appendix 2). Children were also asked for their consent to take part in the group 
discussions and it was made clear that they could withdraw from the study at any point 
if they wished.  
5.2.2. Procedure 
Participants were assigned randomly to groups of five children from the same 
age and class. Groups consisted of roughly equal numbers of boys and girls. These 
conversations took place over three consecutive days. No group was given more than 
one discussion in the same day. 
At the beginning of each session, the group was given instructions to engage in 
and listen to a recorded story (e.g., “Let’s listen to a story about two friends. Please try 
to pay attention, because after listen to the story, we are going to talk about it”). The 
storytelling was immediately followed by discussion of the story as a whole. 
Conversations were elicited by a key question related with the moral theme in the story. 
 At the start and during discussion, the interviewer asked a series of questions to 
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initiate and maintain discussion. For example, related to the first story (“The bear that 
spoke”), students were asked the following question: “Is there any difference between 
helping a stranger or a friend?” Then the researcher gave the following instructions to 
the group: “Your task is to talk about the friendship and helping others, or whether is 
there any difference between helping a friend or a stranger. You will need to discuss the 
reasons each of you have for your views and find out where you agree or disagree. If 
you disagree, try to determine why and try to reach an agreement if you can”. If 
participants had difficulty maintaining the discussion during the prescribed time, or 
generating arguments, the researcher asked some questions to prompt further dialogue 
and also to generate counterarguments and rebuttals (see Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. Illustration of prompt questions used in the discussion of the story “the bear 
that spoke” 
Key question Is there any difference between helping a stranger or a friend?  
Prompt 
questions 
1. Why? Try to refer to all reasons that explain your position. 
1 a. (Probe, when subject completes initial response) Anything else? 
2. Someone (child’s name) seems to disagree with your opinion. 
What would you reply to him/ her to explain that your position is 
right? 
2.a. (If not already indicated) What could you say to show that your 
own view is the right one? 
 
In order to end the discussion, the researcher asked: “Do you think you can 
reach an agreement together?” If the majority of children said “yes”, the researcher 
continued: “Thank you. It was very interesting to listen to your opinions about this 
topic. Did you like discussing this together?” If some children did not agree and 
continued discussing ideas, the researcher finalised the discussion saying: “We have to 
stop now, because we are running out of time and I have to call the next group. Thank 
you very much for participating in this activity. It was very interesting to listen to your 
opinions about this topic, and I hope you enjoyed it as well”.  
 Discussions lasted an average of eight minutes among 5-6 year old children, 13 
minutes among 8-9 year old children, and 11 minutes among 11-12 year old children. 
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All of the verbal dialogue data were recorded on videotape and later transcribed for 
coding and analysis. 
Materials 
 Stimulus stories were selected from two books for children: “First stories for 
thinking” (Fisher, 1999), for children aged four upwards, and “Stories for thinking” 
(Fisher, 1996), for children aged nine upwards. The three stories selected for these tasks 
come from different countries and cultures including folktales from Europe, India and 
North America. All three stories contained a theme for thinking and discussion. “The 
black tulip” (Fisher, 1996) is a Dutch folktale about stealing; “The bear that spoke” 
(Fisher, 1996) is a Canadian folktale that talks about friendship and helping others, and 
“The ungrateful crocodile” (Fisher, 1999) is a story from India about trust. (Complete 
stories are presented in Appendix 4). All three stories were recorded by the researcher’s 
supervisor. Children listened for approximately 2-3 minutes to a story and, immediately 
after storytelling, the researcher asked a key question related to the moral theme in the 
story (see illustration on Table 5.2). Prompt questions were also used for further 
discussions of each story (Appendix 5). All of the verbal dialogue data were recorded 
on videotape using a camera. 
Table 5.2. Stories and key questions for discussions 
Story Moral theme Duration 
(min) 
Key question 
The bear that 
spoke 
Helping 
friends 
2, 07  Is there any difference between helping a 
stranger or a friend? 
The black 
tulip 
Stealing 3, 43  In the story, the thief said that thieves never 
prosper. Do you think that stealing is always 
wrong? 
The 
ungrateful 
crocodile 
Trusting 
others 
2, 22  In the story the man is kind and also trusting 
of others, but someone took advantage of it. 
If someone breaks a promise, should people 
trust this person again? 
Coding 
 There were 12 discussions produced by 5-6 years old children (year 1), 28 
discussions produced by 8-9 years old children (year 4), and 17 discussions produced by 
11-12 years old children (year 7). Evaluation of argumentative discourse skills in these 
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series of discussions was based on the assessment scheme developed by Felton and 
Kuhn (2001) that assessed similar skills in adolescents and adults. A summary of the 
coding scheme is provided in Table 5.3 below. A detailed description of this coding 
scheme is provided in the methodology chapter of this thesis (see Chapter Three).  
Table 5.3. Summary of analytical scheme for argumentative discourse (Felton & Kuhn, 
2001, p.141) 
Transactive questions  
Agree-? A question that asks whether the partner will accept or agree 
with the speaker’s claim 
Case-? A request for the partner to take a position on a particular 
case or scenario 
Clarify-? A request for the partner to clarify his or her preceding 
utterance 
Justify-? A request for the partner to support his or her preceding 
utterance with evidence or further argument 
Meta-? A question regarding the dialogue itself (rather than its 
content) 
Position-? A request for the partner to state his or her position on an 
issue 
Question-? A simple informational question which does not refer back to 
the partner’s preceding utterances 
Respond-? A request for the partner to react to the speaker’s utterance 
Transactive statements 
Add An extension or elaboration of the partner’s preceding 
utterance 
Advance An extension or elaboration that advances the partner’s 
preceding argument 
Agree A statement of agreement with the partner’s preceding 
utterance 
Aside A comment that does not extend or elaborate the partner’s 
preceding utterance 
Clarify A clarification of speaker’s own argument in response to the 
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Transactive questions  
partner’s preceding utterance 
Coopt An assertion at the partner’s immediately preceding utterance 
that serves the speaker’s opposing argument 
Counter-A A disagreement with the partner’s preceding utterance, 
accompanied by an alternate argument 
Counter-C A disagreement with the partner’s preceding utterance, 
accompanied by a critique 
Disagree A simple disagreement without further argument or 
elaboration 
Dismiss An assertion that the partner’s immediately preceding 
utterance is irrelevant to the speaker’s position 
Interpret A paraphrase of the partner’s preceding utterance with or 
without further elaboration 
Meta An utterance regarding the dialogue itself (rather than its 
content) 
Null An unintelligible or off-task utterance 
Refuse An explicit refusal to respond to the partner’s preceding 
question 
Substantiate An utterance offered in support of the partner’s preceding 
utterance 
Non-transactive statements 
Continue A continuation or elaboration of the speaker’s own last 
utterance which ignores the partner’s immediately preceding 
utterance 
Dismiss An utterance having no apparent connection to the preceding 
utterances of either partner or speaker 
 
 This scheme categorises each utterance in a dialogue based on its function 
relative to the preceding utterance, rather than focusing on the content of conversations. 
The scheme includes three general categories: transactive questions, transactive 
statements, and non-transactive statements. According to Felton and Kuhn (2001), an 
utterance is defined as transactive if it connects directly to the partner’s preceding 
utterance. Transactive questions request a response or a clarification from the partner, 
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for example “What do you mean?” or “Why do you think that...?” or “What if…?” 
Transactive statements are utterances expressed in response to the partner. Non-
transactive statements are utterances that do not connect to the partner’s preceding 
utterance (they include utterances coded as ‘Continue’ and ‘Unconnected’). In such 
cases, the speaker is breaking from the preceding conversation and introducing a new 
argument or idea.  
In each discussion, each turn was segmented into utterances, and each utterance 
was given a code. Each conversational turn was assigned with one code (or sometimes 
with two codes). Coding conversational turns of five speakers can be challenging, as 
often a speaker responds to the first speaker, instead of addressing the argument of the 
last one. However, a code was given always according to the preceding speaker. 
Occasionally, children did not complete an argument or idea, because of interruptions 
from another child. Thus, conversational turns with incomplete utterances were not 
coded. Also, a code was not given when the preceding speaker was the researcher.  
 After coding individual utterances, all discussions were re-examined in search of 
strategic sequences. Felton and Kuhn (2001) defined strategic sequences as “patterns of 
utterances that might represent an attempt to advance an extended argumentative 
strategy” (p. 145). Based on this analytic system, four sequences of codes were 
identified and counted in the discussions produced by children in the three age groups:  
1. Corner sequence, identified when the speaker asks the partner to clarify his 
position (Clarify-?), or when the speaker tries to interpret the other’s response 
(Interpret), and then, challenges his or her view advancing a Counter-C;  
2. Case-? sequence, which is a variant of the corner sequence defined by 
Clarify-?, followed by a Counter-C. Instead of Clarify-?, the opening statement is a 
Case question;  
3. Rebuttal is defined as presenting a counterargument that follows another 
counterargument (Counter-A or Counter- C) produced by the partner; and 
4. Blocking occurs when the speaker presents a Counter-C, to reject or counter-
argue the premise of a leading question (e.g., Case-?) posed by the preceding speaker.  
Reliability of utterance and sequence types 
 To test reliability of the coding of argumentative discourse measures a second 
judge coded blind ten of the discussions, selected at random (about 15% of the total 
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number of discussions). Agreement on coding for utterance and sequence categories 
was good: utterance types, Cohen’s kappa = .88; sequence types, Cohen’s kappa =.76.  
5.3. Results 
5.3.1. Design and analysis 
 A total of sixty seven group discussions were produced; fifty seven (out of 67 of 
these discussions) were produced by groups of five children, and ten (out of 67 of these 
discussions) were produced by groups of four or six children. Therefore, the analysis 
included only the group discussions composed by five children. The other ten were 
excluded from the analysis. More specifically, there were 12 discussions produced by 5-
6 years old children (year 1), 28 discussions produced by 8-9 year old children (year 4), 
and 17 discussions produced by 11-12 years old children (year 7).  
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to 
determine the effect of age on all measures of argumentative discourse: first the 
utterances used by groups in discussion; and second, the strategic sequences.  
Age differences in utterance types 
The first objective of this study was to identify differences in the argumentative 
discourse of children at different ages. For this purpose, the generation of different 
utterance types in group discussions by children in three age groups (5-6, 8-9, and 11-12 
years-of-age) was explored. 
Statistically significant multivariate differences between age groups appeared 
with respect to four utterance codes, Wilks’ λ = .05, F (46, 64) = 4.82, p < .001. Table 
5.4 presents the mean use of these utterance types in children’s discussions in the three 
age groups. The three age groups differed significantly in terms of the use of Clarify-?, 
F (2, 54) = 3.22, p < .01, partial η2 = .11, Add, F (2, 54) = 11.77, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.30, of Advance, F (2, 54) = 51.97, p < .001, partial η2 = .66, and use of Counter-A, F (2, 
54) = 15.29, p < .001, partial η2 = .36. 
As can be seen from Table 5.4, post hoc tests indicated that the use of Add was 
found significantly more often in discourse of 8- year olds. The other three utterance 
codes were found significantly more often in discourse of the oldest children (11- year 
olds), compared with younger children (5 and 8 year olds). Use of Advance and 
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Counter-A increased progressively with age. However, although means indicate some 
changes, use of these two utterance types only differed significantly for 11-year-old 
compared with 5- and 8- year old children. Use of the question Clarify-? differed 
significantly between the oldest children (11 years) and the youngest children (5 years). 
Table 5.4. Mean use (and standard deviations) of utterance types Clarify-?, Add, 
Advance and Counter-A and Rebuttal strategies in group discussions 
 5 years 8 years 11 years 
Code Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Clarify-? .08
 a .29 .21 a .42 .65 b 1.06 
Add 3.92
 a 2.84 8.43 b 3.06 4.94 a 3.31 
Advance 1.08
 a .90 1.50 a 1.14 7.59 b 3.50 
Counter-A .75
 a .75 1.89 a 1.75 3.94 b 1.78 
Note: Subscript letters indicate groups that differ significantly using post-hoc 
Bonferroni tests (p<.05) 
Use of Clarify-? 
 As Table 5.4 shows, the question Clarify-? was more prevalent in the oldest 
children group (11-12 years-of-age). Sometimes, this question does not reflect an 
argumentative strategy. A speaker might ask the partner to explain his or her preceding 
utterance, without argumentative goals in mind. However, in other situations, Clarify-? 
is used indirectly to address the partner’s argument with the intent of weakening it. In 
the following example, regarding the topic of stealing, speaker B asks for a clarification 
on the argument given by the first speaker (“Are you saying that stealing a pencil is 
O.K.?”). This question has an argumentative goal: speaker B wants to elicit what he or 
she sees as a weak argument from the first speaker and is prepared to criticise it. Thus, 
as predicted, after speaker A gives an explanation, speaker B advances a Counter-C (see 
Table 5.5.).  
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Table 5.5. Example of the use of Clarify-? as an argumentative strategy by 11-year old 
children 
Code Speaker/ Utterance 
Counter-C Speaker A: That is not classified as stealing, but as just taking 
something. We don’t say: “he stole my pencil!” We say: “he took my 
pencil!” 
Clarify-? Speaker B: Are you saying that stealing a pencil is O.K.? 
Clarify Speaker A: You’re not stealing; you’re just using a pencil. 
Counter-C Speaker B: If you don’t usually do that, then it is O.K., but if you keep 
on doing it all the time, that’s classified as wrong! 
Use of Add 
 Results showed that children aged 8-9 years exceeded the other age groups in 
the mean use of the utterance Add. Add is defined as an extension or elaboration of the 
partner’s preceding utterance. It is a weak strategic utterance, since it neither advances 
the speaker’s position nor challenges the partner’s argument. Table 5.6 presents 
examples of Add in a discussion between 8-9 years old children on the topic helping 
friends and strangers. 
Table 5.6 Example of Add produced by 8-year old children discussing a story about 
helping friends and strangers  
Code Speaker/ Utterance 
Continue Speaker A: You can help strangers except in a dark alley. 
Add Speaker B: you can help strangers when there are lots of people around, 
so they can’t hurt you. 
Add Speaker C: Don’t help them at night or in graveyards! 
Use of Advance 
 Along with the code Add, the utterance Advance is also directed to strengthen 
the other speaker’s position. In this case, the speaker provides an extension or 
elaboration of the partner’s preceding argument. Results showed that this utterance type 
was more prevalent in the discussion of 11-12 year-olds (see Table 5.7). 
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Table 5.7. Example of Advance an 11-year old child while discussing a story about 
stealing 
Code Speaker/ Utterance 
Continue Speaker A: So, stealing is wrong depending on the situation. 
Advance Speaker B: Most of the times stealing is wrong, and thieves either get 
caught or they will have to run away through the rest of their lives. 
They become paranoid about being caught. Stealing is breaking the 
law. 
Use of Counter-Alternate (Counter-A) 
 The three age groups also differed in the mean use of the utterance type 
Counter-A. Counter-A is defined as a disagreement with the speaker’s preceding 
utterance, accompanied by an alternative argument. This utterance type is intended to 
pursue argumentative ends, since it challenges the speaker’s position with a different 
argument (see Table 5.8).  
Table 5.8. Example of Counter-A produced by an 11-year old child while discussing a 
story about stealing 
Code Speaker/ Utterance 
Clarify Speaker A: Maybe people deserve a second opportunity. 
Counter-A Speaker B: I would trust someone again if this person breaks a promise 
once, but if they keep doing it again and again, then I would probably 
not trust this person again.  
Age differences in the use of strategic sequences 
 Finally, the mean use of different strategic sequences by age group was 
examined. The three age groups differed only in terms of the use of rebuttal, F (2, 54) = 
4.47, p < .01, partial η2 = .07. Post hoc Bonferroni tests revealed that the use of 
rebuttals differed significantly only between 11 year olds and 5 and 8 year old children 
(see Table 5.9). As seen in Table 5.9, the other three strategic sequences identified 
(corner sequence, block, and case sequence) occurred infrequently in children’s 
discussions in all age groups, and results show no statistical differences between them. 
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 Rebuttal represents a defensive move, but it is still a very strong strategic 
sequence, since it demonstrates that the speaker is aware of the argumentative goals in a 
discussion (Felton & Kuhn, 2001). Table 5.10 presents an example of a rebuttal.  
Table 5.9. Mean frequency (and standard deviation) of sequence types in group 
discussions 
 5-6 years 8-9 years 11-12 years 
Code Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Corner sequence .00 .00 .04 .19 .18 .53 
Rebuttal 1.17a 1.34 1.11a 1.62 2.59 b 2.00 
Block .17 .39 .32 .82 .24 .56 
Case-? sequence  .00 .00 .14 .45 .18 .39 
Note: subscript letters indicate groups that differ significantly using post-hoc 
Bonferroni tests (p < .05) 
Table 5.10. Example of a Rebuttal produced by 8- year old children while discussing a 
story about trust 
Code Speaker/ Utterance 
Clarify Speaker A: Well, forgiving means that you will talk to him, and not 
trusting means probably that you wouldn’t borrow him things anymore. 
Counter-C Speaker B: I disagree, because trusting is the same as forgiving. For 
example, if you give something to other person, you allow him to have 
it and that’s trusting. 
Counter-C Speaker A: No, trusting and forgiving are not the same, because trust is 
when you can rely on someone to do something, and forgiving is when 
someone says sorry and you say it is O.K. and you can agree not to 
fight about it. 
5.4. Discussion  
 The present study explored age differences in children’s use of discourse and 
argumentation skills in peer group discussions. Children aged 5-6, 8-9, and 11-12 years 
discussed three different topics of a socio-moral theme in response to a stimulus story. 
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Conversations were analysed in terms of utterance and sequence types (i.e., argument 
strategies), based on the analytical coding scheme designed by Felton and Kuhn (2001).   
The results showed that children in all age groups, even as young as 5 year old, 
were able to argue about a topic, express their opinions, and communicate with their 
peers. The use of unconnected or null utterances was practically inexistent. However, 
results also suggested that while the youngest children (5-6 years old) seem more 
preoccupied in expressing their own opinions, older children (11-12 years old) appeared 
to behave more strategically, producing more critiques (Counter-C), alternative 
arguments (Counter-A) and sequences of counterarguments (Rebuttals). These data 
suggest that at 11-12 years children have acquired many important argument skills and 
deploy them when exploring and evaluating the reasons for one’s own and other’s 
positions or perspectives in a discussion. Older children improve their strategy use as 
they adjust the goals they seek to achieve in discourse. Skilled arguers understand that 
the goal of effective argumentation is not only advancing sophisticated arguments, but 
to direct the arguments to gain advantage over the others (Leont’ev, 1981).  
Results pointed to a key shift between 8-9 and 11-12 year old in terms of the 
mastery of many important argument skills. Particularly noteworthy regarding the use 
of utterance types were the changes in the use of Add statements in discourse. These 
show an inverted U-shaped developmental trajectory, increasing between 5-6 and 8-9 
years, but then dropping between 8-9 and 11-12 years. Add statements extend or 
elaborate a speaker’s preceding utterance. Adding is a poor strategy to the goals of 
argumentation, since it only elaborates the other speaker’s statement, without either 
advancing the argument, or offering an opposing view. These differ from Advance 
statements in which children extend or elaborate a speaker’s preceding argument. The 
oldest children (11-12 years) showed a decline in the use of Add, and an increase in the 
use of Advance, showing a more sophisticated form of argument. Another fundamental 
advance in argumentation skills was the use of the question Clarify-?, which was more 
prevalent in the oldest group (11-12 years). By asking the other to clarify his or her 
position, children demonstrated an appreciation for the other’s perspective. A 
clarification question could have also been used as a first step to advance a corner-
sequence strategy. 
This suggests that at 8-9 years children are beginning to take others’ 
perspectives on board but have difficulty recognising the ways in which positions and 
arguments (reasons that support these positions) inter-relate in a conversation. In this 
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respect, 8-9 year old children may spend more time in discussions adding to their co-
discussants’ statements because they are starting to recognise that another’s perspective 
is a relevant concern (Leman & Duveen, 1996; Leman & Oldham, 2005). Yet, they may 
still lack adequate awareness to coordinate this information in a strategic way to 
conduct effective argumentation. This result is also consistent with the theory and data 
on the relationship between perspective-taking and effective argumentation (Clark & 
Delia, 1976) and helps explain the present findings. 
Moreover, the age differences observed in children’s use of rebuttals in the 
interviews analysed in the previous study (Chapter Four) suggest that, while 8-year old 
children appear to have a good grasp of counterargument, they do not use significantly 
more of these skills in peer discussion. The oldest age group employed significantly 
more rebuttal strategies in the discussions than the younger children. Counterargument 
and rebuttal are markers of an awareness of others’ perspectives in conversation and 
discussion and, as such, have been characterised as more advanced argument skills (e.g. 
Felton & Kuhn, 2001). The present results point to the possibility that the deployment 
of argument skills in peer discussion lags behind children’s ability to use these skills. 
5.4.1. Limitations 
The results of this study with respect to the use of strategic sequences in 
children’s discussions remain tentative because all age groups produced argumentative 
strategies (e.g., corner-sequence, block and case-based sequence) rather infrequently. 
This was probably due to the nature of the task. Each discussion lasted for about ten 
minutes (including listening to the stimuli story and task instructions), which probably 
was not enough time for children, in groups of five peers, to express their points of view 
and discuss in depth the positions and arguments of the other speakers.  
A potential criticism of this task design was that assignment to groups was not 
based on any particular criterion. Children were then asked to discuss their reasons, and 
if they disagreed, to determine why and reach a possible agreement. Because the 
emphasis was on discovery and exploration, the researcher gave children the freedom to 
determine the content of their discussions and used a flexible approach to create a 
productive group dynamic. The researcher exercised direct control over the discussion 
only in rare occasions, such as, when a child was dominating the entire discussion and 
not letting other children participate. In most cases, members of the group held different 
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positions on a topic and were led to engage in a debate with their peers and reach an 
agreement. In a few occasions, it was difficult for children to maintain a discussion 
during the prescribed time or generating arguments, particularly with 5-year olds. In this 
case, the researcher asked some questions to prompt further dialogue and also to 
generate counterarguments. Nevertheless, the composition of the group (of whether the 
group was composed of members who shared the same opinion or who had opposing 
views) may have led to differences in the quality and quantity of argument and 
argumentative strategies produced. On one hand, this variable should have been 
controlled or examined; on the other hand, it would have been impractical to do it with 
such a large sample and with the time restrictions of schools. 
Another limitation regarding the methodology of this study was that the measure 
used to assess the components of argumentative reasoning was originally developed to 
measure argument dyads (either individuals or teams) where individuals have 
opportunity to directly respond to the previous utterance of the other interlocutor. In the 
present study, there were five interlocutors speaking and, therefore, the coding scheme 
was adapted to fit the characteristics of the group discussions. For instance, from time to 
time, the investigator asked a child to clarify his or her position in relation to the last 
speaker’s utterance (e.g., “So, do you disagree with what [child’s name] said?”). In such 
situations, and every time participants responded to the investigator’s prompt questions, 
participants’ utterances were assigned a Null code. Most of the times, the decision to 
give codes was similar to the ground rules of the original coding scheme. Through the 
course of a discussion, it is expected that participants address the utterance of the last 
speaker (Felton, 2000). This was observed in practice.  
Given the potential difficulties in measuring or rating utterances in a group, and 
the lack of research on how adults fair at it, it may seem premature to look at how 
young children perform at this task. However, as stressed in the methodology chapter 
(Chapter Three), this study was mainly exploratory and served as a means to devise new 
quantitative measures for subsequent studies. It was, thus, the first attempt to test a 
dyadic measurement of argumentative skills in a different context.  
A further limitation is that the design of this research did not enable to draw 
conclusions regarding possible differences between the two contexts: dyadic and group 
discussions. It is, thus, clear that further research is needed to device appropriate 
measurements to determine whether the skills involved in dyadic argumentation versus 
argumentation with multiple individuals are similar. For instance, establishing how 
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children’s knowledge and use of arguments change with age, and also how 
opportunities for discussion can be optimised to promote the development of argument 
skills can have important theoretical and practical implications.   
5.4.2. Implications 
These findings highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating 
others’ perspectives in discussion (see again Leman & Duveen, 1996). A study focused 
on the argumentative skills of young children is particularly relevant in terms of its 
implications on education and classroom learning. As Mercer (2009) argues, one of the 
most important aims of education is to develop children’s abilities in argumentation. In 
his view, education is conceived as a dialogic process in which the dialogue between 
teachers and learners and the dialogue amongst learners contributes to the development 
of their individual intellectual abilities. It is through the use of language that children 
develop their skills in reasoning and argumentation. The work of Stein and her 
colleagues (e.g., Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b) has shown that 
children first learn to argue through conflictual talk with their parents about everyday 
situations. In these interactions, children learn how to use language effectively as a 
means of pursuing interests and developing shared understanding. In school, teachers 
also use discursive strategies, such as questioning, recapping, reformulating, and 
elaborating to engage students in learning activities. As well as learning from guidance, 
and example of adults, children also learn the skills of thinking by interacting and 
communicating with each other (Mercer, 2009). Any account of the development of 
reasoning and argumentation based only on the study of conversations between older 
and younger participants (e.g., parent-child interactions) would be insufficient. Children 
also learn how to communicate and argue better when interacting, playing, and talking 
with their peers.  
While Study One (Chapter Four) focused on the argument skills that children 
exhibit in a formal interview with the researcher, the present study explored these skills 
when children engage in a more informal group activity with their peers. This study 
extends the limited literature on children’s argument skills by examining the specific 
argumentative discourse elements that children generate at different ages. Results 
revealed significant differences between younger children and 11-year olds in terms of 
children’s discourse strategies during group discus
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showing more instances of asking for clarifications and building on the utterances of 
their interactive partners. Nevertheless, children at all ages did use rebuttals (a sequence 
of counterarguments) in discussions. Although rebuttal represents a defensive move in 
part of the speaker, it is still a very strong strategic sequence, since it demonstrates that 
the speaker is aware of the argumentative goals in a discussion (Felton & Kuhn, 2001).  
This result suggests that, from a young age, children understand the goals of 
discourse and the role speakers play in an argumentative discussion. This recognition or 
awareness seems to develop with age. A question one may ask is whether giving 
instructions regarding the definition and use of strategic arguments can promote the 
development of these strategies. These implications are further discussed in the final 
discussion chapter (Chapter Eight).  
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Chapter Six - Children’s evaluation of argument strength (Study Three) and 
argument effectiveness (Study Four)  
6.1. Introduction 
 The previous two studies have addressed how children at different ages generate 
arguments, both individually (Study One) and in peer collaborations (Study Two). 
Results showed that older children (11-12 years old) generate more complex forms of 
arguments compared to younger children (5-6 and 8-9 years old). For example, in face-
to-face interviews (Study One), older children produced arguments that contained more 
justifications, and arguments that addressed both sides of the question (two-sided 
arguments). Moreover, the oldest age group (11- year olds) intervened more in group 
discussions, not only in constructing their own arguments, but also in challenging and 
critiquing opposing arguments generated by the other speakers. Increasing construction 
of stronger types of arguments suggests that older children were more aware of others’ 
perspectives and arguments.  
 The tasks of constructing, evaluating, and responding to arguments are closely 
connected (Govier, 2005). For instance, when we decide that someone else has offered a 
weak argument, and we give an appraisal of the argument to show that the reasons in 
support of the claim or the conclusion are not acceptable, we are actually offering an 
argument ourselves. Moreover, when we evaluate arguments in a text or speech, we 
always end up constructing our own arguments, because we will be giving reasons to 
our own conclusion as to whether the argument is strong or not. When we offer our own 
arguments, we need to explore all the reasons that support our claims, and also to 
evaluate whether they are acceptable and relevant. Therefore, there are two sides to the 
practice of argument. There is the matter of evaluating other people’s arguments, and 
there is the matter of constructing strong arguments (Govier, 2005).  While the focus of 
the previous two studies was on argument generation, the studies described in this 
chapter address argument evaluation. Although generation and evaluation skills in 
argumentation are interconnected, some researchers on argumentation have investigated 
these two components of argumentation in separate studies (e.g., Goldstein, Crowell, & 
Kuhn, 2009; Leitão, 2003).  
 The present chapter describes a series of empirical studies designed to explore 
children’s ability to appreciate and evaluate arguments. The study of evaluation skills, 
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also referred as meta-level skills by Kuhn and colleagues (e.g., Goldstein, Crowell, & 
Kuhn, 2009; Kuhn, 1991) is highly practical for education and in everyday life. 
 Children are required to express their ideas and produce arguments in many 
situations in daily life, for example in family conflicts and peer interactions. In these 
argumentative interactions, children need to understand and carefully examine the views 
and arguments proposed, in order to argue and counter-argue effectively. In school, 
students are also required to critically evaluate the relevance of claims and arguments 
provided in textbooks and other sources, such as the Internet (Glassner, Weinstock, & 
Neuman, 2005). Evaluating information from the Internet is a particularly relevant topic 
for parents and teachers concerned with students’ increased use of Internet materials for 
personal and academic research. The Internet exposes students to information that 
ranges widely in its reliability. To guard effectively against misinformation and fraud, 
and use information effectively, students need to critically evaluate what they read on 
Internet websites. As highlighted in the literature review chapter (see Chapter Two), 
building students’ critical thinking lies partially in teaching them argument evaluation 
skills.  
6.1.1. Understanding an argument and taking sides 
 In order to evaluate an argument, we first have to know what an argument is. In 
practice, this means finding claims and justifications in written and spoken material. 
Children, and even adults, find this matter difficult. Brem, Russell and Weems (2001), 
found that students often performed poorly in analysing scientific information on an 
Internet website, because they did not evaluate the information sufficiently. Some 
characteristics of websites made argument evaluation challenging (for example, 
multiple layers of argument, missing evidence or insufficient detail), but students’ 
weaknesses exacerbated these difficulties. According to the authors, these weaknesses 
stemmed from (1) students’ overreliance on surface features rather than systematic 
analysis, for example, relying on credentials as a marker of credibility, and also (2) 
students’ failure to understand the nature of science and publishing, for example, 
focusing on the scientific argument, thus paying less attention to the reporting. 
Moreover, a recurrent theme was the lack of meta-cognitive reflection. Many students 
showed an “absolutist” orientation, that is, a belief that, given enough time and 
information, one can arrive at a “right answer” with complete certainty (Kuhn, 1991). 
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They also trusted common sense when assessing reasonableness, even though the goal 
was to produce the opposite response. These results indicated that students reacted to 
information on websites without reflecting on why they responded in a particular way. 
This is consistent with other findings suggesting a lack of reflection in argument 
exhibited by young adults (Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn & Felton, 2000).   
 Other studies have suggested that people tend to rely too heavily on explanations 
rather than evidence when they evaluate arguments (e.g., Brem & Rips, 2000; Kuhn, 
1991). Kuhn (1991) suggested that these errors arise from an inability to distinguish 
between explanations and evidence. Specifically, people’s weaknesses in argument 
evaluation result, not only because explanations influence their search for and 
interpretation of evidence, but also because people believe that their explanation is 
evidence. Brem and Rips (2000), on the other hand, advanced an alternative account 
that many people do distinguish between explanations and evidence, but rely more 
heavily on unsupported explanations when evidence is weak or absent. Although 
evidence availability influences performance, the authors considered that factor not 
necessarily a weakness. When no evidence is available, participants, who have nothing 
but an explanation to go on, give that story some weight, even if it is weak. In these 
cases, they are substituting explanations for unavailable as a useful strategy to argue 
under uncertainty.  
Evaluating an argument involves, not only describing an argument, but also 
having sufficient knowledge about the argument’s topic to make appropriate 
judgements (Voss & van Dyke, 2001). Brem (2000) analysed how adolescents’ prior 
knowledge regarding the purpose of science influences their evaluations of science 
accounts on the Internet. First, using a survey instrument including Likert scale items 
and open-ended questions, Brem (2000) assessed students’ concept of science. 
Participant were girls, aged 14 to 16 years (from 9th and 10th grades), and results showed 
that their concept of science was focused on practical and life-enhancing goals, such as 
improving life or helping people. For example, of some presented uses of science, the 
strongest link found was that “Science helps staying safe and healthy”; over half stated 
that they used science for this purpose at least once a month, and 78% agreed that 
science could be useful for his purpose. “Solving everyday problems” was the second 
most popular purpose. As the set of items moved to less traditional pedagogical notions 
of science, students saw less connection to science. Fewer reported using science to 
“Understand people”, and only 50% thought this was potentially useful. Additionally, 
CHAPTER 6: CHILDREN’S EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS 
 
164 
 
very few students reported that science could be useful for “Taking a stand in political 
issues” and “Test experts’ credibility”. When presented with specific reasons for 
wanting to learn science, students again showed an interest in practical and caretaking 
functions (such as “Making decisions about personal health”, or “Want a job that uses 
science”), though enjoyment of science was their number one reason.  
In the second part of the study, Brem (2000) developed a web-based task which 
consisted of an introductory section about critical evaluation, and an evaluation section. 
The program allowed students to visit third-party websites for information, while 
remaining within a framework that provided instructions in assessing arguments, note-
taking capabilities, and graphical argumentation tools. Eighty-one girls, aged 14 to 18 
years, from grades 9, 10, and 12 (including the students who participated in the survey 
described above) participated in this study. Results showed that students’ prior 
conceptions of science influenced how they evaluated accounts of science provided on 
the Internet. For instance, assessing source credibility was a real challenge to students 
with little knowledge about a particular scientific area (e.g., the role of a biochemist in 
cloning research). Instead of determining whether a source was knowledgeable and 
trustworthy, or examining their credentials and experience, students relied on the 
appearance of the credibility when they could not establish the importance of 
information, assuming that affiliations were relevant and reputable.  
Moreover, students’ views of “real” scientists were very similar to those that 
emerged from the survey. According to the student model, credible scientists are 
“Unprejudiced and interested only in advancing science”, or “Engaged in activities with 
a clear purpose, often humanitarian in nature”. According to this view, scientists do not 
possess ulterior motives, such as financial gain, or motivation by career goals and 
prestige. As Brem (2000) discusses, believing that scientists have no motive beyond 
helping and discovery may lead to an unwarranted level of trust. Moreover, if students 
do not know much about a scientific area and they do not recognise the purpose of a 
study, they may dismiss it prematurely. As this study shows, students’ prior knowledge 
about a topic plays a crucial role in how they address and evaluate arguments related to 
that topic.  
As highlighted in the literature review chapter (Chapter Two), research on 
argument generation has also demonstrated that arguers tend to ignore the opponent’s 
argument and focus mainly on their own arguments (e.g., Felton & Kuhn 2001; Kuhn & 
Udell, 2007). For example, Kuhn and Udell (2007) conducted a study on preference for 
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favoured or opposing arguments between adolescents and adults. Results of this study 
showed that adolescents tend to pay less attention to the opposing position, compared 
with adults. However, adolescents are still able to address the opposing position when 
explicitly asked to do so. As Kuhn and Udell (2007) suggest, it might be that 
adolescents do not recognise the need to address the opposing arguments, because they 
do not understand the goals and potential benefits of addressing and challenging 
counterarguments. This evidence indicates that, although cognitive and linguistic 
demands of argumentation can explain in part developmental differences in argument 
skill, the development of epistemological understanding is also crucial for appreciating 
the relevance of counterarguments. The work of Stein and her colleagues on children’s 
generation of arguments in family conflicts has also showed that children are more 
aware of arguments in favour of their own positions than the claims and reasons of the 
opposing side (e.g., Stein, Bernas, & Calicchia, 1997; Stein & Miller, 1990).  
Arguments can involve personal, socio-moral, ethical, political, or scientific 
issues. In most arguments, especially those in socio-moral domain, reasons given to 
justify a position are closely linked to personal preferences, values, and beliefs about the 
benefits and costs of supporting that position (Stein & Miller, 1990, 1993a). When 
arguers support one side versus the other they have decided that the values and socio-
moral principles that underlie their favoured position are more important than those of 
their opponent’s position (Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b). Further, arguers (regardless of 
their age) begin a discussion with support for their position to convince or persuade the 
other person about the greater legitimacy of their position. Persuasion is carried forward 
by providing support for the favoured position and criticisms of the opposing position. 
In family or peer conflicts, even preschool age children give reasons for supporting their 
side of the issue (Stein & Liwag, 1997) and for opposing their opponent (Albro & Stein, 
2000). 
The question that may arise is: do arguers have equal amounts of knowledge 
about their own and their opponent’s position? Stein and Miller (1993a) attempted to 
answer this question by asking primary school children and adults to talk about four 
different types of argument knowledge: 1) reasons for supporting a favoured position, 2) 
reasons for opposing a favoured position, 3) reasons for supporting an opponent’s 
position, and 4) reasons for opposing an opponent’s position. Results from this study 
revealed that participants at different ages (ranging from 7 to 21 years) could generate 
supporting reasons for their own position and at least one reason in favour of their 
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opponent’s position. While participants easily generated problems with their opponent’s 
position, they had greater difficulty generating reasons that would weaken or dismiss 
their own position. They also do not generate the more fundamental principles that 
motivate their opponents’ claims. Stein and Miller (1993b) also concluded that an 
individual’s knowledge about an issue is critical in determining the choice of supporting 
one side over another. The greater the number of supporting reasons for one side, the 
more likely an arguer would be to support that side (Stein & Miller, 1993b). Thus, the 
content and structure of argument knowledge across the position is asymmetrical (Stein 
& Miller, 1993a, 1993b).  
6.1.2. The communicative goals of argumentative discourse  
 The research reported in this chapter seeks to explore whether there are 
developmental differences in children’s evaluation skills of written arguments. In the 
first instance, analyses of arguments focused on its formal structure. These involved 
verifying the presence or absence of individual components regarded as necessary to 
sound arguments. This analysis is important because it could reveal which particular 
type or structure of argument children, at different ages, regard as “good” or strong. The 
framework adopted was drawn from Toulmin’s (1958) analysis of the components of 
argument. As noted by Clark, Sampson, Weinberg, and Erkens (2007), in their review 
of approaches, most researchers have adopted Toulmin’s model to analyse arguments. 
Some researchers have also made adaptations to the model to improve clarity and 
reliability of analysis (e.g., Erduran, Simon, & Osborne, 2004; Kuhn, 1991; Means & 
Voss, 1996). Regardless of the adaptations, stronger arguments are thought to contain 
more of the different components (e.g., inclusion of sound reasons to back up claims, 
inclusion of counterarguments) than weaker arguments. A further objective of the 
present research was to explore whether children’s views on the topics influenced their 
evaluation of the strength of particular types of argument.  
 In the second instance, the present research investigated how children evaluate 
arguments in an interpersonal or dialogic context. In particular, the second study 
focused on children’s evaluative skills with respect to the pragmatic function of 
argumentation. Analyses of children’s arguments focused on the goal arguers pursue in 
argumentation - that of influencing others’ points of view. This interest stemmed from 
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recent studies that have shown that discourse goals are important mediators of the way 
children understand and evaluate arguments (Leitão, 2000, 2003).  
For instance, Leitão (2003) analysed how children, aged 8-, 11- and 14- years, 
evaluate and select arguments and counterarguments for inclusion in a text aiming at 
convincing possible readers about the position defended. Participants were given one of 
two cards containing the following statements: Children themselves should select the 
programs they watch on TV or Parents should select the programs children watch on 
TV. Participants were presented with three reasons in favour of their views and three 
reasons in favour of the opposite view (i.e., counterarguments), and were then asked to 
decide whether those reasons should be included in the text. Additionally, children were 
asked to give reasons for each decision made. Results showed that the number of 
counterarguments selected for inclusion in the text was significantly lower than the 
number of arguments (for all age groups). Nevertheless, an unexpected percentage of 
counterarguments (40%) were selected by 8-, 11-, and 14- year old children to be 
incorporated into the text. As Leitão (2003) suggests, this result challenges the widely 
accepted view that children do not generate counterarguments in oral or written tasks 
because they cannot take alternative views into account. The result indicates that, when 
selecting content for inclusion in a text, children may consider views and 
counterarguments that may never be incorporated into the text. Analysis of reasons 
children invoked to justify their decisions revealed that they decided whether to include 
a statement in the text based on three criteria: (a) agreement or disagreement with the 
content of the target statement, (b) understanding that even though the content of a 
statement is partially acceptable, its scope should be restricted or modulated, and (c) 
assessment of the impact of an idea on the text goal, that is, the perception that the 
presence of a statement would or would not enhance the probability of the text 
viewpoint’s being accepted. According to Leitão (2003), these criteria reflect the 
arguer’s compliance with two constraints. The first is the content constraint, which 
leads the writer to focuses on the content (the first two criteria above). The second is the 
rhetorical constraint, or the writer’s perception of the potential effect of an idea on the 
acceptability of the text’s viewpoint (third criterion).  
In a second study, Leitão (2003) looked in particular at children’s awareness of 
the rhetorical value of counterarguments for persuading a reader. Participants were 8-, 
11- year old children and first year college students (age 18-19), and they were asked to 
evaluate texts that varied in the inclusion of different argumentative elements (e.g., 
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supporting element, counterargument, and reply). The essay topic concerned the 
extension of playtime in school. Results indicated that almost none of the participants 
regarded the texts, in which a counterargument was included, as capable of achieving 
the text goal. When asked to evaluate text versions that included counterarguments, 
92% of 8- year olds and 69% of 11-year olds saw the inclusion of counterargument as 
something that would run against text purposes. Even among college students, 56% 
thought the presence of counterarguments might not be “good enough” to achieve the 
text’s goal.  
Similar results were obtained in educational studies. For instance, in a review of 
empirical studies on argumentative writing, Santos and Santos (1999) advanced the idea 
that writing to persuade, in contrast to simply expressing an opinion, might inhibit the 
production of alternative views and counterarguments because the failure to rebut them 
undermines the essay’s persuasiveness. Recent studies on argumentative writing have 
provided evidence for this explanation.  
For example, in an experiment conducted by Nussbaum and Kardash (2005), 
college students were asked to write an essay to persuade an audience or to simply 
express an opinion (no persuasion) about a controversial topic (“Does watching 
television causes children to become more violent?”). The authors also wanted to 
explore whether the provision of a short text, outlining arguments on both sides of the 
issue, would improve essay quality. Results showed that, compared to the no persuasion 
goal, the persuasion goal reduced the quality of the essay, when students wrote without 
the support of the text. Nussbaum and Kardash (2005) concluded that persuasion goals 
might discourage students to take into account alternative views.  
Another set of studies conducted by Ferretti and colleagues compared the effects 
of a general goal to persuade and an elaborated goal that contained specific sub-goals on 
the argumentative writing of fourth- and sixth-grade students with and without learning 
disabilities (Ferretti, Lewis, Andrews-Weckerly, 2009; Ferretti, MacArthur, Dowdy, 
2000). Both studies showed that the elaborated goal induced students to include more 
alternative views and arguments, and therefore to produce more persuasive essays than 
the general goal of persuasion.  
In sum, previous research has shown that the ability to evaluate and construct 
arguments is influenced by several personal and situational dimensions. These include: 
background knowledge of a topic, ability to understand and display argumentative 
strategies, arguers’ attitudes and beliefs toward a topic, discourse goals, and type of 
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audience that arguers address. However, very few studies have looked particularly at the 
relationship between goals and processes in argumentation from a developmental 
perspective. For instance, while Leitão (2003) addressed this question in the studies 
described above, the results of her studies showed no differences between young 
children’s and teenagers’ performances in the argument selection tasks.  
6.1.3. The present research 
 The research reported in this chapter comprises two related studies on argument 
evaluative skills of 8- year old and 11-year old children. Study Three investigates 
developmental differences in children’s evaluation of arguments in terms of its strength. 
Study Four explores developmental differences in children’s evaluation of arguments in 
terms of its effectiveness, that is, the extent to which an argument is seen to be 
persuasive enough to change the audience’s points of view. 
Study Three assessed how 8- year olds and 11- year olds appreciate different 
statements (e.g., children should get pocket money) and how they evaluate the quality 
or strength of different types of arguments. Arguments varied in content (reasons) and 
structure (number of reasons; inclusion of an alternative position). Based on the 
assessment criteria of quality of arguments delineated in the previous studies, three 
types of argument were analysed: single argument (the simplest form of argument, in 
which a claim is supported by one reason); multiple argument (an argument that states a 
claim supported by two reasons); and counterargument (an argument that includes a 
reason in favour of the claim, and another reason in favour of the alternative position).  
Two specific hypotheses were formulated regarding age differences in children’s 
evaluation of the strength of different argument structures. First, it was predicted that 
multiple arguments supporting any particular position would be perceived as stronger 
than a single argument, because they contain more reasons. This prediction was 
developed on the basis of previous research on argument generation (e.g., Kuhn, 1991; 
Means & Voss, 1996). For instance, Kuhn’s research (e.g., Kuhn, 1991; Kuhn, Shaw, & 
Felton, 1997) has shown that skilled arguers generate more reasons to support their 
claims. The second hypothesis predicted that older children (11-12 years) would rate 
counterarguments as stronger than arguments, whereas younger children (8-9 years) 
would perceive fewer differences between the two. Again, this prediction is in line with 
previous research on counterargumentation (e.g., Kuhn, Felton, & Shaw, 1997) and also 
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previous findings reported in this thesis. For instance, Study One (Chapter Four) 
showed that children generate progressively more complex forms of argument as they 
get older. For example, 11-year old children produce arguments that address both sides 
of an issue and, thus, they advance more reasons and opposing reasons to justify their 
views, compared with younger children. The research question posed in the present 
study was whether children would show corresponding developmental change in the 
appreciation of stronger versus weaker arguments. Increasing use of stronger arguments 
implies such awareness, nevertheless, this question is worthy of an empirical test.  
Children engaged in a computer task and were asked to think about several 
controversial statements. These claims were related to everyday issues that most 
children are familiar with, such as wearing school uniforms, or receiving pocket money. 
Children were asked to state their position on each issue and then to rate how weak or 
strong an argument was, independently of their views on the topic. A further objective 
of this study was to explore whether children’s views on the topics influenced their 
preference for particular types of argument. In light with previous findings, it was 
predicted that children with a favourable opinion regarding a target statement would 
consider arguments in favour of that statement as stronger (Kardash & Nussbaum, 2005; 
Leitão, 2003). 
Study Four was conducted to address the question posed earlier as to how the 
goal of persuasion affects children’s evaluation of arguments: Are the arguments 
previously evaluated as strong also perceived as the most persuasive? In a similar 
computer based task, children were asked to select arguments to influence a character’s 
point of view. The general hypothesis formulated in this study was that younger 
children (8-9 years) will show a preference for arguments over counterarguments for 
persuading arguers to change their points of view. 
Prior to conducting these two studies, a small-scale, focus group study was 
carried out to gather information about the sorts of arguments children typically use on 
various topics.  
6.2. Pilot study  
A small scale focus-group study was carried out to gather information prior to 
the larger studies. Children were asked about discussion topics listed in Table 6.1. The 
objectives of the pilot study were: (1) assessing whether children were familiar with the 
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topics selected; (2) gathering information on the sort of reasons children give to justify 
their points of view; (3) selecting the most suitable topics to be incorporated in the main 
studies, based on children’s level of knowledge and the arguments they generate; and 
(4) creating a list of arguments to incorporate in the design of the main studies. As 
already discussed in the methodology chapter (see Chapter Three), piloting is a crucial 
stage of the design of research tasks for children. Results could be compromised if 
children did not have enough knowledge regarding the topics, or did not understand the 
wording in the questions.   
6.2.1. Participants 
Twelve children (6 boys, 6 girls) were assigned to two focus-group sessions. 
Each group had an equal number of boys and girls. Children were 8-9 years old (M = 
8,3 years, SD = .49), and were in the fourth year of school education. Only the youngest 
group participated in the pilot study, and this group served as a point of reference for 
assessing the appropriate level of difficulty of the task. Children were drawn from a 
primary school in the local area of Surrey, SE England. The class teacher helped in the 
selection of participants, which was based on children’s competence. A letter explaining 
the study in more detail was sent to the school’s Head Teacher (see Appendix 7). This 
was followed by up by a telephone call. After receiving permission from the school, a 
consent letter was sent to children’s parents (see Appendix 8). 
6.2.2. Materials 
An audio-recorder was used to record children’s discussions during focus-group 
sessions. A paper-and-pencil questionnaire in Likert format was used to evaluate 
children’s self-reported knowledge on ten different topics (see Appendix 10).   
6.2.3. Tasks and Procedure 
Children participated in group discussions, designed to collect their opinions on 
several social issues (e.g., children wearing school uniforms). Each group discussion 
lasted approximately 40 minutes. Children were asked to discuss, spontaneously, their 
opinions and to generate reasons in response of ten different statements (see Table 6.1). 
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Table 6.1. Topics and statements used in the pilot study 
Topics Statements 
School uniforms Students should wear school uniforms. 
Zoos Animals should be kept in the zoo. 
Technology The Internet brings people of the world closer together. 
Machines In the future, machines will replace people at work. 
Television Children should be able to have TVs in their bedrooms. 
Laws If laws did not exist, everyone would commit crimes. 
School time School days should be two hours shorter than they are now. 
Famous people Famous people are treated unfairly by the media. 
Pocket money Children should get pocket money. 
Naughty children Some children are naughtier than others. 
 
The focus-group session was relatively unstructured, and all children had the 
opportunity to express their ideas about all statements. The researcher facilitated the 
discussion, to ensure that all group members contributed to the discussion and to avoid 
letting one child’s ideas dominate. At the beginning of the discussion, children were 
given the following instructions: “The purpose of this study is to help me understand 
what children think about everyday issues. I am going to give you a statement, and then 
ask your opinion about that statement and the reasons why you agree or disagree with 
it”. The major part of the session consisted of eliciting and probing children’s reasoning 
regarding the topics. Broadly focused questions included presenting a statement and 
asking children’s points of view on the topic, for example, “Some people think that in 
the future machines will replace people. Try to determine whether you agree or disagree 
with this statement and give me at least one reason to justify your position”; and also 
proposing a new reason and asking children to comment or discuss it, for example: 
“Some people think that school uniforms are very expensive. Do you agree with this 
idea, and why?” The initial instructions included a request to listen to “a wide range of 
different points of view”. During the discussion, the researcher reinforced these initial 
instructions with probes and follow-up questions, such as: “Who else has some thoughts 
about this; maybe something a little different?”, “You have been discussing several 
different ideas; what hasn’t been said yet?”, “Remember, I want to listen to all your 
opinions”; “Who has something else?” Additional information regarding the 
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instructions given in focus group sessions is provided in Appendix 9. A more structured 
framework for the focus group discussion would be inappropriate given the nature and 
purposes of the present study.  
Group discussions were audio-recorded. Additionally, the researcher took notes 
during the sessions and wrote up notes afterwards. Permission was obtained from 
children to be recorded prior to the start of the focus-group sessions. Brief notes were 
taken during the discussions to remind the researcher of points of interest and areas 
requiring further clarification within that discussion. Notes made immediately after the 
researcher had left the school were used to record important information to assist with 
data analysis.  
At the end of focus group the session, children were asked to respond 
individually to a simple questionnaire about their personal knowledge regarding the 
topics, in response to the question: “How much would you say you know about the 
topic [e.g., school uniforms]?” Self-reported knowledge regarding the topics was rated 
on a 3-point scale, where 1 was marked “I know nothing”, 2 “I know a little” and 3 “I 
know a lot” (see again Appendix 10). 
6.2.4 Analysis 
Group discussions were audio-recorded, and then analysed. In addition, notes 
taken by the researcher during the discussions and afterwards were also analysed. The 
aim was to generate a list of different reasons that could be used in the main studies. 
The self-reported knowledge questionnaire was also analysed to assess children’s level 
of knowledge of the topics presented.  
Argument generation 
For the argument generation task there was no need to collect individual 
participant-level data. A total of twelve children (two groups of six children each) 
advanced reasons in favour and against all statements. A list of reasons given by 
children to support their views is detailed in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2. Reasons in favour and against several different statements given by children 
Statement: Children should wear school uniforms 
Reasons in favour 
• Uniforms represent the school  
• Children in the morning would not have to make up their minds on what to wear 
• Uniforms are easy to wear 
• It is easier to identify children who belong in the school and those who do not 
• It is cheaper to buy uniforms than lots of different clothes 
Reasons against 
• Uniforms are dull 
• Children cannot play games or sports with uniforms, because they would not 
have clothes to wear the next day 
• Uniforms are expensive 
• Uniforms stop children being creative 
• Everyone looks the same 
Statement: Animals should be kept in the zoo 
Reasons in favour 
• Zoos provide a safe home for animals 
• Zoos protect animals  
• Zoos provide regular meals for animals 
• Children can learn about animals when they visit zoos 
Reasons against 
• Animals in zoos live in cages 
• Animals in zoos do not have a big area to run or to hunt their food 
• Animals in zoos suffer a lot because they live alone 
Statement: The Internet brings people of the world closer together 
Reasons in favour 
• People from different countries can communicate with each other 
• People talk with each other more frequently through email 
• People can make new friends in chat rooms 
Reasons against 
• People do not know what the person they are emailing look like or is like 
personally 
• People who use Internet a lot do not have time to meet friends and do other 
things  
Statement: In the future, machines will replace people at work 
Reasons in favour 
• Machines are not lazy 
• Machines work quicker 
• Machines do not make mistakes 
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Reasons against 
• Machines cannot be creative like people 
• Machines cannot interact with people 
• Machines do not have feelings 
Statement: Children should be able to have TVs in their bedrooms 
Reasons in favour 
• Everyone in the family can do their own thing 
• Watching TV after doing homework is a good reward 
• Children can learn things 
• Children would be more responsible with their own TV 
• Children can watch their favourite shows in their rooms 
Reasons against 
• Children would watch stuff that parents do not allow 
• Children would spend less time with their family 
• Children who watch too much TV often do not make many friends 
• TV is addictive 
• Some TV shows are violent  
• Children would not study hard or do their homework 
Statement: If laws did not exist, everyone would commit crimes 
Reasons in favour 
• Without laws, there would be nothing protecting the human rights 
Reasons against 
• Crimes exist even with laws 
• People would be more responsible for their own actions 
Statement: School days should be two hours shorter than they are now 
Reasons in favour 
• Children could sleep more in the morning 
• Children would concentrate better at school in the afternoon 
• Children would have more time to play 
• Children would have more time to do their homework the night before 
• Children would learn more 
Reasons against 
• Parents who work in the morning would not be able to take their children to 
school 
• Changes would require a lot of money 
• Children would have to do more homework to catch up 
• Children would learn fewer things 
• Children would have to work two hours later at school in the afternoon 
Statement: Famous people are treated badly by the media 
Reasons in favour 
• Famous people cannot go anywhere without bodyguards 
• Magazines and TV invent lies about people’s lives 
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• Famous people are photographed even when they do not want to be. 
Reasons against 
• Famous people use the media to gain fame 
• The media pays famous people to have photographs taken 
Statement: Children should get pocket money 
Reasons in favour 
• Children could save money to buy a special item 
• Children would learn the value of money 
• Children would learn about savings 
• Children would be more independent 
• Children would be more responsible 
• Children could learn to understand the cost of things 
Reasons against 
• Children are too young to manage money 
• Children might sometimes receive money without doing anything to deserve it 
• Children might not appreciate the value of money as they get older 
• It is dangerous for children to carry money with them 
• Children would spend all their money on sweets 
Statement: Why are some children naughtier than others? 
Reasons in favour 
• Children are raised in different families and some parents are naughtier than 
others 
Reasons against 
• All children behave badly from time to time 
Self-reported knowledge on topics 
Differences in self-reported knowledge were examined to determine the most 
suitable topics regarding the degree of knowledge an 8-year old child was likely to 
have. Direct measures of knowledge were not undertaken. The topics related to school 
uniforms, television, school time, and pocket money were the ones for which children’s 
reported knowledge was the greatest (see Table 6.3). Few children, in contrast, reported 
to have knowledge regarding machines, laws, and famous people. For topics related to 
zoos, technology, and why some children are naughty, subjects reported to have 
intermediate knowledge (see again Table 6.3).  
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Table 6.3. Frequency distribution of children’s reported knowledge on selected topics  
Topics I know nothing I know a little I know a lot 
School uniforms 0 2 10 
Zoos 6 4 2 
Technology 3 8 1 
Machines 10 2 0 
Television 0 3 9 
Laws 9 3 0 
School time 0 6 6 
Famous people 9 2 1 
Pocket money 0 1 11 
Naughty children 4 6 2 
  
The focus-group sample (N = 12) was quite small and unrepresentative of the 
characteristics of the population from which the sample was selected. No statistical tests 
were performed to analyse whether there were statistically significant differences for 
scores of children’s reported knowledge for all topics. This was appropriate because the 
objective of this part of the pilot study was merely exploratory. More specifically, it was 
carried out to refine the results obtained in the focus groups and to help select only four 
out of ten topics to be displayed in the main studies.  
 The following topics listed below were chosen as ones children were able to 
think and talk about in the focus-group sessions. They were also chosen as ones which a 
group of 8-year old children reported knowing more about.  
 
1. Children should wear school uniforms. 
2. Children should be able to have TVs in their bedrooms. 
3. School days should be two hours shorter than they are now. 
4. Children should get pocket money. 
 
 Participants were very familiar with topics related to school, for example 
regarding wearing school uniforms. They were also interested in school policies, in 
particular concerning the amount of time students spend in school. The topics related 
with having television set in children’s bedrooms and getting pocket money were also 
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relevant, because most children who participated in the focus groups reported having 
discussed these issues at least once with teachers or parents. These topics continue to be 
relevant as children get older. For instance, the topic about television has been highly 
debated in news and Internet forums, by parents, teachers, and professionals of health 
care concerned with children’s school performance. Therefore, it was predicted that 
most 8- year olds, and also 11- year olds (the other age group to be included in the main 
studies) would have heard of or discussed these topics in school or at home.  
6.3. Study Three: Age differences in children’s evaluation of the strength of 
arguments 
 The objective of this study was to explore which particular argument type or 
structure children regard to be strong. Arguments varied, not only in structure (number 
of reasons, inclusion of an alternative position), but also in content (reasons). These 
arguments were selected from the pilot study conducted earlier. 
6.3.1. Method 
Participants 
 One hundred and forty-two children (76 boys and 66 girls) participated in the 
study. Children came from two different age groups; 8-9 years (M = 8,4 years, SD = 
.49), and 11-12 years (M = 11,9 years, SD = .32). Children were in their fourth and 
seventh year of school education, respectively. They were not from the same population 
reported in the pilot study. The reason for choosing these two age groups (8-year olds 
and 11-year olds) was the interest in studying children for whom the handling of 
opposing positions and counterarguments seems to be critical, as shown in the previous 
studies and other literature (e.g., Golder & Coirier, 1994, 1996; Leitão, 2003). 
The sample was collected at primary and secondary schools in the local area of 
Surrey, South East England. Students were of heterogeneous ethnic (mostly European) 
and socioeconomic (mostly middle class) backgrounds. All children in a class were 
invited to participate (i.e., there were no exclusion criteria based on gender, race, or any 
other characteristic). Consent was established by means of a consent letter that was sent 
schools (see Appendix 11) and to children’s parents (see Appendix 12). Children were 
also asked for their consent to participate before the study began. Children, teachers and 
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parents were fully debriefed and told of the study aims after the data collection had been 
completed. 
Materials 
Children completed a test individually in a computer room available at their 
school. The computer program used was written in a web language called Active Server 
Pages (ASP). ASP is a web application framework, developed by Microsoft, which 
allows creating interactive web pages or web-based applications that are easy to modify. 
The web page is connected to a database that holds the questions and also records the 
data for the participants.  
The program structure consisted of 25 page screens, including information sheet, 
instructions for each task and tasks presentation. Topics were presented in the same 
order; first about school uniforms, then about TVs in bedrooms, followed by the topics 
about school time, and finally about pocket money. Order of appearance of the 
arguments was counterbalanced across topics. The test also included a measurement of 
participants’ time reactions. Time reactions were analysed as a check for outliers.  
The syntax of programming language consisted of the various language 
elements, and operators used to write the instructions. In order to produce different 
structures of argument, we first had to create a list of reasons for the arguments. For 
each of the four topics, there were four reasons in favour (pro- condition), and one 
reason against (anti- condition) the statement (see Table 6.4).  
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Table 6.4. List of reasons in favour and against for four different topics as displayed in 
the computer program script 
Topic Reason Condition 
School 
uniforms 
• Uniforms represent the school pro 
• Uniforms are easy to wear pro 
• Uniforms can save parents money pro 
• Uniforms mean personality is more important than 
how much money someone has 
pro 
• Uniforms are dull anti 
TV in 
bedrooms 
• Having a TV allows children to have time for 
themselves 
pro 
• Watching TV is a good reward for children pro 
• Children can learn to be more responsible with their 
own TV 
pro 
• Some TV shows are educational pro 
• Children would watch shows that parents don’t allow anti 
School 
time 
• Children would concentrate better for the time they 
are in school 
pro 
• Children would have more time to play pro 
• Children would be happier pro 
• Teachers would have more time to prepare classes pro 
• Children would learn less anti 
Pocket 
money 
• An allowance could teach children about savings pro 
• Children could learn to understand the cost of things pro 
• An allowance gives children a little independence pro 
• Children could save money to buy something special pro 
• Children might spend all of their money on sweets anti 
 
Three types of argument were created; single argument, multiple argument, and 
counterargument. Different argument structures were created with the help of indicator 
words. These are certain words that often indicate the presence of a particular element 
of an argument. For example, a simple argument includes a statement (e.g., children 
should get pocket money), followed by the word “because” and then reason(s) to 
support it. The use of “because” is a common word indicator for reasons, which helps in 
their identification.  
Single arguments were constructed by combining a statement with one reason in 
favour of the statement, chosen randomly from a list of four reasons. (e.g., children 
should get pocket money, because children could understand the cost of things). 
 Multiple arguments were created by combining a statement with two reasons 
separated by the word “and”, an indicator of enumerating reasons. (e.g., children should 
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get pocket money, because an allowance could teach children about savings and 
children could save money to buy something special).  
Counterarguments include reason(s) that count against the author’s conclusion 
rather than for it. Usually, they can be given away by phrases like “some might argue 
that”, “it has been suggested that”, or the use of word indicators like “but” and 
“however” before introducing the criticism or the alternative position. However, for the 
purposes of this study, the alternative position was mentioned at the beginning of the 
sentence. If used the other way round, it would not make sense to ask children to rate 
the extent to which an argument, ending in a disfavoured position, strengthens a 
favourable statement. Therefore, counterarguments were created by presenting the 
statement, then the word “although” followed by one reason against the statement, next 
a comma sign, and then one reason in favour of the statement (e.g., children should get 
pocket money, because although children might spend all their money on sweets, an 
allowance gives children a little independence).  
The order of selection of reasons was randomised, and once a reason had been 
selected to create the first argument, it was excluded from the list of reasons available to 
integrate the next arguments. The program database included two separate databases, 
one with participant’s personal data, and another with participant’s responses to the test. 
Test results on each child were recorded separately from the personal information they 
provided by using an anonymous identifying number only. Reaction times of the 
subjects were also recorded in the test response spreadsheet. 
Tasks and procedure 
Each child was assigned to a desk with a computer. Testing took place during an 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) class. ICT classes are 
implemented in the curriculum in primary education; therefore, all children in year four 
were skilled at using a computer. The researcher provided the internet link to assess the 
test. Children worked individually at a computer for approximately 10 minutes, but the 
researcher provided assistance when needed. The topics and arguments presented were 
based on the responses children provided in the pilot study.  
In the first page screen, children were asked to complete a simple personal 
information sheet, with name, date of birth, and gender. General instructions about the 
test were included at the bottom of the first page screen: “This test is about several 
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different topics: wearing school uniforms, having TVs in the bedroom, school time, and 
children’s pocket money. Please read the next instructions carefully before giving your 
answers! [press continue button when you are ready]”.  
The next segment included instructions about the opinion rating task: “Thank 
you! You will now be shown a statement. Please say how strongly you agree or disagree 
with this statement [press continue button when you are ready]”. Then, the first 
statement was presented (e.g., Students should wear school uniforms) and children were 
required to respond using a 5-point scale that ranged from strongly disagree “1” to 
strongly agree “5” (See Figure 6.1).  
The next page screen included instructions for the argument rating task: “That’s 
great! Now you will see on the screen three short sentences. You need to decide how 
strong the arguments are. This task is NOT about your personal opinion! Rather than 
deciding which argument you agree with, you have to evaluate whether the argument is 
weak or strong [press continue button when you are ready]”. Here, children were asked 
to rate the strength of different arguments, using a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is marked “very 
weak” and 5 “very strong”.  
In all rating tasks, visual cues (figures of thumbs up and down) were added to 
facilitate children’s understanding of the task. Moreover, questions were carefully 
written to avoid ambiguities and difficult words that children could not understand. 
Particular attention was also given to layout, so younger children were never in doubt as 
to how or where a response should be placed. 
Order of appearance of the arguments (single argument, multiple argument, and 
counterargument) was counterbalanced across topics. However, topics appeared in the 
same order. The following figures are illustrative. The remaining three topics and 
respective arguments were identical in form.  
 
children should wear school uniforms 
    
 
    
 
Strongly Disagree Disagree Neither Agree Strongly Agree 
Figure 6.1. Opinion rating screen 
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Children should wear school uniforms, because… 
uniforms represent the school, and uniforms mean personality is more important than 
how much money someone has 
 
    
 
Very Weak Weak Neutral Strong Very Strong 
Figure 6.2. Multiple argument rating screen 
Children should wear school uniforms, because… 
although uniforms are dull, uniforms are easy to wear. 
 
    
 
Very Weak Weak Neutral Strong Very Strong 
Figure 6.3. Counterargument rating screen 
Children should wear school uniforms, because… 
uniforms can save parents money 
 
    
 
Very Weak Weak Neutral Strong Very Strong 
Figure 6.4. Single argument rating screen 
Measures 
 Children’s responses were examined to establish levels of agreement for each 
topic, and strength of different types of argument. Level of agreement was rated in a 5-
point scale, with a score 1 corresponding to the lowest level of agreement (“strongly 
disagree”), and a score of 5 corresponding to the highest level of agreement (“strongly 
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agree”). Similarly, level of argument strength was rated in a 5-point scale, with a score 1 
corresponding to the lowest level of strength (“very weak”), and a score of 5 
corresponding to the highest level of strength (“very strong”). 
6.3.2. Results 
Design 
The design involved a mixed model comparing between groups effects related to 
children’s age group (i.e., 8- years, 11- years). Within groups effects compared ratings 
of different types of argument (i.e., single argument, multiple argument, and 
counterargument). Dependent variables were opinion rating for the statements, and 
ratings of the strength of arguments.  
Missing data 
 Two 8-year old children were not able to complete the test. The teacher reported 
that both children had severe reading difficulties. They were still invited to take part of 
the study and the researcher “worked through” the test with them, by reading the 
statements aloud. However, it was decided not to include these data in the analysis.  
 Initial analysis of the data revealed a small number of outliers in terms of time 
taken to complete the tasks. Specifically, three 8-year old children took less than two 
seconds to respond to each question, gave the same rating score to all questions, and 
completed the test in less than two minutes. In these three cases, children did not focus 
on the task at hand at all. Therefore, it was decided not to include data from these 
participants in the subsequent analyses. 
Statistical procedures 
 Tests of normality were calculated for each dependent variable using the 
Shapiro-Wilks statistic. Results showed a p value < .001 for all variables; therefore the 
null hypothesis, which stated that the data were normally distributed, was rejected. 
Skewness and kurtosis, which describe departures from normality in the distributions of 
variables, were also estimated. Estimates of skewness and kurtosis were calculated by 
dividing the statistic value by its standard error to obtain a z test of the null hypothesis. 
Skew and kurtosis values in the range +2 to -2 would be expected for a normal 
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distribution (Davis & Smith, 2005). However, the dependent variables tested failed the 
test of normality, because either one of skew or kurtosis values were outside this range.   
 Given the fact that the data were not normally distributed and were collected 
using nominal or ordinal scales, nonparametric tests were chosen to test the hypotheses 
in this study. These included correlation tests using Spearman’s value, Mann Whitney 
test of differences for independent samples, and Wilcoxon test of differences for related 
samples. Data descriptive statistics included median as a measure of central tendency 
and range as a measure of dispersion. The disadvantage of nonparametric tests is that 
they are less powerful than their parametric equivalents (Brace, Kemp, & Snelgar, 
2006). Therefore, as a check and to guarantee greater statistical power, parametric tests 
were also run, including analysis of variance (ANOVA). In addition, data descriptive 
reports below also include values of mean as a measure of central tendency and values 
of standard deviation as a measure of dispersion (see Table 6.5). 
 Analyses performed, using parametric and non-parametric, revealed the same 
significant effects and interactions; therefore, in subsequent analysis, statistical tests 
reported are non-parametric. 
Do children of different ages have different points of view on the topics? 
 Both 8- and 11-year old children had favourable opinions regarding most topics. 
Table 6.5 provides the median and range values of opinion rating by age (in addition, 
mean and standard deviation are also reported). Opinions diverged between 8-year-old 
and 11-year- old children regarding the topic about students wearing school uniforms. 
As seen in Figure 6.5, frequencies of unfavourable ratings (disagree and strongly 
disagree) are higher for older children (11 years) compared with 8-year-old children, 
who in turn, seem to agree more with the target statement.  
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Table 6.5. Descriptive values (median, range, mean and standard deviation) of position ratings for each age group 
 8 years, N=67 11 years, N=70 
 Median Range Mean Std.dev Median Range Mean Std.dev 
“Students should wear school uniforms” 4 4 3.55 1.34 2 4 2.59 1.29 
“Children should have TVs in their rooms” 4 4 4.04 1.24 5 4 4.40 .88 
“School days should be two hours shorter than they are now” 4 3 3.66 1.49 4 4 3.73 1.31 
“Children should get pocket money” 5 4 4.49 .98 5 4 4.39 .95 
  
 
Figure 6.5. Frequency of position ratings for each age 
Effects of children’s points of view on argument evaluation 
 The first hypothesis pred
children’s own positions would be perceived as stronger than arguments which concur 
with an alternative position. The des
variables each measured on a 5 point scale. A nonparametric measure of correlation, 
Spearman’s rs, was chosen for this test, because the variables did not meet the 
assumptions for parametric 
this study. It was expected that there would be a positive relationship between opinion 
rating and ratings of the three types of argument proposed (single arguments, multiple 
arguments, and count
favourable views on a topic, will rate arguments and counterarguments in favour of that 
position as stronger.  
 Results revealed significant positive correlations for the relationship between 
positions children hold and how they rate all types 
specifically, for the topic concerning school uniforms, there was a significant positive 
correlation between children’s point of view and the ratings of all types of arguments, 
including single arguments (
(r = .57, N = 137, p < .001, one
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icted that arguments that are in agreement
ign employed was correlational, 
data and also given the relatively small sample size used in 
erarguments) across topics. Thus, children who held strong 
of arguments presented. More 
r = .41, N = 137, p < .001, one-tailed), multiple arguments, 
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4 - agree
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< .01, one-tailed). For the topic related with children having TV in their bedrooms, there 
was also a fairly strong correlation between children’s opinions and how they rate single 
arguments (r = .33, N = 137, p < .001, one-tailed), multiple arguments (r = .47, N = 137, 
p < .001, one-tailed), and counterarguments (r = .44, N = 137, p < .001, one-tailed). 
There were also significant correlations between children’s opinion on school hours and 
all types of argument, including single arguments (r = .47, N = 137, p < .001, one-
tailed), multiple arguments, (r = .52, N = 137, p < .001, one-tailed), and also 
counterarguments, (r = .48, N = 137, p < .01, one-tailed). For the last topic, related to 
children’s pocket money, there were significant positive correlations between opinion 
rating and strength rating for all types of arguments; single arguments (r = .37, N = 137, 
p < .001, one-tailed), multiple arguments, (r = .27, N = 137, p < .001, one-tailed), and 
also counterarguments, (r = .36, N = 137, p < .001, one-tailed). A parametric measure of 
correlation, Pearson’s r, was also performed and yielded the same significant results. 
These correlations varied from weak to moderate. As predicted, these results confirm 
that the way children rate arguments is related to their personal points of view on an 
issue. 
Children’s ratings of single versus multiple arguments 
 The prediction here was that children would rate multiple arguments supporting 
a particular position as stronger than single arguments. To test this hypothesis, a 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was performed. A significant difference was found 
between ratings of multiple and single arguments about school uniforms, based on 
positive ranks, z = 1.68, N – Ties = 105, p < .01, one-tailed. There were more high ranks 
for the positive differences, that is, children’s ratings for multiple arguments were 
superior to the ratings for single arguments. 
 There were no significant differences between the conditions for the remaining 
topics, that is, there were a fairly equal spread of ranks of strength ratings for single and 
multiple arguments for these topics.  
Age differences in children’s evaluation of arguments and counterarguments 
 A Mann-Whitney test was used to assess whether there was a statistically 
significant difference between the mean ranks of argument strength ratings by 8-year 
olds (N = 67) and 11-year olds (N = 70). First, age differences in ratings of single and 
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multiple arguments were explored. These two types of argument only differed in the 
number of reasons. It was expected that older children (11- years) would give higher 
scores of strength to multiple arguments than single arguments. Secondly, age 
differences in the evaluation of counterarguments were analysed. A hypothesis 
formulated here was that 11-year old children would rate counterarguments as a 
stronger than arguments, whereas younger children (8- year olds) would not evaluate 
counterarguments as a stronger type of argument.  
 For the first topic, related to children wearing school uniforms, there was a 
statistically significant difference on how children at different ages rated single 
arguments (U = 1604, N1 = 67, N2 = 70, p < .001, two-tailed), and also multiple 
arguments (U = 1899, N1 = 67, N2 = 70, p < .01, two-tailed). For single arguments (i.e., 
arguments including one reason), the average rank rating of strength by 8-year old 
children was significantly higher (80.06) than the average rank rating of strength by 11-
year old children (58.41), and so single arguments had a higher mean rating score by 8-
year olds. The average rank rating of strength for multiple arguments by younger 
children (8- years) was also significantly higher (75.66) compared with the average rank 
rating of argument strength by 11-year old children (62.63). 
 For the topic related to having TVs in bedrooms, there was a statistically 
significant difference between the two age groups in terms of ratings of multiple 
arguments (U = 1779.5, N1 = 67, N2 = 70, p < .01, two-tailed), and also 
counterarguments (U = 1576, N1 = 67, N2 = 70, p < .001, two-tailed). For this topic, the 
mean rank of strength of multiple arguments for younger children was significantly 
lower (60.56) than the mean rank of strength of multiple arguments for 11-year old 
children (77.08) Similarly, the mean rank of strength of counterarguments for younger 
children was significantly lower (57.52) than the mean rank of strength of 
counterarguments for 11-year old children (79.99).  
 For the topic related to school days, there were statistically significant age 
differences only in the ratings of counterarguments, U = 1693, N1 = 67, N2 = 70, p < .01, 
two-tailed. The average rank of strength of counterarguments for younger children was 
significantly lower (59.27) than the average rank of strength of counterarguments for 
11-year old children (78.31).  
 For the last topic, related to children’s pocket money, there were also age 
differences again in the ratings of counterarguments, U = 1482, N1 = 67, N2 = 70, p < 
.001, two-tailed. The mean rank of strength of counterarguments for younger children 
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Figure 6.6. Evaluation of counterarguments by age group across topics
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mean personality is more important than how much money someone has” as a strong or 
a very strong argument. In contrast, fewer children rated “Uniforms are easy to wear” 
and “Uniforms can save parents money” with high scores on the scale.  
For the topic related to pocket money, there was a significant association 
between the reasons presented and how children rated those reasons, χ2 (9, N = 137) = 
35.33, p < .001 (Pearson’s chi-square). In this case, almost all reasons were rated 
positively. However, more children rated the reason “Children could save money to buy 
something special” as a very strong reason (see Table 6.7). There was no association 
between the two variables for the remaining topics: TV in rooms and school time.  
Table 6.6. Distribution of children’s ratings of argument strength related to different 
reasons in favour of school uniforms 
 Ratings Total 
  
very 
weak weak neutral strong 
very 
strong  
Uniforms represent the school 5 4 6 6 12 33 
Uniforms are easy to wear 7 11 8 7 3 36 
Uniforms can save parents money 7 11 8 13 3 42 
Uniforms mean personality is more 
important than how much money 
someone has 
1 5 2 12 6 26 
Total 20 31 24 38 24 137 
Table 6.7. Distribution of children’s ratings of argument strength related to different 
reasons in favour of pocket money 
 Ratings Total 
  
very 
weak weak neutral strong 
very 
strong  
An allowance could teach children 
about savings 0 1 4 18 9 32 
Children could learn to understand the 
cost of things 0 3 10 8 12 33 
An allowance gives children a little 
independence 0 1 2 9 17 29 
Children could save money to buy 
something special 0 1 3 5 34 43 
Total 0 6 19 40 72 137 
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6.3.3. Discussion of results for Study Three   
 This study examined how 8-year old and 11-year old children rated the strength 
of different arguments. Arguments were presented randomly and they varied in content 
(different reasons) and structure (number of reasons; inclusion of alternative views).  
The first hypothesis made predictions about how children’s personal views on a 
topic would affect the evaluation of argument strength. The prediction that children with 
a favourable position on an issue would evaluate arguments in favour of that statement 
as stronger was confirmed. For example, if a child strongly agreed that school days 
should be shorter, then he or she would classify “School days should be two hours 
shorter than they are now, because children would have more time to play” as a strong 
argument. Children with strong favourable views on a topic also evaluated 
counterarguments (arguments that address the alternative view at the beginning, but 
states a reason that favours the initial position at the end) as a strong type of argument. 
Previous research has demonstrated that individuals’ points of view influence their 
reasoning on a topic, so the result is not surprising. For example, Nussbaum and 
Kardash (2005) found that students with extreme attitudes about a controversial issue 
generated fewer alternative ideas about the issue than those with less extreme attitudes.  
 The second hypothesis predicted that children would rate multiple arguments (a 
claim supported by two reasons) as a stronger type of argument, because they are longer 
and include more reasons than single arguments (supported by only one reason). 
However, the findings of the present study indicate that children do not necessarily 
regard arguments with a greater number of reasons as stronger. With the exception of 
the results related to the topic about school uniforms, which revealed a marginally 
significant preference for multiple arguments, both single and multiple arguments for 
the remaining topics were rated as equally strong.  
There are at least two possible explanations for this result. It may be that 
children’s responses were an artefact of the research design, as children were asked to 
rate different types of arguments one at the time. That is, single arguments, multiple 
arguments and counterarguments were presented in a randomised order, and no clues 
were given related to what arguments would appear next on the screen. Thus, children 
may have been forced to give similar ratings to arguments, making it difficult to 
differentiate stronger versus weaker arguments. In order to find out whether children 
had preference for a particular kind of argument (for example, a multiple argument over 
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a single argument), it would have been more appropriate to use a comparative measure, 
in which children would be given the opportunity to choose between two types of 
argument. This procedure (paired-comparison rating task) was the chosen measure to be 
employed in the next study described in this chapter. 
 Another possible explanation is that the content of arguments may have also 
influenced the way children evaluated the strength of different argument structures. 
Results of the content analysis revealed that children’s ratings of argument strength 
depended on the content of arguments presented for some topics. For a start, this finding 
indicates that children are responding to the task at hand in a thoughtful way, that is, 
they are carefully examining the elements (reasons) that constitute an argument before 
making a judgement. For instance, for the topic related to whether children should 
receive pocket money, there were reasons children favoured more than others. It is 
possible that children evaluated a single argument containing a favourite reason (e.g., 
“Children could save money to buy something special”) as a stronger argument than a 
multiple argument containing a reason they did not agree with. It is also possible that 
the presence of a reason regarded as weak was enough to diminish the strength of an 
argument. Consequently, children did not regard most multiple arguments as a stronger 
type compared to simpler forms of argument.  
The content of arguments for the topic concerning school uniforms also had an 
effect on children’s ratings of the strength of arguments, even though the presentation of 
reasons was randomised. More specifically, twelve out of thirty-three children rated 
“Uniforms represent the school” as a very strong reason. Most children also rated 
arguments including the reason “Uniforms mean personality is more important than 
how much money someone has” as a strong or a very strong argument. In contrast, 
fewer children rated “Uniforms are easy to wear” and “Uniforms can save parents 
money” with high scores on the scale. For the remaining two topics, children’s ratings 
of arguments containing several different reasons yielded no statistical significant.  
Why did the content of arguments influence children’s ratings of strength for 
some topics (pocket money and school uniforms) but not for others (TV in bedrooms 
and school days)? It could be children have regarded the first two topics (pocket money 
and school uniforms) as more controversial and agreed less with some of the reasons 
presented in favour of those statements. Although posttest measures of children’s 
justifications for their ratings were not undertaken in this study, the results may be 
interpreted in light of previous qualitative analyses.  
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For instance, Leitão (2003) analysed the reasons children, aged 8-, 11- and 14- 
years, invoked to justify their selection of arguments to be included in a text. Results 
showed that children in all age groups selected or rejected ideas based on their 
agreement with the content of an argument, and also the restriction or modulation of its 
scope (which implies partial acceptance of the content). Similarly, the present results are 
indicative that the content of arguments is an important mediator of children’s 
evaluation of argument strength. This is an important finding, because it defies some of 
the premises in which research based on Toulmin’s framework is conducted. According 
to researchers who use a framework focused on formal argumentation structure, the 
accuracy or relevance of the statements within an argument is less important than the 
number of components an argument has in terms of evaluating its strength (Goldstein, 
Crowell, & Kuhn, 2009).  
 The next set of hypotheses made predictions about age differences in children’s 
evaluation of arguments and counterarguments. First, it was predicted that older 
children (11- years) would rate multiple arguments as a stronger type than single 
arguments. Although in argumentation, more does not necessarily mean better (Means 
& Voss, 1996), most researchers have regarded arguments with a greater number of 
reasons to be stronger (e.g., Kuhn, 1991). This hypothesis was confirmed in relation to 
only one topic (Children should have a TV in their bedrooms).  
In contrast, for the topic related to school uniforms, younger children (8- years) 
rated multiple arguments more favourably than 11- year old children, contrary to what 
was expected. There were no age differences in how children rated the two types of 
argument for the remaining two topics. These results are not completely at odds with 
previous research. In fact, the first study presented in this thesis, regarding age 
differences in argument generation (see Chapter Four) supports these findings. Results 
from Study One outlined in this thesis showed that the ability to generate a greater 
number of reasons increased progressively with age, from 5 years to 12 years. However, 
no statistical significant differences were found between 8-year-olds and 11-year olds.  
 The second hypothesis concerned age differences in children’s evaluation of 
counterarguments. It was predicted that older children (11- years) would regard 
counterarguments as a particularly strong type of argument. Counterarguments were 
constructed in order to address both positions, but to emphasise the favoured position 
(e.g., Although children might spend all their money on sweets, children could 
understand the cost of things). As predicted, 11- year old children gave higher scores to 
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counterarguments than 8- year old children across most topics (TV in bedrooms, school 
days, and pocket money). No statistically significant age differences were found in the 
evaluation of counterarguments for the topic about students wearing school uniforms.  
 Overall, examination of the two age groups revealed both similarities and 
differences. The hypothesis concerning age differences in the evaluation of 
counterarguments is a particularly interesting one and has the potential of adding 
understanding to previous research on argumentation. The present findings reflect the 
close parallels between argument generation skills and argument evaluative skills 
among 8- year-olds and 11- year olds.  Compared to older children (11- years), fewer 8-
year old children evaluated counterarguments as a strong type of argument. This result 
suggests that younger children showed less appreciation for alternative arguments, an 
age-related pattern that parallels one found in discourse.   
6.4. Study Four: Age differences in children’s evaluation of the effectiveness of 
arguments 
Using a similar computer-based task and the same topics, this second study 
investigated how children evaluated arguments and counterarguments when the task 
goal was to persuade a hypothetical arguer to adopt a different position. This study was, 
in contrast to the previous one, focused on the pragmatic function of arguments, that is, 
their effectiveness.  
6.4.1. Method 
Participants 
One hundred and fourteen children (57 boys and 57 girls) participated in the 
study. Children came from two different age groups; 8-9 years (M = 8,5 years, SD = 
.50), and 11-12 years (M = 11,2 years, SD = .37). Children were in their fourth and 
seventh year of school education, respectively. This sample corresponds to two classes 
from each year group that were in attendance in the class during data collection and that 
had given consent to participate in the study. Children were not from the same 
population reported in the previous study (Study Three). The sample was collected from 
a school situated in the local area of Slough, in South East England. Students were of 
heterogeneous ethnic (primarily European and South Asian) and socioeconomic (mostly 
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low-middle class) backgrounds. Consent was obtained through letters sent to schools 
(see Appendix 13) and children’s parents (see Appendix 14). 
Materials 
Materials used in this test were similar to the ones developed for the previous 
study. The computer test consisted of opinion rating and argument selection tasks. 
Stimuli (topics and arguments) were generated and evaluated in the pilot assessment of 
the previous study (Study Three). However, only three out of four topics were selected 
to be displayed in this study; otherwise the task would be too long and harder for 
children. The topic about school days was chosen to be taken out from this study, 
because in the pilot study conducted prior to these two main studies, children reported 
knowing less about the topic school days than the other three topics, and also said they 
were less interested in talking about the topic school days in the focus group sessions 
compared with the other topics, for example about school uniforms or pocket money. 
In order to produce different structures of argument, a list of reasons was 
created. This list was identical to the one used in the computer program script of the 
previous study, but three new reasons against each topic were added. In total, four 
reasons in favour (pro- condition), and four reasons against (anti- condition) for each of 
the three statements (see Table 6.8).  
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Table 6.8. List of reasons in favour and against three different statements as displayed 
in the computer program script 
 Topic Reason Condition 
School 
uniforms 
• Uniforms represent the school pro 
• Uniforms are easy to wear pro 
• Uniforms can save parents money pro 
• Uniforms mean personality is more important than 
how much money someone has 
pro 
• Uniforms are dull anti 
• Uniforms can be expensive anti 
• Uniforms have no use outside school anti 
• Uniforms stop children being creative anti 
TV in 
bedrooms 
• Having a TV allows children to have time for 
themselves 
pro 
• Watching TV is a good reward for children pro 
• Children can learn to be more responsible with their 
own TV 
pro 
• Some TV shows are educational pro 
• Children would watch shows that parents do not 
allow 
anti 
• Children would spend less time with their family anti 
• Children wouldn’t read a book if they could just 
switch on the TV 
anti 
• TV is addictive anti 
Pocket 
money 
• An allowance could teach children about savings pro 
• Children could learn to understand the cost of 
things 
pro 
• An allowance gives children a little independence pro 
• Children could save money to buy something 
special 
pro 
• Children might spend all of their money on sweets anti 
• children are too young to manage money anti 
• Children might not appreciate the value of money 
as they get older 
anti 
• It could be dangerous if children carry money 
around 
anti 
Tasks and procedure 
 Children completed a computer task individually during an ICT class. All 
children in the class were invited to participate and they were able to complete the test 
simultaneously in a quiet computer room at their school. The task took approximately 
10 minutes to complete.  
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In the first page screen, children were asked to complete a simple personal 
information sheet, with name, date of birth, and gender. General instructions about the 
test were included at the bottom of the first page screen: “We are interested in knowing 
what you think about everyday topics, such as wearing school uniforms. We are going 
to ask your opinion about this and other topics and you have to say how strongly you 
agree or disagree [press continue button when you are ready]”.   
The next segment included instructions about the opinion rating task: “Thank 
you! You will now be shown a statement. Please say how strongly you agree or disagree 
with this statement [press continue button when you are ready]”. Then, the first 
statement was presented (e.g., Children should wear school uniforms) and children were 
required to respond using a 5-point scale that ranged from strongly disagree “1” to 
strongly agree “5”. In the opinion rating task, visual cues (figures of thumbs up and 
down) were added to facilitate children’s understanding of the task.  
 The next page screen included instructions for the argument selection task based 
on the persuasion goal proposed: “That’s great! We also have a more challenging task 
for you! We are going to introduce you six friends: Thomas, Maria, Jamaal, Emma, 
Laura, and Omar. They all have opinions about the topics, your task is to choose the 
best arguments to convince or persuade them to change their mind [press continue 
button when you are ready]”. Here, children were asked to choose one of two 
arguments. Order of appearance of types of argument (single argument, multiple 
argument, and counterargument) was counterbalanced across topics. However, topics 
and characters appeared in the same order. The following figures are illustrative. The 
remaining two topics and related arguments were identical in form.  
 
 
I am Thomas. I think children SHOULD wear school uniforms. 
Which one of these arguments is most likely to persuade Thomas that children should 
NOT wear uniforms? 
uniforms stop children being creative 
uniforms are dull, and uniforms can be expensive 
Figure 6.7. Example of an argument selection screen: presentation of a single argument 
versus a multiple arguments.  
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I am Maria. I think children should NOT wear school uniforms. 
Which one of these arguments is most likely to persuade Maria that children 
SHOULD wear school uniforms? 
 
uniforms make it easy to identify children who belong in the school  
although uniforms are dull, uniforms are easy to wear  
Figure 6.8. Example of an argument selection screen: presentation of a single argument 
versus a counterargument  
6.4.2. Results 
Design and measures 
The design employed had two factors; the between-subjects factor of age group 
(i.e., 8-years, 11-years) and the within-subjects factor of condition (single vs. multiple 
arguments, single argument vs. counterargument, and multiple argument vs. 
counterargument). There were two dependent variables: (1) opinion rating for the 
statements was measured on an ordinal scale and was operationalised as the response on 
a 5 point scale, where point 1 was “strongly disagree” and point 5 “completely agree”; 
and (2) preference for a specific type of argument was measured on a nominal scale and 
was operationalised as the response chosen from two possible responses (e.g., single vs. 
multiple arguments). 
Missing data 
 Four 8-year old children with severe learning disabilities were not able to 
complete the test. They were still invited to take part in the study and the researcher 
administered the test in a one-on-one verbal interview, with frequent comprehension 
checks and rest breaks. Although children were able to provide answers and complete 
the task with the researcher’s help, it was decided not to include these data in the 
analysis. There were no outliers in terms of time reactions taken to complete the task. 
CHAPTER 6: CHILDREN’S EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS 
 
200 
 
Children’s points of view on the topics 
 Children’s views on the topics did not differ from the views given by children 
on the same topics in the previous study (Study Three). Again, 8- year old children had 
favourable views regarding all topics. In contrast, most 11- year old children reported 
having unfavourable or neutral views about students wearing school uniforms (see 
Table 6.9).  
Table 6.9. Descriptive values (median, range, mean and standard deviation) of position 
ratings by age  
 8 years, N=55 11 years, N=55 
 Median Range Mean Std. dev. Median Range Mean Std dev. 
Uniforms 4 4 3.55 1.45 3 4 2.69 1.14 
TV 4 4 3.95 1.29 4 3 3.67 1.25 
Pocket 
money 
5 4 4.24 1.14 5 2 4.40 .76 
Children’s preference for types of arguments across topics 
 A Binomial test was used to determine the proportion of children who selected a 
particular argument in a set of two possibilities. The Binomial test was chosen because 
the data were in two discrete categories and the design was of one-sample type (Sidney 
& Castellan, 1988). There were three different sets of arguments and children were 
asked to select one of the two: (1) single vs. multiple arguments; (2) single argument vs. 
counterargument; and (3) multiple argument vs. counterargument. The task included 
two goals: to persuade a character to agree with position (e.g., “Children should have 
TV in their rooms”), or to persuade the character to disagree with a position (e.g., 
“Children should NOT have TV in their rooms”). Arguments were provided according 
to the task instructions.  
 The Binominal test assessed whether the proportion of preferred types of 
arguments differed significantly from 50% chance (i.e., from .5). The prediction was 
that there would be a difference between the frequencies of chosen arguments, that is, 
the proportion of children choosing complex arguments, such as multiple arguments and 
counterarguments, would be greater than the proportion of children choosing single 
arguments. More specifically, for the pair single versus argument, it was expected that 
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children would choose a multiple argument as the most persuasive, because it contains 
more reasons. For the pair single argument versus counterargument, it was predicted 
that children would select a counterargument to persuade the character, because it is a 
more sophisticated form of argumentation. For the last paired condition, multiple 
argument versus counterargument, no predictions were made related to children’s 
preference for one these types, because both can be regarded as strong. Furthermore, no 
predictions were made related to preferences for a particular type of argument in these 
two conditions: (a) when the task goal was to persuade the character to agree with a 
statement, and (b) when the task goal was to persuade the character to disagree with a 
statement. The results showed statistically significant differences in some conditions 
across topics. Table 6.10 shows data for all topics. Sixty eight out of 110 children 
preferred single arguments rather than counterarguments to persuade the character to 
adopt a favoured position for wearing school uniforms. A binomial test revealed a 
significant preference for single arguments, p < .05. In the condition single vs. multiple 
arguments supporting an opposite position, sixty six out of 110 children preferred 
multiple arguments, p < .05.  
 For the topic related to TV in bedrooms, results showed a significant preference 
for multiple arguments rather than single arguments supporting an opposite position 
(see Table 6.10). Seventy one out of 110 children chose multiple arguments and this 
preference was statistically significant, p < .05. In the condition single argument vs. 
counterargument in favour of the position, sixty seven out of 110 children preferred 
single arguments, p < .05. Moreover, in the condition counterargument vs. multiple 
argument, seventy three out of 110 children chose multiple argument to support the 
favoured position, p < .05.  
 For the topic about whether children should receive pocket money, results 
showed no statistically significant differences on preference for a particular type/ 
structure of argument in all conditions (see again Table 6.10).  
 Overall, these results indicated that the prediction that stated that 
counterarguments would be a preferred argument over simpler types of argument was 
not confirmed.  
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Table 6.10. Frequency of children selecting an argument in three paired conditions in favour and against each topic (N = 110) 
 single vs. multiple single vs. counter counter vs. multiple 
 single multi single counter counter multi 
In favour of students wearing school uniforms 57 53 68 42 45 65 
Against students wearing school uniforms 44 66 47 63 57 53 
In favour of children having TV in their bed rooms 53 57 67 43 37 73 
Against children having TV in their bedrooms 39 71 52 58 50 60 
In favour of children receiving pocket money 55 55 64 46 47 63 
Against children receiving pocket money 52 58 53 57 65 45 
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Age differences in preference for types of arguments across topics 
 First, a Binomial test was performed separately for each age group, to explore 
the proportion of arguments chosen by 8-year old and 11-year old children, in different 
conditions across topics.  
 For the topic about TV in bedrooms, results showed that the oldest age group (N 
= 55) chose multiple arguments in favour the statement as more persuasive than 
counterarguments, p < .05. In the condition in which the arguments were against having 
TV in bedrooms, 11- year old children also preferred multiple arguments over single 
arguments, p < .05, and counterarguments, p < .05. Similarly, for the topic about pocket 
money, there was a statistically significant difference for the preference for multiple 
arguments over single arguments in favour of the statement, p < .05, with thirty seven 
out of 55 children choosing multiple arguments as the most persuasive. A significant 
difference was also found for preference for multiple arguments over counterarguments 
p < .05, with forty out of 55 children considering multiple arguments in favour of 
pocket money the most persuasive.  
 In contrast, 8- year old children (N = 55) did not show a preference for any 
particular type of argument across conditions and topics. The only statistically 
significant result found was a preference for single arguments over multiple arguments 
in favour of the topic of pocket money, p < .05, with thirty seven out of 55 children 
choosing single arguments as the most persuasive type of argument.  
 To explore these results further, a series of binomial logistic regression analyses 
were performed with age as a predictor variable, and argument preferences across 
different conditions as dependent variables. There were 18 binary response variables in 
total. These included three different conditions of argument type (single vs. multiple 
arguments; single argument vs. counterargument; and multiple argument vs. 
counterargument) for each topic, and two sides of argument (positive or negative), that 
is, they could be in favour or against the statement.  
 A total of 110 cases were analysed and children’s age significantly predicted 
preference for multiple arguments over counterarguments in favour of the topic pocket 
money (omnibus chi-square = 8.79, df = 1, p < .005). According to the model, 65.5% of 
overall predictions were accurate. The values of the coefficients revealed that an 
increase of age was associated with an increase of the odds of children selecting 
multiple arguments as the most persuasive type of argument, by a factor of 1.52 (95% 
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CI 1.14-2.03). Children’s age also predicted their preference for multiple arguments 
over single arguments in favour of the topic pocket money (omnibus chi-square = 12.94, 
df = 1, p < .005). According to the model, 67.3% of overall predictions were accurate. 
The values of the coefficients revealed that an increase of age was associated with an 
increase of the odds of children selecting multiple arguments as the most persuasive 
type of argument, by a factor of 1.67 (95% CI 1.25-2.23). 
 Similarly, for the topic about TV in bedrooms, the factor of age predicted 
preference for multiple arguments rather counterarguments, only when these arguments 
were against the statement. Overall, 59.1% predictions of the model were accurate. The 
values of the coefficients revealed that an increase of age was associated with an 
increase of the odds of children selecting multiple arguments as the most persuasive 
type of argument, by a factor of 1.41 (95% CI 1.07-1.86). 
6.4.3. Discussion of results for Study Four 
 Children’s views on the topics did not differ from the views given by children 
on the same topics in the previous study (Study Three). Again, 8- year old children had 
favourable views regarding all topics. In contrast, most 11- year old children, in both 
studies, reported having unfavourable or neutral views about students wearing school 
uniforms. This discussion topic is particularly relevant for children in the U.K., as most 
schools require students to wear school uniforms. While it has been argued that school 
uniforms provide a positive sense of unity among students, they can also imply the 
sacrifice of individuality and self-expression. A possible interpretation for the shift in 
attitudes towards school uniforms evidenced in these studies is that, as children become 
more independent and develop a sense of their personal identity (Catherwood & 
Gillibrand, 2004), they realise that the disadvantage of losing their individuality 
associated with wearing school uniforms far outweighs its benefits.  
 This study further explored developmental differences in children’s selection or 
preference for a particular type of argument (single argument, multiple argument, or 
counterargument) when the task goal was to persuade hypothetical arguers to change 
their views. The general hypothesis formulated in this study was that younger children 
(8-9 years) would show a preference for arguments over counterarguments for 
persuading arguers to change their points of view. As expected, 8- year olds selected 
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either single or multiple arguments over counterarguments (which addressed the 
alternative view) to change the characters’ views, consistently across all three topics.  
The most striking finding was that older children (11-12 years) also did not 
regard counterarguments to be persuasive comparing to other types of argument. 
Although 11-year olds may regard counterarguments as a strong type of argument when 
standing alone (as found in Study Three), they seem to adopt different evaluation 
criteria when the task involves a communicative goal. That is, both 8- year olds and 11-
year olds do not regard arguments that contain opposing elements as a valuable resource 
for making a position more acceptable and persuading arguers to change their views.  
As noted in the previous study (Study Three), a counterargument was defined in 
this study as an argument containing a reason that addresses the character’s point of 
view and also a reason that strengthens the alternative position (e.g., “Although an 
allowance gives children a little independence, it could be dangerous to carry money 
around”). In this example, the first line of reasoning strengths the character’s position 
(“Children should get pocket money”) and the second part presents a challenge to the 
character’s view (“But it could be dangerous if children carry money around”).  
The present result suggests that children at both ages did not choose 
counterarguments to pursue the pragmatic goal, because these included a reason in 
favour of the character’s position. Instead, children focused on the arguments that 
addressed a single view (opposite to the character’s view). The finding that 
counterarguments are not regarded as persuasive is consistent with research on 
argumentative writing (Coirier, 1996; Ferretti, Lewis, Andrews-Weckerly, 2009; 
Ferretti, MacArthur, Dowdy, 2000; Leitão 2000, 2003; Nussbaum & Kardash, 2005).  
Coirier (1996) identified two processes fundamental for writing elaborated 
argumentative texts. The first process is the ability to state arguments, which requires 
the use of writing skills, including cognitive and linguistic tools. The second process is 
negotiation which refers to the ability to take the audience into account. This process 
involves not only the use of linguistic devices, but also the use of sophisticated 
argumentative and rhetorical strategies to persuade an audience. Coirier’s approach 
emphasises that the writing process is influenced by factors such as the writer’s 
perception of his or her interaction with the audience (polemic or cooperative) and his 
or her ultimate goal with regard to the audience (persuading or compromising).  
More recently, other studies provided further evidence that text goals are 
important mediators of the way children understand and evaluate arguments. For 
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instance, Leitão (2003) showed that when a text goal involved making a viewpoint more 
acceptable and persuasive (to convince a potential reader), 8- year olds, 11- year olds 
and college students did not choose texts that incorporated opposing elements. 
Moreover, when asked to explain their decisions, the majority of young children and 
even college students viewed counterargumentation as “negative”. Half of the college 
students thought that the inclusion of a counterargument in a text would reduce the 
probability of its viewpoint being accepted, unless the writer was able to preserve the 
strength of his or her own position by replying to it. Accordingly, other researchers 
advanced the idea that writing to persuade, in contrast to simply expressing an opinion, 
might inhibit the production of alternative views and counterarguments because the 
failure to rebut them undermines the text’s persuasiveness (Nussbaum & Kardash, 
2005; Santos & Santos, 1999).  
 Another important finding in the present study was that older children (11- 
years) selected arguments containing two reasons (multiple arguments) as the most 
persuasive type of argument, consistently across topics. Whereas in the previous study 
(Study Three), 11- year olds rated single and multiple arguments as equally strong, 
results in this study showed that older children regarded number of reasons as an 
important criterion for defining a persuasive argument. Younger children (8- years), on 
the other hand, did not show a preference for single or multiple arguments, and regarded 
both types as equally persuasive.  
6.5. General discussion 
These two studies focused on children’s meta-level or evaluative skills with 
respect to individual arguments. These studies addressed a number of questions. For 
instance, what constitutes strong arguments for children? And, does this change 
developmentally? Furthermore, do children regard strong arguments as the most 
persuasive? Or do criteria for evaluating arguments change accordingly to the 
communicative goals of a task?  
Study Three examined how children at different ages appreciate and evaluate 
arguments in terms of their strength. A further objective was to explore whether 
children’s prior opinions on a topic influence subsequent evaluation of arguments. 
Although this is not a new research question, it was included in this study because it has 
the potential of adding some understanding of the processes underlying children’s 
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evaluation of arguments. Results showed that both 8- year olds and 11- year olds 
evaluated arguments based on their agreement with the statements, that is, when 
children had a favourable position on an issue, they evaluated arguments in favour of 
that statement as stronger.  
Moreover, both age groups did not regard arguments with greater number of 
reasons to be stronger, contrary to what expected. In three out of four topics, both 8- 
year olds and 11- year olds rated multiple and single arguments as equally strong. As 
suggested in previous literature (e.g., Leitão 2000, 2003; Nussbaum & Kardash, 2005), 
it is likely that children may have agreed with some reasons but not others and, thus, 
they have accepted only part of the content of arguments. Consequently, single and 
multiple arguments were evaluated as equally strong. Indeed, the content analysis 
revealed that children favoured some reasons more than others for the topic related to 
whether children should receive pocket money and the topic about children wearing 
school uniforms.  
The results discussed so far may seem somewhat trivial. Few people would 
argue that individuals’ evaluation of arguments on controversial topics is not, to some 
extent, subjective. However, most studies in argumentation have neglected the 
subjective dimension of argumentation processes, focusing merely on individuals’ 
cognitive abilities to reason or argue well. This study is important because it offers a 
comprehensive understanding of how children appreciate and evaluate of arguments, by 
taking into account their perspective and exploring how their personal views affect their 
judgments of argument strength. Moreover, in order to establish the evaluative criteria 
of what constitute good arguments and teach students to argue better, one has first to 
assess what meaning children give to “goodness” or “strength” of an argument.  
As hypothesised, results regarding age differences revealed that 11-year-old 
children gave higher scores to counterarguments than 8- year old children across most 
topics. This finding suggests that younger children showed less appreciation for 
alternative arguments, an age-related pattern that parallels one found in the discourse of 
8- year olds examined in Study Two (Chapter Five).  
Having identified how 8-year-olds and 11-year-olds evaluate the strength of 
arguments in a simple evaluation task, a second study was devised to explore whether 
children’s evaluative criteria change when the task involves a different goal.  
Specifically, using a similar computer-based task, children in the same age groups were 
asked to select arguments to persuade hypothetical characters to change their views. 
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This study differed from the previous one in two ways. First, the focus was on the 
pragmatic function of arguments, or their effectiveness, rather than on argument 
strength. Second, children were asked to select arguments given two possible choices, 
rather than rate each argument individually.  
As expected, results indicated that 8- year olds selected either single or multiple 
arguments over counterarguments (which addressed the alternative view) to change the 
characters’ views, consistently across all three topics. Interestingly, older children (11-
12 years) also did not regard counterarguments to be persuasive comparing to other 
types of argument. Even though 11- year olds may regard counterarguments as a strong 
type of argument when standing alone (as found in Study Three), they seem to adopt 
different evaluation criteria when the task involves a discourse or communicative goal. 
That is, both 8- year olds and 11- year olds do not regard arguments containing 
opposing elements as a valuable resource for achieving the persuasion goal. As 
mentioned earlier, this finding can be interpreted in light of previous research on 
argumentative writing (Coirier, 1996; Ferretti, Lewis, Andrews-Weckerly, 2009; 
Ferretti, MacArthur, Dowdy, 2000; Leitão 2000, 2003; Nussbaum & Kardash, 2005), 
that has documented that students do not include alternative views and 
counterarguments when writing argumentative essays to persuade an audience to accept 
a point of view.  
This study also revealed that 11- year old children, but not younger children, 
regard arguments with greater number of reasons as the most persuasive type of 
argument, consistently across topics. However, the results obtained in these two studies 
cannot be evaluated without considering the limitations associated with the methods 
used in both studies. The strengths of these studies and the potential implications for 
future research are also addressed in the next sections.  
6.5.1. Limitations 
The assessment tasks used in these two studies might have not been sensitive 
enough to explore the complexity of children’s skill in evaluating claims and arguments. 
One way to better understand the nature of children’s responses and interpret the results 
obtained in these two studies would have been to conduct follow-up interviews with a 
number of children to gain insight into the thinking underlying their choices. This 
would have revealed, for example, whether children chose an argument based only on 
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their agreement with the content of that argument. Moreover, it could provide some 
understanding about children’s cognitive processing of choices of one argument over 
the other in Study Four. 
Another problem in pursuing these research questions using a restrictive set of 
tasks is that argumentation processes cannot be fully understood when isolated from the 
discourse contexts and goals. For instance, in Study Four, children were asked to 
engage in a hypothetical situation and persuade a character to change his or her point of 
view. A problem of designing tasks, with hypothetical social scenarios like these, is that 
they may have no compelling motivational value for children (e.g., Bearison & Gass, 
1979). Moreover, in a study examining developmental differences between hypothetical 
and practical social reasoning, Cox (1975) found that children’s ability to understand on 
other’s perspective appeared to be developmentally more advanced when the target was 
an actual person compared with a doll representing a person. These issues raise the 
relevant question of whether children’s responses to hypothetical social scenarios are 
transferable to naturally occurring social situations. On the other hand, as discussed in 
the methodology chapter (Chapter Three), these computer-based tasks mirror much of 
children’s daily life and school activities, and have the potential of being used as an 
educational tool.  
Another potential criticism of these two studies is that the quantitative measures 
used in these studies did not allow drawing inferences about the psychological 
processes underlying children’s evaluation and selection of arguments. For instance, 
after completing the questionnaire, it would have been interesting to interview a number 
of participants to gain insight into the thinking underlying their choices. Future research 
should consider these methodological limitations in order to devise better tasks to 
document children’s developmental advances in argument evaluative skills.  
6.5.2. Implications 
 The resulting simplicity of the tasks, while sacrificing examination of the many 
nuances and processes involved in argumentation, had the practical advantage of 
making it feasible to assess children’s evaluation of claims and reasons across multiple 
kinds of arguments and content. In addition, its simplicity made it more appropriate for 
children than a long interview or paper-pencil test formats in which oral and written 
argumentative skills have been typically assessed. Specifically, these studies overcome 
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the major challenges resulting from methods used in research on generation of oral or 
written arguments, including the difficulty some children have producing arguments or 
writing argumentative essays on complex academic topics. These two studies were self-
completion computer tasks, with instructions and questions appearing on the screen.  
As discussed in the methodology chapter (Chapter Three), using computers to 
devise and conduct research tasks has increased in popularity in recent years, because of 
the many advantages they present (Stangor, 2007). For instance, in terms of presenting 
information, computers can randomly select stimuli from lists, allowing 
counterbalancing across research participants. Moreover, information can be presented 
in many formats, including text, pictures and hyperlinks, which make the task more fun 
and interesting for children. A further strength of these studies was that a pilot study 
was conducted prior to the design of the tasks to guarantee that the tasks were adequate 
for children’s content knowledge.  
 Overall, this work offered a clear empirical way to document how children 
evaluate arguments on several social topics, and to establish a link between 
argumentation and persuasive goals. In this respect, the fourth study is particularly 
relevant as it emphasises the importance of understanding the goals individuals pursue 
in argumentation (e.g., influencing the audience’s point of view). The importance of the 
study of argumentation, and in particular its pragmatic function, or persuasion, is a 
persistent theme in this thesis.  
The literature review chapter has highlighted that the study of argument is 
integral to many areas including education (see Chapter Two for more detail). For 
instance, the computer tasks devised for these studies could be used in school classes to 
teach children how to identify strong arguments and how to critically evaluate them. In 
fact, most teachers who had collaborated in the data collection, expressed interest in 
using these materials in class. And so, after data have been collected, teachers used 
some of the topics (e.g., children receiving pocket money or having a television in their 
bedrooms) in Assembly and debate classes to elicit argumentative discussions among 
students. 
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Chapter Seven - Study Five: Children’s evaluation of argument strategy in 
debates  
7.1. Introduction 
 The present study is the last one in a series of five interconnected studies that 
examined age differences in children’s argumentation skills in different tasks and 
contexts. The first set of studies focused on generation of arguments, both individually 
(Study One) and in group interactions with peers (Study Two). The next studies focused 
on how children evaluate arguments. The ability to understand and carefully examine 
the views and arguments is essential to argue and counter-argue effectively. Two studies 
investigated children’s understanding and evaluation of arguments using simple 
computer-based tasks. In Study Three, results indicated that younger children (8-9 years 
old) perceive fewer differences between weak and strong arguments than older children 
(11-12 years old). Older children showed a good grasp of the strength of arguments, 
rating for example counterarguments as stronger than single arguments. Study Four 
explored arguments’ effectiveness or persuasiveness, using the same stimuli generated 
in the previous study. The interest here was to examine what kinds of arguments 
children find persuasive and whether there is a correlation between ratings of the 
strength of arguments and effectiveness, that is, the extent to which an argument is 
persuasive. Results revealed developmental differences in preference for different types 
of arguments, and that children regarded some types of arguments as more persuasive 
than others, for example arguments with more reasons.  
 The great advantage of using these empirical tasks is that it made it possible to 
manipulate different hypothetical conditions and explore how children evaluate 
arguments across these conditions. However, as outlined in Chapter Six, there are some 
limitations associated with these methods; for example, exploring argumentation 
processes outside social contexts makes it more difficult to generalise the results to 
children’s interactions in everyday situations.  
The present study complements the previous set of studies (see Chapter Six) by 
focusing on argument evaluation skills in real social interactions. More specifically, this 
study focused on children’s ability to understand and evaluate goal-directed arguments 
and strategies employed in video-recorded argumentative dialogues. These videos were 
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recorded by 9-10 year olds and they attempted to simulate, as accurately as possible, 
real dialogues between children.  
This study is important because it could reveal which kinds of strategic 
arguments persuade children, and also, whether children can be persuaded by these 
arguments. The focus on persuasion as a goal of argumentation constitutes a novel 
approach to study the development of children’s argumentative skills. For the most part, 
past research in children’s argumentation has focused on the kinds of arguments they 
produce in family interactions (e.g., Stein, Bernas, Calicchia, & Wright, 1995; Stein & 
Miller, 1993a, 1993b) and school tasks (e.g., Marttunen, Laurinen, Litosseliti, & Lund, 
2005; Means & Voss, 1996). Fewer researchers have looked specifically at the 
effectiveness of argumentation, that is, the extent to which arguments can influence or 
persuade children to maintain or change a position. Moreover, the task employed in this 
study is more representative of the sort of activities children normally engage in at 
school or in real-life situations (e.g., watching TV/ media), rather than the previous 
tasks in which children were asked to respond individually to a questionnaire at the 
computer.  
7.1.1. The dynamics of arguing and persuading 
 Both Chapter One and a review of the literature (Chapter Two) highlighted the 
importance of understanding the course of development of discourse strategies to use 
arguments competitively in social contexts. Some studies have attempted to look 
directly at the strategies used in peer discourse and track their development (e.g., 
Anderson, Nguyen-Jahiel, McNurlen, Archodidou, Kim, Reznitskaya, Tillmanns, & 
Gilbert, 2001; Clark & Delia, 1976; Felton, 2004; Felton & Kuhn, 2001).  
For instance, Anderson and colleagues (2001) examined the early development 
of argumentative strategies among 9-10 year old children. Children’s discussions were 
transcribed and analysed to determine patterns of occurrence of different argument 
stratagems. These included attempts to make explicit claims, to articulate one’s position 
relative to conversational partners, and to challenge others’ arguments with hypothetical 
scenarios and critiques. The major finding was that the use of argument stratagems 
“snowballs” in discourse groups. That is, once a stratagem has been used successfully 
by a child, it tends to spread to other children and appear again during a discussion 
(Anderson et al., 2001).  
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Although it is unclear whether young children use these strategies to direct 
discourse to pursue argumentative goals, they do represent an attempt to coordinate 
conversation with their peers (Felton, 2004). Clark and Delia (1976) have found 
developmental differences in the discourse goals exhibited by children and adolescents. 
Their data suggest that, while children often make appeals without thinking about how 
they will impact others, adolescents use strategies reflecting progressively greater 
ability to understand and adapt to the perspective of others. In others words, adolescents 
are more aware of the goals and the competitive nature of argumentation than are 
children. Once adolescents recognise the goals that argumentative discourse entails, 
they are then ready to develop strategies to pursue these goals (Clark & Delia, 1976; 
Felton & Kuhn, 2001).  
 Felton and Kuhn (2001) have developed a system for categorising the strategies 
that adolescents and adults deploy in argumentative dialogues. They compared 
discourse of adolescents and those of adults in discussions about capital punishment. 
Results showed that adolescents were less preoccupied with producing the dialogue and 
less able to adapt effective strategies to meet the goals of argumentation. In contrast, 
adults adapted discourse to the requirement of different argumentative contexts 
(agreeing versus disagreeing dialogues). When they met with agreeing partners, adults 
engaged in a qualitatively different discourse than when they met with disagreeing 
partners.  
Discourse strategies produced by adults were characterised by three features: (a) 
eliciting and critiquing partner’s arguments, (b) directing partner’s reasoning, and (c) 
blocking or rebutting attempts by the partner to critique arguments. The researchers 
identified nine strategies of argumentative discourse on which adults and adolescents 
differed: adding, using case-based questions, interpreting, counter-arguing, using case-
based cornering sequences, interpretation-based cornering sequences, rebutting and 
blocking. The first three of these strategies occurred more frequently among adolescents 
and characterises less effective discourse. The remaining six were more frequent among 
adults and represent more advanced argumentative discourse. This coding scheme is 
fully described in the methodology chapter of this thesis (Chapter Three). However, a 
summary of the scheme and the theoretical framework in which this coding scheme was 
based are provided in the next section.  
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7.1.2. Arguers’ goals and strategies  
 According to Walton (1989), when engaged in argumentative discourse, 
speakers have two goals: (1) to secure commitments from the opponent that can be used 
to support one’s own argument; and (2) to undermine the opponent’s position by 
identifying and challenging weaknesses in his or her argument. Drawing on Walton’s 
analysis, Felton and Kuhn (2001) proposed that effective argumentation progresses as 
speakers are able to understand the discourse goals, and apply effective strategies to 
pursue these goals. When analysing the adolescents’ and adults’ dialogues about capital 
punishment, Felton and Kuhn (2001) identified four argumentative strategies.  
1. Rebutting: is a basic element of argumentative discourse. It is a sequence in 
which a speaker presents a counterargument that follows the counterarguments 
produced by the partner. Thus, it represents an attempt by the speaker to remove 
the strength of a critique advanced by the partner. Ideally, a speaker should rebut 
every critique to his or her argument. Otherwise, the partner has successfully 
undermined the speaker’s position. Although it is a defensive move, it is one that 
demonstrates awareness of the goals of argumentative discourse.  
2. Blocking: occurs when a speaker rejects or counter-argues the premise of a 
leading question posed by the partner. In so doing, a speaker avoids being forced 
to undermine his or her position. Like rebuttals, blocks represent a defensive 
move on the part of the speaker. 
3. Case-cornering: occurs when a speaker asks the partner to clarify his or her 
position, or when a speaker tries to interpret the other’s response, and then, 
challenges his or her view advancing a counterargument. Thus, the speaker 
corners the partner in a weak position, and then is able to criticise his or her 
argument. This strategy reflects an offensive attempt to direct the partner’s 
argument. 
4. Formulating a case: is a variant of the corner sequence. However, instead of a 
clarifying question, the opening statement is a case question (i.e., the speaker 
starts an argument by proposing a hypothetical case or scenario). Once the 
partner takes a position, the opponent advances a counterargument. Like case-
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cornering, case-based sequences reflect offensive attempts to direct the partner’s 
argument. 
 In their study, Felton and Kuhn (2001) found that corner, rebuttal, and block 
occurred more frequently in adult dialogues, and case-based sequence was identified in 
both adolescent and adult dialogues. According to Felton and Kuhn (2001), case-based 
sequences lack strategic power compared with other strategies, such as corner 
sequences. This is because case-based sequences focus mainly on the partner’s position, 
instead of addressing a speaker’s own arguments.  
 Study Two in this thesis (Chapter Five) explored the use of these elements of 
discourse in younger populations (children were 5-6, 8-9, and 11-12 years-old). The 
objective of this previous study was mainly exploratory and the results remain tentative, 
because children produced discourse strategies rather infrequently. There were only 
significant statistical differences between the three age groups for the use of rebuttal, 
which appeared more frequently in the discourse of year 7 children (11-12 years).  
Nonetheless, these data suggest that awareness of goals in argumentation may 
develop before late adolescence and adulthood. This view has been supported by the 
combined work of Stein and her colleagues (e.g., Stein & Liwag, 1999; Stein & Miller, 
1990, 1993a). Their theoretical position has been that argumentation skill emerges early 
in development (around 3-5 years of age) and that neither children nor adults have 
cognitive difficulties understanding the basic components of an argument and the goals 
entailed in argumentative discourse. This contrasts with the position of other theorists, 
who argue that development of argument skills occurs late in childhood, during the 
beginning of adolescence.  
For instance, Kuhn (2007b) is one of the investigators who have claimed that 
even adults have difficulty mastering the skills needed to become good arguers. Other 
researchers (e.g., Coirier, 1996; Coirier et al., 1999; Golder and Coirier, 1994; Knudson, 
1992) have also focused on the difficulties that adolescents and adults experience in 
writing coherent and strong arguments. Gilbert (1997) adopts partially this position, 
except that he suggests that inadequacies of argument skills should be accepted so that 
we can teach people how to be more proficient in constructing arguments.  
In light of the previous findings in this thesis (Chapters Four to Six), and in 
accordance with Stein’s early emergence hypothesis, the present study further explores 
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age differences in children’s ability to recognise and evaluate argumentative goals 
presented in a series of video-recorded dialogues.  
7.1.3. Engaging in argumentation and changing views 
 As noted in the literature review chapter (Chapter Two) and in previous study 
chapters, cognitive and developmental psychologists have been increasingly interested 
in understanding how new sources of information interact with existing beliefs and 
opinions in ways that lead children to change their views (Asterhan & Schwarz, 2009; 
Brem, Russel, & Weems, 2001; Chambers, 1995; Vosniadou, 2007). These studies fall 
under a heading of what has been termed “conceptual change”. Vosniadou (2007), 
defines conceptual change as “the outcome of a complex cognitive as well as a social 
process thereby which an initial framework theory is restructured” (p. 2). Studies of 
conceptual change have focused mainly on how children learn science (Howe, Rodgers, 
& Tolmie, 1990; Howe & Tolmie, 2003; Howe, Tolmie, & Mackenzie, 1995; 
Stathopoulou & Vosniadou, 2007; Vosniadou, 2002; Vosniadou & Brewer, 1994; 
Vosniadou, Skopeliti, & Ikospentaki, 2004), but also mathematics (Damon & Phelps, 
1988; Schwarz, Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000) and history (Pontecorvo & Girardet, 1993). 
These studies have all shown that conceptual change is the result of a slow and gradual 
process often accompanied by knowledge biases and lack of critical thinking.  
 Within social psychology, and particularly in the studies of persuasion, the 
assessment of attitudes and attitude change has a long history. Social psychologists have 
been concerned with both the cognitive and affective dimensions entailed in attitudes. 
The result has been the development of many dual process models to explain the 
affective (emotion) and cognitive processing and interpretations of persuasive messages. 
These include the elaboration likelihood model, the heuristic-systematic model, and 
the extended parallel process model.  
In the Elaboration Likelihood Model, or ELM, (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), 
cognitive processing is the central route, and affective or emotion processing is 
associated with the peripheral route. While central route processes involve cognitive 
processing of the content message, the peripheral route relies on the environmental cues 
of the message, such as the perceived credibility of the communicator, the attractiveness 
of the communicator, or the way the communicator conveys the message (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). The ELM suggests that effective attitude change happens only 
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through the central processing route that incorporates both cognitive and affective 
components, as opposed to the more heuristics-based peripheral route. This suggests 
that motivation through emotion alone does not result in attitude change (O’Keefe, 
2008). Petty and Cacioppo also speculated that young children are only able to engage 
in peripheral processing. If so, then children’s processing of a peer’s presentation of 
evidence or a dialogue may be based more on the child’s evaluation than on a careful 
consideration of the peer’s arguments. Further, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) proposed that 
young children’s inability to engage in elaborative processing may be due to limited 
prior knowledge.  
Similar to the ELM, the Heuristic-Systematic Model, or HSM, (Chaiken, 
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) states that information is either processed in a systematic 
way through comprehensive and analytical cognitive processing of the content message, 
or information is processed through shortcuts known as heuristics. Emotions (affect 
heuristics, feelings and gut-feeling reactions) are often used as shortcuts. According to 
this model, individuals are more apt to minimise their use of cognitive resources, thus, 
affecting the intake and processing of messages.  
The Extended Parallel Process Model, or EPPM, includes both cognition and 
emotion in combination with threat and fear appeals (Witte, 1992). EPPM suggests that 
persuasive fear appeals are most effective when an individual has high involvement and 
efficacy. In other words, fear appeals are more effective when people care about the 
issue or situation, and when people perceive they possess the agency to deal with that 
issue or situation. 
 Research on attitudes has interested both social and cognitive psychologists. A 
particular phenomenon that has received a great deal of attention in recent years is 
attitude polarization. Attitude or belief polarization is a phenomenon in which a 
disagreement becomes more extreme as people evaluate mixed evidence on an issue 
(Fine, 2007). It is one of the effects of confirmation bias: the tendency to search and 
interpret information in such a way that it strengthens a person’s initial view (Fine, 
2007).  
A pioneering study on attitude polarization, that continues to be widely cited 
nowadays, was conducted in 1979 by Lord, Ross, and Lepper. In this study, two groups 
of subjects were selected; one was strongly in favour of capital punishment, and the 
other was strongly against it. The researchers began by measuring the strength of 
participants’ positions on the death penalty. Later, both groups of participants (pro- and 
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anti-capital punishment) were put into small groups and were shown one of two cards. 
One card contained a statement about the results of a research project that favoured the 
death penalty, for example: “Kroner and Phillips (1977) compared murder rates for the 
year before and the year after adoption of capital punishment in 14 states. In 11 of the 
14 states, murder rates were lower after adoption of the death penalty. This research 
supports the deterrent effect of the death penalty” (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979, p. 
2100). The other card had a statement about the results of a research project that 
opposed to the death penalty, for example: “Palmer and Crandall (1977) compared 
murder rates in 10 pairs of neighbouring states with different capital punishment laws. 
In 8 of the 10 pairs, murder rates were higher in the state with capital punishment. This 
research opposes the deterrent effect of the death penalty” (Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979, 
p. 2100).  
Participants were then asked again about the strength of their beliefs regarding 
the effects of the death penalty, and also asked about the effect that the research had on 
their attitudes. In the final stage, participants were given the card that supported the 
opposite position to that they had initially read. Again, participants’ degree of 
commitment to their original positions was re-measured, and participants were asked 
about the quality of the research and the effect that the research information had on their 
beliefs.  
Lord, Ross and Lepper (1979) found that participants tended to hold that 
research which agreed with their initial views had been better conducted and was more 
convincing than research that conflicted with their original beliefs. Whichever position 
participants held initially, they tended to hold that position more strongly after reading 
about research that supported their position. In addition, after they had read the research 
that supported their current views as well as the research that conflicted with their 
views, they tended to hold their original attitudes more strongly than before they had 
received that information.   
 More recently, Kuhn and Lao (1996) conducted a study to probe the existence 
and frequency of the polarization phenomenon using some of the materials employed in 
the original Lord et al. study. Kuhn and Lao (1996) compared an evidence evaluation 
condition with several comparison conditions in which subjects were engaged with the 
topic but did not examine evidence. They found that polarization is a real but infrequent 
outcome of exposure to mixed evidence. In addition, their data suggest that it is simply 
cognitive engagement, rather than exposure to new evidence, that produces the 
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polarization effect. Subsequent research conducted by Kuhn and her colleagues supports 
this view and provided new evidence that cognitive engagement with peers in 
discussion of a topic enhances thinking about that topic (Kuhn, Shaw, & Felton, 1997; 
Kuhn & Udell, 2003), and also facilitates attitude development (Lao & Kuhn, 2002). As 
Lao and Kuhn (2002) are careful to note, attitude development and attitude change are 
distinct constructs, in that, an attitude toward something may change from positive to 
negative without any change in the quality of the thinking supporting it. Conversely, the 
quality of thinking supporting an attitude may improve while the attitude itself remains 
unchanged.   
7.1.4. The present study 
 The first aim of this study was to explore age differences in children’s ability to 
recognise the role that different argumentative strategies play in discourse and to 
understand the dynamics between arguers in pursuing the goals of argumentation. 
Children participating in the study were presented with video clips in which two 
children were debating a scientific invention. In these videos, the supporters’ goal was 
to convince participants that their ideas and arguments were strong. The opponents’ 
goal was to challenge the supporters’ ideas by diminishing the strength of their 
arguments. The strategic sequences presented were drawn from Felton and Kuhn’s 
coding scheme of argumentative strategies (2001), but were adapted to a new topic to fit 
children’s level of knowledge and understanding.  
In Study Two (Chapter Five), this coding scheme was also applied to explore 
whether children, at different ages, were able to generate these strategies in discussion 
with their peers. Results showed that children’s discourse at all ages was more 
expository than strategic, because they produced these strategies infrequently. Age 
differences were only found in the use of rebuttals, which was used more frequently by 
older children (11- year olds). The question posed here was whether these results reflect 
children’s difficulty in constructing effective argumentative strategies, or children’s lack 
of understanding of the goals of argumentative discourse. If children do not understand 
the arguer’s goals and intentions that argumentation implies, then they may find it 
unnecessary to behave strategically. Thus, the present study complements the previous 
one by looking specifically at children’s evaluative skills in discourse.  
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The first hypothesis formulated here was that there would be age differences in 
children’s ability to recognise different strategic goals. If these skills are developmental, 
as the results from previous studies seem to indicate (Chapter Four to Six), then it is 
predicted that older children (11-12 years) would be better at recognising the impact 
that different strategies play in argumentative discourse than would younger children (8-
9 years). More specifically, older children will show a preference for the supporter’s 
arguments and evaluate his or her performance as strong in the rebutting and blocking 
scenarios. This is because rebutting and blocking represent defensive moves by an 
arguer to avoid being forced to undermine the initial position. In these scenarios, the 
supporter gains advantage by defending with success his or her initial position with 
counterarguments. Conversely, in scenarios with corner and case sequences, 11- year 
olds will evaluate the supporter’s performance as weak and prefer the opponent’s 
arguments. This is because corner sequence and case sequence reflect offensive 
attempts by the opponent to direct the partner’s argument, thus leaving him or her in a 
weaker position. On the other hand, younger children (8- years) will have more 
difficulty in differentiating the supporters’ and opponents’ goals and intentions in the 
four strategic sequences.  
 The second hypothesis was that there would be age differences in the preference 
for a particular strategy, in terms of its effectiveness, when comparing six different 
paired combinations (corner sequence vs. rebuttal, case-based sequence vs. block, 
rebuttal vs. case-based sequence, block vs. rebuttal, corner sequence vs. block, case-
based sequence vs. corner sequence). However, because this hypothesis is being 
investigated for the first time, no specific predictions relating to age differences were 
made here.  
A further objective of the present study was to examine whether children can be 
persuaded to change their initial positions after listening to the strategic arguments of a 
particular communicator. The research question posed here is whether the presentation 
of evidence in a passive condition (video-recorded dialogues) is an effective means of 
attitude change, and also whether there are age-related differences in this respect.  
However, the focus is not on the study of attitudes per se, but rather to examine 
children’s thinking about novel ideas (original inventions) related to important social 
issues, such as protecting the environment, and improving people’s lifestyle. In light of 
the finding by Staudinger and Baltes (1996) that implicit (imagined) interaction can be 
as effective as real social interaction in enhancing adults’ thinking about everyday ill-
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structured dilemmas, it was predicted that children would be influenced to revaluate 
their positions after exposure to arguments. Again, predictions relating to age 
differences were not formulated because these are being investigated for the first time. 
7.2. Pilot study 
 A pilot study was undertaken two weeks prior to the main study. The aim of the 
pilot survey was to gather information about the sorts of arguments adults 
(undergraduate students) consider strong. This assessment provided the basis of the 
stimuli to be deployed in the main study. Undergraduate students were told that the 
researcher was interested in how adults evaluate the strength of arguments and that this 
assessment would provide information to devise materials for a study with young 
children.  
7.2.1. Participants in the pilot survey 
 Participants were 75 undergraduate students (65 female, 10 male) attending the 
first year of the Psychology degree in the university where the researcher studies.  
Students were 18-25 years old (M = 19, 1 years, S.D. = 1.52). They were recruited 
through the department’s Research Participation Scheme. This is an online scheme 
accessible to first-year students via the departmental website. Through this scheme, 
students can sign up to take part in Psychology research studies, schedule appointments 
and receive course credits for their participation. The pilot study was advertised in the 
website for three weeks. Several timeslots were created to allow students to choose a 
convenient time to participate in the study.  
 A sample of student volunteers was chosen to be part of this pilot assessment for 
several reasons. First, the subjects were accessible and readily available. This allowed 
the process of data collection to be fast, inexpensive and easy. Another advantage of 
using adults in the pilot study was because they would be able to understand and cope 
with the large amount of information provided in the questionnaire. Moreover, 
designing questionnaires for children would be time consuming because they would 
have to be relatively short in length and contain language accessible to their level of 
comprehension. However, an obvious criticism of using a convenience sample was 
sampling bias and that the sample was not representative of the population of interest 
(Stangor, 2007).  
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7.2.2. Questionnaire survey 
A paper-and-pencil questionnaire was designed specifically for the purpose of 
this pilot study. The instrument consisted of a five-point scale for measuring the 
strength of arguments, with a score of 1 corresponding to the lowest level of strength 
(“very weak”), and a score of 5 corresponding to the highest level of strength (“very 
strong”). The instrument consisted of four pages. Arguments listed in the scale were 
related to different scientific inventions (e.g., a recycling robot, a flying car, etc). The 
scale included a short description of an invention and a list of five reasons in favour and 
five reasons against each invention (i.e., the advantages and disadvantages of an 
invention). The following instructions appeared in the first page: “These inventions 
were created by 10-year-old children and they are related to the topic [e.g., protecting 
the environment]. Below you will find several arguments in favour and against these 
innovative ideas. Please evaluate the strength of each argument, using a 1 to 5 scale”. 
Figure 7.1 provides an illustration of the arguments given in favour and against the 
recycling robot invention.  
In total, items listed in the scale included four topics (Environment, Technology, 
Lifestyle, and Health), eight inventions (recycling robot, rain converter, translation 
telephone, flying car, clever hat, locator for lost things, healthy ice-cream, and spray for 
safe food), and eighty arguments (40 advantages, 40 disadvantages). An illustration of a 
part of the questionnaire is provided below (see Figure 7.1). The complete questionnaire 
is available in Appendix 15. 
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Invention 1: City recycling robot.  It is a small robot that will go around a city and pick up 
any trash. It is able to identify and separate garbage using special-made sensors to look for 
recyclable materials. Material that can be recycled would be put into appropriate sections 
inside the robot 
Advantages of a city recycling robot 
Cheap to build (1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Cities would be cleaner (1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Some people do not care about 
recycling, but the robot would 
do it automatically 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Recycling avoids pollution (1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Recycling avoids deforestation (1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a city recycling robot 
The robot picks up the trash, 
but it is incapable to recycle 
materials  
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Expensive to put into practice 
in cities 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Does not solve the problem of 
factories that do not recycle 
materials 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Robots would consume fuel (1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Robots would pollute the 
environment 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Invention 2: Rain converter.  It is a mobile water unit that can transform rain into drinkable 
water and supply homes. The unit is displayed in the roof of a house where it captures the 
rain. 
Advantages of a rain converter 
Prevents the world of running 
short of fresh water 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Reduces the harm done to the 
environment by the water 
industry 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Cheap alternative source of 
water 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Reduces flooding (1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Water storage could be used 
for fire prevention 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a rain converter 
It would not work in places 
where it does not rain often 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
If people capture all rain, 
rivers would run dry. 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Quality of filtered rainwater 
might be not very good 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
It does not rain during the 
Summer 
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
A small device cannot filter 
rainwater  
(1) very weak (2) weak (3) neutral (4) strong (5) very strong 
Figure 7.1. Illustration of a part of the questionnaire for evaluating the strength of 
arguments for inventions for protecting the environment 
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7.2.3. Procedure 
Students completed the questionnaire individually in a quiet room at the 
university. Participants received an information sheet explaining the purpose of the 
assessment. The following introduction appeared first: “You are invited to take part in a 
research study. I am interested in gathering information about the sorts of arguments 
adults consider strong. Your task is to respond to a simple questionnaire designed to 
evaluate your preference for different arguments related to scientific inventions created 
by children. The information you provide will be used to help me design a study about 
children’s understanding of persuasive arguments”. Participants were given the 
opportunity to ask questions before signing the consent form (see again Appendix 15). 
Participants took less than 10 minutes to complete the questionnaire.  
7.2.4. Missing data 
 Examination of frequencies suggested missing data to be random. Thus, in 
accordance with Brace et al. (2006), respondents who missed at least one of the items in 
the questionnaire were excluded from the analysis, leaving a total of 63 participants.  
7.2.5. Statistical note and results  
 Students’ evaluations of the strength of arguments were examined. The data 
were ordinal in nature; therefore median and range values are reported (see Table 7.1).  
In addition, the mean and standard deviation values are also reported (see again Table 
7.1). By reporting the mean value and treating the Likert-scale as an interval scale, one 
is not assuming that the differences between the responses are equal in distance. In this 
example, it shows that students with higher-numbered responses are in more agreement 
with a particular argument than those with lower-numbered responses. For instance, 
related to the advantages of the recycling robot, students seem to agree more that the 
reason “Robots would keep cities clean” (M = 4.03) is stronger than other reasons like 
“Robots would be cheap to build” (M = 2.35), and “Robots are more efficient than 
people” (M = 3.68). Arguments with the highest ratings for each category were selected. 
More specifically, the advantage and the disadvantage rated as the strongest for each 
invention were selected to be displayed in the stimuli. These arguments are displayed in 
Table 7.2. No statistical tests were performed to analyse whether there were statistically 
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significant differences for scores of arguments. Most researchers, particularly in the 
developmental field, agree that there is no need to apply statistical models to pilot data 
(Wilson, 2005). Instead, it is typical to calculate simple descriptive statistics to get an 
estimate of the evaluation of each item (McCartney, Burchinal, & Bub, 2006).  
Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics for the pilot study 
 
Median Range Mean 
Std 
dev. 
Advantages of a city recycling robot      
Cheap to build 2 3 2.35 1.24 
Cities would be cleaner 4 4 4.03 .84 
More efficient than people 4 4 3.68 1.06 
Recycling avoids pollution 4 4 3.83 1.11 
Recycling avoids deforestation 4 4 3.73 1.11 
Disadvantages of a city recycling robot     
Does not recycle materials 3 4 3.03 1.22 
Expensive to put into practice in cities 4 3 4.07 .88 
Does not solve the problem of factories that do not 
recycle materials 
4 4 3.76 1.12 
Robots would consume fuel 4 3 3.75 .98 
Robots would pollute the environment 4 4 3.29 1.18 
Advantages of a rain converter     
Prevents the world of running short of fresh water 4 4 3.56 1.12 
Reduces the harm done to the environment by the 
water industry 
4 4 3.57 .96 
Cheap alternative source of  water 4 4 3.81 .98 
Reduces flooding 4 4 3.05 1.08 
Water storage could be used for fire prevention 4 4 3.31 1.11 
Disadvantages of a rain converter     
It would not work in places where it does not rain 
often 
4 3 4.09 .93 
If people capture all rain, rivers would run dry 2 4 2.73 1.33 
Quality of filtered water might not be very good 4 4 3.41 .96 
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Median Range Mean 
Std 
dev. 
It does not rain during the Summer 3 4 2.53 1.11 
A small device cannot filter rainwater 3 4 2.79 1.00 
Advantages of a translation telephone     
Improves communication in multiple languages 4 3 4.29 .69 
Makes friends from other cultures  4 4 3.64 .97 
Delivers information in multiples languages 4 3 4.03 .77 
Cheaper than human translation 3 4 3.40 1.05 
Quicker than human translation 4 4 3.57 1.07 
Disadvantages of a translation telephone     
Machines would not be able to translate ambiguous 
words and sentences 
4 3 4.24 .69 
Translators would be unemployed 4 3 3.45 1.14 
Calls would be expensive 4 4 3.93 .91 
People would not be interested in learning new 
languages 
4 4 3.40 1.33 
Machines are not reliable  4 4 3.68 .96 
Advantages of a flying car     
Cheaper than aeroplanes 4 4 3.31 1.19 
Quick to go to a distant place 4 4 3.83 .89 
People would not have to drive 3 4 3.05 1.20 
There would not be traffic jams 3 4 3.09 1.25 
Flying cars would be good as ambulances 4 4 3.68 1.18 
Disadvantages of a flying car     
It is not a safe method of transport 4 4 3.61 1.15 
It would be costly to build 5 4 4.33 .91 
It would consume a lot of fuel 5 4 4.31 .90 
There would be a lot of air crashes 4 4 3.88 1.08 
It would not be practical 3 4 3.09 1.09 
Advantages of a clever hat     
It would be fun to wear 3 4 2.73 1.35 
It would be practical 4 4 3.33 1.12 
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Median Range Mean 
Std 
dev. 
It would protect the eyes from the sunlight  4 4 3.49 .92 
Good for bold people  3 4 2.51 1.20 
People could ride a bicycle in the rain without 
carrying an umbrella in one hand 
4 4 3.53 1.11 
Disadvantages of a clever hat     
It would not be feasible 4 4 3.63 .98 
It is not an important invention 4 4 3.55 1.11 
It would make hair dry and puffy 2 4 2.36 1.15 
It is better to have different varieties of hats 2 4 2.47 1.08 
It would be too heavy for people’s head and neck 4 3 3.85 .97 
Advantages of a locator for lost things     
Finds misplaced or lost things quickly 4 3 4.28 .79 
Reduces people’s stress 4 3 3.92 .88 
People would not be late for work 3 4 2.87 1.12 
Cheap to build 3 4 3.09 1.15 
People could also used it to locate a lost dog or cat 4 4 3.32 1.14 
Disadvantages of a locator for lost things     
People would forget to use it 3 4 2.84 1.11 
It is not very practical 3 4 2.59 1.08 
People would need lots of locators for using it on 
different things  
4 4 4.00 1.03 
It is not an original idea 3 4 3.07 1.11 
People already use too many electronic devices 3 4 2.94 1.28 
Advantages of a healthy ice-cream     
Good for people who are picky eaters 4 4 3.43 1.12 
Meals would be fun for children 4 3 3.77 .89 
Prevents obesity 4 4 3.35 1.19 
Parents would not have a problem convincing their 
children to eat healthy food 
4 4 3.61 1.11 
Cheaper than real food 3 4 2.65 .97 
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Median Range Mean 
Std 
dev. 
Disadvantages of a healthy ice-cream 
A vegetable ice-cream would not taste as good as a 
chocolate ice-cream 
4 4 3.95 1.08 
Real fruit and vegetables are healthier 5 3 4.55 .58 
It would not be popular amongst adults 4 4 3.57 1.08 
Restaurants would be empty 2 4 2.43 1.23 
It would be boring to eat ice creams every day 4 4 3.93 1.18 
Advantages of a spray for safe food     
People would not have to peel fruit 3 4 3.00 1.12 
Easy to use 4 4 3.89 .80 
More efficient in killing germs than using water 4 4 4.00 .81 
Prevent diseases provoked by toxins and pesticides  4 4 4.09 .81 
More hygienic  4 3 3.89 .97 
Disadvantages of a spray for safe food     
Difficult to create a safe spray 4 3 3.00 .72 
No use in some fruits and vegetables that need to be 
peeled 
4 4 3.89 .96 
Expensive 4 3 4.00 .98 
Does not solve the problem of pesticides that get 
inside fruits and vegetables 
4 3 4.09 .64 
The spray could leave a bad taste 4 4 3.89 .94 
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Table 7.2. Selected arguments in favour and against each invention (advantages and 
disadvantages) 
Invention Advantage Disadvantage 
Recycling robot: it is a small robot that 
will go around a city and pick up any trash. 
It is able to identify and separate garbage 
using special-made sensors to look for 
recyclable materials. Material that can be 
recycled would be put into appropriate 
sections inside the robot 
Cities would be 
cleaner 
Expensive to put 
into practice in 
cities 
Rain converter: it is a mobile water unit 
that can transform rain into drinkable water 
and supply homes. The unit is displayed in 
the roof of a house where it captures the 
rain. 
Cheap alternative 
source of water 
 
It would not work 
in places where it 
does not rain 
often 
Translation telephone: it is a small 
device, similar to a regular mobile phone, 
with the ability for universal translation. 
People could call anyone in the world and 
the telephone would do instant language 
translation. Translation would be available 
for all languages in the world. 
Improves 
communication in 
multiple languages 
 
Calls would be 
expensive 
Flying car: this car is made of lightweight 
material and would be able to take off and 
fly above the road at hundreds of miles per 
hour. Flying cars would have an automatic 
pilot, so people would not have to drive. 
Quick to go to a 
distant place 
 
It would be costly 
to build and 
maintain 
 
Clever hat: this hat protects you in all 
weathers – sun, wind, snow, lightning – 
you press a button and things come out, for 
example an umbrella for rain. 
People could ride a 
bicycle in the rain 
without carrying an 
umbrella in one 
hand 
It would be too 
heavy for 
people’s head and 
neck 
 
Locator for lost things: this is a very 
small device with a hook on it to put on 
your glasses, on your house keys, etc. that 
will emit a shrill sound or flash a light after 
you dial a number on your mobile phone. 
Finds misplaced or 
lost things quickly 
 
People would 
need lots of 
locators for using 
on different 
things 
Healthy ice-cream: healthy foods, such as 
broccoli, carrots, tomato soup, etc. would 
taste as good as a sweet ice cream. Instead 
of eating a meal of chicken and potatoes, 
you can eat a tasty ice cream with the same 
nutrients and vitamins. 
Meals would be 
fun for children 
 
Real fruit and 
vegetables are 
healthier 
 
Spray for safe food: this spray is made of 
water and other organic components and 
cleans all fruit and vegetables from all 
chemicals. It is really easy to use: just 
spray your food and it is ready to eat! 
Prevents diseases 
caused by 
chemicals 
 
Does not solve 
the problem of 
chemicals that get 
inside fruits and 
vegetables 
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7.3. Development of materials 
The next step was to create different types of strategic sequences using the 
reasons selected earlier (see again Table 7.2 above). Four types of strategies were 
created using the reasons in favour and against each invention: corner, rebuttal, case, 
and block. The example provided below illustrates the scenarios created for the 
recycling robot invention. Each sequence starts with an arguer presenting an argument 
in favour of the invention: “I am in favour of the recycling robot, because it would keep 
cities clean”. Similar strategic sequences were created for the remaining inventions, and 
they are fully described in Appendix 16. These scenarios were then played and video-
recorded by a group of children who agreed to participate in the study.  
 
Scenario 1: Corner sequence 
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of the recycling robot, because it would keep 
cities clean. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] So, you think we need robots to keep cities clean? 
Arguer: [clarify] Well, some cities are very dirty, so robots would very useful. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But cities already have recycling bins. If people recycle, we 
do not need robots to do it. 
 
Scenario 2: Rebuttal  
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of the recycling robot, because it would keep 
cities clean. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But cities already have recycling bins. If people recycle, we 
don’t need robots to do it. 
Arguer: [counter-C] But some people don’t recycle, so we need other solutions, 
like robots to keep cities clean. 
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Scenario 3: Case sequence 
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of the recycling robot, because it would keep 
cities clean. 
Opponent: [case-?] Let’s say we live in a big city that gets very dirty every day. 
Would we have to buy lots of robots? 
Arguer: [clarify] Yes, we could get several robots to keep cities clean. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But this would be very expensive to put into practice in 
cities. 
 
Scenario 4: Block  
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of the recycling robot, because it would keep 
cities clean. 
Opponent:  [case-?] Let’s say we are in a big city that gets very dirty every day. 
Would we have to buy lots of robots to keep the city clean? 
Arguer: [counter-C] Maybe not. Robots last long and they can work several times 
a day. A few robots would be enough to keep large cities clean. 
7.3.1. Preparation of recording sessions 
  Children’s dialogues were recorded using a video camera. The video scenario 
consisted of a white background with two children seated in chairs or standing. The 
camera was placed in front of the children. A medium close-up was used to frame the 
pair, covering children’s face and shoulders. The researcher seated facing the children 
(to show the cards) and near the left-hand side of the camera (to be able to operate it).  
The videos were recorded in a quiet room at the university where the researcher 
works. Children were shown four cards (paper format A4, yellow colour), each one 
presenting the theme and the inventions associated (e.g., theme: “protecting the 
environment”; inventions: “recycling robot” and “rain converter”). For the video 
recording, children were not asked to memorise the script. Instead, children were shown 
cards and asked to read their lines. These cards included descriptions of the inventions 
and arguments in favour and against each invention. Cards in two different colours were 
used to facilitate children’s identification of their lines (white cards for the arguer, and 
green cards for the opponent). A total of 96 cards were printed in A4 paper format, front 
and reverse. The front page of the card was facing the researcher and contained an 
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identification title for the card, printed in small font size (e.g., “robot description” or 
“robot argument” or “robot strategy, first line”). The reverse page of the card was facing 
children and contained lines printed in large font size. 
7.3.2. Children featuring in the videos 
 Participants were eight children (four girls, four boys); mean age 10 years and 4 
months, recruited through acquaintances. Verbal consent to take part in all aspects of 
the study was obtained from parents. Children were also asked for personal approval 
before participating in the study and they were told that they could withdraw from the 
study at any time. All participants were placed in same-gender pairs with one peer of the 
same age group. 
7.3.3. Recording the stimuli 
 The videos were recorded in two sessions in two separate days. Each session 
lasted approximately one hour, including time for instructions and rehearsals before 
recording the videos. Instructions given to children are outlined in Appendix 17. Four 
girls from the same school participated in the first session, and four boys from another 
school participated in the second session. All children were wearing their school 
uniforms.  
 The four inventions used in each recording session were selected randomly from 
a total of eight inventions. Before recording the videos, children chose their favourite 
invention. Children were also given the opportunity to choose a partner to record the 
dialogues. While one pair of children recorded the first video, the other two children 
were asked to wait for their turn, in a room adjacent to the recording room, 
accompanied by an adult (the mother of one child).  
 For each invention topic, five movie clips were produced (less than one minute 
each), including one clip for the description of the invention, and four clips for the 
presentation of short dialogues related to the invention. These dialogues represented 
four different persuasive strategies: corner, rebuttal, case, and block. The sequence of 
presentation and recording of these strategies was the same for all topics. Between each 
movie take, children were invited to take a break. Refreshments (water, juice, fruit, and 
cookies) were provided. Children were very engaged in the activity, and they decided to 
continue filming after each take. Children were praised for their effort during the task 
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by the researcher (e.g., “well done!”, “that’s great!”, “you sound like a real actor!”). 
Occasionally, the researcher asked a child to repeat a line, usually for mispronouncing a 
word. Once the task had been completed, the participants were thanked and each child 
received a book gift card for their collaboration in the study.  
7.4. Method 
7.4.1. Participants 
 One hundred and twenty seven children (64 boys and 63 girls) aged 8-9 years 
(M = 8, 79; S.D. = .41), and 11-12 years (M = 11, 95; S.D. = .22) participated in this 
study. Children were in their fourth and seventh year of school education. The sample 
was collected at two primary schools in the areas of Windsor, and Middlesex, and one 
secondary school in Slough, in South East England. Students from year 7 were from 
heterogeneous ethnic (primarily South Asian) and socioeconomic (mostly low-middle 
class) backgrounds. There were no exclusion criteria based on gender, race, or any other 
characteristic. All children from each age group, who were in attendance in the class 
during data collection and who had given consent, were invited to participate in the 
study. In the first instance, a letter explaining the study in more detail was sent to the 
Head Teacher of each school. This was followed up by a telephone call. After receiving 
permission from the schools, a consent letter was sent to children’s parents. A template 
letter to schools (see Appendix 18) and consent forms for parents are attached (see 
Appendix 19). A more detailed debriefing was given to teachers and children. 
Debriefing to participating children in the main study took the form of a brief 
presentation to the class discussing how children at different ages might have different 
opinions about various topics, like inventions in science, and why researchers have 
interest in arguments and persuasive strategies at different ages. The researcher and her 
supervisor visited the schools where data were collected and gave a brief presentation of 
the results. 
7.4.2. Materials 
Children watched a video in a technology-equipped room available at their 
school. They were equipped with a wide screen and external speakers that could be 
connected to a laptop. The size of these rooms was ideal for working with small groups 
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of children. Children were seated in an individual desk in front of the screen. Desks 
were placed in a row and approximately 20 cm apart. This was appropriate because the 
objective of the study was not to conduct a group discussion, but to collect students’ 
individual responses before and after a video presentation.  
The video was created using the program Windows Movie Maker 2007, and was 
eight minutes long. The video contained four clips, each one of two minutes in length.  
Video clips showed two children (aged 9-10 years) presenting and discussing an 
invention on a specific science topic. There were four different topics: Environment, 
Technology, Lifestyle, and Health. Children featuring in the video were instructed to 
present specific arguments (that formed different types of discourse strategies).  
A total of twelve versions of the video were created, in order to randomise the 
topics and argument content. Table 7.3 illustrates how data were collected to guarantee 
randomisation of contents. For example, children assigned to group A were shown a 
video presenting comparisons between a corner sequence (with arguments about the 
recycling robot invention) and a rebuttal (with arguments about the rain converter); 
between a case sequence (with arguments about the translation telephone) and a block 
(with arguments about the flying car); between a rebuttal (with arguments about the 
clever hat) and a case (with arguments about the locator for lost things); and finally 
between a block (with arguments about the healthy ice-cream) and a rebuttal (with 
arguments about the spray for safe food). On the other hand, children assigned to group 
A’ viewed an identical video presenting the same paired strategies, but with the content 
reversed (e.g., a corner sequence with the arguments related to the rain converter versus 
a rebuttal with arguments about the recycling robot).  
Participants received a questionnaire for assessment of opinion ratings before 
and after video visualisation. They were also asked to complete a questionnaire 
regarding the arguments discussed in the dialogues between each video clip.  
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Table 7.3. Randomisation procedures and design for data collection 
 Corner 
vs. 
Rebuttal 
Case vs. 
Block 
Rebuttal 
vs. Case 
Block vs. 
Rebuttal 
Corner vs. 
Block 
Case vs. 
Corner 
Robot vs. 
Rain 
converter 
A, A’ B, B’ C, C’ D, D’ E, E’ F, F’ 
Translator 
vs. Flying 
car 
F, F’ A, A’ B, B’ C, C’ D, D’ E, E’ 
Hat vs. 
Locator 
E, E’ F, F’ A, A’ B, B’ C, C’ D, D’ 
Ice-cream 
vs. Food 
spray 
D, D’ E, E’ F, F’ A, A’ B, B’ C, C’ 
Note: Letters A, A’, B, B’, C, C’, D, D’, E, E’, F, F’ represent 12 different groups of 
participants (N = 5 to 6 per group).  
7.4.3. Procedure 
 The procedure involved a session of approximately 30 minutes for each group of 
participants. All children watched a video containing several debates. Before and after 
video visualisation, participants were asked about their positions on the ideas and 
arguments presented in the video. 
Assessment of children’s initial positions before exposure to arguments 
 Participants were asked to complete a first questionnaire individually. This 
questionnaire assessed children’s initial opinions regarding the ideas that would be 
presented later in the video. Children’s task was to evaluate several inventions by giving 
points in a scale from 1 (very weak) to 5 (very good). Children were given the following 
instructions: “Hello! I am interested in knowing what you think about other children’s 
ideas and arguments. I am going to show you a video of children discussing inventions 
they created for a Science Competition in their school. Before listening to their ideas, I 
am going to give you this sheet (with two pages) that contains the description of 
children’s inventions. Your task is to read the information very carefully and rate how 
good you think these inventions are. This is not a test, so there are no wrong or right 
answers. If you do not understand a word or you have any questions, do not hesitate to 
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ask me”. All children completed the questionnaire in less than 10 minutes. The pretest 
questionnaire is attached in Appendix 20.  
Video visualisation  
 A video was shown to small groups of children (five or six children for each 
group). Participants were given the following instructions: “As I explained earlier, you 
will now watch a video of other children discussing inventions they created for a 
Science Competition in their school. You have already read about their inventions, but 
now you will listen to the inventors giving arguments in favour of their creations. Please 
listen carefully to the dialogues, because afterwards you will be asked to evaluate the 
inventors’ ideas and arguments, and choose which one who should win the contest in 
each category (e.g., Environment, Technology)”. After each video clip, the researcher 
paused the film and asked children to answer a brief questionnaire about the video clip.  
Assessment of children’s final positions and evaluation of argumentative strategies  
 This assessment occurred immediately after children’s visualisation of each 
video clip. Participants were asked to draw conclusions about the dialogues by 
completing a questionnaire individually. The instrument consisted of a one-page 
questionnaire designed to assess children’s understanding of different persuasive 
strategies, and also children’s positions regarding the inventions after exposure to 
arguments. Children were asked to answer several questions by using a 5-point scale, 
and also by choosing one out of several options. In order to evaluate children’s 
understanding of different types of strategic sequences for each invention, the 
instrument included the following questions:  
 
Inventions for the Environment category (Please check or circle where appropriate) 
 
In the debate, do you think the inventor of the 
recycling robot was good or weak at defending 
the invention?  
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the list 
would you pick as the most important thing to 
explain your previous answer? 
(1) the inventor had the best arguments 
(2) the opponent had the best arguments 
(3) both inventor and opponent had 
strong arguments 
(4) I do not know 
Figure 7.2. Illustration of part of the questionnaire used after video visualisation 
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 The third question assessed children’s final positions on each invention and it 
was identical to the question used prior to video visualisation. Children were asked to 
evaluate several inventions by giving points in a scale from 1 (very weak) to 5 (very 
good) (e.g., “After listening to the debate about the recycling robot, how would you rate 
this invention?”). 
 Finally, after answering the questions regarding both inventions for each 
category, children were asked to choose the best inventor for the category (e.g., “Who 
do you think should be the winner for the category Environment in this competition: the 
inventor of the recycling robot, or the inventor of the rain converter?”). The complete 
questionnaire is attached in Appendix 21. 
Missing data 
 There was a small number of missing values, which suggests that these were 
likely to be random (Brace et al., 2006). Three subjects missed one item of the 
questionnaire, so data from all individuals were used (N = 127), except for analyses 
involving those particular responses.  
7.5. Results 
7.5.1. Design and analysis  
A mixed design was employed in this study. The first factor was the within-
subjects factor of before and after measures of children’s positions on different topics. 
The second factor was the between-subjects factor of age group, with two levels (8- and 
11- years) and also the factor of paired-type of persuasive strategies, with six levels 
(corner vs. rebuttal, case vs. block, rebuttal vs. case, block vs. rebuttal, corner vs. block, 
and case vs. corner). Analyses examined children’s ratings of inventors’ effectiveness in 
defending their arguments in debates. Before and after measures of children’s position 
on a topic were also analysed to explore any changes after exposure to arguments. 
Relations among variables were examined using parametric and non-parametric tests as 
appropriate.  
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Age differences in children’s evaluation of arguers’ skill  
 The first hypothesis concerned age differences in children’s understanding of the 
goals of argumentative discourse entailed in several types of strategic sequences. More 
specifically, it was predicted that children in the two age groups would evaluate arguers’ 
skill in dialogues containing different strategic sequences differently. These strategies 
were combined in six different pairs in order to contrast its effectiveness (or strategic 
power). This was assessed by asking children to listen to two children (a supporter and 
an opponent) engaging in short dialogues containing two different strategic sequences 
(e.g., corner sequence versus rebuttal) and then to give a score to the arguers’ skill in 
defending their ideas. The following question was asked: “In the debate, do you think 
that the inventor of the (e.g., recycling robot) was good at defending the invention?” 
Children’s scores for the inventor’s performance in the dialogues were analysed across 
topics.  
The following analyses detail: (1) age differences in children’s evaluation of 
arguers’  skill in dialogues containing different strategic sequences between groups (8-9 
years and 11-12 years), and (2) a separate analysis by age group of children’s evaluation 
of strategy persuasiveness in each paired combination of strategies.  
Histograms for the two age groups were inspected separately. As data were 
skewed, and participant numbers were small, the most appropriate statistical tests were 
non-parametric. These included a Mann Whitney test of differences for independent 
samples, and a Wilcoxon test of differences for related samples. In addition, data 
descriptive statistics included median as a measure of central tendency and range as a 
measure of dispersion. The disadvantage of nonparametric tests is that they are less 
powerful than their parametric equivalents (Brace, Kemp, & Snelgar, 2006). Therefore, 
parametric tests were also used, including analysis of variance (ANOVA), and a Paired-
Samples T-Test. Data descriptive reports also included values of mean as a measure of 
central tendency and values of standard deviation as a measure of dispersion. Use of 
parametric tests (e.g., one-way ANOVA) served to corroborate the results obtained in 
the non-parametric analyses. However, because they yielded the same results obtained 
in the previous analysis (the equivalent non-parametric test), it was decided to report 
only the results obtained from the non-parametric tests.  
The Mann-Whitney test was used to assess whether there was a statistically 
significant difference between the mean ranks of arguer’s performance in different 
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strategic sequences rated by 8- year olds (N = 67) and 11-year olds (N = 60). Results 
showed a statistically significant difference for ratings of arguer’s effectiveness in case 
sequence strategy in the pair case sequence versus block by comparing the two age 
groups, U = 636, N1 = 45, N2 = 40, p < .01. In this pair, 8- year old children gave higher 
ratings (median = 4) for arguer’s performance in case sequence strategy than 11- year 
old children (median = 3). There were no significant age differences for the remaining 
paired combinations of strategies.  
Next, differences of children’s evaluation skill in each pair of strategies (for 
separate age groups) were analysed. Data descriptive statistics of ratings given by 8-
year old children (N = 47) are reported in Table 7.4. A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test was 
performed for this age group to test whether there were significant differences between 
ratings of arguer’s performance in different pairs of strategies. Results showed a 
statistically significant difference only for the pair rebuttal versus corner sequence, z = 
-2.48, N – Ties = 42, p < .01. Specifically, there were more high ranks for the positive 
differences, that is, children’s ratings for arguer’s performance in the rebuttal strategy 
were significantly higher than the ratings for the arguer’s performance in the corner 
sequence strategy. There were no significant differences between the ratings of other 
pairs of strategies, that is, there was a fairly equal spread of ranks for the evaluation of 
the arguer’s effectiveness in the remaining strategies.  
Descriptive data for scores given by 11-year old children (N = 40) are provided 
in Table 7.5. These data show that 11- year old children evaluated the arguer’s 
performance in rebuttals and blocks more favourably than the other two strategies 
consistently across conditions. These data were explored further using a Wilcoxon 
Signed Ranks Test. A statistically significant difference was found for the ratings in the 
pair rebuttal versus corner sequence, z = -2.79, N – Ties = 29, p < .01, two-tailed. 
There were more high ranks for the positive differences (i.e., children’s scores for 
arguer’s performance in the rebuttal strategy were higher than the scores given to the 
arguer’s performance in the corner sequence strategy). A significant difference was also 
found for the ratings in the pair case sequence versus rebuttal, z = -2.91, N – Ties = 24, 
p < .01, two-tailed. In this case, there were more high ranks for the negative differences 
(i.e., children’s scores for the arguer’s performance in the case sequence strategy were 
lower than the scores attributed to the arguer’s performance in the rebuttal strategy). 
Finally, there was also a statistically significant difference for the ratings in the pair 
block versus corner sequence, z = -2.73, N – Ties = 31, p < .01. There were more high 
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ranks for the positive differences (i.e., children’s ratings for arguer’s performance in the 
block strategy were higher than the ratings for the arguer’s performance in the corner 
sequence strategy).  
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Table 7.4. Descriptive statistics for the evaluation of arguer’s performance in each strategic sequence by younger children (8- years of age) 
 corner vs. rebuttal case vs. block rebuttal vs. case  block vs. rebuttal corner  vs. block case vs. corner  
 
corner 
 
rebuttal 
 
case 
 
block 
 
rebuttal 
 
case 
 
block rebuttal corner block case corner 
Mean 3.20 3.87 3.80 3.60 3.44 3.24 3.60 3.31 3.21 3.60 3.18 3.34 
Std.dev. 1.17 1.02 1.14 1.21 1.36 1.32 1.21 1.24 1.34 1.26 1.40 1.36 
Median 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 
Range 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Mode 4 4 5 3a 4 3 4 3 3 4 2a 4 
Note: a multiple modes exist; therefore the smallest value is reported.  
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Table 7.5. Descriptive statistics for the evaluation of arguer’s performance in each strategic sequence by older children (11- years of age) 
 corner vs. rebuttal case vs. block rebuttal vs. case  block vs. rebuttal corner vs. block case vs. corner  
 
corner 
 
rebuttal 
 
case 
 
block 
 
rebuttal 
 
case 
 
block rebuttal corner block case corner 
Mean 3.00 3.70 3.25 3.43 3.65 3.05 3.68 3.58 3.05 3.83 3.40 3.10 
Std.dev. 1.06 .97 .93 .87 .86 .82 .94 .59 1.18 .93 .90 .98 
Median 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 4.00 3.00 4.00 3.00 3.00 
Range 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 4 
Mode 2 4 3 3a 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 3 
Note: a multiple modes exist; therefore the smallest value is reported.  
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Children’s justifications for the evaluation scores of the arguers 
The next part of the questionnaire included an item to assess the reason that best 
explained children’s evaluation scores in the previous question. Children were asked: 
“If you had to choose, which thing on the list would you pick as the most important 
thing to explain your previous answer?” The following options were given: (1) The 
inventor had the best arguments, (2) The opponent had the best arguments, (3) Both 
inventor and opponent had good arguments, and (4) I do not know.  
First, age differences in children’s chosen reasons were examined using multiple 
two-way tests. The percentage of participants who selected each category is reported in 
the tables below. Table 7.6 provides the data for 8- year old children and Table 7.7 
reports the data for 11- year old children.  
Results showed an association between children’s justifications for the ratings 
given to the case sequence strategy (in the pair rebuttal versus case sequence) and age 
group: χ2 (3, N = 85) = 26.27, p < .001, Φ = .56 (Pearson’s chi-square). Specifically, the 
majority (67.7%) of 11- year old children said that “The opponent had the best 
arguments”, whereas the minority (only 13.3%) of 8- year old children chose this reason 
to justify their scores. There was also an association between children’s age and their 
justifications in evaluating the corner sequence strategy, χ2 (3, N = 83) = 8.11, p < .001, 
Φ = .31 (Pearson’s chi-square), and the block strategy, χ2 (3, N = 83) = 9.05, p < .001, Φ 
= .35 (Pearson’s chi-square). In the corner sequence strategy, 40% of 11-year old 
children indicated that the “Opponent had the best arguments, whereas the younger age 
group (8- years) did not agree with any particular reason, falling into all four categories. 
Moreover, for the block strategy, the majority of 11- year old children said that “The 
inventor had the best arguments”, whereas 8- year old children gave again answers that 
fell into all categories, for example with 34.9% of children choosing the category “I do 
not know”. For the other strategies in the remaining pairs, there was no association 
between children’s choices to justify the previous evaluation scores and their age. 
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Table 7.6. Percentages of children’s justifications for their judgements at 8- years (year 4) 
 corner vs. 
rebuttal 
case  vs. 
block 
rebuttal vs. 
case 
block vs. 
rebuttal 
corner vs. 
block 
case  vs. 
corner 
 corner 
 
rebuttal 
 
case 
 
block 
 
rebuttal 
 
case 
 
block rebuttal corner block case corner 
The inventor had the best arguments 
 
21.7 41.3 22.2 44.4 37.8 31.1 26.7 17.8 23.3 27.9 15.9 27.3 
The opponent had the best arguments 
 
41.3 21.7 24.4 15.6 28.9 13.3 17.8 20.0 20.9 14.0 36.4 15.9 
Both inventor and opponent had good 
arguments 
23.9 23.9 37.8 28.9 22.2 37.8 35.6 33.3 25.6 23.3 22.7 27.3 
I do not know 
 
13.0 13.0 15.6 11.1 11.1 17.8 20.0 28.9 30.2 34.9 25.0 29.5 
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Table 7.7. Percentages of children’s justifications for their judgements at 11- years (year 7) 
 corner vs. 
rebuttal 
case vs. 
block 
rebuttal vs. 
case 
block vs. 
rebuttal 
corner  vs. 
block 
case  vs. 
corner 
 corner 
 
rebuttal 
 
case 
 
block 
 
rebuttal 
 
case 
 
block rebuttal corner block case corner 
The inventor had the best arguments 
 
17.9 45.0 25.0 30.8 37.5 2.5 30.0 32.5 25.0 50.0 25.0 30.0 
The opponent had the best arguments 
 
38.5 15.0 30.0 25.6 17.5 62.5 20.0 12.5 40.0 15.0 25.0 27.5 
Both inventor and opponent had good 
arguments 
33.3 17.5 37.5 30.8 42.5 27.5 45.0 42.5 27.5 27.5 32.5 27.5 
I do not know 
 
10.3 22.5 7.5 12.8 2.5 7.5 5.0 12.5 7.5 7.5 17.5 15.0 
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Children’s preference for a particular strategy at different ages 
The previous assessments have looked at how children evaluate the strategic 
power of each sequence (or the inventor’s skill in defending an argument) separately. In 
contrast, this assessment focused on the type of strategy children choose as the most 
effective or persuasive when they are given a forced-choice response option. Children 
were asked the following question after each debate (e.g., Environment topic): “Who do 
you think should be the winner for the category Environment in this competition; the 
inventor of the recycling robot, or the inventor of the rain converter?” The advantage of 
asking children to choose one option out of two alternatives is that it would indicate a 
definitive opinion or a clear preference from one strategy over the other. The following 
analyses include: (1) results of children’s preference for a particular strategy in six 
different paired combinations, and then (2) the relationship between children’s age and 
their preferences for a strategy. 
First, a chi-square test was performed to contrast the effectiveness of several 
pairs of strategies. Results indicated a significant difference between strategies in the 
pair “rebuttal versus case sequence”, χ2 (3, N = 85) = 21.75, p < .001. More specifically, 
more children chose rebuttal as the most effective strategy (sixty-four out of 85 
children), compared with the case sequence which, in turn, was preferred by twenty-one 
out of 85 children. There was also a significant difference between strategies in the pair 
block versus corner sequence, χ2 (1, N = 83) = 5.31, p < .005. For this pair, more 
children (fifty-two out of 83) preferred block strategy over the corner sequence strategy 
(thirty-one out of 83).  
However, no differences were found for the remaining four pairs of strategies 
(corner sequence vs. rebuttal, case-based sequence vs. block, block vs. rebuttal, and 
case-based sequence vs. corner sequence), that is, there was a fairly equal spread of 
ranks for the evaluation of the arguer’s efficiency for these strategies. Specifically, in 
the pair corner sequence versus rebuttal, forty out of 86 children preferred corner 
sequence strategy and forty-six out of 86 children preferred rebuttal strategy. In the pair 
case-based sequence versus block, thirty-eight out of 85 children chose case-based 
sequence and forty-seven out of 85 children chose block strategy. Moreover, in the pair 
block vs. rebuttal, forty-three out of 85 children chose block as the most effective 
strategy, and forty-two out of 85 children preferred rebuttal strategy. Finally, in the pair 
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case-based sequence versus corner sequence, forty out of 84 children chose the former 
strategy, and forty-four out of 84 children preferred the latter one.  
Then, age differences in children’s preferences for a particular strategy given 
two possible alternatives were analysed using a multiple two-way tests. The distribution 
of frequencies of children who selected a particular strategy in several different pairs by 
age group is displayed in Figure 7.3. There was not a significant relationship between 8-
year olds and 11-year olds and whether or not they would tend to choose a particular 
strategy. Children in both age groups were likely to prefer the same strategies. For 
example, in the pair rebuttal versus case sequence, more 8- year old and 11- year old 
children chose the rebuttal strategy rather than a case sequence strategy (see Figure 
7.3).  
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Figure 7.3. Frequencies of children’s preference for a type of strategy in several paired combinations of strategic sequences by age
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Children’s positions on several topics before and after exposure to arguments 
 The focus of this analysis was the evaluation of changes in children’s initial 
positions after listening to arguments in favour and against several scientific inventions. 
The main hypothesis here was that argumentative debates would influence children’s 
positions at different ages. A repeated measures ANOVA was performed to explore the 
relations among children’s age group and their evaluation of eight different scientific 
inventions. This statistical test was chosen because there were several scores repeated in 
two conditions, and these scores were ordinal in nature (Howitt & Cramer, 2008). The 
first factor was the between-subjects factor of age group, with two levels (8- and 11-
years), and the second factor was the within-subjects factor of initial and final 
evaluation of the strength of different inventions, operationalised on a 5-point scale. The 
following analysis details: (1) the main effect of differences in children’s positions 
before and after visualisation of debates; (2) the effect of age group on children’s 
positions; and then (3) the results of the interaction effect between age and differences 
on children’s positions before and after they listened to the debates.  
 First, the within subject factor of differences in children’s initial and final 
positions (N = 127) for each invention were explored. Results showed a statistically 
significant main effect of this factor for the recycling robot, F (1,125) = 18.03, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .13. More specifically, children’s initial ratings for the recycling robot 
invention were higher (M = 4.06) after children listened to the arguments in favour and 
against this invention (M = 3.67). There was also a statistically significant main effect 
of differences in children’s positions before and after the video presentation for the rain 
converter, F (1,125) = 11.72, p < .001, partial η2 = .09. Again, children’s initial ratings 
for the rain converter were higher (M = 3.76) after children listened to the arguments in 
favour and against this invention (M = 3.37). For the flying car invention, there were 
also significant changes in children’s initial and final positions, F (1,124) = 8.18, p < 
.005, partial η2 = .06. For this invention, ratings of strength also decreased from the 
initial (M = 3.80) to the final evaluation (M = 3.60). There was also a statistically 
significant main effect of this factor for the clever hat, F (1,125) = 5.12, p < .005, partial 
η
2
 = .04. Once more, children’s ratings of strength for this evaluation decreased slightly 
from the initial (M = 3.65) to the final evaluation (M = 3.36). In conclusion, there were 
moderate changes of children’s positions before and after exposure to arguments for 
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four inventions: recycling robot, rain converter, flying car, and clever hat. Specifically, 
after listening to the debates related to these four inventions, children’s ratings of 
strength became less favourable (though partial Eta-squared values revealed weak 
effects). There were no significant changes in children’s initial and final positions for 
the other four inventions.  
 Secondly, the effect of the between-subjects factor of age on children’s positions 
for each invention was examined. Statistically significant differences between age 
groups appeared with respect to only the healthy ice-cream invention, F (1,125) = 4.66, 
p < .05, partial η2 = .04. Specifically, 8- year old children evaluated this invention 
slightly higher (M = 3.61), than 11- year old children (M = 3.19) in the initial 
evaluation. In conclusion, there were not significant differences in overall ratings for the 
remaining inventions between 8- year old and 11- year old children.  
 Finally, an examination of the two-way interaction between age and differences 
in children’s initial and final positions for each invention showed no statistically 
significant results. Contrary to what expected, exposure to arguments did not affect 
children’s initial evaluation of the inventions at different ages.  
7.6. Discussion 
 The present study examined the roles of age, prior opinion, and evaluation of 
argument strategy in debates. Children, aged 8- and 11- years, were asked to listen to 
two children (a supporter and an opponent) discussing topics regarding original 
scientific inventions. The supporter tried to convince the research participants that their 
ideas were good and their supporting arguments were strong; whereas the opponent 
tried to challenge the supporters’ ideas, by diminishing the strength of their arguments. 
After listening to a short sequence of dialogues comparing two argumentative strategies 
in a total of six possible pairs (e.g., rebuttal vs. block), participants were asked to (1) 
evaluate the arguers’ skill in defending their ideas, (2) choose the most persuasive 
arguer, and (3) indicate initial and final positions regarding the topics. 
 This study points to the relevance of assessing how children evaluate arguments 
presented in a dialogic form. As highlighted in the introduction of this chapter, other 
researchers in developmental psychology have also examined argumentation processes 
in social interactions, but have focused mainly on the kinds of arguments children 
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generate while interacting with their family or peers (e.g., Anderson et al., 1997; 
Chambers, 1995; Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b). Consistent with 
the literature on argument generation skill, the findings presented in this study suggest 
that the ability to evaluate arguments, in terms of its relevance and effectiveness, also 
follows a developmental trend. Results showed that older children (11-12 years) are 
better skilled than younger children (8-9 years) at recognising the role that different 
strategic sequences (corner sequence, rebuttal, block, and case-based sequence) play in 
discourse and the dynamics between arguers in pursuing the goals of argumentation.  
As predicted, 11- year olds evaluated the supporters’ performance (i.e., skill in 
arguing in favour of an invention) more favourably in rebuttals and blocks when these 
strategies were paired with corner and case-based sequences consistently across topics. 
Thus, older children were able to recognise that in rebuttals and blocks, the supporter is 
in a stronger position than the opponent, and that in case and corner sequence, the 
opponent gains advantage over the other arguer. According to Felton and Kuhn (2001), 
this is because in rebuttals and blocks a speaker is able to avoid being forced to 
undermine his or her initial position by immediately critiquing the counterarguments 
advanced by the opponent. In contrast, in corner and case-based sequences, the 
opponent directs the other’s argument with the intent to rebut it at the end, thus gaining 
advantage over the first speaker. This is most noticeable when comparing case-based 
sequence and block strategies, which are similar in form, as shown in the example 
provided below (in this example, the same invention is used to best illustrate the 
differences between case-based sequence and block. However, in videos, children saw a 
sequence of dialogues comparing two different inventions):  
 
Scenario 1: Case-based sequence 
Supporter: [argument] I am in favour of a spray for cleaning food, because it could 
prevent diseases caused by chemicals. 
Opponent: [case-?] What if chemicals get inside fruits and vegetables? 
Supporter: [clarify] Well, I think the chemicals stay on the surface of fruits and 
vegetables. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But if they do enter fruit, the spray doesn’t solve this 
problem. 
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Scenario 2: Block  
Supporter: [argument] I am in favour of a spray for cleaning food, because it could 
prevent diseases caused by chemicals. 
Opponent:  [case-?] What if chemicals get inside fruits and vegetables? 
Supporter: [counter-C] Maybe you cannot remove all chemicals, but the spray 
would definitely remove a substantial amount of surface chemicals, and 
prevent diseases. 
 
In both scenarios, an opponent introduces a hypothetical situation (“What if 
chemicals get inside fruits and vegetables?”) and asks the partner to indicate whether his 
or her invention (spray for cleaning food) will work in that case. The opponent’s intent 
is to challenge the inventor’s position in an extreme case in which the position is most 
difficult to defend. While in scenario 1, the opponent is able to point out that the 
inventor or supporter is inconsistent and that he or she will not be able to defend his or 
her position in all circumstances; in scenario 2, the inventor or supporter immediately 
counterargues the premise of the leading question posed by the opponent (“Maybe you 
cannot remove all chemicals, but the spray would definitely remove a substantial 
amount of surface chemicals, and prevent diseases”). Thus, in scenario 1 (case-based 
sequence) the inventor or supporter goes along with the opponent’s hypothetical 
situation, whereas in scenario 2 (block), the inventor or supporter anticipates the 
damaging intent of the assertion, therefore gaining advantage over the opponent.  
In contrast, the youngest group (8- years) perceived fewer differences of 
arguers’ goals in these two strategic sequences compared with older children (11- 
years). In fact, 8- year olds gave higher ratings for the arguer’s performance in the case 
sequence strategy (when it was paired with a block). This result suggests that younger 
children were less preoccupied with analysing the arguers’ different perspectives. 
Instead, it is possible that their main focus has been on the inventor’s personal 
characteristics or the invention itself, rather than the arguments advanced in the 
dialogues, as suggested by Petty and Cacioppo (1986). If so, then 8-year olds were 
likely to be more influenced by peripheral characteristics such as: the arguer they liked 
the most, or the arguer who favoured the position that they had already agreed with, or 
even the invention they preferred the most.  
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Furthermore, when children were asked to choose a reason that best justified 
these evaluation scores, 11- year old children were more likely to associate the reason 
“The inventor had the best arguments” with rebuttals and blocks, and “The opponent 
had the best arguments” with corner and case-based sequences. On the other hand, 8-
year old children tended not to agree with any particular reason and gave answers that 
fell into all categories. They were also more likely to choose the category “I do not 
know” than older children.  
In the next segment of the questionnaire, children were asked to choose the best 
inventor (or the most effective argumentative strategy underlying that invention). Here, 
results were strikingly different. No age differences were found in children’s preference 
for a particular strategy given two possible alternatives (i.e., both 8- year olds and 11-
year olds were likely to prefer the same strategies across the four topics). For example, 
as predicted earlier, in the pair rebuttal versus case-based sequence, more children 
chose rebuttal as the most effective strategy (sixty-four out of 85 children), compared 
with the case sequence which, in turn, was preferred by twenty-one out of 85 children. 
The following example illustrates this pair of strategies for the theme “Improving 
technology”: 
 
Scenario 3: Rebuttal  
Supporter: [argument] I am in favour of a flying car, because it would be quick to 
go to a distant place. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But we already have aeroplanes, and they are quick too. 
Supporter: [counter-C] But we cannot use aeroplanes on a daily basis. 
 
Scenario 4: Case-based sequence 
Supporter: [argument] I am in favour of a translation telephone, because it would 
improve communication between people of different cultures who speak 
different languages. 
Opponent: [case-?] Let’s say you work with people from different countries. Would 
you use the translator to call them every day? 
Supporter: [clarify] Yes, in that case you can use the translator.  
Opponent: [counter-C] But long calls could be very expensive. 
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As illustrated above, in scenario 3 (rebuttal), the inventor or supporter of the 
flying car is able to reduce the force of the opponent’s counterargument (“But we 
already have aeroplanes and they are quick too”). This is done by critiquing the 
previous counterargument (“But we cannot use aeroplanes on a daily basis”), thereby 
restoring force to the original argument. In scenario 4 (case-based sequence), as 
explained earlier, the opponent leads the inventor or supporter in a line of reasoning. 
The opponent presents a case-based question about the practical issues of using a 
translation telephone: “Let’s say you work with people from different countries. Would 
you use the translator to call them every day?”, then elicits a response and points out 
that the inventor or supporter is inconsistent: “But long calls could be very expensive”.  
Based on the results of this particular example, one could argue that children 
said that the inventor in scenario 3 (rebuttal) was more persuasive than the inventor in 
scenario 4 (case-based sequence), because they had a preference for the flying car over 
the translation telephone. However, it is important to remember that this issue was 
controlled by counterbalancing all items. For instance, one group of children were 
shown a video presenting a comparison between a rebuttal (with arguments about the 
flying car) and a case-based sequence (with arguments about the translation telephone). 
The other group was shown an identical video presenting the same pair of strategies, but 
with the content reversed (a rebuttal with the arguments related to the translation 
telephone versus a case-based sequence with arguments about the flying car).  
Results also showed that in the pair block versus corner sequence, more children 
(fifty-two out of 83) preferred block strategy over the corner sequence strategy (thirty-
one out of 83). An example of this pair of strategies (related to the theme “protecting the 
environment”) is provided below: 
 
Scenario 5: Block  
Supporter: [argument] I am in favour of a recycling robot, because it would keep 
cities clean. 
Opponent:  [case-?] Let’s say we are in a big city that gets very dirty every day. 
Would we have to buy lots of robots to keep the city clean? 
Supporter: [counter-C] Maybe not. Robots last long and they can work several times 
a day. A few robots would be enough to keep large cities clean. 
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Scenario 6: Corner sequence 
Supporter: [argument] I am in favour of a rain converter, because it is the cheapest 
source of water. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] So, you think people would not have to buy fresh water 
anymore? 
Supporter: [clarify] Exactly, this would be the cheapest alternative source of water 
because rain is free. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But people would still have to buy water, because there 
might not be enough rain. 
 
In scenario 5 (block), the inventor or supporter avoids being forced to undermine 
his or her position by immediately counterarguing the premise of the case-question 
posed by the opponent: “Maybe not. Robots last long and they can work several times a 
day. A few robots would be enough to keep large cities clean”. In scenario 6 (corner 
sequence), the opponent asks the inventor or supporter to clarify his or her position: 
“So, you think people would not have to buy fresh water anymore?” The opponent’s 
goal is to elicit a commitment from the inventor or supporter that the opponent is ready 
to critique. Thus, the opponent corners the supporter in a weak position.  
However, no differences were found for the remaining four pairs of strategies 
(corner sequence vs. rebuttal, case-based sequence vs. block, block vs. rebuttal, and 
case-based sequence vs. corner sequence). In other words, there was a fairly equal 
spread of ranks for the evaluation of the arguer’s effectiveness for these strategies. Does 
this result mean that children were not aware of the arguers’ goals and strategies and, 
thus, were choosing the best arguers randomly? A closer inspection of the analysis of 
each pair suggests that this may not be the case, and two alternative explanations are 
advanced.  
The first alternative explanation is that children had difficulty choosing one of 
the two when they were paired, because some strategies are equal in terms of strategic 
power. In terms of the inventor’s performance, block and rebuttal are both strategically 
powerful. In both strategies, the arguer favouring the invention is able to respond to the 
challenges of the opponent, thereby restoring the force of the original argument. In 
contrast, for both case-based sequence and corner sequence, the inventor is in an 
untenable or weak position, because the opponent directed his or her arguments. Thus, 
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even though children might have been aware of the arguers’ goals in these strategies, for 
these particular pairs, there would make no difference choosing one strategy over 
another.  
On the other hand, the arguers’ performance in the other two pairs (corner 
sequence vs. rebuttal and case-based sequence vs. block) is clearly distinct, and yet, 
children did not show a preference for any particular strategy. Hence, the second 
alternative account is that children might have been persuaded by some arguments more 
than others. If so, rather than focusing on the overall strategy and following the line of 
reasoning, it is possible that children evaluated the arguers’ skill based on a single 
argument, delivered either by the supporter or the opponent. For instance, in a rebuttal 
(see below an example), both supporter and opponent contribute with valid 
counterarguments. Although the supporter manages to rebut the opponent’s critique, 
this does not guarantee that children consider the supporter’s reply to be persuasive. It is 
possible that children have agreed more with the opponent’s counterargument (“But 
people don’t know what they are going to lose in advance”) rather than the response the 
supporter gave in his or her defence (“But if you’re always losing the same item, you 
can use the locator to prevent losing it again”). 
 
Scenario 7: Rebuttal  
Supporter: [argument] I am in favour of a locator for lost things, because it can find 
misplaced or lost things quickly. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But people don’t know what they are going to lose in 
advance. 
Supporter: [counter-C] But if you’re always losing the same item, you can use the 
locator to prevent losing it again. 
 
Indeed, when children were asked to choose a reason that best explained their 
evaluation scores of the arguers’ performance in the pair rebuttal versus block, the 
reason “Both inventor and opponent had strong arguments” received the highest 
percentage for both rebuttal and block strategies. Specifically, 45% of 11- year old 
children agreed that both arguers had strong arguments in the block strategy, and 43% 
of older children also regarded both arguers to have strong arguments in the rebuttal 
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strategy. Moreover, 36% of 8-year olds also choose this reason for explaining their 
evaluation scores in the block strategy, and 34% did the same for the rebuttal strategy.  
Overall, these results suggest that children do have a basic understanding of the 
goals in argumentation, but they also indicate that the dynamics between arguers in a 
dialogue are not linear or simple to uncover.  
 The final hypothesis in this study predicted that children would be influenced to 
revaluate their positions after exposure to arguments. Results showed that exposure to 
arguments, through the presentation of a series of debates, influenced children’s ratings 
of the strength of some inventions. There were changes in children’s initial and final 
positions for four (out of eight) inventions: recycling robot, rain converter, flying car, 
and clever hat. Specifically, after listening to the pros and cons for each invention in 
video-recorded dialogues, children’s ratings of the strength of inventions decreased 
significantly. This result suggests that other forms of cognitive engagement, and in 
particular in a non-interactive condition, may also lead children to reconsider their 
original positions, as also shown by Staudinger and Baltes (1996).  
7.6.1. Limitations 
There are some limitations concerning the measures employed in the present 
study. For instance, the only measure used to evaluate children’s points of view was 
based on children’s reported opinion in initial and final assessments. While the results 
suggest that exposure to mixed evidence led children’s to reconsider their original 
positions, it is unclear how exactly exposure to arguments affected their views and also 
the thinking underlying those views.  
In order to find out whether exposure to arguments in a non-interactive 
experimental condition improved children’s knowledge and arguments underlying their 
views on the topics, it would have been interesting to assess the outcome variable 
“quality of thinking” by asking participants to justify their positions before and after 
video presentation. For example, Lao and Kuhn (2002) examined the efficacy of 
different forms of cognitive engagement on the student’s thinking underlying attitudes 
toward capital punishment. Participants in three interactive conditions engaged in 
dyadic discussions of the topic with a series of peers over six sessions. The conditions 
differed as to whether the dyads were composed of peers who (a) shared the 
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participant’s pro or con opinion, (b) opposed the participant’s opinion, and (c) were 
equally divided between both types. In a non-interactive condition, students listened to 
audiotapes of other students’ dialogues. In an assessment six weeks later, Lao and Kuhn 
(2002) found that participants in the interactive condition, but not the non-interactive 
condition, showed improvement of quality of thinking about the topic (e.g., generation 
of more reasons and two-sided arguments). Moreover, only those participants who 
engaged in the agreement and mixed condition (but not the disagreement condition) 
showed these improvements. Nevertheless, Lao and Kuhn’s study (2002), along with 
other studies in attitude research, differ from the present study in several aspects. These 
include, as shown in Table 7.8, the nature of the topics discussed, the focus of the study, 
the age of participants, and the experimental conditions.  
Table 7.8. Comparison between the present study and similar work by Lao and Kuhn 
(2002) 
 The present study Similar research  
(Lao & Kuhn, 2002) 
Topic • Opinions about common 
social issues 
• Attitudes on capital 
punishment 
Focus • Opinion change • Attitude development 
 
Age of 
participants 
• 8 to 12 year old children • College students (around 20 
years of age) 
Experimental 
conditions 
• Non-interactive 
condition only 
• Comparison between 
interactive and non-
interactive conditions 
 
Although it would have been of interest to assess how children’s views changed 
after exposure to argumentative dialogues, adding the variable “quality of thinking” 
would have led to further difficulties with data collection. As highlighted in the 
methodology chapter (Chapter Three), conducting studies with children in school 
settings poses numerous challenges. For example, there are the logistics of lessons and 
breaks to cope with, and therefore, limited time to interview children on an individual 
basis or to schedule follow-up assessments. In addition, a longer assessment (including 
video presentation and individual or group discussion of the content) would have made 
teachers and parents reluctant to let their children participate in the study. 
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Findings of the present study suggested age-related differences in children’s 
ability to recognise and evaluate goals and strategies used by arguers in recorded 
dialogues. Compared with 11-year olds, younger children (8 years) showed less 
awareness and understanding of the dynamics involved in argumentation. However, 
interpretations of these findings include a number of cognitive factors. For instance, 
children’s lack of knowledge regarding the topics and arguments discussed, their 
potential difficulty with language used in the videos and wording of the questions in the 
survey, their limited ability to distinguish sources of knowledge (i.e., children featuring 
in the videos) may have led to confusion in recall (“who said what?”). There are also 
some social factors to account for, such as the difficulty in understanding the 
researcher’s questions, including the purpose of repeated questions. Although not 
completely overcome, some of these issues were addressed in the pilot stage and during 
the design of experimental conditions. These procedures are discussed in the next 
section.  
7.6.2. Implications  
 A strength of this study is the good correspondence of the methodology to real 
interactive situations. Firstly, the stimuli used in this study (videos of children debating 
a topic) attempted to simulate, as accurately as possible, real dialogues between 
children. Secondly, the topic of discussion (original inventions for a science 
competition) was closely linked to activities that children normally take part in school, 
and concerned an evaluation task which participants found stimulating, realistic and 
motivating. Thirdly, the discussions included arguments that were carefully selected in 
the pilot stage. Moreover, video-recorded dialogues included the discussion of four 
different topics (related to Environment, Technology, Lifestyle and Health) and a total 
of eight subtopics (which included scientific inventions regarding the four main topics). 
The order of presentation of strategies and inventions within dialogues were randomised 
across groups of participants. In addition, children featuring in the videos were of a 
similar age of the research participants and included boys and girls. The role they 
played in a dyad (as either a supporter or an opponent) was also counterbalanced across 
topics.  
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 The focus of the present research was on children’s perceived effectiveness or 
persuasiveness of four types of argumentative strategies (rebuttal, case-based sequence, 
corner sequence, and block) deployed in dialogues. Study Two (Chapter Five) showed 
that 5 to 11 year old children generate these strategies (which are typically found in 
adults’ discourse) infrequently and developmental differences were found only with 
respect to the use of rebuttal. Other studies (e.g., Leitão, 2000, 2003) have also found 
that successful argumentative interactions adhere to a specific pattern involving a claim, 
a responsive counter-claim, and an integrative reply that incorporates reply that 
incorporates the previous ideas.  
However, the results discussed in this study suggest that children exhibit a basic 
understanding of more complex strategies, such as cornering a speaker in a weaker 
position, or proposing a hypothetical scenario or situation in which the speaker’s 
argument might not be applied. In the future, it will be necessary to confirm this 
conclusion by using samples which are more numerous, and by employing more direct 
measures. This conclusion, subject to further verification, could be of some interest also 
for its practical implications in learning and education. For instance, students would 
benefit from intervention programs that allow them to learn and incorporate these 
elements in argumentative discussions with their peers. This is further discussed in the 
final chapter of this thesis (Chapter Eight).  
In conclusion, the study of children’s evaluation of arguments and discourse 
strategies provides another domain in which to study the development of argument 
skills. The present study points to the need for further research that will bridge studies 
of dialogic argumentation, cognitive engagement, persuasion and attitude change from a 
developmental perspective to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how 
argumentative skills develop with age. 
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Chapter Eight - Conclusion  
8.1. Summary 
This thesis described five interlinked studies that systematically investigated 
children’s argumentative skills at different ages. The first study charted age differences 
in children’s (5-, 8-, and 11-years) ability to generate arguments in response to socio-
moral questions. Semi-structured interviews were used to explore the specific elements 
that children generate at different ages. Further, this study examined whether 
engagement in peer group discussions on similar topics led to subsequent improvement 
in children’s individual use of sophisticated argument elements (e.g., two-sided 
arguments) compared to a control group who did not engage in group discussion.  
The second study identified the argumentative strategies that children, in the 
three age groups, deployed in group discussions. Evaluation of argumentative discourse 
skills in these series of discussions was based on the assessment scheme developed by 
Felton and Kuhn (2001) that assessed similar skills in adolescents and adults. The 
present research is the first of its kind to use this assessment to investigate 
argumentative discourse skills at such young age.  
Findings revealed that older children (8-9, and 11-12 years) produced arguments 
that contained more justifications and arguments that addressed alternative perspectives 
than younger children (5-6 years) in face-to-face interviews (Study One). Moreover, the 
oldest age group (11- year olds) intervened more in group discussions, not only in 
constructing their own arguments, but also in challenging and critiquing opposing 
arguments generated by the other speakers (Study Two). Increasing construction of 
stronger types of arguments suggested that older children were more aware of the 
others’ perspectives and arguments. Thus, the next three studies focused on children’s 
evaluative (or meta-level) skills in argumentation. Although generation and evaluation 
skills in argumentation are closely connected, some researchers have investigated these 
two components of argumentation in separate studies (e.g., Goldstein, Crowell, & Kuhn, 
2009; Leitão, 2003).  
Two studies examined children’s ability to appreciate and evaluate arguments 
using computer-based tasks. In particular, Study Three examined how 8- year olds and 
11- year olds differ in terms of their understanding and evaluation of argument strength, 
and how children’s prior opinions on a topic influence their judgements of strong or 
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weak arguments. Study Four examined how 8- year olds and 11- year olds evaluate the 
effectiveness or persuasiveness of different types of argument when the task goal is to 
influence arguers’ points of view. The fifth and last study complemented this previous 
line of research by focusing on children’s argument evaluative skills in real social 
interactions. More specifically, Study Five focused on children’s ability to understand 
and evaluate goal-directed arguments and strategies employed in video-recorded 
argumentative dialogues. 
Having presented evidence from this series of studies and having discussed each 
study alongside the relevant literature within each chapter, this final chapter provides a 
summary and a discussion of the main findings, outlines the strengths and limitations of 
this research, addresses the main theoretical implications of this research, and outlines 
areas for future research.  
8.2. Discussion of the main research findings 
8.2.1. The argument generation studies 
In Study One (Chapter Four), children, aged 5-, 8-, and 11- years, engaged in 
interviewer dialogue and in peer group discussions. The first objective of this study was 
to identify age differences in the types of argument children generate when asked to talk 
about socio-moral issues. The literature review revealed that most research on children’s 
argumentation has focused on spontaneous generation of arguments, either in family 
interactions (e.g., Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b) or peer 
interactions (e.g., Anderson et al., 1997). However, the study of spontaneous 
argumentative discourse is constrained by quality and type of evidence offered by the 
arguers. Indeed, sophisticated reasoning may be used only if necessary or demanded in 
response of a question or a counterargument (Stein & Miller, 1993a). Rather than 
relying on the results obtained on the basis of children’s spontaneous interactions, this 
study examined children’s ability to construct arguments under more structured 
circumstances. The use of a structured interview (adapted from Kuhn, 1991) allowed a 
better examination of the responses across participants at different ages. The topics were 
of a socio-moral nature (lying to others, and sharing things with others). In peer groups, 
children were asked to discuss three different socio-moral topics in response to a 
stimulus story (drawn from children’s story books, Fisher, 1996, 1999). Using folktales 
and fables to challenge children to think about honesty, friendship, right and wrong, and 
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other questions of ethics is a common activity in classrooms. Moreover, it allowed a 
better examination of assessing children’s reasoning regarding simple, everyday topics, 
rather than complex academic tasks. 
The second objective of this study was to examine the contribution of peer group 
discussions to improvement of individual arguments. As highlighted in the literature 
review (Chapter Two), the role that peer interaction plays on children’s ability to 
articulate their positions and reasons (i.e., to argue effectively) remains unclear. Thus, 
this association needed to be determined.  
As predicted, results revealed that older children (11- years) performed best at 
constructing and responding  to arguments, and the 8- year old children performed 
better than the youngest children (5- years). A particularly relevant result was that all 
participants (even the youngest children) were able to construct a full argument (a 
statement supported by at least one reason), confirming earlier findings that suggest that 
the ability to understand and produce basic arguments emerges relatively early in 
development (e.g., Anderson et al, 1997; Orsolini, 1993; Orsolini & Pontecorvo, 1992; 
Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b).  
Analysis of age differences, across the three age groups, also revealed 
significant changes in argument quality, demonstrated by the evolution from one-sided 
to two-sided arguments with age at the baseline condition, in response to the question 
“Should people share their things with others or keep what they like for themselves?”, 
the youngest children produce simple arguments addressing their own perspective (e.g., 
“I think people should share their things with their friends, because it’s the a kind thing 
to do”, boy, 5- years old). As children get older, their responses become more elaborate 
and they often produce arguments addressing alternative perspectives, even when they 
are not prompted to do so (e.g., “I think that is best to share your things with others, for 
example sharing books with your friends, or sharing your food with poor people. It is 
good to share, because you are helping your friends or people in need, and when you are 
kind to someone, they will return the favour to you. But some things are not meant to be 
shared”, girl, 11 years old). In this example, the child provides reasons in favour of her 
position and also addresses an alternative position, but does not give justification for the 
latter. However, when asked to provide opposing reasons, most 8- year olds and 11- 
year olds are able to do it. In the last example, the child completes her line of reasoning 
by saying “I think it is o.k. not to share things that are special or precious to you, 
because other people may lose or steal them from you. I also think that some things are 
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not meant to say because they can hurt other people’s feelings”. Even 5- year olds were 
able to produce some counterarguments, although the average number was significantly 
lower compared with the average number of counterarguments produced by older 
children. Although there were no age differences in the ability to generate 
counterarguments by children aged 8-9 and 11-12 years, the oldest children produced a 
higher number and stronger opposing reasons (e.g., consequential or rule-based types) 
than 8- year olds. At the end of this section, a summary of the main results of this study 
is provided in Table 8.1.  
Further, the first study (Chapter Four) examined the contribution of peer group 
discussions over a period of three days on the improvement of individual arguments 
generated by children. Results showed an important interaction between condition 
(group discussion vs. individual reflection) and age group in argument generation at 
pre- and posttest. Most notably, 8- year olds who engaged in peer discussions used more 
two-sided arguments at posttest, while their peers in the control group did not. 
However, for the youngest and oldest age groups, the use of two-sided arguments 
increased in both discussion and reflection (experimental and control) groups. This 
result suggests that peer group discussions are particularly beneficial for children at 8 
years. At this age, children may not fully grasp the importance of considering that an 
argument may have two sides. However, discussion and conversation prompts children 
to consider this possibility. Moreover, group discussion appears to be an effective way 
to foster rebuttal skill, mainly at 8 years (see Table 8.1). 
This suggestion is leant further support by the analysis conducted in Study Two 
(Chapter Five) of the arguments and strategies used by children in group discussions. 
The pattern of use of several different argument elements (clarifications, advance 
statements, counterarguments) and the rebuttal strategy are all consistent with idea that 
at 11 years children have acquired many important argument skills. For example, 11-
year-olds deploy complex argument strategies when exploring and evaluating the 
reasons for one’s own and other’s positions or perspectives in a discussion. The analysis 
of group discussions points to a key shift between 8 and 11 years in terms of the 
mastery of many important argument skills. Again, at 8 years, children may only be 
beginning to appreciate and benefit from discussions as opportunities to exchange 
information about different perspectives (Leman & Duveen, 1996) (see again Table 
8.1). 
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This previous set of studies showed developmental differences in children’s 
ability to generate arguments taking into account others’ perspectives. The next two 
studies (Chapter Six) were designed to further explore whether children would show a 
corresponding developmental change in the appreciation and evaluation of arguments 
and counterarguments.  
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Table 8.1. Summary of the main results in terms of children’s generation of arguments at different ages 
Age differences in children’s ability to generate of arguments (N=190) 
5- year olds 8- year olds 11- year olds 
• The youngest children produced only 
the simplest form of arguments (one-
sided arguments) in the baseline 
assessment of argument skill (topic 
about sharing with others) 
• Most 8- year olds produced one-sided 
arguments in the baseline condition. 
Only 14% constructed two-sided 
arguments. 
 
• The oldest children were the most skilled 
at producing two-sided arguments. 58% of 
11-year olds addressed alternative 
perspectives and opposing reasons on the 
baseline topic 
• Half of the participants produced 
counterarguments (53%) and rebuttals 
(44%)  in the baseline condition  
• Most 8- year olds were skilled at 
generating counterarguments (84%) and 
rebutting the previous line of reasoning 
(73%) in the baseline condition 
• They were the best skilled at generating 
counterarguments (93% ) and rebuttals 
(86%) in the baseline condition 
• Gave fewer reasons and opposing 
reasons to justify their positions than 
the older children in the baseline 
condition 
• Gave more reasons to support their 
ideas than 5- year olds, but were less 
skilled at giving opposing reasons (to 
strength the other’s position) than 11-
year olds in the baseline condition 
• Produced the highest number of reasons 
and the most complex type of reasons 
(abstract). They were also better skilled at 
giving strong opposing reasons (e.g., 
consequential, rule-based type) than 
younger children 
• 5- year old children who engaged in 
both conditions (discussion and 
reflection) showed an increased use of 
two-sided arguments 
• 8- year olds benefited from group 
discussions. Children who engaged in 
peer group discussions (experimental 
group) produced more two-sided 
arguments and rebuttals at posttest than 
the control group 
• 11- year old children who engaged in both 
conditions (discussion and reflection) 
showed an increased use of two-sided 
arguments. However, for this age group, 
the posttest increases were from a high 
baseline 
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Age differences in children’s ability to generate of arguments (N=190) 
5- year olds 8- year olds 11- year olds 
• In group discussions (Study Two), 5-
year olds were able to communicate 
effectively their ideas, but were more 
preoccupied in expressing their own 
opinions, rather than addressing the 
other speakers’ perspectives and 
arguments.  
• In group discussions (Study Two), 8-
year olds spent more time adding to 
their co-discussants’ statements rather 
than elaborating, responding or 
criticising the other speakers’ 
arguments. 
• In group discussions (Study Two), 11- 
year olds showed the most advanced 
argumentative discourse skills, using often 
argument elements (clarifications, advance 
statements, counterarguments) and 
strategies (rebuttals) 
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8.2.2. The argument evaluation studies 
Studies Three and Four (Chapter Six) assessed age differences in argument 
evaluative skills between 8- year olds and 11- year olds using computer-based tasks. 
The reason for choosing these two age groups was the interest in studying children for 
whom the handling of opposing positions and counterarguments seems to be critical, as 
shown in the first studies (Chapters Four and Five) and also in previous research on 
argumentative writing (e.g., Golder & Coirier, 1994, 1996; Leitão, 2003).  
In particular, Study Three examined how 8- year-old and 11- year old children 
rated the strength of different arguments on a 5-point scale. Arguments were presented 
randomly in a computer screen and they varied in content (different reasons) and 
structure (number of reasons; inclusion of alternative views). Arguments either 
supported or opposed of four different statements: (1) Children should wear school 
uniforms; (2) Children should have a TV in their bedrooms; (3) School days should be 
two hours shorter than they are now; and (4) Children should get pocket money.  
Results revealed both similarities and differences in terms of children’s ratings 
of strength of arguments in the two age groups. First, regarding similarities between age 
groups, both 8- year olds and 11- year olds evaluated arguments based on their 
agreement with the statements. That is, when children had a favourable position on an 
issue, they evaluated arguments in favour of that statement as stronger. This finding is 
consistent with previous literature (e.g., Nussbaum & Kardash, 2005).  
Moreover, children in both age groups did not regard arguments with greater 
number of reasons to be stronger, contrary to what was expected. In three out of four 
topics, both 8- year olds and 11- year olds rated multiple and single arguments as 
equally strong. However, this result is in accordance with a previous study conducted by 
Leitão (2003) that showed that children of a similar age selected arguments to be 
included in a text according to two criteria: (a) their agreement with the reasons 
included in the argument being evaluated, and (b) the restriction or modulation of an 
argument, that is, their acceptance of part of the argument content. In this respect, 
children in the present study may have agreed with one of the reasons stated in the 
argument, but not the other reason. Indeed, the content analysis revealed that children 
favoured some reasons more than others for the topic related to whether children should 
receive pocket money and the topic about children wearing school uniforms.  
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However, age differences were found concerning how children evaluate 
arguments and counterarguments. As predicted, 11- year old children gave higher scores 
to counterarguments than 8- year old children across most topics (TV in bedrooms, 
school days, and pocket money). This result suggests that younger children showed less 
appreciation for alternative arguments, an age-related pattern that parallels one found in 
the discourse of 8- year olds examined in Study Two (Chapter Five). At the end of this 
section, Table 8.2 summarises these findings. 
Study Four (also described in Chapter Six) investigated how children evaluated 
arguments and counterarguments when the task goal was to persuade a hypothetical 
arguer to adopt a different position. This study used a similar computer-based task and 
the same topics deployed in the previous study, but focused on the pragmatic function 
of arguments (i.e., arguments’ effectiveness).  
As expected, results revealed that 8- year olds selected either single or multiple 
arguments over counterarguments to change the characters’ views. This was consistent 
across all three topics. The most striking finding was that older children (11-12 years) 
also did not regard counterarguments to be more persuasive compared to other types of 
argument. Although 11- year olds may regard counterarguments as a strong type of 
argument when standing alone (as found in Study Three), they seem to adopt different 
evaluation criteria when the task involves a discourse or communicative goal. That is, 
both 8- year olds and 11- year olds do not regard arguments containing opposing 
elements as a valuable resource for making a position more acceptable and persuading 
arguers to change their views.  
This finding can be interpreted in light of previous research on argumentative 
writing (Coirier, 1996; Ferretti, Lewis, Andrews-Weckerly, 2009; Ferretti, MacArthur, 
Dowdy, 2000; Leitão 2000, 2003; Nussbaum & Kardash, 2005), that has documented 
that students do not include alternative views and counterarguments when writing 
argumentative essays to persuade an audience to accept a point of view. The fourth 
study also revealed that 11- year old children, but not younger children, regard 
arguments with greater number of reasons as the most persuasive type of argument, 
consistently across topics (see Table 8.2).  
Finally, the fifth study complemented the previous line of research by focusing 
on children’s argument evaluation skills in real social interactions. More specifically, 
this final study (Chapter Seven) focused on children’s ability to appreciate and evaluate 
goal-directed arguments and strategies employed in video-recorded argumentative 
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dialogues. These videos were recorded by 9-10 year olds and they attempted to simulate 
real dialogues between children.  
Participants, aged 8 and 11 years, were asked to listen to two children (a 
supporter and an opponent) discussing topics regarding original scientific inventions. 
The supporter tried to convince the research participants that their ideas were good and 
their supporting arguments were strong, whereas the opponent tried to challenge the 
supporters’ ideas, by diminishing the strength of their arguments. After listening to a 
short sequence of dialogues comparing two argumentative strategies in a total of six 
possible pairs (e.g., rebuttal vs. block), participants were asked to (1) evaluate the 
arguers’ skill in defending their ideas, (2) choose the most persuasive arguer, and (3) 
indicate initial and final positions regarding the topics. 
The strategic sequences presented in the video-recorded dialogues were drawn 
from Felton and Kuhn’s coding scheme of argumentative strategies (2001), but were 
adapted to the new topic to fit children’s level of knowledge and understanding. The 
same coding scheme was applied in Study Two (Chapter Five), to explore whether 
children at different ages were able to generate these strategies in discussion with their 
peers. As described earlier, results showed that children’s discourse at all ages was more 
expository than strategic. In fact, strategic discourse was observed infrequently in peer 
discussions. Age differences were only found in the use of rebuttals, which was used 
more frequently by older children (11- year olds).  
The question posed in Study Five was whether these results (detailed in Study 
Two, Chapter Five) reflect children’s difficulty in constructing effective argumentative 
strategies, or children’s lack of understanding of the goals of argumentative discourse. If 
children do not understand the arguer’s goals and intentions that argumentation implies, 
then they may find unnecessary to behave strategically. Furthermore, this last study 
complemented the previous set of studies on argument evaluation skills by further 
exploring how children evaluate others arguers’ ability to produce persuasive 
arguments.  
Consistent with the literature on argument generation skill, the findings 
presented in this study suggest that the ability to evaluate arguments, in terms of its 
relevance and effectiveness, also follows a developmental trend. Results revealed that 
older children (11-12 years) were better skilled than younger children (8-9 years) at 
recognising the role that different strategic sequences (corner sequence, rebuttal, block, 
and case-based sequence) play in discourse and the dynamics between arguers in 
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pursuing the goals of argumentation. In particular, older children’s ratings of the 
arguers’ performance and the justifications for their decisions indicate that they 
recognised that, in some strategies (rebuttals and blocks), the supporter was in a 
stronger position than the opponent, or that in others (case and corner sequence), the 
opponent gained advantage over the other arguer.  
In contrast, the youngest group (8 years) perceived fewer differences of arguers’ 
goals. In fact, 8- year olds gave higher ratings for the arguer’s performance in the case 
sequence strategy (when it was paired with a block). This result suggests that younger 
children were less preoccupied with analysing the arguers’ different perspectives. 
Indeed, when asked to justify their decisions, 8- year olds tended not to agree with any 
particular reason and gave answers that fell into all categories. They were also more 
likely to choose the category “I do not know” than older children.  
Results suggest that younger children were more focused on the inventor’s 
personal characteristics or the invention itself, than on the arguments advanced in the 
dialogues. Thus, 8- year olds were likely to be more influenced by peripheral 
characteristics (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) such as, the arguer they liked the most, the 
arguer who favoured the position that they had already agreed with, or the invention 
they preferred the most.  
The most striking finding was that children’s preference for a particular strategy 
when two possible alternatives were given did not vary with age. That is, when asked to 
choose the best arguer (or the most effective argumentative strategy underlying the 
discussion topic), both 8- year olds and 11-year olds preferred the same strategies across 
the four topics. As predicted, children preferred strategies in which the supporter had a 
stronger performance (e.g., rebuttals over case-based sequences, and blocks over corner-
sequences). However, there were no differences for the remaining four pairs of 
strategies (corner sequence vs. rebuttal, case-based sequence vs. block, block vs. 
rebuttal, and case-based sequence vs. corner sequence), that is, there was a similar 
spread of ranks for the evaluation of the arguer’s effectiveness for these strategies.  
Taken together, these results suggest that children (even 8- year olds) have a 
basic understanding of the goals in argumentation. However, results also indicate that 
children’s evaluation of arguments, presented in a dialogic form, do not rely solely on 
the structural features of strategic sequences (i.e., how arguers take turns in a sequential 
presentation of arguments). Other factors may influence their evaluations, such as the 
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content of these argumentative strategies, and also their prior opinions on the object of 
evaluation (as also shown in Study Three).  
The final analysis of Study Five showed that children’s initial evaluations on a 
particular topic changed after listening to the arguments presented in the video-recorded 
dialogues. Specifically, after listening to the pros and cons for each invention in the 
dialogues, children’s ratings of the strength of some inventions decreased significantly. 
This result suggests that other forms of cognitive engagement (in this case, the 
evaluation of mixed evidence in a non-interactive condition) may also lead children to 
reconsider their original positions (Staudinger & Baltes, 1996).  
8.2.3. Assessing skills in generating and evaluating arguments  
The purpose of the five studies reported in this thesis has been to develop a 
means to assess children’s skill in argument generation and what is expected to be a 
parallel skill – the evaluation or appreciation of stronger arguments and superior moves 
in dyadic argumentation. 
The first set of studies explored systematic age differences in children’s ability 
to produce arguments. The first key finding was that 5-year-olds produce only simple 
forms of argument (e.g., a claim supported by only one reason). Ability to produce more 
sophisticated elements of arguments (e.g., addressing the opponents' ideas, generating 
opposing reasons) increased in 8-year-olds and the most in 11-year-olds, both 
individually and in group discussions. In analyses of children’s argumentative discourse 
with their peers, results showed that younger children engaged in exposition regarding 
their own argument more frequently than they sought clarification of the opponent's 
argument. More rarely, did they offer critiques to the opponent's argument. The second 
key finding was that engaging in an argumentation activity was particularly beneficial at 
8 years, prompting children to consider two-sided arguments and to generate more 
counterarguments in a subsequent test of individual argument skills.  
There is much evidence in the cognitive development literature of children and 
adolescents having difficulty adressing others’ arguments and producing 
counterevidence to rebut the opponents’ ideas (Leitão, 2003; Kuhn & Franklin, 2006; 
Stein & Albro, 2001). A contributor to this challenge may lie in the cognitive demands 
involved in the deep-level processing of the opponent’s argument. Children of primary 
school age may have considerable difficulty in coordinating different perspectives and 
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multiple arguments. In addition, exposition of one's own argument and negotiation of 
the mechanisms of discourse may all represent cognitive overload for the younger 
arguers.   
A third aspect of skilled argument, in addition to skill in argumentative 
discourse and in production of individual expository arguments, is skill in argument 
evaluation. The next three studies described in this thesis investigated this third 
component. A prediction made here was that evaluation skills would not simply parallel 
generation skills but would in fact precede them, a pattern that has been noted in other 
domains, such as language development and moral reasoning development: an 
individual first appreciates (and hence at least implicitly evaluates) a higher form prior 
to being able to produce it.  
In the evaluation argument tasks, children were presented with written 
arguments and were asked to evaluate their strength (Study Three) or to choose the most 
persuasive argument given two alternative statements (Study Four). This set of studies 
used a framework focusing on formal argumentation structure (see Chapter Six). The 
main objective of these tasks was to explore whether children were able to identify the 
argument components (e.g., counterargument) that they tend to omit during argument 
construction. The final argument evaluation study assessed children’s ability to 
recognise or appreciate superior argumentative strategies in video-recorded dialogues.  
This task was designed to mimic genuine argumentation. 
In the studies involving non-dialogic argument evaluation (Studies Three and Four), 
children aged eight to 11 years found it difficult to recognise superior forms of 
argument (e.g., arguments addressing alternative positions). In contrast, children’s 
evaluation of arguments depended largely on their views of agreement or disagreement 
with the initial claim and each of the proposed statements. In the case of dialogic 
argument evaluation (Study Five), similar results were found, with older children (11 
years) showing only modest superiority in appreciating stronger arguments and 
argumentative strategies over younger children (8 years).  
In this latter task, children were asked not simply to evaluate two choices on 
their own merit as arguments, but rather to evaluate them in relation to the preceding 
argument. Although a seemingly straightforward task on the surface, the cognitive 
demands it poses are in fact considerable. Children likely hold views of agreement or 
disagreement with the content of the proposed arguments. Each of these positions must 
be temporarily set aside to allow execution of the task: the evaluation of each of 
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statement with regard to its relation to the initial argument.  As in the simpler non-
dialogic evaluation tasks, a metacognitive stance is required (to enable reasoning about 
reasoning), but in the latter task in an even more complex form given the number of 
arguments involved.   
Taken together, these findings further our understanding of the argumentative 
skills (including production and evaluation skills) that children exhibit at different ages. 
The previous chapters in this thesis have suggested some of the cognitive challenges 
that argumentation tasks pose. Confirming their role and more precise nature clearly 
requires further exploration. Such investigation is warranted, given the significance of 
argument and argumentation in education and in children’s everyday thinking. Having a 
better understanding of the skills involved in argumentation and how they develop can 
contribute to its improvement.  
In the last few years, there has been a rush to design and implement inquiry 
software and argumentation tasks in schools. Yet, educators have found that the 
capabilities of the technology tools far outstrip the ability of students to engage in them 
(Kuhn, 2008). In order to develop effective teaching tools (whether technology-based or 
not), cognitive and educational researchers should further explore the nature of students’ 
argument skills.  Teachers will certainly benefit from a roadmap of the skills that are 
most important for children to develop, and why.  
Along with a number of researchers (e.g., Billig, 1995; Kuhn, 2008; Schwarz, 
2009) the work undertaken in this thesis suggests that argument skills develop not only 
as a result of maturation of language and epistemological thinking, but also as a result 
of environmental factors and learning (education, knowledge, experience). In particular, 
the first set of studies provided further evidence that engaging in dialogic argumentation 
can lead to the development of individual expository arguments of children aged eight 
to 11 years. The contribution of the present work is to show that such advancement can 
be observed not only in the arguments that children construct to back up their ideas, but 
also in the quality of argumentative discourse generated in group discussions. Most 
children in the experimental condition showed improvement in their individual 
arguments for or against moral topics, as well as advances in their argumentative 
discourse skills across sessions. As discussed in Chapter Five, a significant feature of 
this intervention is the external representation of ideas (through the prompt questions 
and discourse) that made argument-counterargument-rebuttal structure explicit. By 
engaging as well in scaffolded argumentative discussions, children gain an enhanced 
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overall sense of what an argument is (Reznitskaya et al., 2001). It is possible that with 
continued engagement and practice in argumentation across multiple topics and 
opponents, the cognitive and metacognitive demands of argument evaluation and 
generation become less challenging.  
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Table 8.2. Summary of the main results in terms of children’s evaluation of arguments at different ages 
Age differences in children’s ability to evaluate arguments 
8- year olds 11- year olds 
• Younger children (8- years) gave lower scores for the strength of 
counterarguments compared with 11- year old children in Study 
Three 
• 11- year old children rated counterarguments as a strong type of 
argument across most topics (TV in bedrooms, school days, and 
pocket money) in Study Three 
• 8- year olds also do not regard counterarguments as a persuasive or 
effective type of argument and , thus, do not select this type of 
argument to convince the characters to change their views (Study 
Four)   
• Although 11- year olds regard counterarguments to be strong when 
standing alone (Study Three), the same is not true when the task 
involves achieving the persuasion goal (Study Four). Older 
children do not select counterarguments over other types to 
persuade the characters to change their views. 
• Younger children (8- years) do not show a preference for 
arguments containing one or two reasons and select either single 
arguments or multiple arguments to achieve the persuasion goal 
(Study Four)  
• 11- year old children choose most often arguments with higher 
number of reasons (multiple arguments) to persuade hypothetical 
characters to change their views (Study Four). 
• When evaluating video-recorded dialogues of other children 
arguing (Study Five), 8-year-olds perceived the fewest differences 
between the arguers’ goals, possibly because they were more 
focused on the peripheral characteristics of the message (e.g., the 
arguer they liked the most, or the invention they preferred the 
most), rather than its content. 
• When evaluating video-recorded dialogues of other children 
(Study Five), 11- year olds were better skilled than younger ones 
at recognising the role that different strategic sequences (corner 
sequence, rebuttal, block, and case-based sequence) play in 
discourse and the dynamics between arguers in pursuing the goals 
of argumentation, as revealed by their ratings of the arguers’ 
performance in each dialogue and the justifications for their 
decisions. 
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8.3. Strengths and limitations of the present research  
8.3.1. Conducting research with children at schools 
Argumentation is a socially and culturally situated activity and, thus, it is 
essential to consider the context in which argumentation takes place (Mirza, Perret-
Clermont, Tartas, & Ionnaccone, 2009). Schools are an institutionalised setting which 
defines the units of knowledge that children should learn, and the methods to be used.  
Since the focus of formal education is on knowledge instruction, it is then 
comprehensible that most part of research on children’s argumentation has focused on 
children’s skills in arguing and learning academic concepts (e.g., Marttunen, Laurinen, 
Litosseliti, & Lund, 2005; Orsolini & Pontecorvo, 1992; Sampson & Clark, 2008). The 
present investigation contrasts with this previous line of research by using non-
academic topics. Instead, topics were related to children’s everyday life (e.g., wearing 
school uniforms or receiving pocket money) or socio-moral issues (e.g., sharing things 
with others or helping friends) and were, thus, relevant to children’s social world.  
The use of social-moral issues represents a strength of this investigation. This is 
particularly relevant for its implications in school settings, as education seldom deals 
with socio-emotional dimensions on a daily basis (Andriessen, 2009). Yet, a potential 
criticism is that using non-academic topics in the classroom may have affected 
children’s willingness to participate in argumentative discussions, as demonstrated in a 
study conducted by Dolz and Schneuwly (1998). Children may have felt that the issues 
belong to their personal or family life, in which case they did not feel they were allowed 
to discuss them in the school setting. However, it is unlikely that this has occurred, as 
children were assessed individually or in small groups, rather than in activities 
involving the all classroom. Moreover, a variety of topics was used, including not only 
moral topics, but also social and policy-related issues.  
In terms of collecting data, recruiting participants and conducting research at 
schools posed numerous challenges. As highlighted in the methodology chapter 
(Chapter Three), there were the logistics of lessons and breaks to cope with, and 
therefore, limited time to interview children on an individual basis or to schedule 
follow-up assessments. For instance, in Study Two (outlined in Chapter Five) it would 
have been of interest to conduct a delayed posttest assessment of children’s individual 
arguments. However, this would have led to further difficulties with data collection. In 
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addition, longer assessments would have made teachers and parents reluctant to let their 
children participate in the study. 
Despite the difficulties associated with recruiting students at such young age in 
schools, the studies outlined in this thesis involved large samples. Indeed, the sample 
size of each of the five studies is one of the main strengths of this research. For instance, 
Study One (Chapter Four) and Study Two (Chapter Five) involved one-hundred and 
ninety children at three different ages (5-, 8-, and 11- years), which is a large sample 
compared to those reported in other investigations that have looked at argument skills 
using a similar methodology (e.g., Felton & Kuhn, 1991; Felton, 2004)  
A possible limitation of this research was that it investigated group measures by 
taking into account the age factor rather than individual-level measures. As Goldsmith 
& Fulfs (1999) argue, group measures have less explanatory power when predicting 
individual-level variables. For instance, assessing whether individual difference 
variables correlate with children’s dispositions to engage in argumentation would have 
been of particular relevance in Study Two (Chapter Five), which explored children’s 
ability to generate and respond to arguments in argumentative discussions. As 
demonstrated in a study conducted by Lampert, Rittenhouse, and Crumbaugh (1996) 
with primary school children (aged 9-10 years), students are sometimes reluctant to 
criticise the ideas of their classmates. There could be a variety of reasons for such 
resistance, such as not valuing arguments, and concerns that criticism may disrupt 
friendship (e.g., Nussbaum & Bendixen, 2003; Stein & Albro, 2001).  
It is also important to note that the present research used young children at 
different ages recruited from twelve different primary and secondary schools in 
different locations (although all in the south of England). Whilst this helped to increase 
the reliability, validity, representativeness, generalisability and comprehensiveness of 
the findings, it presented a number of challenges both in terms of gaining consent from 
school staff and parents and the nature of the study designs. Related to this, the different 
sample characteristics, which were the result of the recruitment of students from 
different school types (community, grammar, independent schools), and located in 
different areas (Berkshire, Middlesex, Windsor and Maidenhead, Slough, and Surrey), 
may have affected comparisons between groups and the results obtained in these 
studies. Although most students were of heterogeneous ethnic (mostly European) and 
socioeconomic (mostly middle class) backgrounds, schools in the area of Slough had a 
larger ethnic mix of students than, for example, the area of Windsor and Maidenhead. 
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Moreover, schools differed regarding the students’ performance results, as reported by 
Ofsted. To date, there has been no systematic research on the effects of culture, 
educational context, and academic performance on children’s argument skills. The 
potential limitations associated with the chosen sample should be considered when 
attempting to generalise the findings beyond the study populations.  
Finally, it is important to recognise that with rare exceptions (e.g., Leitão, 2003; 
Rojas-Drummond, Mercer, & Dabrowski, 2001), most of the literature on children’s 
argumentation is drawn from British (e.g., Mercer, 2009), and U.S. samples (Felton & 
Kuhn, 2001; Kuhn, 1991; Means & Voss, 1996; Nussbaum, 2005; Stein & Albro, 2001; 
Stein & Miller, 1993a, 1993b) who were entirely English speaking. While these samples 
are not identical culturally, the study of children’s argumentation would be enriched and 
generalisability enhanced by a broader sampling of children from diverse ethnic and 
national backgrounds.  
8.3.2. Using mixed methods 
 The present research integrated a synthesis of theoretical perspectives, using a 
mixed quantitative-qualitative approach. As referred in the methodology chapter 
(Chapter Three), other researchers who studied argumentation skills have also relied on 
a mixed-methods approach (e.g., Creswell, 2002; Felton & Kuhn, 2001; Nussbaum et 
al., 2002).  It was intended that this would provide more insights into age differences in 
children’s ability to engage in argumentation processes than would have been possible 
with either method alone.  
 In the initial stage of this research, semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with children in three age groups (5-, 8-, and 11- years) to examine the specific 
argumentative elements that children generate when asked to state and justify a position 
on socio-moral topics. The major obstacle in analysing the empirical evidence in this 
study was the lack of adequate coding schemes to assess and evaluate the quality of 
children’s arguments and the cognitive skills entailed in children’s argumentative 
reasoning. In particular, counterarguments were elicited by asking children to “Imagine 
that someone disagreed with his or her opinion”, and to “Give opposing reasons that the 
hypothetical other could say to convince you that he or she is right”. Given their limited 
skills in second-order perspective taking (Kuhn, 1999b), it is possible that children, 
particularly 5-year olds may have struggled to consider the hypothetical situation in the 
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interviews. Another potential criticism is that the qualitative findings were not fed back 
to the interviewees to see whether the analysis was judged to be consistent with their 
perceptions. Despite this, the subsequent study and the quantitative studies provided 
some validation for children’s narratives.  
Using the same sample of children, group discussions were conducted to 
identify the argumentative discourse strategies that children use to convey their ideas 
and arguments effectively with their peers. The use of the transactive coding scheme 
(Felton & Kuhn, 2001) to analyse children’s utterances and argumentative strategies 
revealed difficult to apply to group interactions, as discussed in the relevant study 
chapter (Chapter Five).  
In order to extend this research it is necessary to device more reliable and 
sensitive evaluation systems to determine whether children generate progressively better 
arguments with age. Nevertheless, these two interconnected studies were important to 
gain understanding of the complex processes involved in the study of argumentation, 
and were then used to inform the development of quantitative measures for subsequent 
studies.  
The next two studies (Chapter Six) focused on argument evaluation skills and 
examined how children evaluate arguments and counterarguments considering their 
own and others’ perspectives. The major methodological advantage of these studies was 
that they involved computer-based tasks. These tasks made it feasible to quantitatively 
assess children’s evaluation of claims and reasons across multiple kinds of arguments 
and content. In addition, its simplicity made it more appropriate for children than a long 
interview or paper-pencil test formats with which oral and written argumentative skills 
have been typically assessed. As discussed in the methodology chapter (Chapter Three), 
other advantages of using computers to devise and conduct research tasks are related to 
how information is presented (Stangor, 2007). In particular, computers can randomly 
select stimuli from lists, allowing counterbalancing across research participants. 
Moreover, information can be presented in many formats, including text pictures, 
hyperlinks, etc., which makes the task more fun and interesting for children.  
A further strength of these studies was conducting a pilot study prior to the 
design of the tasks. This guaranteed that the tasks were adequate to children’s content 
knowledge. The pilot study consisted of a small-scale focus-group that was carried to 
gather information on the sort of reasons children give to justify their points of views; 
select the most suitable topics to be incorporated in the main studies, based on 
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children’s level of knowledge and the arguments they generate; and create a list of 
arguments to incorporate in the design of the main studies. The pilot stage was 
important to assure that participants had enough knowledge regarding the topics, and 
understood the wording in the questions.   
The final study (Chapter Seven) further explored the developmental differences 
in children’s argument evaluation skills that were identified in the previous studies. A 
strong point of this study was the good correspondence of the methodology to real 
interactive situations. Firstly, the stimuli used in this study (videos of children debating 
a topic) attempted to simulate, as accurately as possible, real dialogues between 
children. Secondly, the topic of discussion (original inventions for a science 
competition) was closely linked to activities that children normally take part in school, 
and concerned an evaluation task which participants found stimulating, realistic and 
motivating. In addition, qualitative research techniques were used, including surveys 
(questionnaires).  
Taken together, the importance of these three studies lies in the extension of the 
limited literature on children’s ability to understand and evaluate goal-directed 
arguments. Particularly relevant was the findings related to the criteria children at 
different ages adopt to evaluate strong (Study Three) and persuasive arguments (Studies 
Four and Five). However, in all three studies, the quantitative measures did not allow 
drawing inferences regarding the psychological processes that underlie children’s 
evaluation and selection of arguments. One of the possible ways to address this issue 
could have been to use qualitative measures. Moreover, in Study Five (outlined in 
Chapter Seven), it would have been interesting to assess how exactly children’s views 
changed after exposure to argumentative dialogues. Again, a possible way to address 
this question would be to conduct a qualitative analysis (e.g., add the variable “quality 
of thinking”). 
In order to gain insight on the conceptions or justifications children have for 
evaluating arguments, future research could explore new methodological paradigms. 
Combining more quantitative and qualitative measures is one of the possible ways to 
address the questions these studies raised. 
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8.3.3. Other methodological considerations 
Despite the frequent use of Toulmin’s model in argumentation research, some of 
the limitations of this model are worth noting. First, many researchers have argued that 
some elements of arguments, such as data, warrant, and backing are not easily 
distinguished in empirical research (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Kruiger 1987; 
Fulkerson, 1996; Stein & Albro, 2001; Stein & Bernas, 1999; Voss & van Dyke, 2001). 
As Fulkerson (1996) argues, the model is primarily an analytical tool, that is, a 
framework for analysing individual arguments. Even when the model is used for 
analysis, argument scholars themselves have difficulty identifying warrants in an 
argument or an argumentative text. Further, as Perelman (1984) points out, Toulmin 
neglected the role of the audience; his model is one of structure and not of pragmatics. 
In everyday situations, however, individuals are required not only to understand the 
logic and form of arguments, but also their contextual meaning and coherence.  
For these reasons, the present research did not rely exclusively on Toulmin’s 
model as a theoretical and methodological framework. Rather, a simplified argument 
structure was adopted, which included the following elements: claim, reasons, opposing 
claims and opposing reasons (i.e., counterarguments). In addition, this investigation was 
also based on the coding schemes developed by Means and Voss (1996), and Felton and 
Kuhn (2001). Indeed, one of the major objectives of this investigation was to focus on 
pragmatics (i.e., the goals arguers pursue when generating and evaluating arguments) 
rather than logic.  
8.4. Theoretical and practical applications  
8.4.1. Implications for learning and education 
 Argumentation is a cognitive activity which involves the skills of logic and 
reasoning. It is also a discourse activity, conducted with the purpose to convey ideas to 
others effectively (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). This is what makes 
argumentation valuable in educational situations.  
Arguing is not, however, an easy task. It requires the use of language and other 
cognitive skills, including the ability to understand and appreciate another person’s 
perspective. As Kuhn (2008) notes, contrary to elementary skills such as classification 
or number which emerge in all typically developing children during the early years, the 
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skills involved in argumentation do not necessary develop at the level desired. It is in 
the family context that children become familiar with argumentation, by participating in 
an increasingly active way in discussions with their parents and siblings (Stein & Albro, 
2001). However, not all children encounter means to experience and practice their 
argument skills in their home. For some, the observation of, or participation in a 
reasoned discussion may be a rare event. Moreover, in everyday life, there are no 
ground rules of communication or reflection on what constitutes effective 
communication. Thus, individuals have to figure it out for themselves how to 
effectively communicate with others (Mercer, 2009).  
This is why schools have a crucial role to play in the development of children’s 
argumentation. Education should help children to become competent thinkers and 
learners, so they can use the acquired skills productively in adult lives (Kuhn, 2008; 
Mercer, Dawes, Wegerif, & Sams, 2004; Schwartz, 2009).  
However, the importance of argumentation and the defining rules of its place 
and role in classroom learning have not been acknowledged within the educational 
system in the U.K., and it has not figured prominently in national or school curricula 
(Mercer, 2009). Moreover, while teachers are aware of many of the skills they would 
like students to exhibit, the steps to achieve desirable performance often remain 
unarticulated or vague. For instance, the two broad aims of the school curriculum 
reflected in section 351 of the Education Act 1996 requires that all maintained schools 
in the U.K. provide a balanced and broadly based curriculum that: (i) promote the 
spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and physical development of pupils at the school and 
of society, and (ii) prepare pupils at the school for the opportunities, responsibilities and 
experiences of adult life (National Curriculum, 2011). No specifications are, however, 
advanced regarding the theoretical and methodological framework within which schools 
should develop their own curriculum in order to achieve these goals. Another difficulty 
of encouraging children to engage in argumentative tasks in British school may be 
related to the dilemma that teachers face in combining these tasks (e.g., open 
argumentative discussions) with their professional responsibility to teach a set 
curriculum (Littleton, Mercer, Dawes, Wegerif, Rowe, & Sams, 2005).  
The present research contributes to further understanding of the argumentative 
that children exhibit at different ages (5-, 8-, and 11- years). It also explores age-related 
patterns of how the cognitive skills entailed in argumentation develop. In doing so, one 
can better understand how to promote them in educational environments. The series of 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
 
284 
 
studies outlined in this thesis has demonstrated that the ability to develop complex 
argumentation (i.e., to justify, negotiate, and persuade) develops gradually in children.  
In this respect, argument generation and argument evaluation skills may differ. 
For instance, Study Two (Chapter Five) showed that 5 to 12 year old children generate 
argumentative strategies (e.g., case-based sequences, blocks) infrequently in 
unstructured  peer group discussions. However, in an evaluative task which displayed 
the same strategies, children aged 8- and 11- years exhibited a basic understanding of 
more complex strategies, such as cornering a speaker in a weaker position, or proposing 
a hypothetical scenario or situation in which the speaker’s argument might not be 
applied. This result suggests that evaluative skills may precede argument generation 
skills. In the future it will be necessary to confirm this conclusion by using samples 
which are more numerous and by employing more direct measures.  
This conclusion, subject to further verification, could be of some interest also for 
its practical implications in learning and education. For instance, students would benefit 
from intervention programs that allow them to learn and incorporate these elements in 
argumentative discussions with their peers. To date, no educational programmes have 
been devised in the U.K. to promote children’s understanding and acquisition of these 
argumentative discourse elements and strategies.  
A further contribution of this investigation is that it explored children’s 
argumentation skills related to everyday topics that are relevant to their social world. 
Previous educational research has been mainly concerned with argument performance in 
academic subjects (e.g., Marttunen, Laurinen, Litosseliti, & Lund, 2005; Orsolini & 
Pontecorvo, 1992; Sampson & Clark, 2008). Specifically, any interventions should 
consider that children need to be motivated and interested in a topic in order to engage 
efficiently in argumentation. Some topics are more relevant than others for children at 
different ages, for instance, arguing whether students should or should not wear 
uniforms at school is more relevant for children aged 11- years than younger children. 
This is possibly due to the fact that, at age 11, children are becoming more aware of 
themselves as autonomous individuals (as discussed in Studies Three and Four). 
Findings also indicated that, in argumentative situations, children (both at 8 and 
11 years) take from their previous experiences references to beliefs and norms that they 
share in interactions with other people. These beliefs interfere with the judgements 
children make about the arguments being evaluated, as demonstrated in all five studies 
presented in this thesis. 
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Further, it provided evidence that argumentation processes change according to 
the goals children pursue in an argumentative task (e.g., influencing the audience’s 
point of view). As shown in Study Four (Chapter Six), the arguers’ or evaluators’ 
involvement in making their positions and arguments acceptable to an audience, plays a 
major part in the criteria they adopt for evaluating the effectiveness or persuasiveness of 
arguments. Very few studies in developmental and educational literature have 
established a link between argumentation and persuasive goals. The present research has 
addressed this issue and demonstrated that children’s performance on argumentative 
tasks depends on the communicative goals entailed in these tasks.  
8.4.2. Implications for decision-making on social, moral and health-related issues 
In everyday situations, children and adolescents have to face situations of 
uncertainty in which decisions have to be taken. Trying to make good choices, carry out 
the right actions or find solutions to a problem involve processes related to 
argumentation, such as taking a position, or producing justifications and refutations 
(Mirza et al, 2009; Voss & van Dyke, 2001). As Udell (2007) proposes, argument 
provides a foundation for effective decision-making, helping decision-makers to better 
define and justify choices and engage in more thoughtful processing of harms and 
benefits of a choice. Designing interventions based on argumentation (including 
reasoning and communication strategies) has the potential of improving thinking 
underlying individuals’ decisions. For instance, Udell (2007) found that adolescents, 
aged 14-15 years, who engaged in argumentative discussions regarding a personally 
relevant topic (teen pregnancy) improved in the use of counterarguments. Udell (2007) 
also explored whether the learned argument skills transferred to other topic domains. 
Results revealed that only the intervention focusing on the personal topic (teen 
pregnancy) resulted in transfer to the non-personal topic (capital punishment). Transfer 
in the opposite direction did not occur. A further limitation of this intervention was that 
it did not significantly increase rebuttal.  
Bernas and Stein (2001) asked college students who supported opposing 
positions on abortion to state their reasons for and against their own position as well as 
their reason for and against the opposition. Students then served as judges on four cases 
in which women were seeking an abortion (the circumstances motivating a woman 
varied across the cases). Case information either challenged or supported prototypic 
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assumptions and beliefs that underlie a prolife or prochoice stance. Results revealed that 
students who received information directly challenging their position on abortion 
changed stances more frequently than those who did not. Additional factors also 
predicted changes in stances, such as, taking a prochoice rather than a prolife position; 
being able to cite more problems with one's own position; and receiving challenging 
cases that present novel rather than anticipated conditions motivating a woman's desire 
for abortion. According to Bernas and Stein (2001) changes in stances come about 
because of awareness of new information about the negative consequences and also the 
benefits of each position, which in turn causes a shift in the relative ranking of 
important moral beliefs that an arguer uses to support a position.  
Although these two examples did not focus directly on developing adolescents’ 
decision-making, they contribute to better understand the thinking underlying 
adolescents’ positions and to develop cognitive skills that contribute to thoughtful and 
sound decisions. Further research is needed to explore the factors that promote transfer 
of argument skills across topics and also contextual settings. In particular, in these two 
interventions, it is not certain whether adolescents would implement the skills they 
acquired (e.g., evaluating evidence and considering the pros and cons of a position; 
using counterarguments) when making decisions outside of the context of the school-
based activities. Further research on argumentation and decision-making is needed to 
enhance understanding of individuals’ cognitive development, but also the personal 
lives of decision-makers.  
8.5. Possible future educational programmes  
 In comparison with the vast volume of research focused on argumentation as a 
tool for learning specific content (e.g., Howe, Tolmie, Greer, & Mackenzie, 1995; 
Felton, 2004), less theoretical, empirical, and design efforts have been invested in 
designing programmes to foster argumentative skills and in evaluating their efficacy. 
For the most part, previous educational programmes, for example Point Zero (Perkins, 
1992); Philosophy for Children (Lipman, 1991), and Thinking Together (Mercer, 2000) 
have focused on promoting “critical thinking” rather than fostering argumentation. The 
intriguing issue, as observed by Schwarz (2009) is that, although not explicitly stated in 
the programme rationales, their implementation depends heavily on the instilment of 
argumentative practices. Moreover, even though most of these programs emphasise the 
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importance of understanding rather than acquiring skills, their impact has been 
measured by using tools pertaining to the acquisition of skills, thus leading to mixed 
results (Schwarz, 2009).  
In order to design effective argumentative programmes, it is important to clearly 
distinguish between meta-level skills and the other cognitive skills entailed in 
argumentation. The research outlined in this thesis focused on the later set of skills, 
including argument generation and argument evaluation abilities. As mentioned earlier, 
these skills are essential for engaging in thoughtful consideration of alternative ideas, 
and for making sound decisions, either related to educational matters or everyday life 
situations. In order to help children to develop such skills, schools should provide 
opportunity for students to exercise them. This would involve activities in which 
children could learn the following skills: (1) construct strong, coherent, persuasive 
arguments to sustain their points of view, both individually or in groups; (2) recognise 
others’ perspectives and alternative arguments; (3) develop argumentative strategies to 
engage in effective argumentative discussions; and (4) transfer the acquired skills to 
other domain topics and contexts.  
 Moreover, it would be particularly beneficial if these activities employed a 
variety of technology resources (e.g., videos and computer-based tasks). For instance, 
the computer tasks devised for studies Three and Four (both described in Chapter Six) 
could be used in school classes to teach children how to identify strong arguments and 
how to critically evaluate them. In fact, most teachers, who had collaborated in the data 
collection, expressed interest in using these materials in class. And so, after data have 
been collected, teachers used some of the topics (e.g., children receiving pocket money 
or having a television in their bedrooms) in Assembly and debate classes to elicit 
argumentative discussions. In addition, the work presented in this thesis suggests that 
school-based activities should not focus solely on curriculum topics, but rather on other 
cultural reference frames (e.g., policy issues, socio-moral topics). This would be 
relevant for transfering the learned skills to other domain topics and contexts outside 
school settings.  
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8.6. Final remarks 
 This thesis examined age differences in children’s ability to evaluate and 
constructed arguments. This research has contributed to the field of children’s 
argumentation in the following ways: 
1. This was the first research to look at whether 5-, 8-, and 11-year old children are 
able to generate complex types of arguments and argumentative strategies, either 
individually or in group settings, related to topics they are familiar with and 
know about. 
2. Rather than relying on either qualitative or quantitative methods alone, a variety 
of mixed-methods techniques (for data collection and analysis) were used to 
capture the complexity of argumentation processes. 
3. The above studies contributed to further understanding of the cognitive skills 
that children possess at such young age, including those involved in argument 
construction and argument evaluation. 
4. This investigation examined how the communicative goals entailed in a task 
(e.g., persuasion goal) affects children’s understanding of arguments.  
 
 As referred to earlier, the findings may have practical implications in learning 
and education, and also in many instances of children’s lives outside school. It is hoped 
that teachers, educational researchers and those involved in the implementation of 
programmes for promoting children’s learning will find this research interesting and 
useful. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Example of a covering letter for schools (Studies One and Two) 
[University Headed Paper] 
Date here 
Dear (Name of Head Teacher), 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway University of London. I am writing to ask if 
you would be interested in participating in my study of children’s discussion and argument 
skills. It is supervised by Dr Patrick Leman. 
Dr Leman and I fully appreciate the pressures and demands upon children and staff at schools, 
and want to reassure you that the work we have planned will be designed to cause minimal 
disruption to your regular classroom routines. In fact, what we envisage involves merely reading 
some short stories to groups of children and engaging them in discussion afterwards. The stories 
are taken from well-known and widely-used text books and are suitable for children of all ages. 
The stories are based on traditional folk tales from around the world and, as such are probably 
similar to many of the stories that are told to children of the same age in many classrooms. The 
stories themselves are taken from two books for children aged 5 years and upwards, “Stories for 
thinking”, “First stories for thinking”, written by R. Fisher (1996). We can, of course, send you 
full texts of the stories we plan to use, on request. 
Briefly, what we plan to do is to read the stories to groups of children. Some children will 
discuss the story for around 5 minutes afterwards (the stories focus on moral themes like 
stealing, friendship and helping). Some other children will not discuss the stories in a group but 
answer some questions on it on their own. Our aim is to explore whether simply discussing 
issues within the peer group improves discussion and argument skills. By this we mean the 
abilities to form a strong, coherent, and persuasive argument and to understand and listen to 
another’s argument. 
If you are able to participate, I would be hoping to visit your school around a week later in 
January or early February, including time reading stories and discussing them with the children 
in smaller groups. Dr Leman or I would be very happy to explain any of the details further to 
you or your staff at a convenient time. All of our work is subject to approval by our 
departmental ethics committee which conforms to the ethical standards of the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) and American Psychological Association (APA) including full 
parental consent. 
Please do feel free to contact me (01784 443703; A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk) or Dr Leman (01784 
414406; Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk) if you wish to discuss the project any further. We stress 
again that the project would be fun for your children and we very much hope that your staff 
would feel happy to discuss and input to these issues with us as well. We will contact you again 
by telephone in a week’s time. But in the meantime, if you are interested in being involved in 
this study, please let us know by using either of the contact numbers above. 
Yours with best wishes, 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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Appendix 2. Consent form for parents (Studies One and Two) 
 [University Headed Paper] 
Re: Study of children’s conversation and argument skills  
Dear Parent/ Guardian 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway, University of London. For my research project, 
I am carrying out a study of children’s discussion and argument skills, supervised by Dr. Patrick 
Leman. 
Briefly, what we plan to do is to read stories to groups of children. The stories are taken from 
well-known and widely-used text books and are suitable for children of all ages. The stories are 
based on traditional folk tales from around the world and, as such are probably similar to many 
of the stories that are told to children of the same age in many classrooms. Some children will 
discuss the story for around 5 minutes afterwards (the stories focus on moral themes like 
stealing, friendship and helping). Some other children will not discuss the stories in a group but 
answer some questions on it on their own. The aim is to explore whether simply discussing 
issues within the peer group improves discussion and argument skills. By this we mean the 
abilities to form a strong, coherent, and persuasive argument and to understand and listen to 
another’s argument. I would appreciate the participation of your child in my study. The results 
of this research may help teachers to understand and enhance argument skills. This work can be 
also important to maximize potential benefits of peer collaboration in educational settings.   
All children will find these activities fun and similar to the normal activities they would 
undertake in school everyday. In terms of the study itself, nobody except Dr Leman and me will 
see the data or any video-recorded material, and information on each child will be recorded 
using an anonymous identifying number only. If you would like to discuss any aspect of the 
research with Dr. P. Leman you can contact him by email on Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk, or 
by phone on 01784 414406. If you need to contact me, please call 017843703 or email me 
(A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk). We will also ask your child, personally, whether they are happy to 
take part in the study and they will be allowed to withdraw from a session at any time if they do 
not wish to continue. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Psychology Department internal ethical 
procedure at Royal Holloway, University of London. (Name of head teacher), the Head 
Teacher, has also given permission for this study to be carried out.  
We assume that all children will want to participate. But if you DO NOT want your child to 
participate, please complete and return the consent from below. Please retain a copy of this 
sheet for your future information. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
STUDY OF CHILDREN’S CONVERSATION AND ARGUMENT SKILLS 
CONSENT FORM FOR RETURN TO CLASS TEACHER 
Please tick the box indicating consent and then complete the remaining details and detach and 
return this form to your child’s class teacher. Please keep the information sheet for your own 
records. 
Please tick the appropriate box to the right: 
EITHER;         
I consent to my son/daughter taking part in the research  
into children’s understanding and evaluation of arguments. 
OR; 
I do not consent to my son/daughter taking part in the research  
into children’s understanding and evaluation of arguments. 
I have received an information sheet explaining the purpose of the study and of the opportunity 
to ask further questions and with the assurance that my son’s or daughter’s right to privacy and 
confidentiality will be respected at all times.  
Name of parent/ guardian ……………………………………………………….. 
Signature of parent/ guardian…………………………………………….…….... 
Name of child …………………………………...........  Date …………………... 
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Appendix 3. Interview for assessment of argument skill illustrated for sharing topic 
(adapted from Kuhn, 1991, p. 299-300)  
Generating arguments and reasons 
1) Do you think that people should share their things with others or keep what they like for 
themselves?  
2) Why? Try to give reasons to explain your position. 
a) (Probe, if necessary) Can you give some reasons why you think “people should ___?” 
b)  If you were trying to convince someone (or a child with the same age) that your view is 
right, what reasons could you mention to convince the person that “people should ___?” 
c) (Probe, when child completes initial response) Can you think of anything else? 
Generating counterarguments and opposing reasons 
1) Imagine now that someone (or a child with the same age) disagreed with your opinion that 
“people should ___ because ___” What opposing reasons could this person say to show that 
you were wrong?  
a) (If child doesn’t understand) Suppose a person has a view very different from yours – what 
might they say to convince you that you were wrong?  
b) (Probe, if necessary) Can you think of anything else? 
c) (If both sides of the question mentioned and counterarguments already indicated) You 
mentioned some reasons why “people should ___” Just to be sure I understand, can you 
explain a little bit more about these reasons, or think about other reasons to justify this 
alternative position?  
Generating rebuttals 
1) And what could you say to convince this person wrong?  
a) (Include if no counterargument generated) Suppose that someone disagreed with you and 
said that people should ___ because ___. What could you say to show that the person was 
wrong? 
 b) (If not already indicated) What could you say to show that your own opinion is the correct 
one and what reasons would you give to defend it? 
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Appendix 4. Materials for storytelling  
Story 1. “The black tulip” - Dutch folktale (Fisher, 1996, p. 95-96).  
“Ever since tulip flowers were first found in Turkey people have been trying to grow one special 
tulip – a black tulip! Many tulips have been the darkest brown or the deepest blue, but none has 
been truly black. 
 
Many years ago there was a competition among the bulb growers of Holland. A prize of one 
thousand golden crowns was offered to the first person who could grow a black tulip. There was 
great activity among the bulb growers. They tried every way they knew to grow a black tulip. 
They produced dark blue and brown ones, deep purple and bottle green ones, striped and 
blotchy ones.  
 
At last one of the keenest growers produced a small bulb which was a mixture of all the darkest 
colours he had ever grown. ‘This surely’, he said, ‘must be the first and only black tulip’.  
 
It was just a small bulb, but he could see it in his mind’s eye growing and opening into a velvety 
black flower. He didn’t even think of the handsome prize he might win. The black tulip would 
be the most valuable flower in the world, but for him it would be the most beautiful. 
 
The bulb grower knew that he had better keep the news of his bulb a secret. The only people he 
told were his family and closest friends. But like many a well-kept secret it travelled from 
person to person until it reached the ears of a bulb grower who was his greatest rival. This man 
had been trying to grow a black tulip, without success, for years. He would dearly love to get his 
hands on the prize – a thousand gold crowns! Now he had been beaten to it – or had he? A plan 
began to form in his mind. Perhaps he could win the prize after all.  
 
That night, when all was dark and quiet, he slipped out of his house and made his way to the 
garden where he thought the black tulip bulb would be kept. In through the garden gate he went 
and up to the great glass greenhouse where all the bulbs sat ready for planting. There they lay in 
rows, with each one neatly labelled. His hand reached down for the latch. Just as he thought – 
not locked!  
 
Quietly he let himself in to the greenhouse. It was quite dark so he struck a light and quickly 
moved along the rows of bulbs. Yes, there it was – a bulb labelled ‘The Black Tulip’, on a 
special shelf all to itself. He put the bulb safe in his pocket, placed another bulb where the bulb 
of the black tulip had been, and hurried home in triumph. 
 
Back inside his house the thief placed the precious bulb carefully on his mantelpiece. The black 
tulip! It looked like any other tulip bulb, but this one he was sure would make him rich and 
famous. 
 
The following day his housekeeper found what she thought was an onion lying on the 
mantelpiece. ‘Funny place for an onion’, she thought. ‘Oh well, it’ll make a nice omelette’.  
So she took the ‘onion’ out into the kitchen. There she cracked two eggs, chopped up the 
‘onion’ and proudly presented to her master for his breakfast – an onion omelette. The thief’s 
mind was full of the money he would win, and he tucked into his breakfast.  
 
When he had finished the omelette he went over to the mantelpiece. The bulb! Where had it 
gone? In a panic he searched high and low, to no avail; it had quite disappeared. He questioned 
all his servants. No they hadn’t seen a tulip bulb. Had they seen anything unusual? - he asked.  
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‘Well’, said his housekeeper, ‘only an old onion, but you ate that for breakfast’. All of a sudden 
the thief began to feel rather ill. ‘Thieves never prosper’, he groaned, and he went to bed and 
vowed never to steal again. 
 
And we are still waiting for the first black tulip”. 
 
Story 2. “The bear that spoke” - Canadian folktale, a variation of one of Aesop’s fables 
(Fisher, 1996, p. 50-51) 
 
“One day in the cold lands of Canada two friends went out hunting. They were tracking a moose 
through the great pinewood forests. Snow carpeted the ground and as they trod through it they 
heard no sound. They did not suspect that as they followed the track of the moose there were 
two eyes watching them.  
 
The two hunters stopped, hoping to spot the flash of antlers through the trees. Behind them a 
dark shadow moved across the snow. Closer and closer it came. One of the hunters glanced 
round. ‘It’s a bear!’ – he shouted.  
 
The huge grizzly bear, a mass of brown fur and claws, was almost upon them. Without a 
second’s thought the two men ran. They knew that their only hope was to find a place of refuge. 
One of them pointed to a nearby pine tree, and ran towards it. As soon as he reached it he began 
to climb faster than he had ever climbed before. His friend however tripped over a root in the 
snow. He fell with a crash into the snow.  
 
‘Help! I think I’ve sprained my ankle!’ – he shouted. 
 
The man in the tree looked round. He could see that the bear was still some way off. But what 
still some way off. But what could he do? What should he do? He decided to carry on climbing. 
The man on the ground lay quite still and held his breath. The nerves in his body tingled with 
fear as he could hear the ‘scrunch, scrunch’ of pawns snow coming nearer and nearer. The bear 
lumbered up to him, and began to snuffle suspiciously round his head. The man could feel the 
bear’s hot breath on his face. He didn’t move a muscle. The bear’s claws scratched at the snow. 
Then there was a soft padding sound as the bear ambled slowly away. 
 
‘He’s left me alone’, thought the man. ‘He must have thought I was dead’. At once he felt a 
surge of pain in his sprained ankle.  
 
High in the tree his friend saw the bear disappear into the bushes. He waited a few minutes until 
he was sure it was quite safe, then carefully climbed down. He ran quickly to his friend who 
was still lying flat in the snow. He helped the man sit up, and bandaged his ankle. 
 
Seeing his friend was none the worse for his meeting with the bear, the hunter who had climbed 
the tree said, ‘I knew you’d be all right. I guess you were safer down there than I was up that 
tree’. Trying to cheer his friend, who still looked hurt, he added, ‘Hey, that bear was so close he 
seemed to be whispering something in your ear. Come on, tell me, did he say something to 
you?’  
 
‘Well’, the other replied, ‘what he said was, I should never trust a friend who deserts you when 
things get difficult’.” 
 
Story 3. “The ungrateful crocodile” – Story from India (Fisher, 1999, p. 46) 
 
“One day a holy man was walking along the bed of a dried-up river. It had not rained for weeks 
and the earth was hard and dry. Suddenly the holy man saw a crocodile lying in the dust 
painting for breath.  
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‘Please save me,’ gasped the crocodile. ‘Take me to some water or I shall die.’ 
 
The holy man looked at the crocodile and said, ‘I would like to save you but I’ve heard that you 
are fierce and not to be trusted. How do I know you won’t eat me once I’ve rescued you?’ 
 
The animal looked hurt. ‘Do you really think that I would eat someone who had saved my life?’ 
he asked. ‘Is there anyone in the whole world who would do such a cruel thing? Not me, my 
friend; if you let me live I shall be your friend until my dying day’. A big tear began to roll 
down the crocodile’s face.  
 
The holy man was so sorry for the crocodile that he picked him up, put him into his bag and 
walked seven miles to the nearest river. Then he let the crocodile out of the bag and told him to 
crawl into the water. 
 
‘Please carry me into the river’, panted the crocodile. ‘I am so weak I cannot walk.’ The holy 
man did as he was asked, carried him into the water, and let him go. At once the crocodile 
seized the holy man’s leg and began dragging him under.  
 
‘You rogue!’ roared the holy man. ‘You broke your word.’  
 
‘I’m hungry’, said the crocodile and it carried on trying to drown the man.  
 
‘Wait!’ shouted the holy man. ‘There’s a jackal, let us ask him whether you are right to eat me 
or not. If he says that you should, I will stop struggling and you can have me for supper.’ The 
crocodile grumbled but finally agreed to ask the jackal.  
 
When the jackal had heard the story he scratched his head and said, ‘I am not very clever. I 
don’t understand how the man brought you to the river. Can you show me?’ The crocodile 
grumbled again and climbed into he holy man’s bag.  
 
‘Like this’, he growled. The holy man tied up the bag tightly.  
 
‘Take him back’, said the jackal, ‘and leave him where you found him.’  
 
The holy man laughed as the crocodile writhed in his bag. ‘What a clever fellow you are’, he 
said. ‘What a villain he is! I saved his life and he tried to take mine. Who would have thought 
that anyone could be so ungrateful?’ 
 
‘Nearly everybody!’ said the jackal. ‘You are too trusting to your own good. Carry on being 
kind to everyone, but don’t expect people to be kind to you in return. It doesn’t always work out 
that way.’  
 
The holy man picked up the bag of crocodile, and realised the jackal was right.” 
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Appendix 5. Key questions and prompt questions for discussion of stories 
Key questions for each of the three stories  
1. In the story, the thief said that thieves never prosper. Do you think this is true; is stealing 
always wrong?  
2. Is there any difference between helping a stranger or a friend?  
3. In the story the man is kind and also trusting of others, but someone took advantage of it. If 
someone breaks a promise, should people trust this person again? 
Prompt questions  
1. Why? Try to refer to all reasons that explain your position.  
2. (Probe, when subject completes initial response) Anything else? 
3. Someone (child’s name) seems to disagree with your opinion. Do you agree with the 
opposing reasons he/she is saying? 
4. What could you say and what reasons could you give to explain to (child’s name) that your 
own view is the right one? 
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Appendix 6. Worksheet for the control condition (Study Two)  
Reflection Worksheet (illustrated for the story “The ungrateful crocodile”) 
ID number: [PLACE STICKER HERE] 
Today’s date …………………………… 
Listen carefully to the questions given by the researcher and try to write a brief answer: 
1. In the story the man is kind and also trusting of others, but someone took advantage of it. If 
someone breaks a promise, should people trust this person again? Why? (Try to write all 
reasons you can think of to explain your view) 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Imagine someone disagrees with your opinion. What reasons do you think this person could 
give you to show you that his or her view is the right one? 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
3. And what would you reply to this person to explain that your position is the right one? 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 7. Example of a covering letter for schools (Pilot Study) 
[University Headed Paper] 
Date here 
Dear (Name of Head Teacher), 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway University of London. I am writing to ask if 
you would be interested in participating in my study of students’ evaluation of the strength of 
arguments. It is supervised by Dr Patrick Leman. 
Dr Leman and I fully appreciate the pressures and demands upon children and staff at schools, 
and want to reassure you that the work we have planned will be designed to cause minimal 
disruption to your regular classroom routines. In fact, what we envisage involves asking 
children to think about various topics and evaluate different arguments related to those issues.  
Briefly, what we plan to do is asking a few children to discuss common social issues in a group 
with some children from the same class. These issues will not be controversial but will generate 
discussion and, we hope, will include familiar topics such as whether children should wear 
school uniforms, or whether it is right to keep animals in zoos. Our aim is to gather some 
information about the sorts of arguments children typically use on these topics. Then, we will 
ask children to work individually at a computer to let us know what they think are good or bad 
arguments by rating these on a simple scale. Our aim here is to explore what kind of arguments 
children find strong or persuasive. We hope to involve children aged 5, 8, and 11 years-of-age, 
and do not expect that it will take more than 10 minutes for each child to complete the tasks. 
If you are able to participate, I would be hoping to visit your school and assist in classroom 
activities for a day in early October. All of our work is subject to approval by our departmental 
ethics committee which conforms to the ethical standards of the British Psychological Society 
(BPS) and American Psychological Association (APA) including full parental consent. 
Please do feel free to contact me (01784 443703; A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk) or Dr Leman (01784 
414406; Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk) if you wish to discuss the project any further. We stress 
again that the project would be interesting for your students and we very much hope that your 
staff would feel happy to discuss and input to these issues with us as well: this is a new topic for 
research and our work would benefit from the input of professionals who have experience of 
children’s abilities on a daily basis and at first hand. We will contact you again by telephone 
but, in the meantime, if you are interested in being involved in this study, please let us know by 
using either of the contact numbers above. 
Yours with best wishes, 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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Appendix 8. Consent form for parents for (Pilot Study) 
[University Headed Paper] 
Re: Study of children’s conversation skills  
Dear Parent/ Guardian 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway, University of London, and I am currently 
carrying out a study of children’s understanding and evaluation of the persuasiveness of 
arguments. My work is supervised by Dr Patrick Leman, Reader in Psychology at Royal 
Holloway. This study forms part of a larger body of work in which we hope to be able to 
establish how argument skills change with age and develop in conversation. 
Your school has kindly agreed to allow us to approach you, as a parent, to ask if you would 
permit your child to participate in some of this research. We plan two different types of activity. 
First, we will ask a few children to discuss common social issues in a group with some children 
from the same class. These issues will not be controversial but will generate discussion and, we 
hope, will include familiar topics such as whether children should wear school uniforms, or 
whether it is right to keep animals in zoos. Our aim is to gather some information about the sorts 
of arguments children typically use on these topics. For the second type of activity we will ask 
children to work individually at a computer to let us know what they think are good or bad 
arguments by rating these on a simple scale. Our aim here is to explore what kind of arguments 
children find strong or persuasive. We hope to involve children aged 5, 7, and 9 years-of-age, 
and do not expect that it will take more than 30 minutes for each child to complete the tasks. 
Although we are engaged in pure academic research at this stage we very much hope that this 
work will, in due course, inform practice and have implications in educational settings, such as 
helping teachers to understand and enhance children’s argument skills. We will certainly keep 
parents, staff, and the children informed of the outcomes of this work. We have extensive 
experience of conducting this sort of research, and we know that children find this sort of 
activity stimulating – most children really want to take part and we have never encountered a 
situation where a child has not wanted to participate in a discussion such as this. However, 
alongside your consent as a parent, we also check that every child is happy to take part and 
make it clear that they can withdraw from the study at any point if they wish. 
We also take issues of data protection and participant anonymity very seriously: Information on 
each child will be held using an anonymous identifying number only, and nobody except Dr 
Leman and me will see the data or listen to any audio-recorded material. If you would like to 
discuss any aspect of the research with Dr Leman you can contact him by email on 
Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk, or by phone on 01784 414406. If you need to contact me, please 
call 01784 443703 or email me (A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk). 
This study has been approved by the Psychology Department Ethical Committee (which reports 
to the Royal Holloway, University of London Ethics Committee). Our work conforms to the 
ethical guidelines laid out by the British Psychological Society (BPS), American Psychological 
Association (APA), and Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD).   
Please complete and return the consent form, attached, and retain a copy of this sheet for your 
information.Thank you for taking the time to read this information. 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
STUDY OF CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS 
CONSENT FORM FOR RETURN TO CLASS TEACHER 
Please tick the box indicating consent and then complete the remaining details and detach and 
return this form to your child’s class teacher. Please keep the information sheet for your own 
records. 
Please tick the appropriate box to the right: 
EITHER;         
I consent to my son/daughter taking part in the research  
into children’s understanding and evaluation of arguments. 
OR; 
I do not consent to my son/daughter taking part in the research  
into children’s understanding and evaluation of arguments. 
I have received an information sheet explaining the purpose of the study and of the opportunity 
to ask further questions and with the assurance that my son’s or daughter’s right to privacy and 
confidentiality will be respected at all times.  
Name of parent/ guardian ……………………………………………………….. 
Signature of parent/ guardian………………………………………..................... 
Name of child ………………………………….......... Date ………………… 
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Appendix 9. Outline script/ information for focus group discussions (Pilot Study) 
Date ………………………................................. Focus group session no. …………………… 
Step One 
Introduce myself 
• Explain the purpose of the group discussion. The objective of this session is to gather 
information on what children think about some everyday topics and what sorts of 
arguments they typically use to support their opinions. 
• Explain that there are no “correct” answers. The researcher is interested in their own 
personal opinions. 
• Ask for permission to record and take notes (explain confidentiality, length of the 
interview - approximately half an hour).  
• Instructions for children: “The purpose of this study is to help me understand what 
children think about everyday issues. I am going to give you a statement, and then ask 
your opinion about the statement and the reasons why you agree or disagree with it. For 
example, some people think that Internet brings people of the world closer together. Do 
you agree or disagree with this idea, and why?” 
Step Two 
• “Warm-up” (ask children’s names and their age at the start so they can become familiar 
with the researcher). 
Step Three 
• Carry out the interview. Each conversation topic should be discussed in less than 10 
minutes. Introduce the first topic: Students should wear uniforms at school.  
• Do you agree or disagree with this statement? (Pro – or/ and anti- positions). 
• Try to refer to all reasons you know to explain your positions (Generation of pro- and 
anti- arguments) 
• Use probes (silence, mmhmm, “anything else?”) and prompts (“what is your personal 
opinion?”). 
• Imagine that someone is in favour or against the use of uniforms in school. What 
reasons would this person give to explain you that your opinion is wrong? (Generation 
of counterarguments). 
• Give examples: “Some people might say that school uniforms are expensive and have 
no use outside school”. Do you agree with this argument, and why? Would you say it is 
a strong or a weak argument, and why? (Evaluation of the strength of arguments). 
• Final questions: Which discussion topic did you like the most?; What were the most 
difficult and the easiest discussion topics? Show appreciation and end the interview. 
• How familiar are you with this topic? (ask children to complete the questionnaire) 
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Appendix 10. Questionnaire of children’s reported knowledge on the topics (Pilot Study) 
ID number: [PLACE STICKER HERE] 
Today’s date …………………………… 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please provide the following 
information about yourself:  
Date of birth …………………………… 
Please tick: 
Male     Female 
 
Instructions: This questionnaire is about your personal knowledge regarding the topics you 
have discussed. Please read the information below and check or circle the appropriate option.  
Topics How much would you say you know about each of the following 
topics? (Please check or circle the appropriate option below):  
School uniforms I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
Zoos I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
Technology I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
Machines I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
Television I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
Laws I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
School time I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
Famous people I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
Pocket money I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
Naughty children I know nothing (   ) I know a little (   ) I know a lot (   ) 
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Appendix 11. Example of a covering letter for schools (Study Three) 
[University Headed Paper] 
Date here 
Dear (Name of Head Teacher), 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway University of London. I am writing to ask if 
you would be interested in participating in my study of students’ evaluation of the strength of 
arguments. It is supervised by Dr Patrick Leman. 
Dr Leman and I fully appreciate the pressures and demands upon children and staff at schools, 
and want to reassure you that the work we have planned will be designed to cause minimal 
disruption to your regular classroom routines. In fact, what we envisage involves asking 
children to think about various topics and evaluate different arguments related to those issues. 
The topics concern common social issues, such as the importance of wearing school uniforms, 
or the reasons why children should get pocket money. 
Briefly, what we plan to do is asking children to evaluate arguments related to everyday issues. 
Children will work individually at a computer to evaluate and select the most persuasive 
arguments. This task will take no longer than 10 minutes. Our aim is to explore how children at 
different ages (8-9 and 11-12 years-old) might think and feel about different issues, what kind 
of arguments persuade children, and also whether children can be persuaded by these 
arguments. 
If you are able to participate, I would be hoping to visit your school and assist in classroom 
activities for a day in early October. Dr Leman or I would be very happy to explain any of the 
details further to you or your staff at a convenient time. All of our work is subject to approval 
by our departmental ethics committee which conforms to the ethical standards of the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) and American Psychological Association (APA) including full 
parental consent. 
Please do feel free to contact me (01784 443703; A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk) or Dr Leman (01784 
414406; Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk) if you wish to discuss the project any further. We stress 
again that the project would be interesting for your students and we very much hope that your 
staff would feel happy to discuss and input to these issues with us as well: This is a new topic 
for research and our work would benefit from the input of professionals who have experience of 
children’s abilities on a daily basis and at first hand. We will contact you again by telephone 
but, in the meantime, if you are interested in being involved in this study, please let us know by 
using either of the contact numbers above. 
Yours with best wishes, 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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Appendix 12. Consent form for parents (Study Three) 
[University Headed Paper] 
STUDY OF CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS 
Dear Parent/ Guardian 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway, University of London, and I am currently 
carrying out a study of children’s understanding and evaluation of the persuasiveness of 
arguments. My work is supervised by Dr Patrick Leman, Reader in Psychology at Royal 
Holloway. This study forms part of a larger body of work in which we hope to be able to 
establish how argument skills change with age and develop in conversation. 
Your school has kindly agreed to allow us to approach you, as a parent, to ask if you would 
permit your child to participate in some of this research. The activity involves asking students to 
work individually at a computer to let us know what they think are good or bad arguments by 
rating these on a simple scale. The task includes familiar topics such as whether students should 
wear school uniforms, or whether they should get pocket money. Our aim here is to explore 
what kind of arguments children find strong or persuasive. We hope to involve students aged 11 
and 12 years-of-age, and do not expect that it will take more than 10 minutes for each student to 
complete the task. 
Although we are engaged in pure academic research at this stage we very much hope that this 
work will, in due course, inform practice and have implications in educational settings, such as 
helping teachers to understand and enhance students’ argument skills. We will certainly keep 
parents, staff, and the students informed of the outcomes of this work. We have extensive 
experience of conducting this sort of research, and we know that students find this sort of 
activity stimulating – most students really want to take part and we have never encountered a 
situation where a student has not wanted to participate in a discussion such as this. However, 
alongside your consent as a parent, we also check that every participant is happy to take part and 
make it clear that they can withdraw from the study at any point if they wish. 
We also take issues of data protection and participant anonymity very seriously: Information on 
each participant will be held using an anonymous identifying number only, and nobody except 
Dr Leman and me will see the data or listen to any audio-recorded material. If you would like to 
discuss any aspect of the research with Dr Leman you can contact him by email on 
Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk, or by phone on 01784 414406. If you need to contact me, please 
call 01784 443703 or email me (A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk).  
This study has been approved by the Psychology Department Ethical Committee (which reports 
to the Royal Holloway, University of London Ethics Committee). Our work conforms to the 
ethical guidelines laid out by the British Psychological Society (BPS), American Psychological 
Association (APA), and Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD).   
Please complete and return the consent form, attached, and retain a copy of this sheet for your 
information. Thank you for taking the time to read this information. 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
STUDY OF CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING AND EVALUATION OF ARGUMENTS 
CONSENT FORM FOR RETURN TO CLASS TEACHER 
Please tick the box indicating consent and then complete the remaining details and detach and 
return this form to your child’s class teacher. Please keep the information sheet for your own 
records. 
Please tick the appropriate box to the right: 
EITHER;         
I consent to my son/daughter taking part in the research  
into children’s understanding and evaluation of arguments. 
OR; 
I do not consent to my son/daughter taking part in the research  
into children’s understanding and evaluation of arguments. 
I have received an information sheet explaining the purpose of the study and of the opportunity 
to ask further questions and with the assurance that my son’s or daughter’s right to privacy and 
confidentiality will be respected at all times.  
Name of parent/ guardian ……………………………………………………….. 
Signature of parent/ guardian…………………………………………….………. 
Name of student …………………………………… Date …………………. 
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Appendix 13. Example of a covering letter for schools (Study Four) 
[University Headed Paper] 
Date here 
Dear (Name of Head Teacher), 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway University of London under the supervision of 
Dr. Patrick Leman. I am writing to ask if you would be interested in participating in my study of 
children’s evaluation of persuasive arguments.  
Dr Leman and I fully appreciate the pressures and demands upon children and staff at schools, 
and want to reassure you that the work we have planned will be designed to cause minimal 
disruption to your regular classroom routines. In fact, what we envisage involves asking 
children to think about various topics and evaluate different arguments related to those issues. 
The topics concern common social issues, such as the importance of wearing school uniforms, 
or the reasons why children should get pocket money. 
Briefly, what we plan to do is asking children to evaluate arguments related to these topics. 
Children will work individually at a computer to evaluate and select the most persuasive 
arguments. This task will take no longer than 8 minutes. Our aim is to explore how 8-9 years-
old children (year 4) might think and feel about different issues, what kind of arguments 
persuade children, and also whether children can be persuaded by these arguments. 
If you are able to participate, I would be hoping to visit your school and assist in classroom 
activities for a day in January or early February. All of our work is subject to approval by our 
departmental ethics committee which conforms to the ethical standards of the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) and American Psychological Association (APA) including full 
parental consent. 
Please do feel free to contact me (01784 443703; A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk) or Dr Leman (01784 
414406; Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk) if you wish to discuss the project any further. We stress 
again that the project would be interesting for your students and we very much hope that your 
staff would feel happy to discuss and input to these issues with us as well: this is a new topic for 
research and our work would benefit from the input of professionals who have experience of 
children’s abilities on a daily basis and at first hand. We will contact you again by telephone 
but, in the meantime, if you are interested in being involved in this study, please let us know by 
using either of the contact numbers above. 
Yours with best wishes, 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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Appendix 14. Consent form for parents (Study Four) 
[University Headed Paper] 
Re. Study of children’s understanding and evaluation of arguments 
Dear Parent/ Guardian 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway, University of London. For my research project, 
I am carrying out a study of children’s understanding and evaluation of the persuasiveness of 
arguments, supervised by Dr. Patrick Leman. 
Briefly, what we plan to do is asking children to discuss ideas and generate arguments about 
common social issues, such as the importance of wearing school uniforms, or the reasons why 
animals should be kept in zoos. Children will engage in a group discussion with their peers. Our 
aim is to gather some information about the sorts of arguments children at different ages 
typically use on various topics. We also plan asking children to work individually at a computer 
to evaluate different arguments by rating its strength according to a scale. Our aim is to explore 
what kind of arguments persuade children, and also whether children can be persuaded by these 
arguments. This work may have future implications in educational settings, such as help 
teachers to understand and enhance children’s argument skills. 
All children will find this activity interesting and similar to the normal activities they would 
undertake in school everyday. In terms of the study itself, nobody except Dr Leman and me will 
see the data or any audio-recorded material, and information on each child will be recorded 
using an anonymous identifying number only. If you would like to discuss any aspect of the 
research with Dr. P. Leman you can contact him by email on Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk, or by 
phone on 01784414406. If you need to contact me, please call 017843703 or email me 
(A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk). We will also ask your child, personally, whether they are happy to 
take part in the study and they will be allowed to withdraw from a session at any time if they do 
not wish to continue. 
This study has been reviewed and approved by the Psychology Department internal ethical 
procedure at Royal Holloway, University of London. Ms. Susan Porter, the Head Teacher, has 
also given permission for this study to be carried out.  
Please complete and return the consent form overleaf to indicate whether or not you agree to 
your child taking part in this study. Please retain a copy of this sheet for your future 
information. 
Thank you for taking the time to read this information. 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I have received an information sheet explaining the purpose of the study and have had the 
opportunity to ask further questions. 
I agree that my son or daughter may participate in the above research to be carried out by Ana 
Macedo. 
I am assured that my son’s or daughter’s right to privacy and confidentiality will be respected at 
all times.  
Please return this section to (name of teacher) by (date)   
ID number ………………….. 
         
I CONSENT/ DO NOT consent to my son/daughter taking part in the research being conducted 
by Ana Macedo. 
Name of parent/ guardian ……………………………………………………….. 
Signature of parent/ guardian……………………………………….................… 
Name of child …………………………….....................  Date ………... 
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Appendix 15. Questionnaire of evaluation of argument strength (Pilot Study) 
[University headed paper] 
Evaluation of the Strength of Arguments 
Information sheet 
[names and email addresses of researcher and her supervisor] 
You are invited to take part in a research study. We are interested in gathering information 
about the sorts of arguments adults consider strong. Your task is to respond to a simple 
questionnaire designed to evaluate your preference for different arguments related to scientific 
inventions created by children. The information you provide will be used to help us design a 
study about children’s understanding of persuasive arguments.  
You do not have to take part in this study if you don’t want to. If you decide to take part you 
may withdraw at any time without having to give a reason.  
Please be assured that the information you provide in this questionnaire is confidential. 
Individual information and data obtained are not accessible to third parties outside our research 
group. If you would like to discuss any aspect of the research with Ana Macedo, please contact 
her by email on a.p.macedo@rhul.ac.uk, or by phone on 01784 443703. 
You may retain this information sheet for reference. Please feel free to ask any questions you 
may have before completing the consent form (which will be stored separately from the 
anonymous information you provide for the research project).  
This study has been approved by the Psychology Department Ethical Committee (which reports 
to the Royal Holloway, University of London Ethics Committee). Our work conforms to the 
ethical guidelines laid out by the British Psychological Society (BPS), American Psychological 
Association (APA), and Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD).   
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[University headed paper] 
Evaluation of the Strength of Arguments 
Consent form 
You have been asked to participate in a study about how students evaluate different arguments, 
which is being carried out by Ana Macedo. Have you (please circle yes or no): 
• Read the information sheet about the study?    yes no 
• Had an opportunity to ask questions?     yes no 
• Got satisfactory answers to your questions?    yes no 
• Understood that you’re free to withdraw from the study at any time? yes no 
• Do you agree to take part in the study?     yes no 
 
Signature_________________________________________  Date  _______  
Name in block letters ____________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
NB: This consent form will be stored separately from the anonymous information you provide.  
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[University headed paper] 
Evaluation of the Strength of Arguments 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Please provide the following 
information about yourself:  
Date of birth _________________ (Day / Month / Year) 
Please tick: 
Male     Female 
 
Please read the following instructions:  
This questionnaire is in FOUR sections. Each section asks you to evaluate the strength of 
arguments in favour and against several inventions created by children regarding different 
scientific topics.  
Section I – asks you to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of two inventions for 
“Protecting the environment” 
Section II – asks you to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of two inventions for 
“Advances in Technology” 
Section III – asks you to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of two inventions for 
“Improving people’s lifestyle” 
Section IV – asks you to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of two inventions for 
“Health” 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire! 
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Section I: Below you will find several arguments in favour and against two inventions related 
to the theme: “Protecting the Environment”. Please evaluate the strength of each argument, 
using a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is marked “very weak”, and 5 “very strong” 
Invention 1: City recycling robot.  It is a small robot that will go around a city and pick up 
any trash. It is able to identify and separate garbage using special-made sensors to look for 
recyclable materials. Material that can be recycled would be put into appropriate sections 
inside the robot 
Advantages of a city recycling robot 
Cheap to build (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Cities would be cleaner (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Some people do not care 
about recycling, but the 
robot would do it 
automatically 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Recycling avoids pollution (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Recycling avoids 
deforestation 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a city recycling robot 
The robot picks up the 
trash, but it is incapable to 
recycle materials  
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Expensive to put into 
practice in cities 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Does not solve the problem 
of factories that do not 
recycle materials 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Robots would consume fuel (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Robots would pollute the 
environment 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Invention 2: Rain converter.  It is a mobile water unit that can transform rain into drinkable 
water and supply homes. The unit is displayed in the roof of a house where it captures the 
rain. 
Advantages of a rain converter 
Prevent the world of 
running short of fresh water 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Reduce the harm done to 
the environment by the 
water industry 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Cheap alternative source of 
water 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Reduces flooding (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Water storage could be 
used for fire prevention 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a rain converter 
It would not work in places 
where it does not rain often 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
If people capture all rain, 
rivers would run dry. 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Quality of filtered rainwater 
might be not very good 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It does not rain during the 
Summer 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
A small device ca not filter 
rainwater  
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
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Section II: Below you will find several arguments in favour and against two inventions 
related to the theme: “Advances in Technology”. Below you will find several arguments in 
favour and against these innovative ideas. Please evaluate the strength of each argument, 
using a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is marked “very weak”, and 5 “very strong” 
Invention 1: Translation telephone. It is a small device, similar to a regular mobile phone, 
with the ability for universal translation. People could call anyone in the world and the 
telephone would do instant language translation. Translation would be available for all 
languages in the world. 
Advantages of a translation telephone 
Improve communication in 
multiple languages 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Make friends from other 
cultures  
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Deliver information in 
multiples languages 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Cheaper than human 
translation 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Quicker than human 
translation 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a translation telephone 
Machines would not be 
able to translate ambiguous 
words and sentences 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Translators would be 
unemployed 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Calls would be expensive (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
People would not be 
interested in learning new 
languages 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Machines are not reliable  (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Invention 2: Flying car.  This car is made of lightweight material and would be able to take 
off and fly above the road at hundreds of miles per hour. Flying cars would have an automatic 
pilot, so people would not have to drive.  
Advantages of a flying car 
Cheaper than airplanes (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Quick to go to a distant 
place 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
People would not have to 
drive 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
There would not be traffic 
jams 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Flying cars would be good 
as ambulances 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a flying car 
It is not a safe method of 
transport 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It would be costly to build (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It would consume a lot of 
fuel 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
There would be a lot of air 
crashes 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It would not be practical (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
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Section III: Below you will find several arguments in favour and against two inventions 
related to the theme: “Improving people’s lifestyle”. Below you will find several arguments 
in favour and against these innovative ideas. Please evaluate the strength of each argument, 
using a 1 to 5 scale, where 1 is marked “very weak”, and 5 “very strong” 
Invention 1: Clever hat. This hat protects you in all weathers – sun, wind, snow, lightning – 
you press a button and things come out. For example, an umbrella for rain. 
Advantages of a clever hat 
It would be fun to wear (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It would be practical (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It would protect the eyes 
from the sunlight  
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Good for bold people  (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
People could ride a bicycle 
in the rain without carrying 
an umbrella in one hand 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a clever hat 
It would not be feasible (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It is not an important 
invention 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It would make hair dry and 
puffy 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It is better to have different 
varieties of hats 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It would be too heavy for 
people’s head and neck 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Invention 2: Locator of lost things.  This is a very small device with a hook on it (or other 
means of attachment) to put on your glasses, on your house keys, etc. that will emit a shrill 
sound or flash a light after you dial a number on your mobile phone. 
Advantages of a locator of lost things 
Find misplaced or lost 
things quickly 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Reduce people’s stress (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
People wouldn’t be late for 
work 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Cheap to build (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
People could also used it to 
locate a lost dog or cat 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a locator for lost things 
People would forget to use 
it 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It is not very practical (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
People would need lots of 
locators for using it on 
different things  
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It is not an original idea (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
People already use too 
many electronic devices 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
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Section IV: Below you will find several arguments in favour and against two inventions 
related to the theme: “Health”. Below you will find several arguments in favour and against 
these innovative ideas. Please evaluate the strength of each argument, using a 1 to 5 scale, 
where 1 is marked “very weak”, and 5 “very strong” 
Invention 1: Healthy ice cream. Healthy foods, such as broccoli, carrots, tomato soup, etc. 
would taste as good as a sweet ice cream. Instead of eating a meal of chicken and potatoes, 
you can eat a tasty ice cream with the same nutrients and vitamins. 
Advantages of a healthy ice cream 
Good for people who are 
picky eaters 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Meals would be fun for 
children 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Prevent obesity (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Parents would not problems 
to convince their children 
to eat healthy food 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Cheaper than real food (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a healthy ice cream 
Vegetable ice creams 
would not taste as good as 
chocolate ice creams 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Real fruit and vegetables 
are healthier 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It would not be popular 
amongst adults 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Restaurants would be 
empty 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
It would be boring to eat 
ice creams every day 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Invention 2: Spray for safe food. This spray is made of water and other organic components 
and cleans all fruit and vegetables from all bacteria, toxins, and pesticides. It’s really easy to 
use: just spray your food and it’s ready to eat! 
Advantages of a spray for food 
People would not have to 
peel fruit 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Easy to use (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
More efficient in killing 
germs than using water 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Prevent diseases provoked 
by toxins and pesticides  
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
More hygienic  (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Disadvantages of a spray for food 
Difficult to create a safe 
spray 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
No use in some fruits and 
vegetables that need to be 
peeled 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Expensive (1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
Does not solve the problem 
of pesticides that get inside 
fruits and vegetables 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
The spray could leave a bad 
taste 
(1) very weak, (2) weak, (3) neutral, (4) strong, (5) very strong 
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Appendix 16. Script of the video-materials (Study Five) 
Recycling robot (Environment category) 
Scenario 1: Corner sequence 
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of the recycling robot, because it would keep cities 
clean. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] So, you think we need robots to keep cities clean? 
Arguer: [clarify] Well, some cities are very dirty, so robots would very useful. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But cities already have recycling bins. If people recycle, we do not 
need robots to do it. 
Scenario 2: Rebuttal  
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of the recycling robot, because it would keep cities 
clean. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But cities already have recycling bins. If people recycle, we don’t need 
robots to do it. 
Arguer: [counter-C] But some people don’t recycle, so we need other solutions, like robots 
to keep cities clean. 
Scenario 3: Case sequence 
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of the recycling robot, because it would keep cities 
clean. 
Opponent: [case-?] Let’s say we live in a big city that gets very dirty every day. Would we 
have to buy lots of robots? 
Arguer: [clarify] Yes, we could get several robots to keep cities clean. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But this would be very expensive to put into practice in cities. 
Scenario 4: Block  
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of the recycling robot, because it would keep cities 
clean. 
Opponent:  [case-?] Let’s say we are in a big city that gets very dirty every day. Would we have 
to buy lots of robots to keep the city clean? 
Arguer: [counter-C] Maybe not. Robots last long and they can work several times a day. A 
few robots would be enough to keep large cities clean. 
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Rain converter (Environment category) 
Scenario 1: Corner sequence 
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of rain converter, because it is the cheapest source of 
water. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] So, you think people would not have to buy fresh water anymore? 
Arguer: [clarify] Exactly, this would be the cheapest alternative source of water because 
rain is free. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But people would still have to buy water, because there might not be 
enough rain. 
Scenario 2: Rebuttal  
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of rain converter, because it is the cheapest source of 
water. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But I think people would spend a lot of money buying a rain converter 
and maintaining it. Maybe a large family needs to acquire several rain converters 
Arguer: [counter-C] But that it is still cheaper than buying water regularly for the whole 
family. 
Scenario 3: Case sequence 
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of rain converter, because it is the cheapest source of 
water. 
Opponent: [case-?] let’s say it doesn’t rain for weeks. How would we get water then? 
Arguer: [clarify] In that case, people would have to buy fresh water.   
Opponent: [counter-C] So, the rain converter wouldn’t work in places where it doesn’t rain 
often. 
Scenario 4: Block  
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of rain converter, because it is the cheapest source of 
water. 
Opponent:  [case-?] Let’s say it doesn’t rain for 4 weeks. How would you get water then? 
Arguer: [counter-C] Well, people could store water for times when it doesn’t rain. 
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Translation telephone (Technology category) 
Scenario 1: Corner sequence 
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of a translation telephone, because it would improve 
communication between people of different cultures who speak different languages. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] So you think people could have a normal telephone conversation using 
different languages? 
Arguer: [clarify] Well, I am not saying is a regular telephone. It is an electronic translator 
device that people can use to communicate with each other. 
Opponent: [counter-C] So it would not be used in everyday life like a normal telephone. 
Scenario 2: Rebuttal  
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of a translation telephone, because it would improve 
communication between people of different cultures who speak different languages. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But people can learn languages; they don’t need a device to do 
translation. 
Arguer: [counter-C] But the telephone would be very useful for people who travel often 
and have to talk in a language they don’t know.   
Scenario 3: Case sequence 
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of a translation telephone, because it would improve 
communication between people of different cultures who speak different languages 
Opponent: [case-?] Let’s say you work with people from different countries. Would you use 
the translator to call them every day? 
Arguer: [clarify] Yes, in that case you can use the translator.  
Opponent: [counter-C] But long calls could be very expensive. 
Scenario 4: Block  
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of a translation telephone, because it would improve 
communication between people of different cultures who speak different languages. 
Opponent:  [case-?] Let’s say you work with people from different countries, and you need to 
call them every day.  Would you use the telephone regularly? 
Arguer: [counter-C] In that case it would be good to learn their language. But the translator 
would be useful at the start. 
APPENDICES 
 
347 
 
Flying car (Technology category) 
Scenario 1: Corner sequence 
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of flying car, because it would be quick to go to a distant 
place. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] Why do you think it would be quicker to travel? 
Arguer: [clarify] Well, flying cars would fly at hundreds of miles per hour. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But we could use aeroplanes, because they are quick too. 
Scenario 2: Rebuttal  
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of flying car, because it would be quick to go to a distant 
place. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But we already have aeroplanes, and they are quick too 
Arguer: [counter-C] But we cannot use aeroplanes on a daily basis. 
Scenario 3: Case sequence 
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of flying car, because it would be quick to go to a distant 
place. 
Opponent: [case-?] What if you just need to go a place situated at a short distance from your 
home? 
Arguer: [clarify] You could use a flying car as well. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But a flying car would cost a lot to build and maintain. 
Scenario 4: Block  
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of flying car, because it would be quick to go to a distant 
place. 
Opponent:  [case-?] What if you just need to go a place situated a short distance from your 
home? 
Arguer: [counter-C] A flying car could be used for short and long distances, and you would 
get there quickly, especially if you’re in a hurry. 
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Clever hat (Lifestyle category) 
Scenario 1: Corner sequence 
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of clever hat, because people could do more stuff in the 
rain without carrying an umbrella. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] So you think that it would be useful in rainy days? 
Arguer: [clarify] Yes, people could ride a bicycle in the rain without carrying an umbrella 
in one hand. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But people would get wet anyway. 
Scenario 2: Rebuttal  
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of clever hat, because people could do more stuff in the 
rain without carrying an umbrella. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But people already have hats for different weathers. 
Arguer: [counter-C] But it is better to have just one that protects you in all weathers. 
Scenario 3: Case sequence 
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of clever hat, because people could do more stuff in the 
rain without carrying an umbrella. 
Opponent: [case-?] What if someone is very tiny and uses a heavy hat like this? 
Arguer: [clarify] Well, the hat would come in different sizes for different people. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But it would be too heavy for people’s heads and necks! 
Scenario 4: Block  
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of clever hat, because people could do more stuff in the 
rain without carrying an umbrella. 
Opponent:  [case-?] What if someone is very tiny and uses a heavy hat like this? 
Arguer: [counter-C] Well, the hat would come in different sizes, so all people could use it. 
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Locator for lost things (Lifestyle category) 
Scenario 1: Corner sequence 
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of a locator for lost things, because it can find misplaced 
or lost things quickly. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] So you’re saying that it would save people’s time? 
Arguer: [clarify] Yes, it would help people finding lost things more efficiently. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But people don’t know what they are going to lose in advance! 
Scenario 2: Rebuttal  
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of a locator for lost things, because it can find misplaced 
or lost things quickly. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But people don’t know what they are going to lose in advance. 
Arguer: [counter-C] But if you’re always losing the same item, you can use the locator to 
prevent losing it again. 
Scenario 3: Case sequence 
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of a locator for lost things, because it can find misplaced 
or lost things quickly. 
Opponent: [case-?] What if you’re one of those people who are always losing everything, like 
your keys, your glasses and your camera? 
Arguer: [clarify] You could use the locator on all those things. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But then people would need lots of locators for using on different 
things. 
Scenario 4: Block  
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of a locator for lost things, because it can find misplaced 
or lost things quickly. 
Opponent:  [case-?] What if you’re one of those people who are always losing everything, like 
your keys, your glasses, your camera…? 
Arguer: [counter-C] Then you need to pay more attention to the items you frequently can’t 
find, and use the locator to prevent it. 
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Healthy ice-cream (Health category) 
Scenario 1: Corner sequence 
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of healthy ice-creams, because these would make meals 
fun for children. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] So, you think children would like to eat ice-creams every day? 
Arguer: [clarify] Well, I’m saying that this could be a meal replacement option.  
Opponent: [counter-C] But it could be boring to eat ice-creams every day! 
Scenario 2: Rebuttal  
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of healthy ice-creams, because these would make meals 
fun for children. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But ice-creams might not be popular amongst some children and 
adults. 
Arguer: [counter-C] But it would be good for people who are picky eaters. 
Scenario 3: Case sequence 
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of healthy ice-creams, because these would make meals 
fun for children. 
Opponent: [case-?] What if healthy ice-creams don’t have all the essential nutrients and 
vitamins? 
Arguer: [clarify] Well, ice creams would be specially made to have all essential nutrients 
and vitamins. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But I think real fruit and vegetables are healthier. 
Scenario 4: Block  
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of healthy ice-creams, because these would make meals 
fun for children. 
Opponent:  [case-?] What if healthy ice-creams don’t have all the essential nutrients and 
vitamins? 
Arguer: [counter-C] Ice creams would have all essential nutrients and vitamins, because 
they would be made of real fruits and vegetables. 
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Spray for safe food (Health category) 
Scenario 1: Corner sequence 
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of a spray for safe food, because it could prevent 
diseases caused by chemicals. 
Opponent: [clarify-?] So you think it could be used to clean all fruits and vegetables? 
Arguer: [clarify] Yes, the spray would clean the chemicals that stay on the surface of fruits 
and vegetables.  
Opponent: [counter-C] But it would have no use in some fruits and vegetables that need to be 
peeled. 
Scenario 2: Rebuttal  
Arguer [argument] I am in favour of a spray for safe food, because it could prevent 
diseases caused by chemicals. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But people can use water to wash off chemicals from fruits and 
vegetables. 
Arguer: [counter-C] But the spray would be more efficient in eliminating chemicals than 
using water.   
Scenario 3: Case sequence 
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of a spray for safe food, because it could prevent 
diseases caused by chemicals. 
Opponent: [case-?] What if chemicals get inside fruits and vegetables? 
Arguer: [clarify] Well, I think the chemicals stay on the surface of fruits and vegetables. 
Opponent: [counter-C] But if they do enter fruit, the spray doesn’t solve this problem. 
Scenario 4: Block  
Arguer: [argument] I am in favour of a spray for safe food, because it could prevent 
diseases caused by chemicals. 
Opponent:  [case-?] What if chemicals get inside fruits and vegetables? 
Arguer: [counter-C] Maybe you cannot remove all chemicals, but the spray would 
definitely remove a substantial amount of surface chemicals, and prevent diseases. 
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Appendix 17. Outline script/ information for children featuring in the videos (Study Five) 
Instructions regarding the aim of the study: 
“Hello, I am interested in knowing what children at different ages think about scientific 
inventions created by other children. I will be testing children’s responses to videos of two 
children debating their inventions, and I need your help in preparing these videos. The videos 
will be shown to small groups of children in schools” 
Instructions regarding the content of the videos: 
“I would like you to imagine the following scenario: there is a Science Invention 
Contest in your school, and all of you will be participating with different projects.  Each one of 
you will be asked to introduce the invention you created for the competition, and to explain its 
purpose. You do not have to come up with your own ideas for the inventions, because they were 
arranged in advance. Please remember that the videos will be seen and evaluated by other 
children, so your task is to give a convincing performance, i.e., to persuade other children that 
your invention is interesting and the potential winner of the competition”. 
Instructions regarding the materials/script: 
“We will record the videos in pairs, i.e., I will ask two of you to participate in the first 
video, and then the other two will participate in the second video. As you can see [researcher 
holds the cards], there are two pairs of inventions (e.g., recycling robot/ rain converter, and 
clever hat/locator of lost things), related to two themes respectively (e.g., Environment and 
Lifestyle). Please have a look at the cards, and choose which invention you would like to 
represent” 
Instructions regarding video recording (script rehearsal): 
“You are going to present two inventions about the topic (e.g., Environment). Your task 
is to engage in an argumentative dialogue about the advantages and disadvantages of your 
inventions. One of you [researcher says child’s name] will be the arguer, and the other 
[researcher says child’s name] will be the opponent. Then you will switch roles for the second 
invention. I will show white cards with lines for the arguer (i.e., the child defending the 
invention), and I will show green cards with lines for the opponent (i.e., the child opposing the 
invention)” [Give time for children get familiar with the script and read the lines. Let children 
rehearse as long as necessary] 
Further instructions regarding video recording: 
“That’s great! You read your lines very well! Now, let’s try to simulate a real dialogue. 
I know this might be a bit difficult to do, but remember that the audience (other children) will 
not know that you are reading a text. So, to give the impression that you are talking naturally, 
try to look at each other whenever possible, instead of looking straight to the camera all the 
time. Also, try to give emphasis to your speech when you are reading sentences ending in a 
question mark or an exclamation mark”. 
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Appendix 18. Example of a covering letter for schools (Study Five) 
[University Headed Paper] 
Date here 
Dear (Name of Head Teacher), 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway University of London under the supervision of 
Dr. Patrick Leman. I am writing to ask if you would be interested in participating in my study of 
children’s evaluation of arguments.  
Dr Leman and I fully appreciate the pressures and demands upon students and staff at schools, 
and want to reassure you that the work we have planned will be designed to cause minimal 
disruption to your regular classroom routines. In fact, what we envisage involves asking 
students to think about science topics and evaluate different arguments related to those issues.  
Briefly, what we plan to do is showing a video about a scientific topic (e.g., protecting the 
environment) to groups of children. Children will then be asked to fill out a simple 
questionnaire regarding their opinions on the arguments discussed in the video. We hope to 
engage students aged 8-9 and 11-12 years, and do not expect that the task will take more than 10 
minutes to complete. Our aim is to explore what kind of strategic arguments persuade children, 
and also whether children can be persuaded by these arguments.  
If you are able to participate, I would be hoping to visit your school and assist in classroom 
activities for a day in early June. Dr Leman or I would be very happy to explain any of the 
details further to you or your staff at a convenient time. All of our work is subject to approval 
by our departmental ethics committee which conforms to the ethical standards of the British 
Psychological Society (BPS) and American Psychological Association (APA) including full 
parental consent. 
Please do feel free to contact me (01784 443703; A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk) or Dr Leman (01784 
414406; Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk) if you wish to discuss the project any further. We stress 
again that the project would be interesting for your students and we very much hope that your 
staff would feel happy to discuss and input to these issues with us as well: this is a new topic for 
research and our work would benefit from the input of professionals who have experience of 
children’s abilities on a daily basis and at first hand. We will contact you again by telephone 
but, in the meantime, if you are interested in being involved in this study, please let us know by 
using either of the contact numbers above. 
Yours with best wishes, 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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Appendix 19. Consent form for parents (Study Five) 
[University Headed Paper] 
STUDY OF CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS 
Dear Parent/ Guardian 
I am a PhD student studying at Royal Holloway, University of London, and I am currently 
carrying out a study of children’s understanding and evaluation of persuasive arguments. My 
work is supervised by Dr Patrick Leman, Reader in Psychology at Royal Holloway. This study 
forms part of a larger body of work in which we hope to be able to establish how argument 
skills change with age and develop in conversation. 
Your school has kindly agreed to allow us to approach you, as a parent, to ask if you would 
permit your child to participate in some of this research. Briefly, what we plan to do is showing 
a video about a scientific topic (e.g., protecting the environment) to groups of children. Children 
will then be asked to fill out a simple questionnaire regarding their opinions on the arguments 
discussed in the video. We hope to engage children aged 8-9 years (year 4) and 11-12 years 
(year 7), and do not expect that the task will take more than 10 minutes for each group to 
complete. Our aim is to explore what kind of strategic arguments persuade children, and also 
whether children can be persuaded by these arguments.  
Although we are engaged in pure academic research at this stage we very much hope that this 
work will, in due course, inform practice and have implications in educational settings, such as 
helping teachers to understand and enhance children’s argument skills. We will certainly keep 
parents, staff, and the children informed of the outcomes of this work. We have extensive 
experience of conducting this sort of research, and we know that children find this sort of 
activity stimulating – most children really want to take part and we have never encountered a 
situation where a child has not wanted to participate in a discussion such as this. However, 
alongside your consent as a parent, we also check that every child is happy to take part and 
make it clear that they can withdraw from the study at any point if they wish. 
We also take issues of data protection and participant anonymity very seriously: Information on 
each child will be held using an anonymous identifying number only, and nobody except Dr 
Leman and me will see the data. If you would like to discuss any aspect of the research with Dr 
Leman you can contact him by email on Patrick.Leman@rhul.ac.uk, or by phone on 01784 
414406. If you need to contact me, please call 01784 443703 or email me 
(A.P.Macedo@rhul.ac.uk).  
This study has been approved by the Psychology Department Ethical Committee (which reports 
to the Royal Holloway, University of London Ethics Committee). Our work conforms to the 
ethical guidelines laid out by the British Psychological Society (BPS), American Psychological 
Association (APA), and Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD).   
Please complete and return the consent form, attached, and retain a copy of this sheet for your 
information. Thank you for taking the time to read this information. 
[Names of the researcher and her supervisor] 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
STUDY OF CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF PERSUASIVE ARGUMENTS 
CONSENT FORM FOR RETURN TO CLASS TEACHER 
I have received an information sheet explaining the purpose of the study and have had the 
opportunity to ask further questions. 
I agree that my son or daughter may participate in the above research to be carried out by Ana 
Macedo. 
I am assured that my son’s or daughter’s right to privacy and confidentiality will be respected at 
all times.  
I understand that I may withdraw my son or daughter from the study at any point during the 
schedule of research. If my son or daughter indicates that he or she does not wish to participate, 
their wishes will be respected.  
The study will take place on ……….. (specify date) so please return this section to the class 
teacher by ………………….(specify date) 
ONLY IF YOU DO NOT WISH YOUR CHILD TO TAKE PART    
I DO NOT consent to my son/daughter taking part in the research being conducted by Ana 
Macedo. 
Signature of parent/ guardian ………………….…Name of parent/ guardian ……………… 
Name of child ……………………………………    Date ………………………………… 
  
Appendix 20. Initial a
 
 
Please provide the following information about yourself:
Date of birth __________________
Please tick: 
Male     
 
Thank you! Please read the instructions: 
You will watch a video of children discussing inventions they created for a Science Competition 
in their school. Before listening to children’s ideas, let’s look 
inventions.  
Inventions are divided by themes: Environment, Technology, Lifestyle, and Health. Please read 
the following information and rate how good you think these inventions are. 
 
 
ssessment of children’s opinions on the topics (Study Five)
Science Competition
What do you think about scientific inventions? 
 
 
Female  
 
at the description of their 
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Do you think these are good inventions for protecting the environment?  
(Please check or circle where appropriate) 
 
City recycling robot.  It is a small robot that will go around a city and pick up 
trash. It’s able to identify and separate garbage using special-made sensors to 
look for recyclable materials. Material that can be recycled would be put into 
appropriate sections inside the robot 
 
1. very weak 
2. weak 
3. average 
4. good 
5. very good 
Rain converter.  It is a mobile water unit that can transform rain into 
drinkable water and supply homes. The unit is displayed in the roof of a 
house where it captures the rain. 
1. very weak 
2. weak 
3. average 
4. good 
5. very good 
 
Do you think these are good inventions for improving technology? 
(Please check or circle where appropriate) 
 
Translation telephone. It is a small device, similar to a regular mobile phone, 
with the ability for universal translation. People could call anyone in the 
world and the telephone would do instant language translation. Translation 
would be available for all languages in the world. 
1. very weak 
2. weak 
3. average 
4. good 
5. very good 
Flying car.  This car is made of lightweight material and would be able to 
take off and fly above the road at hundreds of miles per hour. Flying cars 
would have an automatic pilot, so people would not have to drive. 
1. very weak 
2. weak 
3. average 
4. good 
5. very good 
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Do you think these are good inventions for improving people’s lifestyle? 
 (Please check or circle where appropriate) 
 
Clever hat. This hat protects you in all weathers – sun, wind, snow, lightning 
– you press a button and things come out. For example, an umbrella for rain. 
1. very weak 
2. weak 
3. average 
4. good 
5. very good 
Locator of lost things.  This is a very small device with a hook on it to put on 
your glasses, and on your house keys, that will emit a shrill sound or flash a 
light after you dial a number on your mobile phone. 
1. very weak 
2. weak 
3. average 
4. good 
5. very good 
 
Do you think these are good inventions for improving health? 
 (Please check or circle where appropriate) 
 
Healthy ice-cream. Healthy foods, such as broccoli, carrots, tomato soup, etc. 
would taste as good as a sweet ice-cream. Instead of eating a meal of chicken 
and potatoes, you can eat a tasty ice-cream with the same nutrients and 
vitamins. 
1. very weak 
2. weak 
3. average 
4. good 
5. very good 
Spray for safe food. This spray is made of water and other organic 
components and cleans all fruit and vegetables from all chemicals. It’s really 
easy to use: just spray your food and it is ready to eat! 
1. very weak 
2. weak 
3. average 
4. good 
5. very good 
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Appendix 21. Final assessment of children’s opinions on the arguments (Study Five) 
Inventions for the Environment category (Please check or circle where appropriate) 
 
In the debate, do you think the inventor of the 
recycling robot was good or weak at defending 
the invention?  
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the list 
would you pick as the most important thing to 
explain your previous answer? 
(1) the inventor had the best arguments 
(2) the opponent had the best arguments 
(3) both inventor and opponent had strong 
arguments 
(4) I do not know 
 
After listening to the debate about the recycling 
robot, how would you rate this invention? 
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
In the debate, do you think the inventor of the 
rain converter was good or weak at defending 
the invention?  
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the list 
would you pick as the most important thing to 
explain your previous answer? 
(1) the inventor had the best arguments 
(2) the opponent had the best arguments 
(3) both inventor and opponent had strong 
arguments 
(4) I do not know 
 
After listening to the debate about the rain 
converter, how would you rate this invention? 
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
Who do you think should be the winner for the 
category “Environment” in this competition? 
Inventor of the recycling robot 
Inventor of the rain converter      
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Inventions for the Technology category (Please check or circle where appropriate) 
 
In the debate, do you think the inventor of the 
translation telephone was good or weak at 
defending the invention?  
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the list 
would you pick as the most important thing to 
explain your previous answer? 
(1) the inventor had the best arguments 
(2) the opponent had the best arguments 
(3) both inventor and opponent had strong 
arguments 
(4) I do not know 
 
After listening to the debate about the 
translation telephone, how would you rate this 
invention? 
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
In the debate, do you think the inventor of the 
flying car was good or weak at defending the 
invention?  
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the list 
would you pick as the most important thing to 
explain your previous answer? 
(1) the inventor had the best arguments 
(2) the opponent had the best arguments 
(3) both inventor and opponent had strong 
arguments 
(4) I do not know 
 
After listening to the debate about the flying 
car, how would you rate this invention? 
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
Who do you think should be the winner for the 
category “Technology” in this competition? 
Inventor of the translation telephone       
Inventor of the flying car     
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Inventions for the Health category (Please check or circle where appropriate) 
 
In the debate, do you think the inventor of the 
healthy ice-cream was good or weak at 
defending the invention?  
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the list 
would you pick as the most important thing to 
explain your previous answer? 
(1) the inventor had the best arguments 
(2) the opponent had the best arguments 
(3) both inventor and opponent had strong 
arguments 
(4) I do not know 
 
After listening to the debate about the healthy 
ice-cream, how would you rate this invention? 
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
In the debate, do you think the inventor of the 
spray for safe food was good or weak at 
defending the invention?  
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the list 
would you pick as the most important thing to 
explain your previous answer? 
(1) the inventor had the best arguments 
(2) the opponent had the best arguments 
(3) both inventor and opponent had strong 
arguments 
(4) I do not know 
 
After listening to the debate about the spray for 
safe food, how would you rate this invention? 
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
Who do you think should be the winner for the 
category “Health” in this competition? 
Inventor of the healthy ice-cream       
Inventor of spray for safe food      
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Inventions for the Lifestyle category (Please check or circle where appropriate) 
 
In the debate, do you think the inventor of the 
clever hat was good or weak at defending the 
invention?  
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the list 
would you pick as the most important thing to 
explain your previous answer? 
(1) the inventor had the best arguments 
(2) the opponent had the best arguments 
(3) both inventor and opponent had strong 
arguments 
(4) I do not know 
 
After listening to the debate about the clever 
hat, how would you rate this invention? 
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
In the debate, do you think the inventor of the 
locator for lost things was good or weak at 
defending the invention?  
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
 
If you had to choose, which thing on the list 
would you pick as the most important thing to 
explain your previous answer? 
(1) the inventor had the best arguments 
(2) the opponent had the best arguments 
(3) both inventor and opponent had strong 
arguments 
(4) I do not know 
 
After listening to the debate about the locator 
for lost things, how would you rate this 
invention? 
(1) very weak 
(2) weak 
(3) average 
(4) good 
(5) very good 
Who do you think should be the winner for the 
category “Lifestyle” in this competition? 
Inventor of the clever hat       
Inventor of the locator for lost things      
 
 
